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The purpose of this thesis is to examine and compare Thai and UK income tax laws to 
establish how they cause conilict between equity of income redistribution and efficiency of 
taxation. This thesis also aims to validate theories that optimal tax structures and efficient tax 
legislation and administration can resolve the conflict. There are six chapters. 
Chapter One reviews concepts of equity and efficiency. Research in the components 
of income tax Jaw to establish optimal tax structures (which require a limited policy, simple 
and certain law, and prevention of tax avoidance) offers a novel way to resolve the conflict. 
Chapter Two concems a progressive rate structure. At present, there are few low 
marginal tax rates, resulting from revenue targets, politics, tax avoidance, and few top-rate 
taxpayers. They achieve only some redistribution, but promote efficiency. A system of two 
tax-rate schedules is proposed, i.e. one for low incomes and another for high incomes. Each 
contains optimal marginal rates to achieve greater redistribution and still promote efficiency. 
Chapter Three involves a tax base. Tax reliefs narrow the base, affecting equity and 
efficiency. An optimal base is therefore proposed, with a broad base, adjustment of personal 
allowances to cover costs of living and inflation, a phase-out of allowances, the abolition of 
standard deduction of expenses, and criteria for abolishing certain tax expenditures. 
Chapter Four considers the tax treatment of married couples. The Thai joint-taxation 
system needs to increase efficiency yet maintain equity. The UK individual-taxation system 
needs to reduce inequity while maintaining efficiency. To strike a balance between equity and 
efficiency, the integration of joint and individual taxation, changes in the structures of tax 
rates and reliefs, and prevention of tax avoidance are proposed. 
Chapter Five analyzes legislative process, primary and secondary legislation, judicial 
interpretation, judicial and statutoty anti-avoidan<;e rules, administrative practice and methods 
of tax collection. lmprovements in these are proposed to achieve and ensure efficiency in tax 
legislation and administration which requires simple and certain tax legislation and simple, 
certain and convenient methods of tax collection. Efficiency in tax legislation and 
administration would encourage efficiency of taxation and further promote equity. l l. h. .d 1 · · Chapter Six briD.gs together the main findings iii the previous chapters to esta-nfl~ll lS st eon Y 
optimal tax structures and efficient tax legislation and administration. 
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Chapter One (Introductory Part) 
Underlying Concepts of Equity and Efficiency, and Proposed Thesis 
1. Introduction 
This chapter explains reasons for undertaking this thesis and its objectives. It also 
gives a reason for. a comparison between the personal income tax systems of 
Thailand and the UK. As this thesis will examine the conflict between equity and 
efficiency caused by personal income tax ('PIT'), a general survey of the underlying 
concepts of equity and efficiency is also conducted. 
Additionally, this chapter explains the reason why this thesis is confined to 
PIT. It also clarifies what PIT covers or encompasses. As this thesis involves 
research in law to establish the optimal components of PIT, this will offer a 
novel/original way to reduce the conflict between equity and efficiency. This 
originality will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter. 
Finally, this chapter will discuss three significant factors which should be 
attached to the proposed optimal components of PIT, the possibility of adaptation of 
the proposed models elsewhere, and the efficacy of solutions under the proposed 
models. 
2. Definitions of key terms 
'Income tax' or ' personal income tax ' means a tax levied on the income of 
individuals and of other entities which are deemed to be individuals, such as trustees, 
personal representatives and partnerships (under UK law)1, non-juristic partnerships 
and a non-juristic body of persons (under Thai law). 
' Optimal taxation' means the design of tax systems to minimize excess 
burdens/deadweight loss while achieving a socially desirable redistribution of 
income, or to strike the correct balance between equity and efficiency.2 
1 Michael Tookey, Revenue Law, 4lh ed., (London: Old Bailey Press, 2003), I. 
2 C.V. Brown and P.M.Jackson, Public Sector Economics, 3'd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 
p.459; Simon James, A Dictionary of Taxation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
1998), 112; and James Alm, "What is an optimal tax system? ", National Tax Journal Vol. XLIX, 
No.1, 120. 
2 
'Optimal tax structures' mean the components of substantive tax law that 
are designed to strike a balance between equity and efficiency.3 
'Equity of income redistribution' ('equity') means a more equal 
distribution of income to reduce income inequality by requiring the rich to pay not 
only a higher amount but also a higher proportion of their income in tax than the 
poor.4 
'Economic efficiency of taxation' ('efficiency') means a small cost of 
collection and administration as a proportion of revenue raised, a low cost of 
taxpayers' compliance, and minimum distortion in taxpayers ' economic behavior or 
in resource allocation (or minimum distortionary/disincentive effects).5 
'Tax avoidance' means any lawful action that reduces tax liability "without 
incurring the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by any 
taxpayer qualifying for such reduction in that liability."6 (More discussion (such as 
the distinction between (acceptable) tax planning and (unacceptable) tax avoidance, 
and the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion will be given in Chapter 
Five). 
'Tax evasion' means an illegal way of not paying tax rightfully due to the 
government. 7 (More discussion (such as the offence of fraudulent evasion of income 
tax) will be given in Chapter Five). 
3. Rationale for undertaking the thesis 
In 1997, Thailand had an economic crisis. At that time, the Thai govemment used 
many fiscal policies and measures to stimulate the economy of the country. The Thai 
government used PIT measures for this purpose, for example, the use of a zero-rate 
bracket for the first 50,000 baht of taxable/net income, and the extensive use of tax 
expenditures (e.g. an increase in the amount of itemized deduction). 
3 In this thesis, the components of PIT law are taken into account and designed. 
4 More discussion will be made in subsection 6.3. 
5 Simon James and Christopher Nobes, The Economics of Taxation, 71hed., (Essex: Pearson 
Education, 2000), pp.l6-17; Lucy ChelUlells, "The Windfall Tax", Fiscal Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 
(1997), 287; Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 41h 
ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1984), 290; and Richard G. Lipsey and Colin Harbury, First 
Principles of Economics, 2"d ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 229-230. 
6 John Tiley, Revenue Law, 5111 ed., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), 94 and 97. 
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The above tax measures stimulated the economy of the country since people 
had higher disposable income after tax. However, these measures adversely affected 
equity and efficiency. In terms of inequity, the poorest did not benefit from tax 
expenditures; and the rich received more tax benefit from a zero-rate bracket and the 
increase in the amount of itemized deductions as compared to the poor. In terms of 
inefficiency, tax expenditures provided tax loopholes and distorted resource 
allocation; and a zero-rate bracket and tax expenditures reduced tax revenues. 
Therefore, I wish to research into the way in which PIT law can be used 
efficiently to have positive effects on both equity and efficiency, i. e. a more equal 
distribution of income while raising revenue for the government with low 
administrative and compliance costs, and minimum distortion in resource allocation. 
4. Objectives of the thesis 
In addition to being used as an economic stimulator, PIT can be used to redistribute 
income and to raise revenue for a govemment. PIT would achieve the redistributive 
objective, if it worked under requirements for equity. Meanwhile, if PIT worked 
under requirements for efficiency, it would achieve the revenue target. 
However, the functions of PIT under equity and efficiency conflict with each 
other. If PIT were made more equitable, it could reduce efficiency. Conversely, if 
PIT were made more economically efficient, that could undermine equity. 
It is argued that it is very difficult to find a tax system that can achieve all the 
opposing objectives at the same time.8 As Wald notes, 
"Yet success in the art of making tax policy is never achieved by pursuing 
only a single goal, such as taxpayer equity, while neglecting others; a 
determined effort is required to seek out taxes that sa6sfy, to the maximum 
extent possible, all the pertinent- and sometimes conflicting - objectives of 
taxation, with the aim of having the best possible system of taxation in the 
given situation.''9 
7 Tax Law Review Committee ('TLRC'), Tax Avoidance (London: The Institute for Fiscal Studies 
('IFS'), 1997), I. 
8 Haskell P. Wald, Taxation of Agricultural Land in Underdeveloped Economies (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1959), 85 . 
9 ibid.p.85 
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Despite the difficulty i11 finding a tax system that can satisfy all conflicting 
objectives, this thesis attempts to suggest desirable solutions. The objective of this 
thesis is to examine and compare the components of current PIT law in Thailand and 
the UK to establish to what extent they cause the conflict between equity and 
efficiency. This thesis also seeks out a solution to the conflict, and it aims to validate 
hypotheses that : (a) the optimal components of substantive PIT law (or optimal tax 
structures) and (b) efficiency in tax legislation and administration could reduce the 
conflict and bring about positive effects on both equity and efficiency 
simultaneously. 
5. Rationale for comparison between the PIT systems of the UK and Thailand 
The rationale for the comparison is to seek differences in the main components of 
PIT and in tax legislation and administration between the PIT system of a developed 
cotmtry (the UK) and that of a developing country (Thailand). These differences will 
show which system has: 
(a) better components to achieve equity and efficiency, and 
(b) more efficient tax legislation and administration. 
The merits of one system are likely to be 1,11odels for the reform of tax 
components and for the improvement of tax legislation and administration of another 
system, in order to bring about positive effects on equity and efficiency. Meanwhile, 
the demerits of one system should not be imitated by another to avoid negative 
effects on equity and efficiency. If any component of one system is found to have 
both merits and demerits (after comparing with another system), its demerits should 
be improved to establish an optimal component to strike a balance between equity 
and efficiency. 
It is supposed that there must be differences between the PIT systems of both 
countries. This supposition is based on the facts that (a) the UK is a developed 
cotmtry, whereas Thailand is a developing country, and (b) the PIT system ofthe UK 
has been developed for a longer period than that of Thailand. 
As regards (a), the UK is more likely to have complex PIT law than 
Thailand. A developed country has complex society, sophisticated business 
environment, and rapid and continuous commercial development. Consequently, it is 
5 
inevitable that the UK will frequently introduce complex PIT law to keep up with 
and respond to these societal and economic activities. Thuronyi supports the view 
that "the U.S has the most complex [tax] legislation .... . ... , followed by countries 
like Australja, Canada, and the UK." 10 Meanwhile, Thailand has less complex social 
and economic activities; consequently, it has simpler PIT law. Thuronyi supports the 
view that "many developing and transition countries have fairly simple tax Jaws." 11 
As regards (b), William Pitt introduced income tax in the UK as a temporary 
measure to help finance the Napoleonic war. 12 Henry Addington reintroduced 
income tax in 1803. 13 Sir Robert Peel last introduced income tax in 1842 as a three-
year temporary measure, but income tax has been with the UK ever since. 14 
Meanwhile, PIT was introduced in Thailand in 1938. 
The ilifference in the development of the UK.'s income tax and Thailand's 
PIT has caused differences in the main components of both systems. For example, 
the UK tax bands and personal allowances have been adjusted for inflation every 
year; meanwhile, there are no such adjustments under Thai law. UK law has 
principally applied a deduction of actual expenses from assessable income to 
determine taxable income; meanwhile, Thai law has appJjed a standard deduction in 
addition to a deduction of actual expenses. The UK has adopted the system of 
individual/independent taxation. Meanwhile, Thailand has adopted the joint-taxation 
system. These ilifferences are believed to have different impacts on equity and 
efficiency. 
Additionally, the difference in the development of the PIT systems of both 
countries has caused differences in the legislative process, judicial interpretation, 
anti-avoidance measures and the method of tax collection. For example, the Thai 
Parliament can enact any tax law subject to a constitution, whereas the enactment of 
UK tax laws is not subject to a constitution. As Morse and Williams note, 
10 Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 17. 
II ibid.p.19 




"We don't have a constitution. In tax matters that is most important. 
Constitutions almost always contain mles limiting aspects of the right to 
impose taxes. We have no such mles." 15 
Besides, the UK has adopted the system of consolidation; meanwhile, 
Thailand has adopted the system of codification. The UK Parliament is required to 
pass an annual Finance Act in relation to taxation; meanwhile, the Thai Parliament is 
not required to pass such Act. The UK courts are increasingly adopting a purposive 
approach to interpreting tax laws; meanwhile, the Thai courts have still stuck to a 
strict interpretation. The UK government has recently introduced rules governing 
disclosure of tax-avoidance schemes; meanwhile, there are no such rules in Thailand. 
In the UK, most people whose income tax is withheld at source through the P AYE 
system are not required to file end-of-year tax returns. Meanwhile, Thai law still 
requires most individuals to file end-of-year tax returns despite withholding at 
source. 
The above examples of dissimilarity are believed to have different impacts on 
efficiency in tax legislation and administration in both countries, affecting efficiency 
and equity. 
6. Underlying concept of equity 
6.1 Income inequality, concept and methods of income redistribution 
The initial distribution of income takes place when people get involved in economic 
activities under the market system. In the market system, individuals initially derive 
income from two main sources, i.e. income from work and income from property. 
Income from these sources is known as 'original income' or 'market income.' 
Barna remarked in 1937 that "in most modern communities incomes are 
distributed in a very unequal manner; there are rich and there are poor, but while the 
number ofthe rich is few, the poor are many."16 Even if this remark was made more 
than sixty years ago, it has been found that there are still rich and poor and a wide 
15 Geoffrey Morse and David Williams, Davies: Principles of Tax Law, 5th ed. (London: 
Sweet&Maxwell, 2004), 37. 
16 Tibor Barna, Redistribution of Incomes through Public Finance in 1937 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1945), 5. 
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income gap between them in the UK and Thailand. 17 In other words, the distribution 
of income under the market system in the UK and Thailand is unequal, leading to 
income inequality and a wide income gap. 
Due to income inequality, income redistribution may be considered to be 
required to generate a more equal distribution of income. Cowell supports the view 
that " ... a very successful redistribution policy will have diminished rather than 
completely eliminated real income differences." 18 This is because the elimination of 
differences in market income implies "destroying the advantages of efficiency and 
freedom which the market offers."19 
Smolensky points out that "no government now simply accepts the 
distribution of income as generated by markets [;] on the contrary, all governments 
now actively seek to affect income distribution."20 Governments can improve the 
existing distribution of income to achieve income redistribution by reallocating 
resource in the economy. 
A government may have a mandate to redistribute resources from the better-
off to the worse-off. Narrowly speaking, money is compulsorily taken by the 
government from the rich and given to the poor. This is regarded as the basic concept 
of income redistribution or "vertical redistribution"21 , which is widely recognized as 
the proper way to redistribute income.22 
Methods of income redistribution include taxation and public expenditure, 
subsidies and price controls, legislation and regulation. Among these methods, the 
17 The selected statistics and the causes of income inequality in Appendix I to Chapter One will 
prove this point. 
18 F.A. Cowell, "Redistribution of Income and Wealth", The New Palgrave A Dictionary of 
Economics, John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman, eds. (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), 
111. 
19 Cedric Sandford, Social Economics (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977), 123. 
20 Eugene Smolensky, Encycopedia of Economics, Douglas Greenwald, ed. (London: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1982), 487. 
21 There is another advanced concept of income redistribution, which will be found in Appendix II to 
Chapter One. 
22 Barna, op.cit.(note16), pp.5-6; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector (New York: W.W 
Norton & Company, 1986), 31; D.A. Collard, "Limits to Redistribution: An Overview", Income 
Redistribution: the Limits to Redistribution (Bristol: Jolm Wright & Sons., 1980), 1; Martin Schnitzer, 
Income Distribution: A Comparative Study of the United States, Sweden, West Germany, East 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1974), 192-193; The 
Commission on Taxation and Citizenship, Paying for Progress: A New Politics of Tax for Public 
Spending (London: Fabian Society, 2000), 231; and Adrian L. Webb and Jack E.B. Sieve, Income 
Redistribution and The Welfare State (London: G.Bell & Sons, 1971), 8. 
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combined system of taxation and public expenditure is accepted as a "better" or more 
"acceptable distribution."23 Tax and expenditure measures are known as 'the public-
finance system.' Under this system, a government provides the poor with more state 
benefits through public expenditure financed by taxes on the rich? 4 Redistribution 
through the public-finance system is therefore consistent with the basic concept of 
redistribution. 
6.2 Use of taxation to achieve redistribution.25 
Brown and Jackson remark that "because [the government] has the resources of 
compulsory taxation it is better placed to redistribute incomes on a large scale."26 
Their view is correct because: 
(a) the government can use tax revenue to fund public expenditure in favour 
of the poor; and 
(b) a tax system with a progressive structure can reduce income inequality. 
Financing for public expenditure 
Taxation is accepted as the most efficient way to raise revenue to finance 
public spending.27 However, the degree to which revenue can be raised through 
taxation is determined by (a) efficiency of taxation, and (b) the level of desired 
government expenditure. 
Factor (a) will be examined in section 7. Relating to factor (b), it is asserted, 
"the level of taxation and public expenditure need to be determined together."28 
Given this, the government must receive sufficient tax revenue to pay for state 
benefits to achieve the redistributive purpose. 
Progressive taxation for redistribution29 
The basic concept of progressive taxation ("the concept of progressivity") is 
that a higher proportion of income is taken in tax when a taxpayer's income 
23 Chalongphob Sussangkam et al., The Tax Structure in Thailand and Its Distribution Implications 
(Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, 1988), 42. 
24 Schnitzer, op.cit.(note22), p.lO 
25 Discussion on legitimacy of government in taxation will be found in Appendix ill to Chapter 
One. 
26 Brown and Jackson, op.cit.(note2), p.38 
27 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.8 
28 The Commission on Taxation and Citizenship, op.cit.(note22), p.368 
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increases. This concept is widely recognized by many scholars.30 The effect of 
progressive taxation is that it can ''smooth out the dispersion of incomes after tax and 
works towards a more equal distribution."31 
Direct taxes (except for local taxesi2 are found to be progressive. PIT is 
usually a progressive tax because it has a progressive struchtre of its own. As one 
notes, "because of the progressive nature of the income tax system, the amount of tax 
payable increases both in cash terms and as a proportion of income as income 
increases. "33 
6.3 Equity of income redistribution 
The progressive structure of PIT has stemmed from its equity. As James and Nobes 
note, "[the] decision about the redistribution of income via progressive 
taxation . .... [is] based on widely held feeling that this is equitable."34 Here, I will 
examine (a) what is equity and how it is approached; and (b) what are the 
requirements for the equity of income redistribution. 
What is equity? 
Equity is a subjective concept with no absolute definition, and it cannot be 
derived from an economist's judgement.35 Additionally, "there is much disagreement 
about what equity means and how the equity of a tax system can be judged."36 
Despite being a subjective concept and there being disagreement about the 
meaning, equity in this context can be defined as the fair share/distribution of the tax 
burden among individuals.37 Nevertheless, the Musgraves point out that "there is no 
such agreement about how the term 'fair share' should be defined."38 As shown 
29 Discussion on progressive taxation versus public expenditure will be found in Appendix IV to 
Chapter One. 
3° For example, Hugh Dalton, Principles of Public Finance, 4th ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1966), 93; Sandford, op.cit.(notel9), p.l46; and Schnitzer, op.cit.(note22), p.7 
31 Paul Marshall, "Welfare: Inequality and Poverty", Understanding The UK Economy, 3'ded., Peter 
Curwen, ed. (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1994), 360. 
32 Tim Harris, ' 'The effects of taxes and benefits on household income, 1998-99", Economic Trends/ 
No.557/April 2000 (London: The Stationery Office, 2000), 45. 
33 The Office for National Statistics ('ONS'), Social Trends/No 31/2001Edition, Jil Matheson and 
Carol Sununerfield, eds., (London: The Stationery Office, 2001), 102. 
34 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.78 
35 David N.Hyman, Public Finance, 41h ed. (Fort Worth: The Dryden Press, 1993), 359. 
36 N.GTegory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Fort Wort: The Dryden Press, 1998), 10. 
37 ibid.p.257 
38 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note 5) p.227 
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below, equity or the fair share/distribution of the tax burden should require people to 
make different contributions to the cost of government according to their 
circumstances. 
Public expenditure is mostly funded by compulsory taxation. However, 
people are in different positions, have different capabilities and opportunities, and 
take different public benefits. On this basis, people should make different 
contributions to the cost of govenunent, so that "those who have benefited more 
from the distribution of income and wealth in the market have a duty to contribute 
more in return. "39 
The requirement for different contributions has two implications. Firstly, 
people in different circumstances should bear different tax burdens ("vertical 
equity").40 Secondly, people in equal circumstances should bear equal tax burdens. 
("horizontal equity").41 Given this, equity affects the tax treatment of people in 
similar and dissimilar circumstances. 42 
Approaches to equity 
Equity under the definition 'similar and dissimilar tax treatment' can be 
approached by either the benefit principle or the ability-to-pay principle. According 
to the benefit principle, equity is ~pproached if individuals or groups pay taxes in 
accordance with state benefits received. Meanwhile, under the ability-to-pay 
principle, equity is approached if each individual pays tax according to his/her ability 
to pay.43 
The question arises as to which principle is the better approach to equity. The 
advantages and disadvantages of both principles will be considered to answer this 
question. 
The benefit principle can apply to similar and dissimilar tax treatment. People 
who receive the same state benefits will pay the same taxes. Individuals who receive 
more state benefits will be taxed more than those who receive less. Despite this 
39 The Conunission on Taxation and Citizenship, op.cit.(note22), p.94 




43 H.A.Silverman, Taxation its Incidence and Effects (London: Macmillan, 1931), 69. 
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advantage, the benefit principle is unlikely to be the better approach to equity. Its 
disadvantages are: -
(a) the nature of tax and the nature of public goods and services, 
(b) difficulties in calculation of the cost of goods and services provided and 
benefits received, and 
(c) the impact on income redistribution. 
As regards (a), the benefit principle treats tax as a direct payment in retum 
for goods and services received.44 This is not true in practice. Firstly, "a tax is not a 
price,'.45 but it is "a compulsory exaction'.46 or "a payment in return for which no 
direct and specific quid pro quo is rendered to the payer."47 Secondly, some goods 
and services which are communal cannot be charged in a similar manner as those 
supplied in market places.48 
As regards (b), it is possible to calculate the cost of some goods and 
services, but others with a common nature are impossible to trace. Additionally, 
beneficiaries of public goods and services are unidentified. Many scholars support 
this argument. 49 
As regards (c), the Musgraves remark that the benefit principle "has the 
disadvantage of excluding redistributional considerations."50 This remark may be 
correct. Firstly, the rich and the poor might pay equal taxes if they received the same 
state benefits. Secondly, the poor might receive more from certain benefits in kind, 
and therefore they could pay more taxes than the rich for such benefits. 
Regarding the advantage of the ability-to-pay principle, this principle can 
apply to similar or dissimilar tax treatment, i.e. people with equal ability to pay will 




47 Dalton, op.cit.(note30), p.6l 
48 Prest, op.cit.(note40), p.ll8 
49 For example, Silverman, op.cit.(note43), p.66; and Otto Eckstein, Public Finance, 2"d ed. (New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 60. 
50 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.245 
51 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note15), p.6 
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tax.52 Accordingly, people with greater taxable capacity will pay more tax than those 
with less. 
The ability-to-pay principle is likely to be the better approach to equity. 
However, there are questions in connection with the ability-to-pay principle, i.e. how 
to measure and how to know whether people have the same or different taxable 
capacity. As Whittington notes, "this principle has the problem of defining precisely 
who are equals; for example, two taxpayers with equal incomes may have different 
family responsibilities."53 
As regards the measurement of taxable capacity, income has widely been 
accepted as the basis for the measure of taxable capacity.54 On this basis, higher-
income earners have greater taxable capacity, while lower-income earners have less. 
Nevertheless, "individuals with the same gross income will not necessarily 
pay the same total level of tax."55 Similarly, "equal income may not imply equal 
ability to pay if taxpayers are in otherwise different positions."56 This point relates to 
the question of how we exactly know that people have the same or different taxable 
capacity. 
Besides income, factors that can determine taxable capacity include: -
(a) personal character (e.g. age and disability), 
(b) personal circumstances (e.g. marital status and family responsibility/ 
expenditure), and 
(c) the expenses in obtaining an income. 
Requirements for the equity of income redistribution 
Despite certain difficulties with the ability-to-pay principle (which could be 
resolved), equity under the ability-to-pay principle is consistent with the basic 
concept of redistribution. However, the equity of income redistribution requires a 
progressive structure additional to the ability-to-pay principle. 
The objective of redistribution is to reduce income inequality by reallocating 
resources from the rich to the poor. To properly satisfy this objective, those with 
52 Eckstein, op.cit.(note49), p.60 
53 Geoffrey Whittington, "The Direct Tax System", Taxation and Social Policy, Cedric Sandford, 
Chris Pond and Robert Walker, eds. (London: Heinematm Educational Books, 1980), 156. 
54 Nicholas Kaldor, An Expenditme Tax, 41h ed. (London: Unwin University Books, 1965), 23. 
55 The Commission on Taxation and Citizenship, op.cit.(note22), p.69 
56 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.344 
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greater taxable capacity are required to pay not only a higher amount but also a 
higher proportion of their income in tax than those with less taxable capacity. 
To force those with greater taxable capacity to pay a higher proportion of 
their income in tax than those with less taxable capacity, a progressive struchLre is 
therefore required in addition to the ability-to-pay principle. The following example 
is likely to support this argument. 
"As between two men, one with £5,000 a year and one with £500 a year, the 
tax burden could not be said to be equitably distributed between the two 
unless the first man were called upon to pay a proportionately higher sum 
than the second. "57 
From the above, to achieve the equity of income redistribution, the main 
components of PIT are required: 
(a) to take a higher amount and a higher proportion of income in tax from 
people with greater taxable capacity, 
(b) to take a lower amount and a lower proportion of income in tax from 
people with less taxable capacity, and 
(c) not to take a different amount and a different proportion of income in tax 
from people with the same taxable capacity. 
7. Underlying concept of efficiency 
7.1 Characteristics of economic efficiency of taxation 
There are two parties involved in the taxing process, i.e. tax-gatherers and taxpayers. 
In this process, there must be costs incurred by both sides, i.e. administrative costs 
and compliance costs. 
As regards administrative costs, such costs must be low in relation to the 
revenue that they generate to raise appropriate revenue. Meanwhile, compliance 
costs should also be as low as possible. Compliance costs are other burdens to 
taxpayers additional to the amount of tax they pay. Greater burdens to taxpayers due 
to high compliance costs probably lead to (a) considerable reduction in taxpayers' 
disposable income and (b) unwillingness to pay tax. 
14 
Regarding (a), disposable income is supposed to be saved and invested. The 
less disposable income taxpayers have, the less they can save and invest. Taxpayers' 
abilities to increase income from saving and investment are therefore prevented by 
having a lower disposable income. Consequently, revenue from taxation on yields 
from saving and investment declines. 
Concerning (b), revenue from taxation would decline if taxpayers were 
unwilling to pay tax. Increased burdens to taxpayers due to high compliance costs 
mean greater loss to them. This loss possibly may generate "an anti-tax mentality and 
an antipathy to the tax system which in tum generates avoidance and more 
particularly, evasion."58 
Besides low costs, taxation must cause minimum distortionary/disincentive 
effects on economic activities. The disincentive effect obstructs the creation of 
income by taxpayers. Consequently, the government probably receives less revenue 
from income taxation through decline in the tax base. The disincentive effect should 
therefore be minimized. In the economics literature, the disincentive effect is the 
excess burden or deadweight loss59which should be eliminated.60 
Altogether, low administrative and compliance costs and mtmmum 
deadweight loss will result in greater tax revenue. So, low costs and minimum loss in 
the taxing process are the characteristics of economic efficiency of taxation. 
7.2 Low administrative costs 
There would be lower administrative costs if some factors of high administrative 
costs were removed. Complex legislation and tax avoidance and evasion are primary 
factors influencing an increase in administrative costs. This is because complex 
legislation is onerous for tax-gatherers to administer. 
It appears that tax avoidance and evasion result in a large loss in tax revenue. 
For example, about 47% of tax revenue in Thailand in 1986 was lost through 
57 Kaldor, op.cit.(note54), p.26 
58 Cedric Sandford, "Tax Compliance Costs, Evasion and Avoidance", Income Redistribution: the 
Limits to Redistribution, David Collard, Richard Lecomber and Martin Slater, eds. (Bristol: John 
Wright & Sons, 1980), 155. 
59 Mankiw, op.cit.(note36), p.244 
60 J.A. Kay and M.A.King, The British Tax System, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
18. 
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corruption and tax evasion.61 Also, there is evidence that a credible figure of tax 
evasion was between 2 and 5 % of GDP between the period 1981-1993 in the UK. 62 
A reduction in tax avoidance and evasion is therefore necessary. In achieving this, an 
increase in administrative costs is unavoidable to fund extra personnel and materials 
to prevent and detect tax avoidance and evasion. 
The tax system should therefore lessen the pnmary causes of high 
administrative costs. First, tax legislation should be made simple and uncomplicated. 
It will then be easy for tax-gatherers to understand and administer. As tax loopholes 
may still be found in complex legislation, simplicity is likely to close such loopholes 
as well. Consequently, extra government resources may not be needed to deal with 
simpler legislation or to pass special provisions to close tax loopholes. 
Secondly, a reduction in incentives for taxpayers to avoid and evade tax is 
believed to help minimize tax avoidance and evasion. Additionally, the system of ta.'< 
administration must be regularly modernized to prevent new methods of tax 
avoidance and evasion. When tax avoidance and evasion decline, the government 
may not need extra resources to prevent and detect avoidance and evasion. 
7.3 Low compliance costs 
There would be lower compliance costs if some factors of high compliance costs 
were eliminated. As with administrative costs, the primary factors of high 
compliance costs are (a) complex legislation and (b) tax avoidance and evasion. 
Complex legislation increases compliance costs because it is hard for 
taxpayers to understand and comply with. They may then have to spend extra time 
and money in dealing with complex legislation by themselves, taking more advice 
from professionals etc. 
High compliance costs resulting from complex rules reduce taxpayers' 
disposable income and may further result in their unwillingness to pay tax. Another 
possible cause of taxpayers' unwillingness to pay tax is the supposition of some 
taxpayers that others can take advantage of complex legislation to search for 
61 Anwar Shah and John Whalley, An Alternative View of Tax Incidence Analysis for Developing 
Countries (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1990), 51. 
62 Andrew Dilnot and Gary Stears, "The United Kingdom", The Tax System in Industrialized 
Countries, Ken Messere, ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 369. 
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loopholes to minimize their tax burdens.63 Those who are unwilling to pay tax may 
either search for tax loopholes (as they suppose others do) or find illegal ways to 
escape tax. 
Tax avoidance and evasion may result from other causes related to reducing 
tax liability. Tax avoidance and evasion increase compliance costs to non-avoiders 
and non-evaders. This is because they may spend extra time and money in complying 
with complex anti-avoidance rules. Additionally, tax avoidance and evasion generate 
costs to tax-avoiders and evaders ("non-compliance costs"). It has been discovered 
that considerable resources are used by taxpayers in avoidance and evasion schemes 
in some countries.64 
Increased compliance and non-compliance costs as a result of tax avoidance 
and evasion are not useful to the taxing process, as they lead to a considerable loss of 
tax revenue. 
The tax system should therefore lessen the primary causes ofhigh compliance 
costs (and non-compliance costs). In doing so, measures recommended for reducing 
high administrative costs can be applied, i.e. (a) employing simple tax legislation, 
and (b) reducing tax avoidance and evasion. 
As regards (a), it will be easy for taxpayers to understand and comply with 
simple legislation. Furthem1ore, simplicity would reduce loopholes for tax 
avoidance. Consequently, taxpayers need not spend extra time and money in dealing 
with simpler legislation and fewer anti-avoidance rules. 
As regards (b), a reduction in incentives to avoid and evade tax as well as 
modernization of the administrative system to prevent new avoidance and evasion 
schemes could mininUze tax avoidance and evasion. This will help remove non-
compliance costs from the taxing process. Additionally, when tax avoidance and 
evasion decline, there will be fewer anti-avoidance rules for taxpayers to comply 
with. 
63 Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves (London: The MIT Press, 1996), 134. 
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7.4 Minimum deadweight loss 
It has been found that '(all economic activities have costs and benefits associated with 
them"65, and "people's economic behavior/decisions may change when the costs or 
benefits change; [that] is, people respond to incentives [in relation to costs and 
benefits] ."66 
Once a tax is imposed on any economic activity, the benefit received from 
such activity decreases. Consequently, the tax possibly reduces the incentive to 
engage in a taxed activity, or it may provide the disincentive to do a taxed activity. 
Similarly, the tax may encourage a person to engage in untaxed or lightly taxed 
activities instead. It seems that people engage in economic activities "according to 
the tax incentive rather than the true costs and benefits."67 
The distortion of the tax in incentives is not limited to work effort. The 
distortion extends to other economic activities, e.g. saving and investment. Many 
scholars support this point.68 Therefore, the distortionary/disincentive effect possibly 
prevents earning opportunities in various forms, such as doing extra work, saving 
more or investing. This results in revenue loss from taxation on income from extra 
work, higher levels of saving or investment. This is regarded as deadweight loss. 
To minimize the distortionary/disincentive effect, the tax should be neutral to, 
or interfere as little as possible with, taxpayers' economic decisions. The neutrality 
approach has been applied in tax reforms since the mid 1980s.69 Many writers agree 
that the neutrality approach means avoidance of distortions in incentives or in 
economic decisions. 70 Nevertheless, real neutrality hardly happens in the real world 
for two reasons: 
(a) "people do take tax considerations into account in their personal and 
business decisions"71 ; and 
64 Wayne Thirsk, Lessons of Tax Reform: An Overview (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1991), 
21. 
65 Kath Nightingale, Taxation Theory and Practice, 3'd ed. (Essex: Pearson Education, 2000), 8. 
66 Mankiw, op.cit.(note36), p.7 
67 ibid.p.244 
68 For example, Mankiw, op.cit.(note36), p.l63 ; and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public 
Sector, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 391. 
69 Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.50 
7° For example, OECD, Personal Income Tax Systems: Under Changing Economic Conditions (Paris: 
OECD, 1986), 42; and Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.8 
71 Eckstein, op.cit.(note49), p.77 
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(b) as a result of progressive taxation, the larger a taxpayer's income, the 
greater the extent of the distortion of a progressive tax in incentives. 
Therefore, it is hard completely to avoid the distortion of the tax m 
incentives. As Gelardi asserts, the principle of neutrality " is often violated, resulting 
in tax laws that distort taxpayers' behavior."72 Minimal distortion of the tax in 
taxpayers' economic behavior/decisions should therefore replace real neutrality, 
which would reduce the distortionary/disincentive effect and deadweight loss. 
8. Restriction to PIT 
As noted earlier, this research aims to seek optimal taxation to promote equity by 
reducing income inequality between people in the same society (in addition to 
promoting efficiency). Therefore, it has to fmd out a tax system which can make the 
distribution of income more equal between individuals. Likewise, this research has to 
search for a tax system which can cause the transfer of income from the better off to 
the worse off to reduce income inequality to a desired extent. It is argued that "[PIT] 
will reduce economic inequality or check the growth of inequality."73 Based on this 
argument, this research is confined to PIT. 
The question arises why PIT is a better means to reduce income inequality 
than other direct taxes, particularly corporation tax ('CT') and capital gains tax 
('CGT'). As compared between PIT and CT, the former is better than the latter 
for the following reasons. 
First, PIT is a tax on the income of individuals; meanwhile, CT is a tax on 
the profits (i.e. income and chargeable gains) of companies.14 Therefore, PIT is more 
relevant to the distribution of income between individuals. Additionally, tax 
incidence falls directly on individuals who are required to pay PIT; consequently, it 
is difficult for taxpayers to shift the tax burden to someone else. 
Secondly, a progressive tax is a more powerful device for reducing income 
inequality than a proportional tax. As noted earlier, PIT which has a progressive 
structure requires a higher proportion of income to be paid in tax as income rises. 
72 Alexander M.G. Gelardi, "The Influence of Tax Law Changes on the Timing of Marriages: A 
Two-Country Analysis", National Tax Journal, Vol. XLIX (1996), 17. 
73 Richard Goode, The Individual Income Tax (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), 
260. 
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Consequently, PIT can make richer people pay not only a higher amount but also a 
larger proportion of their income in tax than poorer people. 
Meanwhile, a proportional tax (e.g. CT under Thai law) requires a constant 
proportion of income to be taken in tax as income increases.75 In other words, 
although richer people pay more in tax than poorer people, richer people and poorer 
people pay the same proportion of income in tax. Consequently, a proportional tax 
cannot achieve a more equal distribution of income in the same way as a progressive 
tax does.76 
Thirdly, income tax is the largest source of revenue for the UK government77 
(for example, "receipts of income tax in 2003-04 amounted to 73% of the total sum 
raised by direct taxes, [CT] 18% and CGT 1.4%.")78 Therefore, income tax is the 
most important source of the government's revenue to fund public expenditure in 
favor of the poor. Similarly, it is the greatest help for the government to transfer 
incomes from the rich and provide state benefits for the poor to reduce income 
inequality in the UK. 
As compared between PIT and CGT, the former is a better tool for 
reducing income inequality than the latter for the following reasons. 
First, CGT relates to the distribution of wealth rather than the distribution of 
income. This is because CGT is a tax on gains accruing on disposals of assets by an 
74 CCH Tax Handbook, op.cit.(note 12), p.513 and p.2007 
75 Under Thai law, CT is charged at the constant rate of 30% regardless of the variation of the profits 
of the company. 
However, the UK law is different from the Thai law. Under UK law, "the standard rate of [CT] in 
2005-06 is 30% with a reduced rate of 19% on profits under 300,000 pounds [;] [for] firms with 
profits between 300,000 pounds and 1,500,000 pounds, a system of relief operates, such that an 
effective marginal rate of 32.75% is levied on profits in excess of 300,000 pounds [;] [this] acts to 
increase tax rate gradually until it reaches 30%." As from April 2006, for all fmns with profits up to 
300,000 pounds, a single 19% rate will apply. 
(Stuart Adam and James Browne, A Survey of The UK Tax System (updated January 2006), 
http:www.ifs.org.uklbnslbn09 .pdf, 19.) 
76 A regressive tax (e.g. VAT, customs duties and excise duties) is the worst tax system for reducing 
income inequality. This is because under regressive taxation, the proportion of income paid in tax is 
lower for the rich, but higher for the poor. (ONS, op.cit.(note33), p.l 02) This is because the 
expenditure of some low income households is higher than their current incomes. (Harris, 
orcit.(note32),p.45) 
7 In Thailand, the four largest sources of revenue are excise taxes, VAT, CT and PIT respectively. 
78 Emma Chamberlain, et aJ., Revenue Law- Principles and Practice, 23'd ed. (West Sussex: Tottel 
Publishing, 2005), 6. 
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individual.79 Similarly, CGT is a tax on "the gain represented by the difference 
between the price at which an item was acquired and the price at which it is sold."80 
Therefore, CGT is a tax on an increase in an individual 's wealth through the sale of 
assets. 
Secondly, "income tax is a tax on profits or gains of an income nah1re" 81 ; 
meanwhile, CGT is "a tax on gains of a capital nature."82 Despite this, "most forms 
of capital gains have much the same characteristics as income."83 Nevertheless, CGT 
is not a powerful device for reducing inequality because "there are a large number of 
exemptions and reliefs applying to CGT."84 
Thirdly, CGT is a progressive tax in the UK, namely: 
"Taxable capital gains are in effect subject to income tax as if they were 
savings income: treated as the top slice of income, capital gains are taxed at 
10% below the starting-rate limit, 20% between the starting- and basic-rate 
limits, and 40% above the basic-rate lirnit."85 
However, in practice, CGT is a proportional tax, i.e. "most capital gains are 
subject to 40% tax."86 Despite this, CGT cannot considerably help transfer resources 
from the rich to fund public expenditure because as we saw, receipts of CGT are a 
small proportion of the total sum raised by direct taxes. It is noted that "its fiscal 
significant is trivial compared with [income tax]."87 
9. What is covered by PIT? 
As PIT raises revenue from individuals' economic activities, mcome which 1s 
charged to PIT covers not only earned income but also unearned income. 
Under Thai law, PIT is charged on money income which covers earned 
mcome (such as income from employment, income from self-employment, and 
mcome from business) and unearned income (such as income from intangible 
79 Author not identified, Simon's Direct Tax Service: Binder 2 (London: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
1995), 1103. 
80 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note15), p.12 
81 CCH Tax Handbook, op.cit.(notel2), p.513 
82 ibid.p.51 3 
83 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l66 
84 CCH Tax Handbook, op.cit.(note 12), p.3009 
85 Adam and Browne, op.cit.(note75), p.l6 
86 ibid.p.l6 
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properties, and interest, dividends and other income from investments). PIT is also 
charged on all types of item which are an accretion to individuals' economic power 
and equivalent to money income (such as any other benefits received which are 
ascertainable in tenns of money). Additionally, capital gains are regarded as being 
equivalent to income, they are subject to PIT in Thailand. For example, gains from 
sales of immovable property are charged to PIT. 
Under UK law, income tax is charged on employment income (such as any 
salary, wages and fee), pension income (such as pensions and annuities), social 
security income (such as bereavement allowance, carer's allowance and income 
support), trading income (such as the profits of a trade, profession and vocation), 
property income (such as the profits of a UK property business), savings and 
investment income (such as interest, dividends and other distributions from UK 
resident companies), and certain miscellaneous income (such as receipts from 
intellectual property). 
Although PIT or income tax is charged on individuals' income, there are 
items of income that are exempted from PIT (under both Thai and UK laws). 
Because of this, "income tax is not a tax on all income."88 
More detailed discussion on income subject to PIT and non-taxable income 
will be given in Chapter Three. 
10. Possible conflict caused by the components of PIT 
Because of its progressive nature, PIT can make the distribution of income after tax 
more equal between individuals. A progressive structure is implemented by tax 
reliefs (particularly personal tax allowances) and/or the progressive rate structure. 
Furthermore, PIT is imposed not only on income but also on gains of a capital 
nature, which reinforces a reduction in economic inequality. As Morse and Williams 
note that under the UK law89, "there are some charges to income tax that are imposed 
87 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note 15), p.l2 
88 ibid.p.ll 
89 Under Thai law, capital gains are charged to PIT (as noted above). 
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on receipts that are not income tax receipts, but rather capital receipts."9° For 
example, "premiums received on leasing land."91 
As noted above, there are items of income that are exempted from PIT. In 
addition to tax exemptions and tax allowances, there are other types of tax reliefs 
brought into the PIT system, including tax credits and tax deductions. Tax reliefs can 
be designed and used to discharge or reduce the tax burden on the poor, thereby 
reducing income inequality. 
Many tax provisions are used to embrace and bring the components of PIT 
(such as tax rates, many types of income, and tax reliefs) into effect to achieve the 
equity purpose. However, these provisions cause legal complexity. The Musgraves 
support the view that "equity considerations may call for a more complex law"92, and 
"equity may require administrative complexity.' '93 
However, as discussed earlier, complex legislation increase administrative 
and compliance costs. Therefore, it may be said that PIT covers the progressive 
nature of taxation, income and capital receipts, and a tax concession which promotes 
equity while embracing many complex tax provisions which discourage efficiency. 
Additionally, PIT may distort people' s economic decisions on work, saving 
and investment since incomes from these activities are charged to PIT at progressive 
rates. People may therefore avoid paying higher tax on higher income by choosing to 
work less, save less, and invest less. Consequently, the government probably receives 
less revenue from income taxation. 
Tax reliefs may also distort people' decisions on resource allocation to tax-
preferred activities. This is because tax reliefs can be used for several purposes other 
than reducing the tax burden on the poor, namely they can be used to encourage 
particular economic activities. 
Therefore, it may also be said that PIT covers taxation of income and a tax 
concession while having an effect on the distribution of income before tax by 
distorting people's economic behavior and resource allocation which discourage 
efficiency. 
90 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note15), p.ll 
91 ibid.p.ll 
92 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.291 
93 ibid.p.225 
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High marginal rates of PIT promote equity to a desired extent. However, 
"because of high rates of tax, evasion and avoidance become very much more 
rewarding pursuits."94 Besides, if an individual is a tax unit, he/she may reduce 
income tax liability by transfer his/her investment income to his/her spouse in order 
to reduce taxable income and avoid high marginal tax rates. Tax reLiefs also provide 
incentives for tax avoidance and evasion because they discharge or reduce tax 
liability. For example, "tax expenditures [or non-structural reliefs] in favour of 
activities deemed worthy of encouragement, lead to the creation of tax-inspired 
shelters. "95 
As noted earlier, tax avoidance and evasion erode tax revenues, generate high 
administrative and compliance costs. Finally, it may be said that PIT covers 
progressive income taxation on individuals and a tax concession while encouraging 
tax avoidance and evasion which discourage efficiency. 
10. Originality of this research 
Striking the balance between equity and efficiency is widely accepted as a proper 
means to reduce the conflict, which is known as 'optimal taxation'. Most optimal 
taxation literature so far has been written in terms of economics. Nevertheless, this 
has a limited use in tax policy. According to Heady, 
"It is an interest in tax policy that has led a number of economists to 
undertake research on optimal taxation, and so one might expect the link 
between the research and the policy-making to be clear. However, the level of 
abstraction of much of the research, together with the extensive use of 
(sometimes difficult) mathematics, has caused many policy-orientated people 
to discount its practical value. It is dismissed as being 'academic', with little 
or no practical value."96 
Besides, James and Nobes have taken note of criticism by Atkinson and 
Stiglitz as follows: 
94 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.154 
95 Graeme Cooper, "Conflicts, Challenges and Choices - The Rule of Law and Anti-Avoidance 
Rules", Tax A voidance and the Rule of Law, Grames S. Cooper, ed., (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications 
BY, 1997), 43. 
96 Christopher Heady, "Optimal Taxation as a Guide to Tax Policy", Fiscal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 
1(1993), 15. 
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"[The] analysis [on optimal taxation] does not lead to unambiguous policy 
conclusions and that the results depend on economic relationships about 
which there is little empirical evidence.'m 
Additionally, most economics literature on optimal income taxation has 
focused only on the tax rate.98 Some deal only with the tax base.99 Therefore, other 
important components of PIT are omitted that could strike a balance between equity 
and efficiency. This is supported by criticism referred to in James and Nobes as 
follows: 
"The work undertaken to date on optimal taxation has attracted some 
criticism ....... The criticism that the analysis has neglected several important 
aspects such as horizontal equity, evasion, administration and taxpayer 
preferences between different taxes is largely accurate. However, this does 
not, of course, prevent such aspects from being incorporated into future 
work."100 
Owing to certain constraints in using economics literature, research in law is 
another possible alternative way to seek a balance between equity and efficiency. 
First, the study of a good tax system is the subject-matter not only of 
economics but also oflaw. 
Secondly, the conflict between equity and efficiency results from legislative 
process as well as tax policy because tax policy cannot be applied without the 
enactment and enforcement of tax laws. 
Thirdly, research in law need not require mathematical discussion. This 
argument is supported by such criticism referred to in James and Nobes that: 
" .... the conclusions of optimal tax analysis have been reached by intuitive 
argument, without the need for extensive mathematical analysis."101 
Fourthly, research in law is likely to cover more extensive areas that lead to 
conflict between equity and efficiency. There is a possibility that the conflict will 
97 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.72 
98 For example, A.B. Atkinson, Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 47-61 ; IFS, The Structure and Reform of Direct 
Taxation: Report of a Committee chaired by Professor J.E.Meade (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1978), 12; Alm, op.cit.(note2), pp.129-130; and Heady, op.cit.(note96), pp.24-30 
99 For example, Alm, op.cit.(note2), pp.129-130 
100 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.71 
101 ibid.pp.71 -72 
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extend beyond matters of the tax rate and the tax base. Besides, the conflict may 
result from the different objectives of using joint or independent taxa.tion of spouses, 
and from legal complexity or simplicity. The tax rate, tax base, and tax unit are 
related to tax legislation, tax administration and compliance as well as tax avoidance 
and evasion. These tax matters are all concerned with the legal system of PIT. 
Therefore, dealing with more extensive areas by research in law is more likely to 
strike the balance between equity and efficiency. 
This research involves research into the components of substantive PIT law in 
Thailand and the UK102 to establish optimal tax structures to strike a balance 
between equity and efficiency. Thus, it offers a novel/original way to reduce the 
conflict between equity and efficiency. To do so, the main components of substantive 
PIT law of both countries will flrst be examined and compared to find out their 
current state and how they operate. Thereafter, lega l solutions will be proposed to 
establish optimal tax structures, if the operation of any component has been found to 
lead to the conflict between both criteria. 
Examination and comparison 
The main components of substantive PIT law include tax rates, the tax base, 
and the tax treatment of spouses. These components under Thai and UK laws will be 
examined and compared. Such examination and comparison aim to search for the 
following: -
(a) to what extent these components work under equity and efficiency 
requirements; and 
(b) to what extent these components lead to conflict between equity and 
efficiency. 
As "tax law is about words"103, words and expressions in relevant taxing 
provisions will be clarified in carrying out the examination and comparison. 
Perception of the meanjng and application of substantive PIT law (together with the 
study and analysis of the underlying tax policy, wruch will be proposed in section 12) 
will help make the examination and comparison to achieve the above purposes. 
102 A comparison between Thai and UK PIT law also offers originality. 
103 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note1 5), p.21 
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Solutions 
Legal solutions will be proposed to sttike a balance between equity and 
efficiency if the above examination and comparison discovers that any component of 
substantive PIT law leads to conflict between equity and efficiency. The proposed 
legal solutions can be made via possible refonn/changes in any questionable 
component of substantive PIT law. 
The above changes/refonn will establish the optimal components of 
substantive PIT law, i.e. optimal statutory tax rates, an optimal tax base, and the 
optimal tax treatment of spouses. These optimal tax stt·uctures or the proposed 
'models' would reduce income inequality; meanwhile, they would reduce 
administrative and compliance costs, tax avoidance and evasiOn, and 
distortionary/disincentive effects. 
Besides, the enhancement of efficiency in tax legislation and administration is 
supposed to have positive effects on equity and efficiency. This is influenced by 
some scholars' views on the efficiency of the economy for public expenditure 
programmes as quoted in Marshall: -
"Some observers argue that efficiency should always be the main criterion for 
judging public expenditure programmes since only if the economy is efficient 
in every respect can the income available for redistribution be maximised; in 
other words, reducing inequality depends upon reducing inefficiency."104 
When the above perception is applied to this research, it is then arguable that 
any means that will encourage efficiency of taxation is likely to promote equity as 
well. 105 The enhancement of efficiency in tax legislation and administration is 
supposed to encourage efficiency of taxation. Therefore, this research will focus on 
any possible means that could make tax legislation and administration more efficient. 
Greater efficiency in tax legislation and administration probably results from 
improvements in the legislative process, delegated legislation, judicial interpretation, 
administrative practice and methods of tax collection. These ways are believed to 
104 Marshall, op.cit.(note31 ), p.354 
105 Conversely, if we opted to use any possible means to promote equity (for example, the use of very 
high marginal tax rates or more tax-free incomes), this would create incentives for tax avoidance and 
evasion, thereby increasing inefficiency of taxation. 
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increase efficiency of taxation. Consequently, such an increase will facilitate greater 
equitable redistribution of income simultaneously. 
In conclusion, the enhancement/improvement of efficiency in tax legislation 
and administration (to be discussed in Chapter Five) will be a further novel/original 
way to have positive effects on both efficiency and equity additional to the 
establishment of optimal tax structures (to be discussed in Chapters Two, Three and 
Four). 
12. How successful are optimal tax structures? 
As we saw, despite promoting equity, PIT probably has adverse effects on efficiency. 
This confl ict would be intensified if policy-makers placed more weight on equity. 
However, if policy-makers wanted to promote efficiency without regard to equity, 
this would not reduce the conflict because this would undermine equity. 106 
The main components of PIT are factors that bring about equity or inequity, 
efficiency or inefficiency. Therefore, as proposed earlier, the optimal components of 
PIT wi ll be established to be 'models' to strike the balance between equity and 
efficiency to reduce the conflict. 
It is safe to say whether or not the conception of optimal tax structures or the 
proposed models will successfully be implemented depends on three significant 
factors, namely (a) a limited tax policy, (b) simple and certain legislation, and (c) 
prevention of tax avoidance and evasion. In other words, the significance of these 
factors should be attached (or jointly considered, where appropriate) to optimal tax 
structures that will be established. 
Limited policy 
A conflict between equity and efficiency results from tax policy. As noted 
above, if policy-makers increased equity, this would reduce efficiency, and vice 
versa. Mankiw notes that "people disagree about tax policy often because they attach 
different weights to these two goals."107 
106 If policy-makers wanted to promote efficiency by reducing (a) distortionary/disincentive effects, 
(b) administrative and compliance costs, or (c) tax avoidance and evasion, there could be a restriction 
on redistribution. 
107 Mankiw, op.cit.(note36), p.257 
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For example, tax rates involve the use of tax policy to gam political 
support.108 Similarly, "the rate is often the most important point politically or 
commercially."109 However, if tax rates were set very high on the rich to obtain 
equity to the greatest extent (for the purpose of gaining political support from the 
poor), they would lead to tax avoidance and evasion. Tax reliefs can also be used for 
political purposes. As Morse and Williams say, "granting an exception is very easy 
politically, and votes are not easily won for removing it later."110 However, the 
extensive use of tax. reliefs contributes to legal complexity, provides tax loopholes, 
distorts resource allocation, and reduces tax revenues. 
Therefore, if we restricted the use of tax policy (or the role of political 
forces/influences) on PIT structures, this would bring about optimal tax structures to 
reduce the conflict between equity and efficiency. For example, if tax rates were 
restricted to be set optimally, they would achieve equity to the optimal extent which 
would reduce incentives to avoid and evade tax. Besides, if tax reliefs were restricted 
only to relieve the tax burden on low-income earners (or they were not used to 
achieve multi economic and political purposes), they would reduce income inequality 
while reducing complexity, providing less loopholes, minimizing distortion in 
resource allocation, and increasing tax revenues. 
As proposed in section 11, this research seeks solutions to reduce the conflict 
between equity and efficiency via possible reform/changes in any questionable 
component of substantive PIT law. Such solutions will be brought forward after 
examining and comparing substantive law. Here, it is further proposed that such 
solutions will be proposed after examining and comparing substantive law together 
with studying and analyzing the underlying tax policy. This is because substantive 
law cannot be enacted properly without the underlying tax policy. 
The underlying tax policy (which will become the government's tax 
proposals) mostly originates from theoretical concepts or hypotheses and empirical 
108 Vito Tanzi and Howell Zee, Tax Policy for Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund, 2001), 6. 
109 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note15), p.13 
110 ibid.p.l3 
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evidence on interrelated subject-matter, particularly economics. 111 Therefore, the 
study and analysis of the underlying tax policy will involve discussion of theories or 
assumptions, empirical evidence, facts, numbers and statistics in the interrelated 
subject-matter. 
The above discussion (which will be made in Chapters Two, Three, and Four) 
will help the examination and comparison of substantive law to identify the extent to 
which the components of PIT lead to conflict between equity and efficiency. 
Additionally, the above discussion will enable this research to make logical 
arguments for limiting the use of tax policy on PIT structures. This limitation would 
lead to the reform of any questionable component of PIT. 
Therefore, a limited policy is significant to optimal tax structures that will be 
proposed. In other words, the proposed models in this thesis would not be put into 
effect unless there were policy changes. 
Simple and certain legislation 
A limited policy on tax structures is supposed to make legislation less 
complex while promoting equity. It is further supposed that optimal tax structures 
would make legislation much less complex while still promoting equity when 
enacted to become tax law if its expressions are simple and certain. 
The World Bank also argues that "reform of tax structure is generally more 
effective when accompanied by improvements in tax administration."112 Simple, 
certain and convenient methods of tax collection are believed to implement optimal 
tax structures successfully. This is because these types of methods would reduce 
administrative and compliance costs, and prevent tax avoidance and evasion. 
Simple and certain legislation, and simple, certain and convenient methods of 
tax collection are therefore significant to the reform of PIT structures. And these 
characteristics of tax legislation and administration are believed to enhance 
efficiency in tax legislation and administration. Given this, this research will seek out 
the criteria of simplicity, certainty and convenience in Chapter Five. 
111 The production or design of the government' s tax proposals may also result from other factors, 
such as public consultation, pressures from certain groups of people, and a desire to gain political 
support. 
11 2 The World Bank, Lessons of Tax Reform (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1991), 61. 
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Prevention of tax avoidance and evasion 
As we saw, tax avoidance and evasion discourage efficiency. In addition, 
they bring about inequity because some people can avoid and evade tax whereas 
others cannot. And they thwart income redistribution. As Sandford notes, 
"Evasion generates its own redistribution of income - a redistribution from 
the honest to the dishonest (or from these with less opportunity to evade to 
those with more opportunity)."11 3 
"Avoidance involves its own redistribution of income as between avoiders 
and non-avoiders (the sophisticated and unsophisticated). Furthermore the 
rich, who can afford the 'best' advice, are those best placed to take advantage 
of avoidance possibilities, so that redistribution as a resu lt of avoidance is 
regressive in its incidence"114 
The prevention of tax avoidance and evasion is therefore vital to equity and 
efficiency. Sufficient penalties (e.g. those imposed on people who file incorrect tax 
returns (such as overstating tax reliefs) or fail to file tax returns and pay tax) and 
criminal prosecution (in the case of fraudulent evasion) can help prevent tax evasion. 
Tax avoidance can be prevented through statutory anti-avoidance rules or judicial 
anti-avoidance rules. 115 
Additionally, as we saw, the main components of PIT (such as tax reliefs and 
high tax rates) encourage tax avoidance and evasion. Therefore, if PIT structures 
were properly reformed to become optimal tax structures, this would also help 
prevent tax avoidance and evasion, which would have positive effects on equity and 
efficiency. 116 The Tax Law Review Committee (TLRC) supports structural reform to 
combat tax avoidance. As it says, "one approach to tax avoidance is to reform those 
structural elements of the tax system that create the opportunities for avoidance."117 
The significance of prevention of tax avoidance and evasion should therefore 
be attached to the reform of PIT structures. 
113 Sandford, op.cit.(note58) p.l58 
114 ibid.p. 160 
115 This will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
116 
" ......................... "in Chapters Two, Three and Four. 
11 7 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), 6. 
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13. How could the conception of optimal tax structures and related matters be 
adapted elsewhere? 
In this thesis, there are two kinds of proposals, namely (a) a general principles 
proposal, and (b) a specific-detailed proposal. 
As regards (a), this research aims to reform any questionable component of 
PIT, and to examine and improve three significant factors which will implement the 
conception of optimal tax structures. Therefore, this thesis will put forward a 
conceptual or theoretical framework of optimal tax structures, a limited tax policy, 
the criteria of efficient tax legislation and administration, and the prevention of tax 
avoidance and evasion. 
As regards {b), based on a conceptual or theoretical framework in (a), there 
will be detailed proposals for: 
• reforming the components of substantive PIT laws of Thailand and the 
UK, and 
• improving tax legislation and methods of tax collection in Thailand and 
the UK. 
It is supposed that a general principles proposal could be adapted for 
employment in another place than in Thailand and the UK; meanwhile, a specific-
detailed proposal might be adapted where it is appropriate for each particular 
COW1try. 
For example, this thesis will establish the advantages of a two tax-rate 
schedule system. This system consists of a schedule for low-income groups and a 
schedule for high-income groups, and each schedule contains few and optimal 
marginal tax rates. This system is a structural proposal of optimal statutory marginal 
tax rates (or the frame and benchmark of rate progressivity). This system is supposed 
to reduce the role of political forces in the tax rate schedule while helping PIT to 
achieve both equity and efficiency. As this system is a structural proposal, it could be 
adapted for employment in countries which adopt the system of progressive income 
taxation. 
Another example is that a conceptual framework for limiting the use of tax 
policy on tax reliefs will be proposed. For instance, a conceptual framework for 
removal of certain tax expenditures to promote equity and efficiency will be 
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proposed. This framework will contain tax expenditures, such as those leading to tax 
avoidance and tax arbitrage. 
Based on this framework, the exemption of any form of return on financial 
products or savings (under Thai and UK laws) could be abolished. This is because 
tax avoidance may involve the exploitation of tax exemption118, and this exemption 
probably provides incentives for the wealthy to manipulate their capital income 
(under contrived schemes) to obtain a tax advantage from it. Lymer, et al., note, 
"[Saving] money in an ISA [or Individual Saving Accounts] rather than an 
ordinary Building Society account has the result that income from the account 
is paid without deduction of tax. This therefore is a (legal) scheme which 
enables taxpayers to avoid paying tax on investment interest received.119 
Individuals may also attempt to avoid paying tax by using more elaborate 
schemes devised by tax planning experts who try to exploit loopholes in the 
tax legislation."120 
Based on the above framework, other countries that use tax policy measures 
to encourage certain saving and investment activities (which probably lead to tax 
avoidance schemes) might consider changing this policy and abolishing the 
exemption of any form of return on financial products or savings. 
Another example is that a theoretical framework for simplicity, certainty and 
convenience of tax law and administration will be sought out. Based on this 
framework, the improvements of the legislative process, primary and secondary 
legislation, judicial interpretation, administrative practice and methods of tax 
collection in Thailand and the UK will be proposed. 
For instance, a theoretical framework for certainty requires rules on the 
structural elements of PIT to be clear, reliable, foreseeable and non-arbitrary. Based 
on this framework, Thai and UK primary and secondary tax legislation should be 
written from a detailed viewpoint, and the Thai and UK courts should interpret clear 
118 J.A. Astin, "Discussion", Income Redistribution: the Limits to Redistribution, David Collard, 
Richard Lecomber and Martin Slater, eds. (Bristol: Scientechnica, 1980), 163. 
119 The exploitation of tax exemptions that Parliament bas introduced is likely to be acceptable tax 
planning. But the use of contrived schemes to exploit tax exemptions in a manner contrary to what the 
legislation seeks to achieve is likely to (unacceptable) tax avoidance. 
120 Andy Lymer, et al., Taxation: Policy and Practice, lOth ed., (Birmingham: Accounting Education, 
2003), 1/20 
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words with strictness (however, a purposive interpretation should be applied where it 
can prevent tax avoidance). The above framework and specific improvements are 
likely to be adapted for employment elsewhere. 
Another example is that a conceptual framework for statutory anti-avoidance 
rules will be sought out. This framework will partly require statutory anti-avoidance 
rules to bring about legal certainty and not to give excessively discretionary powers 
to the tax authorities. Based on this framework, the UK Revenue should not construe 
and apply disclosure rules and targeted anti-avoidance provisions beyond the strict 
letter of the law. This framework and specific improvements are likely to be adapted 
for employment elsewhere which adopts statutory anti-avoidance rules. 
14. T he efficacy of solutions under optimal tax structures 
PIT would become a good direct tax via optimal tax structures to be implemented 
because of a number of significant factors. This is because its operation is supposed 
to solve the conflict between equity and efficiency. This solution would have positive 
effects on the two, namely: 
(a) a more equal distribution of income after tax, 
(b) legal simplification, which would reduce administrative and compliance 
costs, 
(c) discouragement of tax avoidance and evasion, 
(d) minimization of distortion in people's economic behavior and resource 
allocation, and 
(e) an increase in tax revenues. 
Capital gains are liable to CGT because they are "just as much relevant to 
ability to pay as income liable to income tax and therefore should be taxed on 
grounds of equity, both vertical and horizontal."121 However, as we saw, CGT is not 
a powerful tool to transfer resources from the rich to the poor for reducing vertical 
inequity. This is partly because there are many exemptions and reliefs applying to 
CGT under UK Jaw. In Thailand, capital gains are liable to PIT; but many forms of 
them are exempted from PIT. 
121 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.650 
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PIT would bring about a more equal distribution of income after tax partly 
because of the proposed optimal tax base. The proposed optimal tax base would be 
partly obtained by the maintenance of tax reliefs that benefit low-income earners, and 
by the abolition of certain tax exemptions and itemized deductions (under Thai and 
UK law), e.g. the abolition of the tax exemption of capital gains (under Thai law), 
and the abolition of the deduction of contributions paid to personal pension funds 
(under both laws). The result of the abolition is likely to offset a disadvantage of 
CGT, as mentioned above. 
In the UK, CGT "is potentially important as an anti-avoidance measure, as it 
discourages wealthier individuals from converting a large part of their income into 
capital gains in order to reduce their tax liability." 122 CGT would further help reduce 
vertical inequity and promote efficiency simultaneously if it adapted the conception 
of optimal tax structures. 
For example, if we restricted tax policy on exemptions and reliefs applying to 
CGT123, this would help prevent wealthier individuals from converting their income 
into assets which are not charged to CGT when they were sold. The consequence of 
this restriction is that the rich would pay more in CGT while reducing legal 
complexity, providing less loopholes, minimizing distortion in resource allocation, 
and increasing tax revenues. 
As noted above, capital gains are as much relevant to ability to pay as income 
liable to income tax and should be taxed on equity grounds. The two tax-rate 
schedule system which will be proposed to apply to PIT is supposed to promote 
equity and efficiency. Therefore, if capital gains were taxed under the proposed two 
tax-rate schedule system, this would help CGT to achieve equity (like PIT) while 
promoting efficiency. 
As discussed earlier, PIT embraces many complex tax provisions, and "with 
corporation tax, [income tax] is the most complex tax [in the UK]."124 PIT under the 
conception of optimal tax structures would embrace less complex provisions due to a 
limited tax policy and simple and certain legislation. Consequently, with CT, 
122Adam and Browne, op.cit.(note75), p.l7 
123 Exemptions and reliefs should be provided only to the disposal of assets of low-income earners. 
124 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note 15), p.ll 
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income tax would become a less complex tax, which would reduce administrative 
and compliance costs. 
For the CT system, it could help reduce administrative and compliance costs, 
if it adapted the conception of optimal tax structures. For example, the proposed two 
tax-rate schedule system which contains few and optimal tax rates would generate 
simplicity, and discourage tax avoidance and evasion. If the CT system has few and 
optimal tax rates, it is likely to obtain the similar end result. In addition to optimal 
tax rates, the proposed optimal tax base that broadens the tax base of PIT by Limiting 
tax reliefs would simplify legislation, discourage tax avoidance and evasion, 
minimize distortion in resource allocation, and generate more tax revenue. The CT 
system would obtain the similar end result if it had a broad tax base (by limiting the 
excessive deduction of current expenditure from taxable profits, e.g. limiting tax 
relief for current expenditure on R&D). 
It is noted that "companies should be taxed because they lock in capital which 
should reach the shareholders."125 After a company pays CT on its profits, it makes 
distributions to its shareholders. As one says, 
"A company does not exist in isolation and the shareholders who invest in it 
expect to get some financial benefit when the company makes a profit. A 
company confers some benefit on its shareholders in the form of distribution 
which it makes from time to time. The distribution will usually take the form 
of a dividend."126 
Company dividends paid to individuals are subject to PIT or income tax.127 In 
Thailand, as with other incomes, dividends are charged with PIT at rates in the tax-
rate schedule. Meanwhile, in the UK, dividend income is charged at different rates 
from non-savings income and from non-dividend savings income. In Chapter Two, 
this thesis will propose that dividend and interest incomes (unearned incomes) should 
be taxed at the same rates as other earned incomes (i.e. rates under the proposed two 
tax-rate schedules). This is supposed to promote equity, simplify legislation, 
discourage tax avoidance and evasion, and not to create disincentive to invest. 
125 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.815 
126 CCH Tax Handbook, op.cit.(notel2), p.2041 
127 Under Thai and UK laws, the recipients of dividends will receive a tax credit (to be discussed in 
Chapters Three and Five). 
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From the above, the conception of optimal tax structures could be applied to 
CGT and CT (where appropriate) in addition to PIT. Besides, the solutions to the 
conflict between equity and efficiency could be effected when PIT applied this 
conception and operated with CGT and CT. Despite this possibility, this efficacy of 
PIT may impede international tax competition. It is noted that "there is strong tax 
competition between states [;] (tax] systems are as much part of the global 
marketplace as any other aspect of a country."128 Therefore, to attract/encourage 
domestic and foreign direct investment and to prevent the mobility of capital and 
income, tax systems in any country may require low tax rates and tax incentives. 
Tax reliefs or tax incentives that are provided for encouraging certain 
industries or saving and investment activities probably attract saving and investment 
in the country. However, from my viewpoint, PIT should be used only for 
redistributive and revenue-raising purposes. If PIT were used for many other 
purposes, this would affect equity and efficiency. This thesis therefore puts forward 
an idea of a restriction of tax policy on tax reliefs, such as the proposal for the 
abolition of the tax exemption of capital gains, and the abolition of the exemption of 
any form of return on financial products or savings. 
A restriction of tax reliefs/tax incentives above and the same tax treatment of 
unearned and earned incomes are unlikely to have severe effects on saving and 
investment trends in the country which will adopt or adapt the conception of optimal 
tax structures. This is for the following reasons. 
First, "as a matter of fact, tax incentives would be fruitless, if taxpayers 
disregard the tax factor in their business decisions."129 Similarly, "income tax 
exemption was considered a very weak stimulant; those investors, who did consider 
it, did it only marginally."130 
Secondly, tax reliefs/tax incentives and the different tax treatment for 
unearned and earned incomes are unlikely to be the only factors to prevent the 
mobility of capital and income, and to encourage domestic and foreign direct 
investment. According to one investor's comment, "tax exemption is like a dessert; it 
128 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(notel5), p.IO 
129 Cooper, op.cit.(note95),p.21 
130 Jacques Morisset and Neda Pirnia, How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign Direct 
Investment: A review (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000), 5. 
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is good to have, but it does not help very much if the meal is not there."131 The meal 
or other factors influencing the decline and the increase in saving and investment 
include interest rates, the run-up in equity values, cheap labor costs, raw materials, a 
country's economic infrastructure, the stability of political system, and less 
corruption by government officials. 
Thirdly, optimal tax rates in the proposed two tax-rate schedules, and simpler 
and clearer tax legislation (as to be proposed in this thesis) are likely to offset a 
restriction of tax reliefs and the same tax treatment of unearned and earned incomes. 
15. Conclusion 
There are two purposes of this thesis. The first is to examine and compare the main 
components of the Thai and British PIT laws to establish to what extent they can 
cause conflict between equity and efficiency. The second is to validate hypotheses 
that (a) optimal tax structures and (b) the enhancement of efficiency in tax legislation 
and administration could strike the balance between equity and efficiency. 
PIT can make the distribution of income after tax more equal because of the 
progressive nature of taxation, taxation on income and capital receipts, and tax 
reliefs. However, these components have adverse effects on efficiency because they 
cause legal complexity, tax loopholes, distortion in economic decisions and resource 
allocation, and a loss of tax revenues. The conception of optimal components of PIT 
is therefore put forward to reduce the conflict. 
Optimal tax structures would reduce income inequality; meanwhile, they 
would simplify tax legislation, discourage tax avoidance and evasion, minimize 
distortionary/disincentive effects, and increase tax revenues. Additionally, the 
enhancement/improvement of efficiency in tax legislation and administration is 
supposed to encourage efficiency of taxation, which would facilitate greater 
equitable redistribution of income simultaneously. 
The conception of optimal tax structures is likely to be implemented by a 
limited tax policy, efficient tax legislation and administration, and the prevention of 
tax avoidance and evasion. Although the thesis is theoretical, the principles could be 
applied practically. In other words, a conceptual framework of optimal tax structures 
13 1 ibid.p.5 
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and related matters is likely to be adapted for employment elsewhere. Additionally, 
the conception of optimal tax structures could be effected when other components of 
a tax system are taken into account (as discussed above, PIT under this conception 
could operate with CGT and CT). This conception is likely to be applicable to CGT 
and CT (where appropriate) as well. However, the thesis is deliberately restricted to 
the framework for PIT because it serves as the best example for the strategies 
suggested; and because in most systems the PIT is the largest and the most 
fundamental component of the totality of the tax system. 
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Chapter Two 
Optimal Statutory Tax Rates 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the effects of the progressive rate structure t.mder Thai and 
UK laws on equity and efficiency. Average and marginal tax rates, single and 
multiple rate systems, and factors and effects of the progressive rate structure in 
practice will be taken into account in analyzing the effect on equity. In analyzing the 
effect on efficiency, the disincentive effect and the effect on administrative and 
compliance costs will be taken in account. 
Afterwards, the conflict between equity and efficiency caused by the 
progressive rate structure will be discussed. Finally, I will propose optimal statutory 
tax rates to solve the conflict. 
2. Concepts of the progressive rate structure and its effects on equity and 
redistribution 
2.1 The progressive rate structure in principle 
The PIT system can achieve vertical equity/redistribution by applying a progressive 
structure and the ability-to-pay principle. 
A progressive structure requires an average tax rate ("ATR") which rises with 
an increase in income. 132 The A TR 133 represents the proportion of income to be taken 
in tax.134 Thus, the structure of progressive tax rates ("the progressive rate structure") 
which is part of a progressive structure is required to change ATRs at different 
income levels. Consequently, the progressive rate structure, which relies on higher 
ATRs with higher income, achieves vertical equity/redistribution. 
There are two approaches to the progressive rate structure. 
The first approach requires one positive rate to be applied to income above an 
exempt amount (or income after the subtraction of allowable reliefs). 135 The exempt 
132 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l4 
133 The A TR is the total sum of tax paid per period divided by total income derived in that period. 
134 Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), p.l2 
135 "b"d 12 I I .p. 
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mcome is deemed a zero rate; and a single positive rate above such mcome 1s 
progressive. This approach is refened to as a single rate system. 
Another approach is a multiple rate system. This approach requires a number 
of different marginal tax rates ("MTR")136 to be applied to different levels of taxable 
income, namely lower rates are applied to smaller taxable incomes, and higher rates 
are applied to larger taxable incomes. 137 
It has been found that the single and multiple rate systems can constitute a 
progressive rate structure because both cause the ATR to rise as income increases. 
Example 2.1 in Appendix I to Chapter Two will illustrate this point. 
2.2 Redistribution through the progressive rate structure in principle 
To achieve a significant degree of vertical equity/redistribution, the progressive rate 
structure is required to (a) reduce the tax burden on low incomes138, and (b) increase 
the tax burden on high incomes. 139 
Method (a) requires low MTRs for the low-income group. 140 Method (b) 
means increasing MTRs 141 to obtain high ATRs paid by the rich.142 High ATRs can 
be achieved by several methods including (1) having high MTRs on the largest 
incomes143 on the tax-rate schedule144, or (2) maintaining steeply graduated rates. 145 
The question arises whether both single and multiple rate systems can 
effectively reduce the tax burden on low-income earners and increase it on high-
income earners. Although the single and multiple rate systems can increase the level 
of ATRs as income rises, the multiple rate system is likely to be more successful in 
achieving significant vertical equity/redistribution. This will be analyzed below. 
136 The MTR is the additional rate of tax applicable to a person' s additional income or the next portion 
of income. 
137 Schnitzer, op.cit.(note22), pp.l71-l72 
138 D.I. Trotman-Dickenson, Public Sector Economics (London: Heinemann, 1983), 93. 
139 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.5 
140 John Black, A Dictionary ofEconomics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 375. 
14 1 John Tiley, Revenue Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 8. 
142 Whittington, op.cit.(note53), p.l59 
143 Silverman, op.cit.(note43), p.23 
144 Whittington, op.cit.(note53), p.l 59 
145 Silverman, op.cit.(note43), p.23 
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2.2.1 A multiple rate system 
If the progressive rate structure is based on a multiple rate system, the MTR is 
always greater than the A TR because of increasing MTRs on larger taxable incomes. 
If the MTR is raised, so will the ATR rise. 
If MTRs are made higher on the earnings of those with high incomes, a high 
level of ATRs on the rich will come about and result in the achievement of 
signjficant vertical equity/redisttibution. Conversely, if the MTR is lowered, there 
will surely be a decrease in the ATR. Therefore, ifMTRs are lowered on the earnings 
of those with low incomes, there will be a low level of ATRs on the poor. This will 
also result in the achievement of significant vertical redistribution. Example 2.2 in 
Appendix II to Chapter Two will illustrate these points. 
2.2.2 A single rate system 
A large tax-exempt income and a single positive rate are the elements of a single rate 
system. These elements may however prevent high ATRs on high-income groups. A 
large tax-exempt income helps constitute the progressive rate structure. However, the 
larger the tax-exempt income, the lower the level of ATRs on the rich. 146 This affects 
vertical equity/redistribution. Example 2.3 in Appendix III to Chapter Two will 
illustrate this point. 
As with a larger tax-exempt income, a single positive rate may prevent high 
ATRs on high-income groups. In theory, a single positive rate may be set rugh to 
impose higher ATRs on the rich for redistributive purposes. However, a single 
positive rate is unlikely to be set too high in practice because low- and middle-
income groups will suffer. Thus, a moderate single positive rate ("MSPR") may be 
required. As tax-exempt income is deemed a zero rate, the MSPR is the marginal tax 
rate. As a result of the MSPR, the ATR will not be higher than the MSPR. 
Consequently, under a single rate system with the MSPR, the level of ATRs on the 
rich will not be high, wruch affects vertical equity/redistribution. Example 2.4 in 
Appendix IV to Chapter Two will illustrate this point. 
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2.3 Relevant tax p rovisions 
Under Section 48 ( 1) of the Revenue Code of Thai land ("the RCT"), the net/taxable 
income, arrived at by subtracting allowable reliefs from the assessable income, shall 
be charged with tax at rates set f011h in the tax-rate schedule. During the period of 
2000-2005, the schedule which applies to all type of income is as follows: 
Bands of taxable income (baht) Tax rates 
0 100,000 5%147 
100,001 500,000 10% 
500,001 I ,000,000 20% 
1,000,001 4,000,000 30% 
over 4,000,000 37% 
The main provision on tax rates under UK law is Section 1 (2) of the Income 
and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 ("the TA 1988"). 148 According to Section 1 (2), 
rates of income tax for individuals for 2004-05 are as follows: 
Tax rates (%) Bands of taxable income (£) 
Starting rate 10 0-2,020 
Basic rate 22 2,021-31,400 
Higher rate 40 over 31,400 
This structure applies to non-savmgs income. As regards non-dividend 
savings income and dividend income, these will be charged at different progressive 
rates from non-savings income according to Section 1A and Section 1B of the TA 
1988 respectively. 
According to Section 1 A, the rates of tax on savings income other than 
dividends for 2004-05 are as follows: 
Tax rates (%) Bands of taxable income (£) 
Starting rate 10 0-2,020 
Lower rate 20 2,021-31,400 
Higher rate 40 over 31,400 
146 The effect of a tax-exempt income will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
147 From the tax year 1999, taxable income from 0 to 50,000 baht is tax-exempt income. From the tax 
year 2003, taxable income from 0 to 80,000 baht is tax-exempt income. From the tax year 2004, 
taxable income from 0 to 100,000 baht is tax-exempt income. The tax-exempt income will be 
discussed in 2.4.4.2 
148 The text of Section 1 (2) can be found in Appendix V to Chapter Two. 
43 
According to Section 1 B, the rates of tax on dividends for the tax year 2004-
05 are as fo llows: 
Tax rates (%) 
10 
32.5 
Bands of taxable income (£) 
0-31,400 
over 31,400 
It should be noted that Section 1 A (5) treats savings income other than 
dividends as the top slice of taxable income (the top slice). It ftu1her treats dividend 
income as the top slice of savings income or as the highest part of taxable income 
(the top slice of the top slice).149 The tax calculation for non-savings income, non-
dividend savings income and dividend mcome is set out in Example 2.5-2.8 in 
Appendix VI to Chapter Two. 
2.4 Factors and effects of the progressive rate structure in practice 
In this section, I will analyze whether the Thai and UK statutory marginal tax rates 
("MTRs") can work under the equity requirement to achieve significant vertical 
equity/redistribution. 
My analysis will focus on whether the tax-rate schedules in question are 
progressive enough to bring about (a) a low level of ATRs on the poor and (b) a high 
level of ATRs on the rich (" tax progressivity"). In other words, I will ascertain (a) 
how low MTRs in the tax-rate schedules apply to the earnings of the poor and (b) 
how high MTRs apply to the earnings of the rich. For this analysis, the factors behind 
the tax-rate schedules from the past to the present and how such factors bring about 
tax progressivity will be examined. 
The level of tax progressivity is determined by six factors: -
(1) the revenue target, 
(2) political forces, 
(3) tax avoidance and evasion, 
( 4) the number of taxpayers, the level of income and the share of tax paid by 
different groups oftaxpayer, 
(5) price inflation, and 
149 Author not identified, Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder 6: Individuals Schedule E (London: 
Butterworths, 1995), 1105. 
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(6) components of a tax base. 150 
2.4.1 Revenue target 
The revenue target can affect tax progressivity, which may promote or prevent 
vertical equity/redistribution. A statement by International Cooperation 
Administration in 1961 is relevant to this factor. This makes the point as follows: 
"Economists in the industrialized countries of the West often have noted that 
to raise large amounts of revenue, the income tax must reach down into the 
brackets of lower income recipients in which are found the greatest numbers 
of people. Increases in taxes at the upper levels will produce a relatively 
small increase in total tax receipts as a factor in the total national budget. 
Small increases at the lower income brackets, however, result in a 
pronounced increase in total revenue."151 
From the above, one way of raising more tax revenue is to increase MTRs on 
lower income recipients. Although small increases in MTRs on lower income levels 
will obtain higher ATRs on lower income recipients and more tax revenue, this will 
lead to vertical inequity and thwart income redistribution. As we have seen, A TRs on 
low-income taxpayers must be as low as possible to achieve tax progressivity. 
Conversely, imposing heavier tax on high-income taxpayers will enhance tax 
progressivity. 
If the government focuses on the use of the PIT both as a revenue raiser and 
as a means of income redistribution, it has to choose between tax revenue raised from 
lower-income taxpayers or tax revenue from upper-income taxpayers. If the latter · 
choice is made, this may generate more tax revenue and achieve vertical 
equity/redistribution. This choice is however subject to two conditions. 
(a) Other factors that reduce ATRs on high-income taxpayers must be 
removed as far as possible. Such factors include political forces, tax 
avoidance and evasion, the small number of highest-rate taxpayers, the 
small income subject to highest tax rates, the small share of tax paid by 
highest-rate taxpayers, and the effects of tax reliefs on statutory tax rates. 
15° Factor (6) will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
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(b) MTRs on high-income taxpayers must be imposed under the concept of 
optimal statutory marginal tax rates ("OSMTRs"). 
If the above conditions are met, raising more revenue from high-income 
taxpayers will (a) enable the revenue target to be met, (b) lead to tax progressivity 
and achieve vertical equity/redistribution, and (c) least affect efficiency of taxation. 
2.4.2 Political forces 
How the level of tax progressivity is determined partly depends on the role of 
political forces. 152 In most developing countries, the poor are the majority 
population; therefore, it may be argued that a political party that has a tax policy 
applying strong tax progressivity 153would probably win a general election in these. 
This is because it would gain overwhelming support from the majority (the poor) 
who will benefit from the increase in public services provided by the greater tax 
revenue taken from the rich. 
However, the above supposition may not be true for some countries, for the 
following reasons. 
Firstly, in some countries, high-income earners usually take control of the 
economic and political systems. Consequently, high-income earners who are in 
power would hardly allow a tax policy applying strong tax progressivity to lower 
their income after tax. 
Secondly, the rich may resist a political party or put pressure on a 
government that has a strong policy to increase tax progressivity. 
Thirdly, strong tax progressivity possibly deters economic growth because it 
may create disincentives to work, save and invest. Accordingly, the government may 
not opt to use a policy of strong tax progressivity. 
It appears nowadays that tax-rate schedules m many countries are less 
progressive, with few tax bands and low MTRs on the rich. 154 Consequently, the 
lower level of tax progressivity155 has reduced ATRs on high-income groups. This 
lSI International Cooperation Administration, Modernizing Government Revenue Administration 
(Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1961), 50. 
ISl Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note I 5), p.l3 
1s3 ATRs are made much higher when income increases up to the high and highest levels. 
1s4 The World Bank, op.cit.(note l I 2), p.43 
ISS ATRs are not made much higher when income increases up to the high and highest levels. 
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results from poli tical forces. Tiley supports the view that, "of all the aspects of the 
UK tax system the rates of income tax provide the most striking examples of the 
influence of history - and ofpolitics." 156 The Musgraves also remark, 
"No abso lute statement about the desirability of rate progression can be made 
on [the grounds of distributive justice and of ability to pay]. The final answer 
is essentially one of social va1ue judgment and of the balance of political 
power with which altemative views are advanced."157 
This research will establish OSMTRs (the framework and benchmark of tax 
progressivity) to reduce the role of political forces in the tax-rate schedule and to 
generate efficiency of taxation and benefits for the poor and the rich simultaneously. 
2.4.3 Tax avoidance and evasion 
2.4.3.1 Tax-avoidance actions and reduction in tax progressivity 
High MTRs provide incentives for taxpayers to avoid and evade tax. 158 Tax 
progressivity is prevented in practice when high-income groups avoid and evade tax 
as a result of high MTRs. This is because such actions invalidate MTRs and reduce 
ATRs on the rich. Prest supports the view that "the marginal and effective [average] 
tax rates which apply [to high-income groups] in principle do not so apply in practice 
[as a result oftax avoidance]."159 The UK experience as referred to in Collard (1980) 
also supports this point, i.e. 
"The apparently progressive schedule at the highest rates is illusory since 
little income is taxed at these rates. This is due both to evasion and 
avoidance." 160 
Additionally, tax progressivity is thwarted because tax avoidance and evasion 
by high-income groups cause low-income groups to pay more in tax but cause high-
income groups to pay less. Slernrod and Bakija make the assumption that: 
156 John Tiley, "General Description: United Kingdom", Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural 
Analysis, Hugh J. Ault, ed. (Den Haag: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 117. 
157 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.360 
158 Sandford, op.cit.(note81), pp.l59,160 
159 Prest, op.cit.(note40), p.27 1 
160 Collard, op.cit.(note22), p.6 
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"If opportunities or predilections for evasion were related to one's level of 
well-being (for instance, if the rich could evade more easi ly than the poor), 
then evasion would make it difficult for us to achieve whatever degree to 
progressivity we deem to be consistent with vertical equity. " 161 
The World Bank also remarks, 
"High income tax rates may cause greater concealment of income and use of 
tax avoidance methods and so on. In [this case] there is the possibility that 
revenue will be lower at high rates than it is at lower rates."162 
Further investigations have found three possible factors generating income 
red.istribution from the poor to the rich. These are (a) benefits to the rich, (b) 
government policy to raise more tax, and (c) the practice ofbribery in tax evasion. 
(a) Benefits to the rich 
Slemrod and Bakija point out that: 
"Evasion creates horizontal inequity because people with equal abilities-to-
pay end up paying different amounts ..... (T]here is no way for tax rates to be 
adjusted to offset the advantage gained by the evaders, because we don't 
know which people are evading". 163 
In terms of horizontal inequity, it is difficult to specify which people are 
avoiding or evading tax if they have the same taxable capacity. However, if people 
have different taxable capacity, it is possible to specify which people are avoiding 
and evading tax. In a comparison between those with less and those with greater 
taxable capacity, the latter tend to avoid and evade tax due to high MTRs for two 
reasons. 
Firstly, it is worthwhile for the rich to avoid or evade paying tax at high 
MTRs. As the World Bank notes, "the higher the tax rate, the greater the benefits of 
avoiding and evading the tax."164 
Secondly, the rich can afford a professional's fee to find tax loopholes. A 
survey in the UK (in 2000) found that "rich people seem to have more scope for 
161 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.l49 
162 The World Bank Group, "Design elements for administratively simple taxes" 
http://www I. worldbank.org/publ icsector/tax/design.htm, 2. 
163 Slemrod and Bakija, opcit.(note63), p.l49 
164 The World Bank, op.cit.(notell2), p.30 
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opting out of taxes by using accountants and avoidance schemes." 165 The OECD also 
supports the claim that some citizens can avoid or reduce their tax bill, "whi le others 
with equal or lower incomes cannot." 166 
Empirical study by Thirsk (1991) supports the conclusion that higher-income 
groups tend to evade tax more than lower-income groups. It states that, 
"In many of the countries studied, it was estimated that as much as one half 
of all income tax is evaded and that the greatest opp01tunities for evading 
taxes were available to richer rather than poorer taxpayers." 167 
In Thailand, ATRs are mostly paid by wage-eamers who are classified as 
lower-income groups because they cannot avoid tax 168 since their incomes are 
subject to withholding at source. Meanwhile, most higher-income taxpayers in 
Thailand are non-labor income eamers, the self-employed or professionals who can 
avoid or evade tax because they can afford fees to find tax loopholes. 
(b) Government policy to raise more tax 
The government may need to raise tax to offset revenue loss resulting from 
avoiding actions by high-income groups. The tax increase will inevitably put heavier 
tax burdens to lower-income groups who evade tax less. 
(c) Bribery in tax evasion 
In their research on tax incidence in developing countries ( 1990), Shah and 
Whalley note, "the redistributive impacts of the bribe system will dominate the direct 
redistributive effects of the income tax."169 This is because bribery for tax evasion 
will cause income redistribution to high-ranking officers who take the bribes and to 
professionals who often act as intermediaries in the process ofbribery. 170 Both high-
ranking officers and professionals are classified as high-income groups in developing 
cotmtries including Thailand. Shah and Whalley conclude in their research that, 
165 Alan Hedges and Catherine Bromley, Public attitudes towards taxation (London: Fabian Society, 
2001), 11. 
166 OECD, op.cit.(note70), pp.43-44 
167 Thirsk, op.cit.(note64), pp.16-17 
168 Tanasai Fugfaipol, "Effective Tax Rates under the Personallncome Tax", RD Tax Journal, Year 
44, Volume 10, October 1997,49-50. 
169 Shah and Whalley, op.cit.(note61), p.34 
170 ibid.pp.34 - 35 
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"increasing the income tax can thus trigger a reverse distributional process from 
middle class businessmen and others to wealthy elites."17 1 
2.4.3.2 Changes in the tax-rate schedule and reduction in tax progressivity 
Methods to reduce incentives to avoid and evade tax owing to high MTRs are 
required in order to maintain some degree of tax progressivity to achieve vertical 
equity/redisttibution. Such methods are changes in the tax-rate schedule to 
discourage high-income groups from tax avoidance and evasion. 
I have two arguments regarding changes in the tax-rate schedule, which are 
slightly different from those of other people. These concem (a) tax-rate reduction and 
evasion and (b) changes in MTRs. 
(a) Tax-rate reduction and evasion 
Slemrod and Bakija argue that reduction in MTRs IS unlikely to reduce 
evasion. As they state, 
"At first blush the most direct cause of tax evasion is high tax rates. To lower 
evasion, therefore, one could simply lower tax rates. So the relevant question 
is whether evasion would be curtailed if [MTRs] were reduced, holding 
revenues constant, either by making the system less progressive or 
broadening the base. In either case the quantitative evidence is not decisive. 
Even on theoretical grounds, the argument that lower rates reduce evasion is 
not certain." 172 
My research has found that changes in the tax-rate schedule (to reduce 
incentives to avoid and evade tax due to high MTRs) can be made via four methods 
(hereinafter called "the four methods") which are: 
(i) lowering MTRs, 
(ii) reducing the number of tax bands and MTRs, together with widening 
tax bands, 
(iii) setting the top MTR so as not to be considerably different from the 
top rate of corporation tax, and 
(iv) setting the top MTR so as not to exceed 50%. 
17 1 ibid.p.35 
172 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.l 57 
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We have now seen that lowering MTRs as mentioned in Slemrod and 
Bakija's statement is one method to be applied wi th others. Slemrod and Bakija 
comment that lowering MTRs is unlikely to reduce evasion. From my standpoint, it 
is not enough to look merely at lowering MTRs. It is necessary to look at changes in 
all components of the tax-rate schedule that will lower high MTRs on high incomes 
to an acceptable level and ensure a tax-rate schedule that will discourage tax 
avoidance and evasion. 
Lowering MTRs or using any of the three methods can independently reduce 
A TRs or tax burdens, and are likely to help reduce incentives to avoid and evade tax. 
However, it would be better if the four methods worked together to reduce incentives 
to avoid and evade tax. If they did, high MTRs on high incomes would be reduced to 
an acceptable level and other components of the tax-rate schedule could be effective 
in discouraging tax avoidance and evasion. 
The method~ to reduce evasion that I have noted here, including lowering 
MTRs, are supposed to reduce incentives to avoid and evade tax and are not expected 
to wipe out tax avoidance and evasion completely. For complete removal of tax 
avoidance and evasion, other elements in the PIT law, i.e. the tax base, the tax unit, 
and legislative and administrative processes, must be properly fixed to help the 
changed tax-rate schedule. Goode supports this point as follows: 
"Many of the practices [of tax avoidance] that have grown up might not be 
eliminated or even greatly abated if income tax rates were simply reduced, 
without other reforms."173 
(b) Changes in MTRs 
Thirsk 's study ( 1991) says that in some countries "almost no taxpayer ever 
paid tax at the highest rate because considerable taxpayer resources were devoted to 
avoiding that outcome."174 Additionally, according to Collard (1980), "little income 
was taxed at these [highest] rates [in the UK.]"175 
In my view, it may be misleading to think that methods to reduce incentives 
to avoid and evade tax should emphasize a change in the highest MTR on highest-
income taxpayers only. It is probable that changes in MTRs on high- and highest-
173 Goode, op.cit.(note73), p.73 
174 Thirsk, op.cit.(note64), p.21 
income taxpayers are both required. This is because tax avoidance and evasion result 
from the actions of both high- and highest-income taxpayers. 
Four methods to discourage tax avoidance and evasion 
To discourage high-income groups from tax avoidance and evasion, the four 
methods as noted above are required. 
(i) Lowering MTRs on high incomes 
It is accepted that lowering MTRs helps reduce incentives to avoid and evade 
tax 176because "the losses are smaller."177 Furthermore, lowering the top MTR 
prevents high-income taxpayers from opting out of the PIT. 178 MTRs under Thai and 
UK laws have now been lowered following this direction. 
Under the Thai tax-rate schedule, the top MTR has been reduced to 37% 
since 1992. It used to be 65%, 55% and 50% during the periods 1982-1985, 1986-
1988, and 1989-1991 respectively. Besides, the second-highest MTR has been 
reduced to 30% since 1992. It used to be 60%, 50% and 40% during the periods 
1982-1985, 1986-1988, and 1989-1991 respectively. 
In the UK, in 1978-1979, the highest MTR on earned income was 83%, and 
on unearned income 98%. 179 The 1979 Budget reduced the highest MTR on earned 
incomes from 83% to 60% and on unearned incomes from 98% to 75%. 180 The 
highest MTR on earned income has been reduced from 60 to 40% since the tax year 
1988-1989. (Additionall)!', other remaining MTRs on high-income levels before the 
highest rate were abolished in 1988). The present highest rates are 40% and 32.5% 
on non-dividend savings and dividend income respectively. 
Jeffrey-Cook notes that the top rate of 40% since 1988 has reduced avoidance 
and evasion. 181 Shipwright and Keeling have a similar view .182 According to Dilnot 
and Stears (1998), with the reduction in MTRs "the incentives to evade and avoid at 
175 Collard, op.cit.(note22), p.6 
176 Trursk, op.cit.(note64), p.21 
177 The Commission on Taxation and Citizenship, op.cit.(note22), p.l 07 
178 Saroj Thongprakum, "A Thai Tax System: the Past, Present, and the Future", RD Tax Journal, 
Year 47, Volume 12, December 2000, 50. 
179 Tiley, op.cit.(note 156), p.117 
180 Whittington, op.cit.(note53), p.160 
181 John Jeffrey-Cook, Taxes ancient and modem, 
http://www. tax.org.uk/showarticle.pl?n=&id= 1562&p= 1, as of 30/05/2004, 2. 
182 Adrian Srupwright and Elizabeth Keeling, Revenue Law, 2"d ed. (London: Blackstone Press, 1998), 
148-149 
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the margin have fa llen over the last fifteen years [in the UK)."183 This evidence 
refutes Slemrod and Bakija's argument that lowering MTRs is unlikely to reduce 
evas1on. 
(ii) Reducing the number of tax bands and rates, and widening tax bands 
It has been fou nd that "too many rates increase tax evasion"184 and "steep 
rates contribute to serious evasion of tax." 185 Widening the tax bands and reducing 
the number of tax bands help reduce the number of MTRs, and thus probably reduce 
incentives for high-income groups to avoid and evade tax. Thailand and the UK have 
now changed tax-rate schedules following this direction. 
There were thirteen narrow tax bands with thirteen MTRs under the Thai tax-
rate schedule during the period 1982-1985, and thirteen slightly widened tax bands 
with thirteen MTRs during the period 1986-1988. During the periods 1989-1991 , 
these were replaced by six wider tax bands with six MTRs. These six tax bands with 
six MTRs have been reduced to five wider tax bands with five MTRs since 1992. 
Additionally, the tax band before the top tax band under the current schedule has 
been made wider than that under the previous schedule. The width of tax band before 
the top tax band is 3,000,000 baht. It was 1,000,000 baht during the period 1982-
1991. 
Under the 2004-2005 UK tax-rate schedule for non-savings income, there are 
only three MTRs with three tax bands, i.e. the starting-rate band, the basic-rate hand 
and the higher-rate band. Formerly, there were one basic-rate band and many higher-
rate bands on incomes in excess of the basic-rate band. For example, during the 
period 1974-1979, there were one basic-rate band and nine higher-rate bands.186 
During the period of 1979-1988, there were one basic-rate band and five higher-rate 
bands. 187 From the tax year 1988-89, there was one basic-rate band; the five higher-
rate bands were replaced by one higher-rate band. From the tax year 1992-1993 to 
the tax year 1998-1999, there was one lower-rate, one basic-rate and one higher-rate 
183 Dilnot and Stears, op.cit.(note62), p.369 
184 The World Bank, op.cit.(notell2), p.41 
185 George E. Lent and Teruo Hirao, A Survey of Thailand's Tax Structure (Washington, D.C.:Fiscal 
Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund, 1970), 35. 
186 Except for the tax year 1978-79, there was a reduced rate band in addition to the basic rate band 
and the higher rate band. 
187 Except for the tax year 1979-80, there was a reduced rate band in addition to the basic rate band 
and the higher rate band. 
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band. From the tax year 1999-2000 to the present (the tax year 2004-2005), there was 
one starting-rate band replacing the lower-rate band, one basic-rate band and one 
higher-rate band. 
(iii) Setting the top MTR 
Setting the top MTR of the PIT so as not to be considerably different from the 
top rate of corporation tax is likely to reduce incentives for high-income groups to 
avoid and evade tax. This is because if the top MTR of the PIT is excessively higher 
than the top rate of corporation tax, high-income groups may choose the corporate 
way of doing business. Under existing Thai and UK laws, the top marginal personal 
income tax rates do not differ considerably from the top corporate income tax 
rates.188 
(iv) The top MTR not exceeding 50% 
The fourth method is to set the top MTR so as not to exceed 50%. The World 
Bank proposed in 1991 that: 
"It is important to set the top [MTR] at a level that will not result in 
widespread tax evasion. Thirty to fifty percent is a reasonable range that will 
avert tax arbitrage."189 
Similarly, "[MTRs] of 50% or more on income are likely to cause incentives 
to evade taxes."190 A survey in the UK (2001) also supported this point that a rate 
above about 50% wou ld encourage tax avoidance and evasion. 191 
Altogether, the four methods help Thai and UK laws to reduce incentives for 
high-income groups to avoid and evade tax. However, they reduce tax progressivity. 
2.4.3.3 Differences between the reduction in tax progressivity under 2.4.3.1 and 
that under 2.4.3.2 
A reduction. in tax progressivity results from either (a) tax avoidance and evasion by 
high-income groups owing to high MTRs, or (b) changes in the tax-rate schedule via 
188 The top rate of Thai corporation tax is 30% in 2003. The full rate of UK corporation tax is 30% in 
2003-2004. 
189 The World Bank, op.cit.(notell2), p.43 
190 Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht, Public Spending in the 20th Century: A Global Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 60. 
191 Hedges and Bromley, op.cit.(notel65), pp.2 and 34 
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the four methods to discourage tax avoidance and evasion. Nevertheless, the impact 
of reduced tax progressivity in each case is differen t. 
Cause (a) has a negative impact on vertical equity/redist1ibution. Conversely, 
cause (b) has a positive impact on vertical equity/redistribution. Reduced tax 
progressivity from cause (b) can maintain sufficient tax progressivity to ach ieve a 
measure of vertical equity/red istribution. 
2.4.3.4 Changes in the tax-rate schedule and vertical redistribution 
The question arises whether a reduction in tax progressivity owing to changes in the 
tax-rate schedule promotes vertical equity/redistribution. A comparison between 
losses in ATRs on high-income groups before and after changes in the tax-rate 
schedule is required. Therefore, the following comparisons need to be investigated: -
(a) the degree of vertical equity/redistribution through the tax-rate schedule 
before changes in the schedule, 
(b) the degree of vertical equity/redistribution through the structure of high 
MTRs, and 
(c) the degree of vertical equity/redistribution after changes in the tax-rate 
schedule to discourage tax avoidance and evasion. 
We have seen that ATRs on high-income groups are reduced by tax 
avoidance and evasion, which lower the level of tax progressivity. Therefore, it 
seems that the lower level of tax progressivity cannot achieve satisfactory vertical 
equity/redistribution. The question then arises whether vertical equity/redistribution 
at the desired level will be achieved if MTRs are made much higher on the earnings 
of high-income groups. Sandford suggests an answer to this question as follows: 
"High tax rates intended to achieve a desired redistribution generate evasion, 
which then necessitates still. higher tax rates in order to achieve the desired 
redistribution, thus generating more evasion. Evasion feeds on itself - the 
more people evade taxes, the more inequities there are in the operation of the 
tax system to drive taxpayers towards evasion."192 
Sandford's idea is convincing: ifMTRs are made much higher, taxpayers will 
face the fact that the loss of their earnings is much higher; or that the gain is much 
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lower. Consequently, there may be more tax avoidance and evas10n; and vertical 
equity/redistribution at the desired level wi ll not emerge. 
Conversely, although changes in the tax-rate schedule to discourage tax 
avoidance and evasion lower the level of tax progressivity, such changes will not 
substantially reduce the degree of vertical equity/redistribution. This is because there 
may be fewer losses in ATRs on high-income groups after changes in the tax-rate 
schedule since attempts to avoid or evade tax are likely to fail. Prest supports this 
point as follows: 
"The amoWJt of tax really lost by the curtailment of the top bracket rate is 
likely to be extremely small, when one allows for the reductions in the 
incentives to avoid and evade."193 
After comparing losses in ATRs on high-income groups before and after 
changes in the tax-rate schedule, the following is my answer to the question raised at 
the outset of this subsection. 
Although changes in the tax-rate schedule to discourage tax avoidance and 
evasion reduce the level of tax progressivity, this reduction offsets the advantage 
gained by avoiders or evaders before such changes occur. The advantage gained by 
avoiders and evaders is tax saving. However, this advantage causes revenue loss or 
makes tax revenue lower than the given rate in the tax-rate schedule, which also 
affects vertical equity/redistribution. 
When changes in the tax-rate schedule occur, incentives to tax avoidance and 
evasion by high-income groups tend to decrease. This phenomenon is likely to bring 
back tax revenue from high-income groups at a level close to the given rate in the 
changed tax-rate schedule. Therefore, it offsets the advantage gained by avoiders and 
evaders before changes in the tax-rate schedule. This phenomenon also reduces 
vertical inequity and inequality in post-tax income distribution to some extent (but 
perhaps not to the desired extent in principle.) 
192 Sandford, op.cit.(note58), p.l59 
193 Prest, op.cit.(note40), p.273 
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2.4.3.5 Changes in the tax-rate schedule and OSMTRs 
The final question concerning avoiding actions is whether reduced tax progressivity 
resulting from changes in the tax-rate schedule can fonn part of OSMTRs. 
If we look at changes in the tax-rate schedule in terms of the discouragement 
of tax avoidance and evasion, reduced tax progressivity has caused fewer losses in 
ATRs on high-income groups. Therefore, reduced tax progressivity in this case to 
some extent helps achieve income redistribution. 
Given this, the tax-rate schedule under the fom methods to discourage tax 
avoidance and evasion is likely to be in agreement with part of OSMTRs, which 
requires the provision of benefits for the poor. 194 
2.4.4 Number of taxpayers, level of income, share of tax liabilities 
Sandford notes that the level of income subject to tax and the proportion of taxpayers 
need to be taken into accotmt when we want to compare the top rates of two tax-rate 
schedules (to see which one is higher). 195 However, the share of tax paid by different 
groups oftaxpayer has to be taken into account in determining tax progressivity. 
2.4.4.1 Number of highest-rate taxpayers and share of their tax liabilities 
The achievement of tax progressivity depends on the number of high- and highest-
rate taxpayers. If the number of people paying tax at high and highest rates is great, · 
the following effects are expected: -
(a) a large number of the rich who pay ATRs, and 
(b) a large amount of tax revenue contributed by the rich. 
However, from past and present experiences in many countries, the number 
of highest-rate taxpayers is small. This results from two causes. 
Firstly, tax avoidance and evasion by highest-income taxpayers result in there 
being a small number of highest-rate taxpayers in some countries. 
Secondly, the top MTR, which is designed to be excessively high applied to a 
high-income level, means that very few people are subject to this rate. As Sandford 
194 As noted in subsection 2.4.2, the proposal for a complete structure of OSMTRs is intended 
simultaneously to provide benefits for poor and rich people. 
195 Cedric Sandford, Why Tax Systems Differ (Bath: Fiscal Publication, 2000), p.51 
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notes, "in one country the top rate may relate to such a high income level that hardly 
anyone pays it." 196 The IMF staffs report also says, 
'The effectiveness of a high [MTR] is also much reduced by its o ften being 
applied at such high levels of income (expressed in shares of per capita GDP) 
that little income is subject to these rates. In some developing countries, a 
taxpayer ' s income must be htmdreds of times the per capita income before it 
enters the highest rate bracket." 197 
In the past, this phenomenon was also found in the UK. The top MTR applied 
to a high-income level also resulted in there being a very small number of highest-
rate taxpayers (or "higher-rate" taxpayers). There were very few people (not 
exceeding about 5% of the total number of taxpayers) paying tax at higher rates, 
resulting in payment of a small amount of tax at these rates. 198 The facts quoted 
below support this. 
"In 1948/9 there were no less than thirteen different rates of income tax, 
rising to 95%. Yet the basic rate of income tax, then 36%, applied to incomes 
up to £30,000 (at 1988 earnings levels). The absurd 95% rate applied only 
above £250,000 (at 1988 earnings levels), and it is likely that some of the 
thirteen rates [higher rates] were the [MTR] for only a few thousand, or even 
hundred taxpayers." 199 
Additionally, there were about 25,000 people paying tax at the top MTR 
(98%) in 1976-77.200 
Hence, two inferences can be made from the above theoretical analysis and 
facts. 
Firstly, strong tax progressivity may not be fulfilled owing to (a) the small 
number of highest-rate taxpayers and (b) a high-income level subject to tax at the 
highest rate. 
Secondly, a top MTR designed to be excessively high is insignificant m 
practice. This is because (a) this rate relates to a very high-income level, and (b) 
there are (i) very few people paying tax at this rate, (ii) a small amount of income 
196 "b"d 51 I 1 .p. 
197 Tanzi and Zee, op.cit.(note108), p.7 
198 Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), pp.196-l97 
199 ibid.p.197 
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subject to this rate, and (iii) a small amount of tax paid at this rate. The significance 
of the highest rate of tax should not be ovenated, in view of the small number of 
highest-rate taxpayers. 201 
The top rates in the cunent Thai and UK tax-rate schedules have been 
considerably reduced. Although the top MTR in the Thai tax-rate schedule has been 
reduced from 65% to 55%, 50% and 37% over the period from 1982 until the 
present, there was a very small number of highest-rate taxpayers during 2000-2002 
(the latest data as found in the website of the Revenue Department of Thailand) as 
shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 
Year Number of highest-rate taxpayers Percentage of total taxpayers 
2000 14,631 0.27%--zoL 
2001 17,608 0.29%203 
2002 19,902 0.32%204 
Although there have been a very small number and very small proportion of 
Thai highest-rate taxpayers, the amount and share of tax paid by this group have been 
very large as shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 
Year Amount of income tax liabilittes Percentage of total income tax liabilities 
of highest-rate taxpayers (baht) 
2000 19,595,281,092 33.06%205 
2001 24,206,817,476 34.42%206 
2002 26,67 4,662,186 31.31%207 
200 Astin, op.cit.(notell8), p.163 
201 Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), p. I96 
202Source: The Revenue Department of Thailand, http://www.rd.go.tb!publlsh/20525.0.html,as of 
04/07/05 
203 
"------------------ - - --------------- --------", http://www.rd.go. th/publish/61 03.0.hbnl,as of 04/07/05 
204 
"---------- ---------------------------------", http://www.rd.go.th/publish/20524.0.html,as of04/07/05 
205 
"--------------------- ----------- ------ - - ---", http://www.rd.go.th/publish/20525.0.html,as of04/07/05 
206 
"--------------- --------- - ------------------", bttp://www.rd.go.th/publish/61 03.0.hbnl,as of 04/07/05 
207 
"-------- - ----------------------------------", http://www.rd.go.th/publish/20524.0.hhnl,as of04/07/05 
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Table 2.3 will compare the number and share ofThai taxpayers as well as the 
amount and share of tax paid by di fferent groups ofThai taxpayer in 2002. 
Table 2.3208 
Group of taxpayers Number Percentage of Amount of income Percentage of total 
of total taxpayers tax liabili ties income tax liabilities 
taxpayers (million baht) 
Low-rate taxpayers 1,796, 107 28.85% 1.31 0.001 % 
(Lower) Middle-rate taxpayers 3,896,903 63.60% 12,751.31 16.40% 
(Upper) Middle-rate taxpayers 362,449 5.82% 12,970.04 16.68% 
High-rate taxpayers 149,268 2.40% 25.347.12 32.60% 
Highest-rate taxpayers 19,902 0.32% 26,674.66 34.31% 
Total 6,073,419 100% 77,744.44 100% 
Accordmg to Table 2.3, although the amount and share of tax patd by Thai 
highest-rate taxpayers are large, a change in the Thai tax-rate schedule is still 
required in order to bring a larger number and proportion of highest-rate taxpayers 
into the PIT system. This will further bring a much larger amount and share of 
income tax liability of the rich. This change may be made by widening the present 
highest-rate band. There are two reasons for this. 
Firstly, although a high-income level subject to the top MTR is lowered as a 
result of reduction in the top rate from 65% to 37%, a taxpayer's income must be 
nearly fifty times the per capita GDP before it is subject to the top MTR. 209 Lowering 
the highest-rate threshold is therefore required. This will also make the present 
highest-rate band wider. 
Secondly, a wide tax band does not cause unfairness between taxpayers in the 
same tax band. It is misleading to think that too wide a range of income in a tax band 
causes unfairness between taxpayers at the bottom end of a tax band and those at the 
top end. This misunderstanding results from looking at MTRs only and ignoring 
ATRs. As discussed earlier, a multiple rate structure relies on the increase of ATRs 
with higher income, which is implemented by increasing MTRs. Therefore, the 
208 Source: The Revenue Department of Thailand, http: //www.rd.go.th/pub1ish/20524.0.html,as of 
04/07/05 
The definitions of low-rate taxpayers, (lower) middle-rate taxpayers, (upper) middle-rate taxpayers, 
high-rate taxpayers, and highest-rate taxpayers can be found in Appendix VII to Chapter Two. 
209 The evidence is that per capita GDP in 2001 was 81,057 baht, while the highest-rate threshold is 
taxable income over 4,000,000 baht. (National Statistical Office of Thailand, 
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difference in tax liability between taxpayers with different incomes is determined by 
ATRs at different levels of income. The increase of ATRs with higher income should 
also be taken into account in considering whether a very wide tax band causes 
unfaimess between taxpayers in the same tax band. Kay and King give an example to 
suppott this point as follows: 
" It is true that someone who eams £5,000 is liable to tax at the basic rate of 
25% [in 1988/1989), and so is someone who eams £20,000. However, the 
man on £5,000 pays ammal tax of £226-equivalent to an [ATR] of 4.5%. His 
counterpart on £20,000 has to pay £3,976, an [ATR] of 19.9%. The fact that 
they are both in the [wide] basic rate band does not prevent the man with the 
higher income from paying a much higher proportion of his income in tax."210 
Considering the above, I disagree with James and Nobes when they say that 
the wide tax band causes inequity between taxpayers because "the same marginal 
rate applies to individuals over a very wide income range."211 They give an example 
as follows: 
"For example, in 2000/2001 an individual entitled only to the single person's 
allowance would pay the same marginal rate of tax [of 22%] whether he or 
she earned as little as £5,906 or as much as £32,785."212 
Meanwhile, there has been a small number of British higher-rate taxpayers 
under the UK tax-rate schedule as shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 




http://www.nso.go.th/eng/ indicators/core e.htm,as of?/12/2002, 1.) 
21° Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), pp.40-41 
2 11 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l59 
212 ibid.p.159 




http://www.inlandxevenue.gov.uk/stats/jncome tax/it tO 1 l.htm,as of 18/03/03 
214 Source: Inland Revenue 
http://www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/sta ts/jncome tax/it tO 1 l.htm,as of 10/09/03 
215 Source: Stuart Adam, A Survey of UK Tax System: IFS Briefing Note, BN09 (updated November 
2004) 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn09.pdf ,as of04/07/05, 6. 
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Although the number of higher-rate taxpayers is small at present, it is larger 
than it has been in the past. As the IFS paper notes, "the total number of income 
taxpayers has increased slowly over the years, whi le the number of higher-rate 
taxpayers has grown much more quickly, from less than 3% of the taxpaying 
population in 1979-80 to more than 10% in 2004-05."216 
Although there have been a comparatively small number and small 
proportion of higher-rate taxpayers, the amount and share of tax paid by higher-rate 
taxpayers have been very large as shown in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 
Year Amount of income tax Percentage of total income tax liabilities 
liabilities of higher-rate 
taxpayers (£) 
2002-03 60,600,000,000 52.3%ll/ 
2003-04 66,400,000,000 53.3%218 
2004-05 69,100,000,000 54.5%219 
Table 2.6 will compare the number and share of British taxpayers as well as 
the amount and share of tax paid by different groups of taxpayer in 2004-05. 
Table 2.6220 
Group of taxpayers Number of Percentage of Amount of income Percentage of total 
taxpayers total taxpayers tax liabilities (£) income tax liabilities 
Starting-rate taxpayers 4,200,000 14.04% 1,066,000,000 0.8% 
Basic-rate taxpayers 22,300,000 74.58% 56,700,000,000221 44.7% 
Higher-rate taxpayers 3,430,000 11.47% 69,100,000,000222 54.5% 
Total 29,900,000 100% 126,900,000,000 100% 
The IFS paper remarks that the share of income tax liability borne by higher-
rate taxpayers has grown since 1978-79, "despite reductions in the higher rates."223 
216 ibid.p.25 
217 Source: Inland Revenue, 
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk!stats/ income tax/it t05 l.htm,as of 18/03/03 
218 Source: Inland Revenue, 
hnp://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk!stats/income tax/it t05 l.htm,as of 10/09/03 
219 Adam, op.cit.(note215), p.6 
220 This table is adapted from Table 4 in Adam. (ibid.p.6) 
The defmitions of starting-rate taxpayers, basic-rate taxpayers, and higher-rate taxpayers can be 
fow1d in Appendix Vll to Chapter Two. 
221 This amollilt includes their starting-rate liabilities. 
222 This amount includes their starting- and basic-rate liabilities. 
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Fut1her to a remark in the IFS paper, since the top MTR was reduced from 60% to 
40% and the five higher-rate bands were replaced by one higher-rate band in 1988-
89, the share of income tax liability borne by higher-rate taxpayers has grown much 
more. The greater the reduction in higher rates, the more higher-rate taxpayers have 
shared the tax burdens. 
Table 2.7 will show increases in the share of income tax liabilities borne by 
the top 1% and the top 1 0% of income taxpayers who represent higher-rate 
taxpayers. 
Table 2.7: Share of total income tax liability224 
Year Top 1% of income Top 10% of income Top rates 
taxpayers taxpayers 
1978-79 11 35 83%,98% 
1981-82 11 35 60%,75% 
1986-87 14 39 60% 
1990-91 15 42 40%. 
1991-92 16 43 40% 
1992-93 16 44 40% 
1993-94 16 44 40% 
1994-95 17 45 40% 
1995-96 17 45 40% 
1996-97 20 48 40% 
1997-98 20 48 40% 
1998-99 21 49 40% 
1999-2000 21 50 40% 
2000-01 22 52 40% 
2001-02 22 52 40% 
2002-03 21 52 40% 
2003-04 21 51 40% 
2004-05 21 52 
40% 
It can be seen from discussion, and the facts and tables above that the gradual 
reduction of the top rate from 98% to 40% has had the following outcomes. 
(1) Such reductions have brought a larger number and proportion of higher-
rate taxpayers into the present UK income tax system. 
223 Adam, op.cit.(note2 15), p.27 
224 Data from 1978-79 until 1986-87 are taken from Table 17 in the IFS paper. (ibid.p.27) 
Data from 1990-91 until 2004-05 are taken from Table 2.4 Shares of total income tax liability. (HM 
Revenue & Customs, http://www.hmrc.gov. uk/stats/income _ tax/table2-4.pdf,as of 04/07 /05) 
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(2) Although the number and proportion of higher-rate taxpayers are smaller 
than those of basjc- and starting-rate taxpayers, the amount and share of 
income tax paid by higher-rate taxpayers are larger than those paid by 
basic- and starting-rate taxpayers. 
(3) The share of tax liability borne by higher-rate taxpayers has steadily 
grown. 
The IFS paper remarks on the quick growth in the number of higher-rate 
taxpayers from less than 3% of total taxpayers in 1978-80 to more than 10% in 2004-
05 as follows: 
"Some of this growth reflects periods when the threshold above which 
higher-rate tax is due has not been raised in line with price inflation, some 
reflects the fact that incomes on average have grown more quickly than 
prices, and some the fact that the dispersion of incomes has grown, with 
especially rapid increases in the incomes of those already towards the top of 
the income djstribution, pushing more of them into higher-rate income tax 
liability. "225 
Additionally, earlier facts and discussions show that an increase in the 
number of higher-rate taxpayers and in the amount of tax liability of higher-rate 
taxpayers partly results from two achievements consequential on the steady reduction 
in the top rate; namely (a) the discouragement of tax avoidance and evasion (as 
discussed in 2.4.3), and (b) the lowering of the high-income level subject to the top 
rate. 
Regarding achievement (b), it is evident that in the past the top rate related to 
a high-income level subject to it. As we have seen, the excessively high top rate 
applying to a high-income level generated a small income as very few people were 
subject to it. Continual reductions in this rate from 98% to 40% helped lower the 
high-income level. Consequently, the reductions have raised more income and 
brought a larger number of people into the top rate. This is because a larger amount 
of income subject to the top rate is supposed to come from there being a larger 
number of people subject to this rate. Additionally, the larger income subject to the 
top rate will mean a larger amount and greater share of tax liability at the higher rate. 
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However, if the higher-rate band were made wider, a larger number and 
greater proportion of higher-rate taxpayers would be brought into the UK income tax 
system. This would also generate a larger amount and greater share of tax liability of 
the rich , resu lting in greater tax progressivity. The higher-rate band may be widened 
by lowering the highest-rate threshold. 
2.4.4.2 Number of low-rate taxpayers and share of tax liabilities 
There should be a few people paying tax at 'the low rate' or 'the starting rate' to 
promote tax progressivity. If the number of low- or starting-rate taxpayers is small, a 
small number of the poor will pay ATRs, and a small amount of tax revenue will be 
contributed by the poor. This will not cause income to be redistributed too much 
from low-income groups. 
Nevertheless, the number of Thai low- rate taxpayers is not small during 
2000-2002 (the latest data as found in the website of the Revenue Department of 
Thailand) as shown in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8 
Year Number of Thai low-rate taxpayers Percentage of total taxpayers 
2000 1,713,619 32.03%l:l(J 
2001 1,959,489 32.41%227 
2002 1,796,107 28.85%728 
Meanwhile, the number of British starting-rate taxpayers is not small as 
shown in Table 2.9. 
Table 2.9 
Year Number of British starting-rate Percentage of total taxpayers 
taxpayers 
2002-03 3,880,000 13.20%22Y 
2003-04 4,300,000 14%230 
2004-05 4,200,000 14.04%231 
225 Adam, op.cit.(note2 15), pp.25-26 
226 Source: The Revenue Department of Thailand, http://www.rd.go.th/publish/20525.0.htmJ,as of 
04/07/05 
227 
" --------------------------------------------", http :II www. rd. go. thlpub lish/61 0 3. 0. html,as of 04/07/0 5 
228 
"--------------------------------------------", http:iiwww.rd.go.th/publish/20524.0html,as of04/07/05 
229 Source: Inland Revenue, 
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The fact that the number and proportion of Thai and British low- or starting-
rate taxpayers are not small could mean that: -
(a) a large number of the poor pay A TRs, and 
(b) a large amount of tax revenue is contributed by the poor. 
However, it cannot yet be concluded that the present Thai and UK tax-rate 
schedules have failed to achieve vertical equity/ redistribution. lt is further necessary 
to take the amount and share of tax liabilities at the low or starting rate under both 
tax-rate schedules into account. 
Table 2.10 will show the amount and share of tax paid by Thai low-rate 
taxpayers during 2000-2002 (the latest data as found in the website of the Revenue 
Department of Thailand). 
Table 2.10 
Year Amount of income tax liabilities Percentage of total income tax liabilities 
of Thai low-rate taxpayers 
(baht) 
2000 44,564,309 0.07%:.uz 
2001 726,392,670 1.04%233 
2002 1,3 17,920 0.001234 
htrp://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/statsiincome ta.· ir tO I l .hl!!1aS of 18/03/03 
230 Source: Inland Revenue 
hup://www.inlandrevenue.gov.ukistatsiincome tax/it tO 1 l .ht!!1aS of I 0/09/03 
231 Adam, op.cit.(note215), p.6 
232 Source: The Revenue Department of Thailand, htrp://www.rd.go.th/publish/20525.0.html,as of 
04/07/2005 
233 
"-----------------------------------------", http:i/www.rd.go.th/publislv'G I 03.0.html,as of 04/07/2005 
234 
"------------------------------------------", http://www.rd.go.th/publish/20524.0.html,as of04/07/2005 
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Table 2.11 wi 11 show the amount and share of tax paid by British starting-rate 
taxpayers. 
Table 2.11 
Year Amount of income tax Percentage of total income tax liabilities 
liabilities of British starting-
rate taxpayers (£) 
2002-03 I ,020,000,000 0.9o/oLJ.) 
2003-04 1,040,000,000 0.8%236 
2004-05 1,066,000,000 0.8%237 
Although the number and proportion of Thai and British low- or starting-rate 
taxpayers are not small, the amount and share of tax paid by these taxpayers are very 
small. This implies that both tax-rate schedules only partly help achieve vertical 
equity/redistribution. To achieve a greater vertical equity/redistribution at a low-
income level, the present number and proportion of Thai and British low- or starting-
rate taxpayers should be further lowered. This will further lower the amount and 
share of tax paid by these taxpayers. 
Reductions in the number and proportion of low- or starting-rate taxpayers as 
well as in the amount and share of tax paid by these taxpayers can be made by: 
(a) lowering the low or starting rate, 
(b) narrowing the low- or starting-rate band, and 
(c) raising the level of income subject to the low or starting rate. 
Methods (a) and (b) 
These two methods are influenced by the UK experience. In 1999-2000, the 
20% lower rate was replaced by a new 10% rate. The new lower rate is known as 
'the starting rate' and applies to a smaller amount of taxable income than the 20% 
235 Source: Inland Revenue, 
http://www.inlandrevenue. gov .uk/stats!income tax/it tO I l.htm,as of 18/03/03 
236 Source: Inland Revenue, 
http://ww1.v. inlandrevenue.gov.uk/stats/ income taxi it t05 J.htm,as of 10/09/03 
237 Adam, op.cit.(note215), p.6 
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rate that it replaced. 238 The introduction of the new 10% rate together with a 
nanower tax band has Jed to the fo llowing outcomes: -
Firstly, the number of starting-rate taxpayers has been reduced.239 
Secondly, the amount and share of income tax liability at the starting rate 
have been reduced. This is due to: -
(a) the reduced tax rate, 
(b) the smaller amount of income subject to the 10% starting rate, and 
(c) the smaller number of people paying tax at the 10% starting rate. 
Method (c) 
The level of income subject to the low rate or the starting rate set at a low 
level would subject a large amount of income and a large number of people, in 
particular the poor, to this rate. Consequently, it would raise the amount and share of 
tax liability at this rate. If the level of income subject to the low or starting rate were 
raised, there would be less income and a smaller number of people, in particular the 
poor, subject to it. Consequently, there would be a reduction in the amount and share 
of tax paid by low-income people. 
Messere has found the facts as follows: -
"Thresholds, zero rate brackets and first positive rates should logically be 
discussed together, for while most countries simply have a threshold and then 
a first positive rate, others have a threshold and a zero rate before a positive 
rate is reached."240 
The use of a zero-rate bracket (after a threshold and before a positive rate) is 
one ofways to raise the level of income subject to the low rate.241 
In Thailand, a zero-rate bracket has been enacted since the tax year 1999. 
Before 1999, the low-rate band together with the 5% low rate applied to the first 
100,000 baht of taxable income. In 1999, Royal Decree No.352 (1999) was passed to 
exempt the first 50,000 baht of taxable income from tax? 42 In other words, in 1999 
238 The 10% starting rate applies to the ftrst £1,500 of taxable income in 1999-2000. In the previous 
year (1998-1999), the 20% lower rate applied to the first £4,300 of taxable income. 
239 Adam, op.cit.(note215), p.27 
24° K.C. Messere, Tax Policy in OECD countries: Choices and Conflicts (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications BV, 1993), 239. 
241 Another way of raising the tax threshold is by increasing personal tax allowances. 
242 This law was effective from !51 January 1999. 
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the low-rate band was divided into two portions; the first portion (50,000 baht) was 
taxed at a zero rate and the second portion (50,000 baht) was taxed at the 5% low 
rate. 
Royal Decree No.352 (1999) was subsequently abolished by Royal Decree 
No.412 (2002). According to Royal Decree No.412 (2002), the first 80,000 baht of 
taxable income is tax exempt.243 fn other words, since 2003 the low-rate band has 
been divided into two portions; the first portion (80,000 baht) being taxed at a zero 
rate and the second portion (20,000 baht) at the 5% low rate. 
Royal Decree No.412 (2002) was subsequently abolished by Royal Decree 
No. 430 (2005). According to Royal Decree No.430 (2005), the first 100,000 baht of 
taxable income is tax exempt.244 In other words, since 2004 the first 100,000 baht of 
taxable income has been taxed at a zero rate. 
The tax-exempt income or a zero-rate bracket for the first 50,000 baht, the 
first 80,000 baht and the first 100,000 baht of taxable income has applied to the 
calculation of taxable income by subtracting deductible expenses and tax reliefs from 
the assessable income in computing the tax liability at the end of the tax year and at 
withholding of tax at source for income from employment.245 So, it has not applied to 
certain withholding of tax at source which does not require the calculation of taxable 
income by subtracting deductible expenses and tax reliefs from the assessable 
income, such as withholding .. at source in relation to payments for the sale of 
authorship and for the sale of immovable property.246 
The Revenue Department of Thailand states that the objective of zero-rate 
bracket is to reduce the tax burdens of the low- and middle-income groups.247 As we 
have seen in Table 2.1 0, during the period when a zero-rate bracket for the first 
50,000 baht was in effect, there were the small amount and share of tax liability at 
the low rate. A zero-rate bracket for the first 80,000 baht and for the first 100,000 
baht are expected to bring about the smaller number and proportion of low-rate 
243 This law was effective from l st January 2003. 
244 This law has been effective since 151 January 2004. 
245 The group of Thai tax academicians, Taxation According to Revenue Code 2005 (Bangkok: Ruan-
Gaow Printing, 2005), 42. 
246 ibid.pp.42-43 
247 The Revenue Department ofThailand, What's New: New measures for the lower income, 
http://www.rd.go.th/publishi l2794.0.html,as of 18/1146, 1. 
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taxpayers as well as the smaller amount and share of income tax paid at the low-
income level.248 This is because such zero-rate brackets will raise the income subject 
to the low rate, removing more people at a low-income level fi·om the PIT system 
and reducing the amount of income subject to the low rate. 
2.4.4.3 Changes in the tax-rate schedule and OSMTRs 
To bring about greater tax progressivity and promote income redistribution, the 
following phenomena are required: 
(a) an increase in the number of highest- or higher-rate taxpayers and in the 
amount of tax paid by these taxpayers, and 
(b) a reduction in the mm1ber of low- or starting-rate taxpayers and in the 
amount of tax paid by these taxpayers. 
Phenomenon (a) can come about via the widening of the highest- or higher-
rate band. Phenomenon (b) can be realized by (i) lowering the low or starting rate, 
(ii) narrowing the low- or starting-rate band, and (iii) using a zero-rate bracket. 
The above changes encourage income redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
Consequently, they are likely to be in agreement with part of OSMTRs, which 
requires the provision of benefits for the poor. 
2.4.5 Price inflation 
Inflation is "persistent increases in the general level of prices. "249 Consequently, the 
cost of living increases, and nominal income increases to cover the cost of living. 
When an individual's nominal income and the price level increase at the same rate, 
his/her real income remains unchanged. 250 
As nominal income increases with price inflation, the taxpayer is pushed into 
higher tax bands with higher MTRs although his/her real income does not 
increase.251 This phenomenon is referred to as "fiscal drag" or "bracket creep."252 
248 At the time of doing this research, no data from the website of the Revenue Department of 
Thailand is available for 2003 and 2004. 
249 Graham Bannock et al., The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, 6th ed. (London: Penguin Books, 
1998), 205. 
250 Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance, s•h ed. (Boston: JrwiJl!McGraw-Hill, 1999), 367. 
251 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.371 
252 James, op.cit.(note2), p.l9 
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Heavier tax burdens as the result of the 'bracket creep' effect, particularly on 
low-income taxpayers, deter tax progressivity. Similarly, the ' bracket creep' effect 
"can seriously undennine the progressivity and faimess of [the PIT] because low-
income groups will be subject to unduly high [MTRs]."253 
Tax bands should therefore be widened to keep pace with the price level to 
maintain their real value and to avoid a tax increase brought about by price inflation. 
The p1ice level/the rate of inflation is measured by the retai l ptices index or the 
consumer price index. The retail prices index is "an index of the p1ices of goods and 
services purchased by consumers to measure the rate of inflation or the cost of 
living."254 Likewise, it is "the official UK cost of living index."255 Therefore, tax 
bands should be armually adjusted in line with changes in the retail prices index. 
According to UK law, unless Parliament otherwise determines, the starting-
rate band, the basic-rate band, and the higher-rate band (where applicable) are 
widened annually by the same percentage as the percentage increase in the retail 
prices index for the previous year. The resultant figure (other than the starting-rate 
band) and income limits is rounded up to the nearest £100 and in the case of the 
starting-rate band to the nearest £10.256 Therefore, UK law relating to the indexation 
of tax bands can prevent bracket creep. 
Meanwrule, Thai law has no provision for adjusting tax bands according to 
the rate of price inflation. However, the Thai government has changed the tax-rate 
schedule from time to time to mitigate the effect of bracket creep due to price 
inflation?57 The government changed the tax-rate schedule four times between 1982 
and 1992. However, there bas not been a change in the tax-rate schedule since 1992, 
although inflation has occurred every year during this period. The rates of price 
inflation from 1992-2004 were 4.1%, 3.4%, 5.1%, 5.8%, 5.9%, 5.6%, 8.1%, 0.3%, 
1.6%, 1.6%258, 0.7%, 1.8%, and 2.7%259respectively. Therefore, "though the 
253 The World Bank, op.cit.(note112), p.49 
254 Bannock, op.cit.(note249), p.359 
255 Black, op.cit.(note140), p.404 
256 Sections 1(4) (5A) (6), TA 1988 
257 Chaipat Sahasakul, Features of the Tax System in Thailand (Bangkok: Thailand Development 
Research Institute, 1987), 26. 
258 Source: The Bank ofThailand, 
http:www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/databank/EconDataffhai keyffhai key E.asp,as of 25/07/2005, 
p.1 
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government has so far tried to offset the bracket creep effect due to inflation for low-
income and middle- income taxpayers , it can only do it partially. " 260 
It is clear that without indexation provision, inflation, through bracket creep, 
increases tax burdens on taxpayers. AdditionaJiy, occasional changes in the tax-rate 
schedule are not good enough to maintain the real value of tax bands to completely 
counteract bracket creep. The US experience is likely to support this conclusion. 
According to Brunori, "for many years, the failure of many states to index their 
income tax systems to inflation has resulted in substantial tax increases without 
legislative action. "261 
By comparison, UK law is more likely to prevent bracket creep and to bring 
about tax progressivity than Thai law. The adoption of provisions. for price-level 
indexation should therefore be made into Thai law as is done in UK law. The World 
Bank supports this suggestion as follows: 
"[In Thai land], equity of the PIT is low. There are no automatic adjustments 
of brackets ... , so the inflationary effect on rates . . .. has gradually eliminated 
much of the progressivity of the rate structure . . . .. Also, consideration should 
be given to creating an automatic inflation adjustment methodology to update 
brackets ... in the PIT. "262 
The annual adjustment of tax bands in line with changes in the retail prices 
index to prevent the bracket-creep effect due>to price inflation would mean a change 
in the tax-rate schedule. As we have seen, without adjustment of tax bands for price 
inflation, inflation increases tax burdens on taxpayers although their income remains 
unchanged. The indexation of tax bands to the price level can maintain the real value 
of tax bands and avoid an unintended tax increase brought about by price inflation. 
Therefore, a change in the tax-rate schedule to match inflation benefits all groups of 
taxpayers. Such change also promotes tax progressivity and vertical 
259 Source: The National Statistical Office of Thailand, Statistical Yearbook Thailand 2004 (Table 
19.1 General Consumer Price Index by Region and Commodity Group 2001-2004), (Bangkok: 
National Statistical Office, 2005), 424. 
260 Sahasakul, op.cit.(note257), p.29 
26 1 David Brunori, "State Personal Income Taxation in the Twenty-First Century", The Future of State 
Taxation, David Brunori ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1998), 198. 
262 The World Bank, Thailand Public Finance in Transition (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 
2000), 27. 
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equity/redistribution because of a reduction in tax burdens on the poor, which ts 
likely to be in agreement with part of OSMTRs. 
3. Concepts and effects of the progressive rate structure on efficiency 
Astin remarks that "high [MTRs] may be imposed in order to achieve redistribution 
or in order to achieve a desired total revenue from a progressive sh-ucture, or 
both."263 
However, the revenue-raising purpose may not be achieved because high 
MTRs are believed to produce high costs and great losses in the taxing process, 
leading to inefficiency of taxation. Likewise, "the criteria of economic efficiency 
requires low [MTRs]." 264 
To promote efficiency of taxation, the tax-rate schedule must reduce 
administrative and compliance costs, and losses in the taxing process. 
3.1 Administrative and compliance costs 
To reduce administrative and compliance costs, the tax-rate schedule should (a) be 
simple and (b) reduce incentives to avoid and evade tax. 
3.1.1 Complex tax system 
The tax-rate schedule causes complexity because of (a) the inherent complexity 
within the tax-rate schedule, and (b) tax rates and bands leading to complexity in 
other structures of the PIT system. 
3.1.1.1 Inherent complexity within the tax-rate schedule 
Slemrod and Bakija argue that "a graduated tax rate structure does not, by itself, 
directly contribute any significant complexity to the taxpaying process."265 
However, I have found that the inherent complexity within the tax-rate schedule 
causes complexity through the existence of: 
263 Astin, op.cit.(notell8), p.l63 
264 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.l2 
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(a) many MTRs and tax bands, and 
(b) the great differential between tax rates on earned income, non-dividend 
savings income, and dividend income. 
As regards (a), The World Bank notes, "the worldwide tax refom1s of the 
Eighties resulted in a real attack on multiple rate structures."266 This is because the 
multiple rate stntcture increases administrati ve complexity and collection costs.267 
Similarly "when rates are not fl at, there is an additional cost of collection in 
admjnistering graduated rates."268 As regards (b), The World Bank notes, "too many 
[different] rates increase the complexity of the tax system."269 
Additionally, causes (a) and (b) can increase the complexity and the cost of 
tax compliance. This is because taxpayers who have neither basic nor advanced 
knowledge of progressive tax rates and various rates are supposed to spend extra 
resources in dealing with their tax affairs. The survey in the UK (in 2000) pointed 
out that the British people "are sometimes confused about the effects of thresholds 
and rates oftax."270 The survey has also found as follows: -
"The idea that there are different rates at different earnings thresholds is 
broadly familiar, but not many people have an accurate grasp of all the actual 
thresholds and rates."271 
"There are often signs of ignorance or misconception about specifics-
sometimes even about fundamental items like · the basic rate of income 
tax."272 
"[Many people] sometimes talk as if people pay. their highest rate on all their 
income. So conversation about the 40% higher rate of income tax would 
sometimes lurch into a false frame of reference as people started speaking as 
if someone earning (say) £35,000 would pay 40% of their entire income in 
tax.":nJ 
265 Slernrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p. l38 
266 The World Bank Group, op.cit.(notel62), p.2 
261 ibid.p.2 
268 Dalton, op.cit.(note30), p.l13 
269 The World Bank, op.cit.(notell2), p.41 
210 Hedges and Bromley, op.cit.(notel65), p.20 
271 ibid.p.l9 
272 ibid.p. l2 
273 "b"d 12 I I .p. 
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Furthermore, the survey notes that the ordinary people do not understand the 
progressive rate structure and this is the reason for rich people to employ 
J74 accountants.-
This survey was conducted in 2000, when there were few MTRs and tax 
bands as wel l as only a slight differential in tax rates between earned and unearned 
income. It can be infened that the progressive rate structure is hard to understand 
even though it is uncomplicated. 
It is clear that simplicity in the tax-rate schedule is required and can be 
achieved by: 
(a) reducing the number ofMTRs and tax bands, and 
(b) reducing the differential in tax rates between earned mcome, non-
dividend savings income and dividend income. 
(a) Fewer rates and bands 
The World Bank notes, "the numbers of rates [and bands] [have] been greatly 
reduced in many countries with attendant savings of administrative cost."275 
However, Messere argues that: 
"The reduction of the number of brackets has an appearance of simplicity, but 
it is unlikely in most countries to have much practical effect. For example, 
fewer brackets will probably have little effect on tax administrative or 
taxpayers' compliance costs, since taxpayers will ·refer directly to details of 
liabilities at different income levels and in different family circumstances, 
which are made available by governments and published in newspapers, 
rather than calculate their liability from the legal schedule."276 
In my opinion, having fewer rates and bands reduces the inherent complexity 
within the tax-rate schedule as well as reducing administrative and compliance costs, 
for two reasons. 
Firstly, as a result of there being fewer rates and bands, tax bands are wider. 
Consequently, the amount of tax deducted at source probably equals the amount of 
tax liability according to the tax-rate schedule. On this basis, most British taxpayers 
274 'b'd 11 I I .p. 
275 The World Bank Group, op.cit.(note 162), p.2 
276 Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.239 
75 
are not required to file tax returns. This fact can be seen from the operation of the 
very wide UK basic-rate band. James and Nobes support this, stating that: 
"The main reason for the long band has been that it a llows tax to be deducted 
at source very accurately from the investment income and from any second 
and subsequent employments of most taxpayers."277 
Secondly, as a result of there being fewer rates and bands, taxpayers will 
spend less time understanding the progressive rate structure to calculate and 
complete their tax returns if returns are required. 
At present, tax rates and bands in the Thai and UK tax-rate schedules have 
been greatly reduced. Therefore, the inherent complexity within both tax-rate 
schedules has been reduced. 
(b) Reduction in rate differential 
The great differential in tax rates between earned and unearned income is one 
factor causing the inherent complexity within the tax-rate schedule. Reducing rate 
differentials will reduce inherent complexity. Differentials in tax rates on such 
incomes result from their being taxed through separate schedules.278 To reduce such 
differentials, the unification of rate structures is required. It would lead to simplicity 
oftax administration.279 
3.1.1.2 Other complexity caused by the progressive rate·structure 
Tax rates or bands can lead to complexity in other structures of the PIT system, 
which includes: -
(a) complex legislation to prevent tax-avoidance schemes resulting from high 
MTRs; 
(b) complexity in the taxing process and increased costs of tax compliance 
and administration resulting from the width of the low- or starting-rate 
band which brings more poor people into the PIT system. 
As regards (a), tax-avoidance schemes caused by high MTRs are 
complicated280, which lead to "substantial enforcement problems for tax 
277 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p. I59 
278 The World Bank, op.cit.(note112), p.39 
279 T hirsk, op.cit.(note64), p.22 
280 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.{note63), p.l39 
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administration."28 1 Problems for tax administration include the administration of 
complex legislation to prevent tax-avoidance schemes. 282 Complex legislation 
increases costs for tax-gatherers and taxpayers in administering or dealing with it. 
Lowering high MTRs accompanied by three other methods283 to discourage 
tax-avoidance schemes (as discussed in 2.4.3.2) probably make tax avoidance and 
evasion less desirable. Consequently, there wi ll be fewer complex anti-avoidance 
rules for tax gatherers to administer and for taxpayers to comply with, which will 
reduce administrative and compliance costs. 
As regards (b), the width of the low- OJ" starting-rate band may lead to 
complexity in the taxing process and increased costs of tax compliance and 
administration because it increases the n':mber of low-income taxpayers. This tends 
to incur "compliance costs that are disproportionate to the tax they pay."284 
As indicated in 2.4.4.2, the amount and share of tax paid by a large number of 
Thai and UK low- or starting-rate taxpayers are very small. Therefore, the large 
number of low-income taxpayers leads to complexity in the taxing process and 
increased costs of tax compliance and administration without producing a large 
amount of tax revenue. 
To reduce the role of the low- or starting-rate band in causing complexity in 
the taxing process and increased costs of tax compliance and administration, some of 
the low- or starting-rate taxpayers should be moved out of the PIT system. As noted 
in 2.4.4.2, the low- or starting-rate band under the present Thai and UK tax-rate 
schedules is not too wide as a result of using a zero-rate bracket (under Thai law) and 
narrowing the starting-rate band (under UK law). In spite of such changes, the 
number of Thai and UK low- or starting-rate taxpayers is still large. This implies that 
the low- or starting-rate band may need to be further narrowed to reduce further the 
number of low-income taxpayers. 285 
281 The World Bank Group, op.cit.(notel53), p.2 
282 .b.d 2 I I .p. 
283except for expanding the low- or starting-rate band 
284 The World Bank Group, op.cit.(notel62), p.2 
285 To further remove low-income taxpayers out of the PIT system, the following methods can be 
made to further narrow the width of the low- or starting-rate band: -
(a) to use a zero-rate band for the first amotmt of taxable income and to adjust such band in 
line with price inflation in each tax year; and 
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3.1.1.3 Changes in the tax-rate schedule and OSMTRS 
My research so far suggests that the following are required to reduce administrative 
and compliance costs: 
(a) a reduction in the inherent complexity of the tax-rate schedule, and 
(b) a reduction in the complexity of other structures of the PIT system. 
Simplicity in the tax-rate schedule would lead to phenomenon (a). Such 
simplicity can be brought about by using fewer rates and bands and reducing rate 
differentials between eamed and unearned income. As regards (b), simpler 
legislation can be brought about by lowering high MTRs and by three other methods 
to discourage tax-avoidance schemes. Additionally, nanowing the width of the low-
or starting-rate band would reduce complexity and costs of tax compliance and 
administration. 
The above changes in the tax-rate schedule tend to reduce complexity not 
only in the tax-rate schedule but also in other structures of the PIT system, which 
reduces administrative and compliance costs. (Reduced compliance costs mean a 
reduction in other burdens on low- and high-income taxpayers than taxes they pay). 
Therefore, such changes are likely to be in agreement with the concept of OSMTRs, 
which requires efficiency of taxation and benefits both poor and rich people. 
3.1.2 Tax avoidance and evasion 
Tax avoidance and evasion resulting from high MTRs lead to inefficiency of taxation 
as they cause revenue loss and increased administrative and compliance costs. 
As discussed in 2.4.3.2, changes in the tax-rate schedule under the four 
methods help reduce incentives to avoid and evade tax. However, such changes are 
made to maintain tax progressivity to achieve an extent of vertical equity/ 
redistribution because the changes are focused on discouraging high-income groups 
from avoiding and evading tax. Meanwhile, changes in the tax-rate schedule in this 
subsection focus on the discouragement of taxpayers at all income levels from tax 
avoidance and evasion. This is because tax avoidance and evasion by taxpayers at all 
(b) to raise the tax threshold by increasing the amount of personal tax allowances and to 
adjust such allowances in line with price inflation in each tax year. 
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income levels lead to greater revenue loss and an mcrease m administrative and 
compliance costs. 
To reduce incentives for taxpayers at all income levels to avoid and evade 
tax, MTRs need to be lowered at all income levels. The number of tax bands and 
MTRs should also be reduced at all income levels. Moreover, the width of tax bands 
should be expanded at all i11come levels (except the low- or starting-rate band). The 
further question arises whether or not changes in the tax-rate schedule following 
these patterns can reduce revenue loss and administrative and compliance costs. 
3.1.2.1 Reduction in revenue loss 
Lower MTRs, fewer tax bands and MTRs, and wider tax bands at all income levels 
(except for expanding the low- or starting-rate band) make tax avoidance and evasion 
less desirable. The discouragement of tax avoidance and evasion resulting from such 
changes is likely to reduce revenue loss because such discouragement should reduce 
losses in ATRs at all income levels. 
However, Slemrod and Bakija are against the. above inference. They argue 
that it is uncertain that simply lowering MTRs will hold revenue constant because 
"the quantitative evidence is not decisive. "286 Their argument is likely to be refuted 
by the UK and Thai experiences. Brown and Sandford have discovered that: 
"It is quite possible that the 1979 reduction in higher rate income tax in the 
United Kingdom from 83 to 60 per cent on earned income and from 98 to 75 
per cent on investment income may have been responsible for higher revenue 
yield among those affected, especially because of a reduction in tax 
avoidance. "287 
Jeffrey-Cook has also found that a reduction in the top MTR to 40% since 
1988 has attracted business to the UK and reduced avoidance and evasion, which has 
brought in more revenue.288 Lent and Hirao (1970) have found that steep rates under 
the 1970 Thai tax-rate schedule led to serious tax evasion; however, lower MTRs 
286 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.157 
187 Chuck Brown and Cedric Sandford, "Chapter 9 Tax Reform and Incentives: A Case Study. from the 
United Kingdom", Key Issues in Tax Reform, Cedric Sandford, ed. (Bath: Fiscal Publications, 1993), 
217. 
288 Jeffrey-Cook, op.cit.(note 181 ), p.2 
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would not result in revenue loss if the incentive to evade tax had been reduced 
together with effective tax enforcement.289 
3.1.2.2 Reduction in administrative and compliance costs 
When incentives to avoid and evade tax have been reduced, administrative costs are 
likely to be reduced in the following ways. 
Firstly, extra government resources may not be needed to research and 
develop complex legislation to prevent avoidance schemes. 
Secondly, when legislation is simpler, extra government resources are 
unnecessary to administer it. 
Thirdly, extra government resources that are used to detect actions of 
avoidance and evasion and bribery for tax evasion should become redundant. 
Compliance costs are likely to fall because honest or unsophisticated 
taxpayers will spend less in complying with simpler legislation. The expenditure of 
avoiders and evaders should also become redundant. 
3.1.2.3 Changes in the tax-rate schedule and OSMTRS 
Changes in the tax-rate schedule (as discussed above) possibly reduce incentives for 
taxpayers at all income levels to avoid and evade tax, and thus reduce revenue loss, 
administrative costs and compliance costs for taxpayers at all income levels. 
Therefore, such changes are likely to be in agreement with the concept of OSMTRs, 
which requires efficiency of taxation and benefits both poor and rich people. 
There are fewer low MTRs and wide tax bands at all income levels in Thai 
and UK tax-rate schedules at present (except for the narrow low- or starting-rate 
band). Comparisons between the past and present Thai and UK tax rate schedules in 
Appendix VIII to Chapter Two will help to clarify this point. 
3.2 Deadweight loss 
It is argued that high MTRs have a disincentive effect, resulting in deadweight loss. 
This is because high MTRs distort incentives to engage in taxed activities. Therefore, 
the tax-rate schedule should reduce a disincentive effect. 
289 Lent and Hirao, op.cit.(notel85), p.35 
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3.2.1 Effects on work decisions 
It is argued that "high [MTRs] are relevant to disincentive effects while the [ATR] is 
relevant to the incentive effect. "290 The disincentive and incentive effects will affect 
work/labour supply.29 1 "Work/labour supply" includes "work effort, occupational 
choice, and the acquisition of education and job-specific skills."292 
3.2.1.1 MTR and disincentives to work 
It is argued that the MTR is a disincentive to work.293 This argument may be correct 
in principle. This is because the MTR is the rate applicable to people's additional 
income that people earn. Many further believe that high MTRs (e.g. 50% or higher) 
enhances disincentives to work.294 This argument may also be correct in principle 
because an increase in MTRs minimizes the reward from extra working or reduces 
the incentive to do extra work.295 On this basis, "almost all economists would agree 
that [MTRs] in the vicinity of 90 percent are too high to do much good for 
anyone."296 
The disincentive effect causes a taxpayer to choose between unpaid and paid 
work or to substitute untaxed activities or lightly taxed work for high taxed work 
("the substitution effect"). More discussion in the substitution effect can be found in 
Appendix IX to Chapter Two. 
People's productivity and opportunities to create higher earrungs are 
restrained as a consequence of the substitution effect. Similarly, "high [MTRs] cause 
people to think twice before adding to their output."297 Therefore, the 
disincentive/substitution effect leads to loss in the taxing process. Reducing the 
disincentive effect has become one of objectives of tax reforms in many countries 
290 Chuck Brown, "Will the 1988 Income Tax Cuts Either Increase Work Incentives or Raise More 
Revenue?", Fiscal Studies, Volume 9, Number 4, November 1988, 98. 
291 Trotman-Dickenson, op.cit.(note138), p.98 
292 Slernrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.l08 
293 Mankiw, op.cit.(note36), p.248 
294 Slernrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.97; the Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.360; Tanzi and 
Schuknecht, op.cit.(note190), p.60; and the Commission on Taxation and Citizenship, op.cit.(note22), 
~.225 
95 Chuck Brown and Cedric Sandford, "The Effects of Income Tax on Incentives: How the 1988 
Income Tax Reduction Affected Accountants", British Tax Review 1991 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1991), 414. 
296 Slernrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.97 
297 Schnitzer, op.cit.(note22), p.7 
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since the late 1970s.298 As high MTRs distort incentives to work, a reduction in high 
MTRs is supposed to distort less, resulting in a reduced disincentive effect. Many 
support this point.299 
The high and very high MTRs on high-income taxpayers tend to produce a 
greater disincentive effect. Therefore, the proposal to reduce the top rate which is 
high or very high has been widely suppo11ed. For example, the World Bank notes, 
"It is imp011ant to set the top [MTR] at a level that wi 11 not result in reduction 
in work effort. Trurty to fifty percent is a reasonable range that will limit 
disincentives to work. 300 
It is also argued that there are a number of reasons for lowering MTRs to 
produce an increase in tax revenue301, which include the following two. 
The first is that the level of economic activity is greater because people have 
a higher disposable income as a result of tax-rate reduction?02 Consequently, the 
government can impose higher taxes. 
The second is based on the labour-supply effect. There is an argument 
referred to in Dilnot and Kell that " lower [MTRs] provide the incentive for people to 
work harder and generally encourage enterprise in the economy, thus boosting output 
and hence tax revenues. "303 There is also an argument referred to in Kay and King 
that reducing the MTR on the rich to zero could increase tax revenue. 304 Such an 
argument is based on the principle of neutrality as follows: 
"[Tax] revenue depends on [ATRs] but disincentives on [MTRs]. Ifwe lower 
the [MTR] on the richest man, we reduce disincentive effects on him without 
reducing the amount of tax that he (or anyone else) pays. So if these 
disincentives are of any significance, earnings will increase and so wjl] tax 
revenue. "305 
298 Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.249 
299 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.56; Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), p.39; and Andrew Dilnot and 
Michael Kell, "Top-Rate Tax Cuts and Incentives: Some Empirical Evidence", Fiscal Studies, 
Volume 9, Number 4, November 1988, 72. 
300 The World Bank, op.cit.(notel 12), p.43 
301 Brown and Sandford, op.cit.(note287), p.214 
302 Dilnot and Kell, op.cit.(note299), p.71 
303 ibid.p.71 
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The argument that Kay and King refer to may be conect in theory. This is 
because the 0% MTR on the rich would not interfere with their choices between 
untaxed and taxed work because it allows them to keep the ful.l return from extTa 
work. This reason is adapted from Kay and King writing that "we would obtain more 
tax revenue if we retained some incentives by allowing [the ri ch] to keep part of their 
earnings for themselves. "306 
However, Brown points out that " if reductions in [tax rates] do not affect 
labour supply, then there can be no revenue-increasing effect from increased labour 
supply."307 Therefore, despite a reduction in the top rate to 30-50% or 0%, tax 
revenue might not be increased if, in practice, such reduction did not influence 
taxpayers ' decisions to do more paid work. 
Slemrod and Bakija further argue that a reduction in MTRs on high-income 
taxpayers would help "the rest of the population. "308 Their argument is on the 
grounds that: 
"Reduced tax rates on high-income people, combined with greater incentives 
for saving, will lead to a larger and higher-quality capital stock. This, in tum, 
would give workers better 'tools' to work with, increasing their productivity 
and raising their wages."309 
This argument implies that a reduction in MTRs on high-income earners 
could help increase tax revenue. This is because the more the workers earn as a result 
of higher investment by high-income groups, the more income tax the government 
can impose. However, this assumption relies on the fact that reduced MTRs on high-
income earners do encourage them to invest their higher after-tax income on labour 
market activities. 
Many countries have reduced MTRs to reduce the disincentive effect, 
particularly the top rates. The aim of the top-rate reduction which is part of "the 
world - wide tax reform" starting in the late 1970s was "the desire to make the tax 
system as neutral as possible, to minimize the effect of tax on economic decision-
306 ibid.p.37 
307 Brown, op.cit.(note290), p. l 02 
308 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.l20 
309 ibid.p. l20 
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making."310 The major tax reforms in the UK to reduce the disincentive effect of high 
MTRs took place in the years 1979 ancl1988. 
3.2.1.2 ATR and incentives to work 
Many support the argument that the ATR is relevant to the incentive effect. 311 This 
argument may be conect in principle. 
The ATR represents the proportion of an individual ' s income paid in tax. 
After being taxed, a taxpayer becomes poorer and cannot afford the goods and 
services he/she could afford before tax.312 lf the taxpayer wanted to maintain his/her 
standard of living at the same level as that before tax, he/she would have to work 
harder and longer and take less leisure.313 Accordingly, the ATR encourages a 
taxpayer to seek and/or to do more paid work to recover his/her taxed earnings. 
Similarly, the ATR has the incentive/income effect, which does not result in 
deadweight loss.314 
Some further argue that an increase in ATRs increases work incentives.315 
However, others argue that an increase in MTRs encourages people to do more paid 
work.316 It is difficult to prefer the former argument to the latter. This is because an 
increase in either ATRs or MTRs may help increase work incentives. As analyzed in 
2.2, one means to increase the level of ATRs is to increase MTRs. Therefore, high 
MTRs indirectly support incentives to work in addition to directly creating 
disincentives to work. 
310 Brown and Sandford, op.cit.(note287), p.202 
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313 Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), p.26; Brown and Sandford, op.cit.(note295), p.414; and Slemrod 
and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.l 04 
314 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.8, and James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.51 
315 Graham C. Hockley, Public Finance: An introduction (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1979)393 
316 The Commission on Taxation and Citizenship, op.cit.(note22), p.226 
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3.2.1.3 Unclear theory 
It appears from the above that the progress1ve rate structure creates "the 
countervailing effects"31 7 of the incentive and disincentive effects. The ideas behind 
the effects of the progressive rate structure on work decisions are therefore unclear. 
Brown and Sandford support the view that: 
"Economic theory does not provide a clear answer about whether an increase 
in income tax rates reduces the willingness to work and a reduction in income 
tax rates increases it."318 
To clarify the theory, I pose the following questions. 
(a) Is it acceptable by reason of the world-wide tax reform to reduce MTRs in 
order to reduce the disincentive effect? 
(b) There have been continuous reductions in MTRs in many countries since 
the late 1970s. A further question is to what extent such reductions have 
increased work incentives. 
(c) Have MTRs under the current Thai and UK tax-rate schedules been set 
optimally enough to distort as little as possible work incentives? 
Due to the unclear theory, empirical analysis of the effects of the progressive 
rate structure on work decisions is required.319 
3.2.1.4 Empirical studies on tax effects 
A number of empirical studies have been carried out in the form of interview and 
questionnaire surveys in different countries (including the UK.i20 at different times, 
covering low- and high-income groups.321 However, most empirical studies conclude 
that the net effect of income taxation (which is based on the progressive rate 
structure) on work decisions is very small, either in the direction of disincentive or 
incentive.322 Likewise, progressive income taxation has not influenced the work 
317 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.l 04 
318 Brown and Sandford, op.cit.(note286), p.204 
3 19 Sandford, op.cit.(note 19), p.l49; and OECD, Theoretical and Empirical Aspects of the Effects of 
Taxation on the Supply of Labour (Paris: OECD, 1975), 6 and 26. 
320 I have found no empirical study on this field conducted in Thailand. 
321 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.63; Sandford, op.cit.(note 19), p.l50; and OECD, 
op.cit.(note319), p.l24 
322 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5),p. 63; and Brown and Sandford, op.cit.(note295), p.414 
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behaviour of the majority of people surveyed.323 It has only affected the decisions of 
a minority of people surveyed in tenns ofboth disincentive and incentive effects.324 
32-For example :>, Barlow, Brazer and Morgan carried out a survey of tax 
effects on the work behaviour of high earners in the US in 1964.326 They interviewed 
957 high-income individuals.327 They found that only one-eighth of interviewees 
suffered a disincentive effect and reduced "their work effort as a result of progressive 
income tax."328 They therefore concluded that: 
"It is clear that there are many more powerful motives affecting the working 
behaviour of high-income people than the [MTRs]. People are aware of taxes 
and do not enjoy paying them, but other considerations are far more 
important to them in deciding how long to work."329 
Brown and Levin carried out a survey of tax effects on overtime by 
interviewing over 2000 weekly paid workers (low-income groups) in Britain in 
1971.330 Their survey found that about 74% of interviewees were unaffected by 
income tax on overtime hours.33 1 Among the remaining interviewees, 15% 
experienced an incentive effect and worked more overtime; 11% suffered a 
disincentive effect and worked less overtime. 332 Their survey then suggests that "the 
aggregate effect of tax on overtime is small."333 
There are four noteworthy points from empirical studies. 
Firstly, there are both disincentive and incentive effects m practice . 
However, both effects on work decisions are rather limited. 
Secondly, although the disincentive and incentive effects are small according 
to empirical evidence, the features of both effects in practice are similar to those in 
theoretical analysis. Disincentive effects take the forms of reduction in work effort, 
refusal of a new job or of promotion, and emigration. 
323 Sandford, op.cit.(note 19), p.15 1 
324 OECD, op.cit.(note319), p.50 
325 More empirical studies on this issue can be found in Appendix X to Chapter Two. 




330 Brown and Jackson, op.cit.(note2), p.332 
331 ibid.p.332 
332 ibid.p.332 
333 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.63 
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Meanwrule, incentive effects take the forms of postponing retirement, 
working more overtime, or choosing professions with high earnings potential where 
the probability of being affected by progressive income taxation is highest. 
Thirdly, empirical studies do not provide clear results of tax effects on work 
decisions because there are both disincentive and incentive effects. Dilnot agrees that 
"evidence on the relationship between tax rates and incentives to work is still 
somewhat confusing."334 
Fourthly, the work decisions of the majority of both low- and high-income 
groups are in practice unaffected by progressive income taxation. 
Following the conclusion of a study conducted by Barlow, Brazer and 
Morgan above, there are a number of possible factors influencing individuals' work 
decisions apart from progressive income taxation. Such factors include the nature of 
work, personal circumstances, the mechanism of the labour market, and fmancial 
considerations. (More detailed discussion on these factors can be found in Appendix 
XI to Chapter Two). 
Other factors influencing the work decisions mentioned above tend to support 
empirical studies that the disincentive and incentive effects of progressive income 
taxation are weak in practice. Given this, the rationale of the world-wide tax reform 
(including the UK tax reform) to reduce high MTRs to reduce the disincentive effect 
is unacceptable. However, I have not yet concluded that the rationale of tax reform 
for such a purpose is unacceptable, because there are arguments in favour of a 
reduction in high MTRs to reduce the disincentive effect. Such arguments include: 
(a) tax avoidance overrides tax effects on work decisions; 
(b) there is some evidence of tax effects on work decisions; and 
(c) empirical studies based upon survey research are defective. 
(a) Tax avoidance 
Prest points out that: 
"[There] is no net effect of high [MTRs] on the amount of work done by the 
upper income groups. [This] is because avoiding action is taken by people to 
334 Andrew Dilnot, "The Income Tax Rate Structure", Key Issues in Tax Refom1 Cedric Sandford, ed. 
(Bath: Fiscal Publications, 1993), 19. 
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make sure that the actual [MTRs] applicable to them are less than the 
apparent ones." 335 
Prest's argument may be valid because high-income groups tend to avoid and 
evade income tax. A survey by Holland supports Prest 's argument, i.e. "[there is] 
little evidence of taxation reducing or increas ing productive work, but rather more 
evidence of taxation causing businessmen to devote time to minimising their 
corporate and personal tax liabilities. "336 
(b) Evidence of tax effects on work decisions 
According to Lindbeck as referTed to in Slemrod and Bakija, 
"[Tbe explanation of tax effects on work supply decisions] cannot be 
dismissed with regard to lugh-tax Sweden, wlllch has experienced a gradual 
decline in hours worked over the past two decades."337 
Slemrod and Bakija comment that Lindbeck's evidence adds "uncertainty to 
the claim that labor supply effects are negligible, but certainly does not provide any 
decisive evidence against that conclusion."338 
Another piece of evidence has been discovered by Sandford. 339 He carried out 
a survey of 100 executives in the UK in 1967.340 About 63% of those surveyed 
believed that "the tax had a disincentive effect."341 The reason why the majority of 
people surveyed had such a belief might result from the fact that around the period 
the survey took place, lllgh MTRs stretched to 91.25% in the UK. 342 
As noted in 2.4.3, the top MTR on earned income used to reach 83% and on 
unearned income 98% in the UK in the late 1970s. Prest agrees that such rates 
"might have strong repercussions on incentives to work. "343 Whittington asserts that: 
"It does not require the sophisticated analysis of optimal tax theory to 
demonstrate that a MTR of 98% provides a strong disincentive for the 
taxpayer to make much effort to increase his income."344 
335 Prest, op.cit.(note40), p.270 
336 Brown and Jackson, op.cit.(note2), p.336 
337 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.l08 
338 ibid.p.l08 
339 This study is referred to in Trotman-Dickenson. (Trotman-Dickenson, op.cit.(note138), p.l 02) 
340 ibid.p.l 02 
341 ibid.p.l02 
342 Prest, op.cit.(note40), p.268 
343 ibid.p.269 
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Altogether, the disincentive effect might be important for people paying 
income tax at the MTR of 90% or more. However, this conclusion is inconsistent 
with the finding of Break's survey. In Break's survey, the majority of high-income 
groups interviewed did not suffer from a disincentive effect even though at the time 
of the survey, the top MTR on earned income reached 92.5%. It is possible that a 
very high MTR did not have this effect on people in Break 's survey because such 
people, solicitors and accountants, knew a legal way to avoid tax. 
Besides Lindbeck 's and Sandford's evidence, there is a claim on the 
disincentive effect in Mr. Lawson's Budget speech of 1988. Mr. Lawson claimed that 
"excessive rates of income tax ... drive talent to more hospitable shores overseas."345 
However, this c1aim may be refuted by The Brain Drain - Report of the Working 
Group on Migration (Cmnd.3417, 1967), if the talent to which Mr. Lawson referred 
includes engineers, technologists and scientists. This report is referred to in Brown 
and Sandford as follows: 
"The brain drain - restricted in its terms of reference to qualified engineers, 
technologists and scientists. [The Report] found little evidence to support the 
fear that tax was a main cause [of brain drain], and stressed other factors, 
such as better research facilities abroad, in explaining the brain drain."146 
If the talent to which Mr. Lawson referred includes those in other fields than 
the scientific, the question then arises whether high MTRs affect such people's 
decisions to emigrate. According to an empirical study by Fiegehen and Reddaway, 
progressive income taxation had minimal effects on the decisions of senior 
executives to emigrate and to refuse "to return from overseas postings."347 Dilnot and 
Kell also argue that "in deciding whether or not to emigrate, differences in gross 
salary levels and working conditions are likely to be as important as [MTR]."348 
Therefore, Mr. Lawson's claim is indecisive evidence to support the disincentive 
effect of high MTRs. 
344 Whittington, op.cit.(note53), p.l60 
345 Brown and Sandford, op.cit.(note287), p.211 
346 ibid.p.2ll 
347 Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), p.34 
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(c) Flaw of survey resear·cb 
There are certain causes for defectiveness of empirical studies based upon 
survey research, which include: 
(i) the methodology of empirical studies and the questions used Ill the 
survey, 
(ii) the limitation of the groups of people surveyed, and 
(iii) the knowledge and attitude of people surveyed about progressive 
income taxation. 
Flaw (i) 
It is argued that interview surveys are not "a very satisfactory method of 
investigation: they can reveal attitudes to taxation, but these are not necessarily good 
indicators of what people actually do."349 Besides survey research, empirical study 
can be conducted in the form of econometric analyses. The OECD notes that tax 
effects on work decisions are small according to empirical research including 
econometric analyses.350 James and Nobes assert, 
"The overwhelming weight of econometric evidence paints a fairly clear 
picture and cannot be ignored. It appears that, for many individuals, taxation 
has little influence on labour market activity."351 
The general results of survey research and of econometric analyses are very 
similar. Given this, the statement that interview surveys are not good indicators to 
suggest tax effects on people's work decisions is not strong. We can - with some 
exceptions - accept the results of survey research. 
However, although the results of general survey research are likely to have 
authority, "the survey results will be of little value if the wrong questions are 
asked."352 The wrong questions relating to MTRs and ATRs will probably receive 
unexpected answers,353 as Brown and Jackson remark by comparing the questions 
used in the surveys by Fields and Stanbury and by Break: 
348 Dilnot and Kell, op.cit.(note299), p.72 
349 Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), p.33 
350 OECD, op.cit.(note318), p.126 
351 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5),p.60 
352 OECD, op.cit.(note319), p. 30 
353 Brown and Jackson, op.cit.(note2), p.334 
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"Fields and Stanbury asked questions 'relating to the incentive or disincentive 
effects on work effort of high [MTRs]' , whereas Break had asked questions 
about ' tax influences' on work effoti. A subtle point, but one wonders how 
the results would have been affected if Fields and Stanbury had substituted 
the word ' average' for ' marginal ' or better still just left it out altogether. The 
words used imply bias because high [MTRs] are relevant to disincentive 
effects while the [ATR] is relevant to the incentive effect."354 
As shown earlier, the results of surveys by Fields and Stanbury and by Break 
are generally similar, showing that a majority of those surveyed were unaffected by 
progressive income taxation. The results of both surveys are only slightly different. 
The controversial result is the number of those suffering a disincentive effect. The 
number in Fields and Stanbury's study is 6% higher than that in Break's study. 
However, the difference did not absolutely result from the different words used in 
each survey. One observes that the difference in the numbers of those suffering 
disincentive effects might result from "the long-continued high levels of income 
taxation or declines in the nonmonetary satisfactions received from work or both."355 
Therefore, an argument against survey research based on the use of different words is 
unlikely to refute the survey results as a whole. 
Flaw (ii) 
Sandford claims that each survey research effort has been confined to "a 
particular income range or a small occupational group, so that firm generalized 
conclusions cannot easily be drawn."356 The OECD also supports the view that as a 
result of the limitation of the groups of people surveyed, "the survey results are 
obviously of limited value as far as predicting the effects of taxation on the whole 
force is concerned. "357 
However, although the confined populations in surveys cannot give replies 
which represent the results of tax effects on the whole labour force, their replies tend 
to produce the results which researchers want, i.e. whether progressive income 
taxation creates incentives or disincentives to work in practice. As we have seen, 
354 ibid.p.334 
355 George F. Break, "The Incidence and Economic Effects of Taxation", The Economics of Public 
Finance (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 184. 
356 Sandford, op.cit.(notel9), p.l50 
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business executives and professionals, and workers who can work overtime and are 
paid piece rates are often chosen in surveys because they are aware of bow to vary 
their working behavior to bring about changes in actual tax rates. Therefore, the 
replies of these groups tend to produce the desired results, provided that they have 
had sufficient knowledge of income taxation. 
Flaw (iii) 
This flaw involves the knowledge and attitude of people surveyed about 
income taxation. The OECD points out that "if individuals are unaware of tax 
changes they will not respond to them." 358 Similarly, James and Nobes refer to 
Brown and Dawson's comments that: 
"Misconceptions of the tax system may also influence incentives. If people 
think that tax rates are highef or lower than they really are, then this in itself 
can affect their work effort. "359 
Thus, if the people surveyed have insufficient knowledge or misconceptions 
about income taxation, they cannot be expected to vary their working behavior 
according to changes in actual tax rates. However, the representatives of high-income 
groups surveyed, i.e. business executives and professionals, are accepted as having 
an accurate knowledge of the tax structure.360 They are therefore expected to be 
responsive to tax changes and their replies are likely to be reliable. Therefore, an 
argument against research based on the knowledge of high-income groups surveyed 
about progressive income taxation is unlikely to deny the survey results as a whole. 
Conversely, there is some evidence showing that the representatives of low-
income groups surveyed had insufficient knowledge of progressive income taxation. 
Summer refers to a survey by Brown (1968) that: 
"None of the 179 wage earners knew his [MTR], which was typically 
overestimated; almost all the 53 salaries workers displayed the same bias 
towards exaggeration, and only three knew the correct figure."361 
357 OECD, op.cit.(note319), p.l23 
358 ibid.p.l27 
359 James and Nobes, op.cit(note5), p.58 
360 OECD, op.cit.(note319), p.51 
361 Michael T. Summer, "Chapter 2 The Incentive Effects of Taxation", Public Sector Economics 
(London: Longman, 1983), 45. 
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Similar evidence appears in a survey for the British Royal Commission on the 
Taxation of Pro:fit and Incomes (1 952). The OECD refers to this survey claiming that 
"many of the workers in the sample were very ignorant about their tax position, and 
it was estimated that only 4% of the men knew in any detail how they were affected 
by income tax."362 Trotman-Dickenson also comments that "very few of them 
(workers) , it seems, have sufficient knowledge of the way that they are affected by 
the tax to be able to take that factor accurately into account in deciding upon 
behavior at work. "363 As stated earlier, the conclusion of this smvey is that "there 
was no evidence that [the) productive effort [of these workers] was inhibited by the 
income tax."364 It seems that the replies of these workers might be unreliable because 
of their insufficient knowledge of income taxation. Prest supports the view that: 
"Worker-attitude surveys simply cannot be reliable. People have an innate 
tendency to rationalize their answers to questions of this kind, and therefore 
no trust can be placed in their answers."365 
However, the replies of these workers that income tax had no influence on 
their work decisions could result from their very low MTRs. Consequently, these 
workers might be unaware of tax considerations. As Prest notes, 
"By far the great majority of those interviewed in the Royal Commission 
Survey were in the income ranges below £1 0 a week and as a consequence, 
the [MTRs] payable were relatively low. It is not therefore really surprising 
that tax considerations were unimportant for people at these income 
levels. "366 
Regarding the knowledge of low-income groups surveyed, the following 
conclusions are made. 
(a) If people were not knowledgeable about income taxation, their replies in 
surveys could be unreliable, causing a flaw in survey research. 
(b) A very low tax rate might make people unaware of tax effects on their 
work decisions. 
362 OECD, op.cit.(note319), p.35 
363 Trotman-Dickenson, op.cit.(note138), p.lOO 
364 Brown and Jackson, op.cit.(note2), p.331 
365 Prest, op.cit.(note40), p.269 
366 ibid.p.270 
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Additionally, the attitude of people surveyed might cause flaws m survey 
research. As James and Nobes note, 
"Individuals may not give accurate rep lies in response to a survey for a 
number of reasons. The respondents may not be aware of the real answers; or 
there may be other reasons why they wish to give an impression of their 
behavior which is not wholly consistent with the facts."367 
However, this point is unlikely to deny the main results of survey research for 
the fo llowing reasons. 
(a) If the people surveyed are expected to have attitudes, such as James and 
Nobes' s claim above, their replies could be diversified because people simply have 
different views. 
(b) However, it appears that " there are so many similarities in the findings of 
[survey research]"368 although survey studies are carried out at different times in 
different countries covering both low- and high-income groups of taxpayers.369 This 
is because the majority of people surveyed in the examples given above had the same 
view that income taxation had little influence on their work decisions. 
Altogether, the main finding of empirical studies is that progressive income 
taxation has little disincentive or incentive effect on work decisions in practice. This 
fmding is reinforced by factors that affect individuals' work decisions other than 
income taxation. However, this finding may be · weakened by the following 
arguments. 
(a) That the majority of high-income groups do not suffer the disincentive 
effect of high MTRs partly results from tax avoidance and evasion. 
(b) A very high MTR would have a disincentive effect on high-income 
groups if they did not have a chance to avoid or evade tax. 
(c) If people are not knowledgeable about income taxation, their replies in 
surveys could be unreliable, causing flaws in survey research. 
(d) A very low MTR might make people unaware of tax effects on their work 
decisions. 
367 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.62 
368 OECD, op.cit.(note319), p.50 
369 ibid.p.50 
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Although the above arguments may cast doubt on the finding of empirical 
studies, there is no argument against other factors that influence individuals ' work 
decisions, e.g. the nature of the work. Thus, the fi nding of empirical studies cannot 
be absolutely denied. 
Given this, it is more difficult to answer the question of whether the rationale 
of the world- wide tax reform to reduce high MTRs to reduce the disincentive effect 
is acceptable or not. It is fmther necessary to consider whether tax-rate reduction has 
led to an increase in work effort. Empirical evidence is required in addition to 
theoretical analysis. 
3.2.1.5 Empirical studies on tax-rate reduction 
A reduction in high MTRs on labour income is supposed to increase work incentives 
and tax revenue. However, this supposition can be denied if we consider the effect of 
tax-rate reduction in the direction of income effect. 
In terms of the income effect, lower MTRs could reduce work incentives 
because lower MTRs make people better-off; therefore, people might not want to 
work harder because the higher disposable income after tax could maintain their 
standard of living. 370 
Theoretical analysis thus seems give unclear answer about whether tax-rate 
reduction increases or reduces work incentives. Empirical studies in this area are 
necessary. The major UK tax reforms to reduce the disincentive effect of high MTRs 
took place in the 1979 and 1988 Budgets. Although there were predictions that tax-
rate reduction could significantly increase work incentives and tax revenue, empirical 
studies in the UK371 suggest the opposite. 
As a result of the 1979 Budget, the basic rate of income tax came down from 
33% to 30%3.72; and the highest MTR on earned income was cut from 83% to 60% 
and on unearned income from 98% to 75%.373 In Sir Geoffrey Howe's Budget 
speech of 1979, he claimed that tax-rate reduction at all levels "is the only way we 
370 Dilnot and Kell, op.cit.(note299), p.72; and Brown and Sandford, op.cit.(note287), p.205 
37 1 I have found no empirical evidence on this area in Thailand. 
372 Brown, op.cit.(note290), p.96 
373 Whittington, op.cit.(note53) , p.l60 
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can restore incentives and make it worthwhile to work."374 Whittington supports this 
Budget. He claims that tax-rate reduction would "alleviate the problem of high 
[MTRs] on high incomes", in particular the problem of a strong disincentive.375 
Similarly to the 1979 Budget, the 1988 Budget further reduced MTRs. As a 
result of this Budget, the basic rate came down to 25%.376 Besides, it swept away 
"the four top rates" cutting the highest MTR on both eamed and unearned income to 
40%.377 Mr. Lawson claimed in his 1988 Budget speech that "a reduction in the top 
rates of income tax can, over time, result in a higher, not a lower yield to the 
Exchequer. "378 
Brown refers to Minford (1988) and Lindsey (1987) who support Mr. 
Lawson's claim that "the higher-rate tax cuts will lead to a substantial increase in 
work incentives", and " increase tax receipts."379 
According to Dilnot and Kell, the evidence of revenue increase following tax-
rate reduction from 83% to 60% in 1979 and the abolition of the investment income 
surcharge in 1984 is that "the share of total tax revenue paid by the richest 5 per cent 
of taxpayers increased between 1978179 and 1985/86. "380 Ormrod (1988) as referred 
to in Dilnot and Kell argues that: 
"One may expect the greatest motivation to be given to the top 1% who have 
received the greatest fall in [MTRs]. They are also sometimes put forward by 
supply-siders as the group most able and willing to increase their income. Yet 
it is this group which has increased its proportionate share the least of the top 
5 percentile groups."38 l 
It can be inferred from evidence and Ormrod's argument that tax-rate 
reduction caused higher-rate taxpayers to do more paid work and to pay more income 
tax, resulting in revenue increase. 
However, there is empirical evidence that the effects of tax-rate reduction on 
(a) work incentives and (b) revenue increase were minimal. Regarding the reduction 
374 Brown, op.cit.(note290), p.96 
375 Whittington, op.cit.(note53), p.l60 
376 Brown and Sandford, op.cit.(note295), p.415 
377 ibid.p.415 
378 Brown, op.cit.(note290), p.93 
379 ibid.p.93 
380 Dilnot and Kell, op.cit.(note299), p. 72 
381 ibid.pp.72-73 
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in the basic rate to 25% in 1988, Brown notes, "there is little evidence to suggest that 
there will be significant changes in short-run labour supply as a result of the cut in 
the basic rate of tax. "382 He also finds evidence about the effect of the reduction in 
the top rate to 40% in 1988 as follows: 
"Evidence about the labour supply effects of higher tax rates is weaker but 
most evidence suggests that the cuts in the higher rates of tax will not 
increase work incentives. "383 
Empirical study by Dilnot and Kell supports the evidence as claimed by 
Brown.384 According to Dilnot and Kell 's research conducted in 1988 on the effects 
of reductions in the top rate between 1978 (98%) and 1988 (40%) (referred to in 
Nightingale), "there was a small incentive in cutting the [MTRs]."385 This study also 
argues against evidence which shows that revenue increase between 1978/79 and 
1985/8 came about because the tax-rate reduction in 1979 and the abolition of the 
investment income surcharge in 1984 had a supply side effect on higher-rate 
taxpayers. The suggestion from their study (referred to in Disney) is that revenue 
increase over that period resulted from "changes in employment, inflation, and 
income components. "386 
There are noteworthy points from empirical studies. 
Firstly, tax-rate reduction has little impact on work incentives. 
Secondly, an increase in work incentives probably results from other factors, 
which include an increase in consumer goods387, pressure of work from the 
demand388, and a desire to extend work experience.389 
Thirdly, although there were revenue increases in subsequent years after the 
reduction in MTRs, the reasons for such increases were other than that lower MTRs 
stimulated work effort and enterprise. 
382 Brown, op.cit.(note290), p.95 
383 ibid.p.106 
384 There are other three empirical studies on this issue, which can be found in Appendix XII to 
Chapter Two. 
385 Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.l3 
386 Richard Disney, IMF Working Paper: The Impact of Tax and Welfare Policies on Employment and 
Unemployment in OECD Countries (Washington D.C.: IMF, 2000), 21. 
387 OECD, op.cit.(note319), p.3.9 
388 Brown, op.cit.(note290), p.106 
389 Brown and Sandford, op.cit.(note287), p.211 
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My research so far bas found that there is disagreement between theoretical 
and empirical analysis. The f01m er suggests that tax-rate reduction can significantly 
increase work incentives and tax revenue, but the latter suggests the opposite. I 
support the view that tax-rate reduction has little impact on work incentives because 
of evidence from the empirical studies above. Besides the UK evidence, there is no 
strong evidence that lower MTRs increase work incentives in the US. 390 
Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that it is not other factors which influence 
individuals ' work behaviour. The OECD suggests that "it [is] impossible to separate 
out the effects of tax changes from the effects of other vmiables determining work 
effort. "391 
I also support the view that tax-rate reduction could not significantly increase 
tax revenue on labour supply grounds. Similarly, I disagree with the theoretical 
analysis which claim that "a reduction in tax rates on labour income could increase 
labour supply and through this route increase tax revenue."392 This disagreement 
comes from evidence in the empirical studies above. Besides the UK evidence, the 
US evidence shows that the tax rate cuts of 1981 did not generate more revenue. 393 
However, there is evidence supporting the view that tax-rate reduction 
increases tax revenue on labour supply grounds, as referred to in Dilnot and Kell. 
Such evidence is the increased share of tax liability of higher-rate taxpayers between 
1978/79 and 1985/86. However, it is indecisive because there are stronger factors to 
support such increase than labour supply. As analyzed in 2.4.4.1, the increased share 
of tax liability of higher-rate taxpayers partly results from discouragement of tax 
avoidance and evasion and the fall in the high-income level subject to the top rate. 
3.2.1.6 Changes in the tax-rate schedule and OSMTRS 
At page 85, I pose three questions. The following are my answers to the questions. 
(a) The rationale of tax reform to reduce high MTRs (except for a very high 
MTRs of around 90% or more) to reduce the disincentive effect seems unacceptable. 
390 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.l24 
391 OECD, op.cit.(note319), p.38 
392 Brown, op.cit.(note290), p.l 01 
393 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), pp.l24-125 
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(b) A reduction in MTRs has not in practice significantly increased work 
incentives. 
(c) MTRs under the current Thai and UK tax-rate schedules have been set 
optimally to prevent probable tax effects on work decisions. 
The following are the chief reasons for these three answers. 
The main finding of empirical studies is that tax effects on work decisions are 
very small in practice. Arguments against empirical studies are not strong enough 
absolutely to dismiss this finding. Furthermore, there is no argument or evidence 
against other factors influencing work decisions than progressive income taxation 
and tax-rate reduction. Moreover, empirical evidence and analysis are more decisive 
than theoretical analysis to support the view that tax-rate reduction cannot 
significantly increase work incentives and tax revenue. (This is the rationale for 
answer (b)). For these reasons, the argument for tax reform to reduce MTRs to 
reduce the disincentive effect seems unacceptable. (This is a reason for answer (a)). 
However, very high MTRs of around 90% or more would create disincentives 
to work when high-income taxpayers have no chance to avoid and evade tax. As we 
have seen, MTRs at all income levels under the current Thai and UK tax-rate 
schedules have now been reduced. Therefore, MTRs under both schedules have been 
set optimally not only to discourage tax avoidance and evasion but also to prevent 
probable disincentives to work. (This is a reason for answer (c)). Consequently, 
MTRs under both schedules are likely to be set in agreement with part of OSMTRS, 
which requires a reduction in the disincentive effect. 
3.2.2 Effects on saving and investment 
It is believed that tax considerations have affected taxpayers' choice of savings 
instruments.394 Furthermore, it is doubtful whether taxation may affect the level of 
household savings.395 Moreover, it is supposed that taxation will affect returns on 
risk-taking and therefore the level ofinvestment.396 
The notion behind the suppositions above is that income taxation based on 
the progressive rate structure creates disincentives to save and invest. It is therefore 
394 Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.137 
395 ibid.p.1 37 
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supposed that lower MTRs on income from saving and investment would generate 
incentives to save and invest. However, this supposition may be dismissed because 
the progressive rate structure can have an incentive effect in addition to a 
disincentive effect. Therefore, I pose the following questions. 
(1) In which direction does the progressive rate structure affect savings and 
investment rates in practice (a negative or positive direction)? 
(2) Is it necessary to reduce MTRs on income from saving and investment, 
particularly interest and dividend income, to boost savings and investment rates? 
(3) Have MTRs on income from saving and investment under the current 
Thai and UK tax-rate schedules been optimally set? 
3.2.2.1 Negative effect on saving and investment 
It is believed that the progressive rate structure could contribute to low savings and 
investment rates. 397 As we shall see below, this belief is plausible because (a) an 
ATR and a MTR reduce a taxpayer's ability to save and invest, and (b) a MTR 
reduces incentives to save and invest. 
3.2.2.1.1 Tax rates and an ability to save and invest 
Dalton claims that "ability to save is reduced by all taxes on persons who have any 
margin of income, out of which saving is possible."3?8 He further claims that "ability 
to invest depends on the resources available for investment; it is clear that these are 
reduced by taxation. "399 
Both claims are correct. If the MTR on earned income were high or very 
high, the disposable income at a margin after tax would be small or very small. The 
disposable income is supposed to be further saved and invested.400 The less the 
disposable income, the less a taxpayer can further save and invest. 
Likewise, the ability to save and invest is reduced when we take a high ATR 
into account. Throop Smith remarks that "the greater the total tax burden, the greater 
396 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.69 
397 ibid.p.72 
398 Dalton, op.cit.(note30), p.74 
399 ibid.p.74 
400 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.67 
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the likelihood that taxation wi ll unduly discourage ... savings and investments.'.40t 
The ATR represents the total tax burden on a taxpayer, affecting his/her disposable 
income after tax. Therefore, the higher the ATR, the less the disposable income a 
taxpayer has to further save and invest. 
3.2.2.1 .2 Tax rates and disincentives to save and invest 
Reductions in savings and investment rates may also result from the disincentive 
effect ofMTRs. There are two arguments for this, namely 
(a) MTRs on income from saving and investment contribute to double 
taxation; and 
(b) high MTRs on income from saving and investment reduce marginal after-
tax returns. on savings and investments. 
(a) Double taxation 
It is argued that savings are taxed twice. They are first levied when a taxpayer 
earns income from work. They are levied again on returns (i.e. interest or dividend 
income) on savings or investment made from earned income.402 Because of this, it 
seems that income tax "differentiates against saving"403 and investment. Income tax 
is then thought to produce disincentives to save and invest.404 
However, this view on double taxation is not decisive enough to conclude 
that income tax reduces incentives to save and invest because interest or dividend 
income that is taxed is a new sum derived from savings or investments. It is therefore 
justifiable to tax interest or dividend, but unjustifiable to tax savings or investments 
a gam. 
(b) High MTRs and disincentive 
According to Schnitzer, 
''[High MTRs] may well have an injurious effect on savmgs and on the 
supply of venture capital. Moreover, the effect of high [MTRs] may well 
discourage entry into high-risk activities."405 
401 Dan Throop Smith, Encyclopedia of Economics, Douglas Greenwal, ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book, 1982), 995 . 
402 OECD, Taxation and Household Saving (Paris: OECD, 1994), 14. 
403 Silverman, op.cit.(note43), p.l66 
404 OECD, op.cit.(note402), p.14 
405 Schnitzer, op.cit.(note22), p.7 
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The above argument may be correct because a high MTR, especially at 50% 
or more406, causes considerable reductions in marginal after-tax retums on savings 
and investments. Additionally, a high MTR contributes to a considerable reduction in 
the overall after-tax returns on savings and investments because it helps increase the 
ATR on such returns. Given this, a high MTR has a disincentive effect. 
The di sincentive effect of high MTRs on saving and investment causes a 
taxpayer to consider substituting present consumption for saving or investing for 
future consumption (or "the substitution effect").407 
The disincentive/substitution effect takes place since low future returns on 
savings or investments would raise " the price of future consumption"408, and then a 
taxpayer might decide to spend his/her money now rather than to save or invest. In 
addition, the price of future consumption would be higher if the rate of inflation were 
also taken into account.409 
The disincentive/substitution effect possibly causes a taxpayer to substitute 
present consumption for saving or investing for future consumption. Consequently, 
such an effect would lower savings and investment rates. Mankiw supports the view 
that " low saving rate... is at least attributable to tax laws [on high MTRs] that 
discourage saving."410 
Low savings and investment rates caused by the disincentive/substitution 
effect are deadweight loss. This is because the less the people save and invest, the 
less tax the government can claim on returns on savings and investments. 
Altogether, it seems that the progressive rate structure creates a negative 
effect on savings and investment rates. However, I cannot conclude this point here 
until arguments on the positive effect of the progressive rate structure on savings and 
investment rates have been examined. 
406 Tanzi and Schuknecht, op.cit.(notel90), p.60 
407 OECD, op.cit.(note402), p.l4; and Anthony B. Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public 
Economics (Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Book, 1980), 94-95 . 
408 Atkinson and Stiglitz, op.cit.(note407), pp.94-95 
409 Example 2.9 in Appendix X.IU to Chapter Two will help clarify this point. 
4 10 Mankiw, op.cit.(note36), p.552 
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3.2.2.2 Positive effect on saving a nd investment 
Besides the disincentive effect, the progressive rate structure has an incentive effect 
on saving and investment. This effect is thought to result from a reduction in the 
overall after-tax returns on savings and investments due to a high ATR. 
A reduction in returns on savings resulting from a high ATR might encourage 
a taxpayer to save more.41 1 The main reasons for greater saving include: 
(a) "to maintain the absolute level of the returns on the stock of savings 
held"412· ,
(b) to secure a taxpayer's future413; or 
(c) to secure the future of a taxpayer' s dependents if he/she should die 
early.414 
As regards investment, a reduction in income from investment as a result of a 
high ATR might stimulate a taxpayer to invest more.41 5 A taxpayer could increase 
income from investment either by "[increasing] his investment or by transferring his 
investment to projects or shares which offer a higher return but are more risky."416 In 
addition, Silverman has found some support for the notion of the incentive effect as 
follows: 
"Some of [writers] contend that heavy taxation may in some cases have the 
reverse effect of stimulating the payer to further effort in order to maintain his 
accustomed standard ofliving.'>417 
Altogether, it seems that the incentive effect of a high ATR boost savings and 
investment rates. 
3.2.2.3 Unclear theory 
The theoretical studies have established that besides reducing the taxpayer's physical 
ability to save and invest, the progressive rate structure creates opposing 
psychological effects, i.e. negative/disincentive and positive/incentive effects on 
411 Silverman, op.cit.(note43), p.l65 
412 OECD, op.cit.(note402), p.14 
413 Silverman, op.cit.(note43), p.l73 
414 ibid.p.l65 
415 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.62 
41 6 ibid.pp. 69-70 
41 7 Silverman, op.cit.(note43), pp.l75-176 
103 
savmg and investment. This ambiguity of these psychological effects makes it 
impossible to answer the question regarding the direction of the effect of the 
progressive rate structure. 
Arguments and empirical evidence suppo11ing or opposing the negative or 
positive effect of the progressive rate structure on savings and investment rates will 
further be investigated. 
3.2.2.4 Arguments and evidence supporting the negative effect 
One ofthe main arguments and evidence to support the claim of negative effect is the 
reduction in a taxpayer's physical ability to save and invest. When the psychological 
effects are taken into consideration, four arguments and evidence have been found to 
confirm the negative influence: 
(a) tax avoidance and evasion, 
(b) the disincentive effect of a very high MTR, 
(c) the advantage of tax-rate reduction, and 
(d) the comparative effect of high MTRs on low- and high-income groups. 
3.2.2.4.1 Tax avoidance and evasion 
The negative effect of the progressive rate structure on saving and investment is also 
seen· in tax avoidance or evasion tactics. If tax evasion cannot be done, tax avoidance 
may be undertaken instead in the following forms. 
A taxpayer may decide not to save money in a form that is subject to a high 
MTR, but may seek another untaxed or more lightly taxed form of saving. 
As regards investment, to avoid high MTRs on higher returns, a taxpayer may 
choose "transfer of the function to smaller businesses'.,.18, or to distribute 
"investments that yield less investment income."419 
3.2.2.4.2 Effects of very high MTR 
It is argued that a very high rate of 98% in the UK in the late 1970s inevitably 
affected people's economic behaviour.420 This UK experience supports the view that 
418 Silverman, op.cit.(note43), p.178 
419 Kaldor, op.cit.(note54), p.lll 
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a very high MTR has a negative effect on saving and investment because .it is likely 
to encourage tax avoidance and evasion. 
Additionally, a very high MTR enhances disincentives to save and invest 
because it produces very low marginal returns on savings and investments. 
Furthem1ore, it leads to a very great reduction in the overall after-tax returns on 
savings and investments since it contributes to a very high ATR. 
3.2.2.4.3 Advantage of tax-rate reduction 
It is argued that a reduction in high MTRs on returns on savings and investments 
would help boost savings and investment rates.421 There are two reasons for this. 
Firstly, tax-rate reduction would reduce incentives to avoid or evade tax 
imposed on returns on savings and investments. 422 
Secondly, lower MTRs are believed to reduce distortions in incentives to 
save and invest423, which would increase incentives to save and invest.424 Likewise, 
higher marginal returns due to lower MTRs would encourage more saving and 
investment.425 Consequently, tax-rate reduction causes people to save and invest 
more because they want to take advantage of the greater returns on savings and 
investment.426 
3.2.2.4.4 Comparative effect on low- and high-income groups 
Silvem1an argues that "the effect of a high income tax on the savings of individuals 
naturally varies with the amount of the respective incomes."427 Comparing lower-
and higher-income groups, Silverman argues that the latter appear to be more 
discouraged from saving than the former.428 
Silverman' s argument may be correct. This is because the higher the MTR 
on interest income, the less people desire to save. Conversely, Silverman argues that 
420 Whittington, op.cit.(note53), p.160 
421 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.120 
422 Brown and Sandford, op.cit.(note286), p.202 
423 ibid.p.202 
424 ibid.p.202 
425 Dalton, op.cit.(note30), p.75 
426 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.llO; and Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.l39 
427 Silverman, op.cit.(note43), p.l68 
428 ibid.p.l72 
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low- and moderate-earners are less discouraged from saving due to MTRs than high-
income earners. According to Silverman, people in the lower income groups are 
more likely to diminish their everyday consumption than to cut clown on their 
savings despite curtai lment of the return on savings due to MTRs.429 The reason for 
this is that: 
" .. . in these classes, the incentive to provide for old age and for dependants is 
very strong. They are more concerned with making their position secure than 
with obtaining the maximum immediate return from their wealth."430 
Additionally, Silverman argues that higher earners are discouraged from 
investment due to MTRs more than lower eamers.431 His reason is that "[those in the 
higher income classes] look to their investments not merely to give them security but 
also to enrich them in the near future."432 High MTRs considerably reduce the 
marginal reh1rns on investments; therefore, "those with large incomes might aver that 
the heavy exactions [due to high rates] make the additional [investment] seem hardly 
worth wbile.'"'33 Conversely, when lower earners are taken into account, Silverman 
states as follows: 
"It has to be recognised that the majority of the smaller taxpayers have little 
chance of adjusting their activities according to the rates of tax , and where 
they are in a position to do so the benefit they would secure would be very 
small. '"'
34 
The comparisons above appear to support the view that a high MTR has a 
negative effect on the saving and investment decisions of high-income earners. 
3.2.2.5 Arguments and evidence supporting the positive effect 
There are two main arguments and evidence supporting the view that the progressive 
rate structure has a positive effect on saving and investment, namely (a) the 
disadvantage of tax-rate reduction, and (b) the existence of other factors influencing 
individuals' saving and investment decisions. 
429 ibid.p.l68 
430 ibid.p.l68 





3.2.2.5.1 Disadvantage of tax-rate reduction 
As discussed in 3.2.2.4.3, reduction in a high MTR would increase incentives to save 
and invest. However, there is an argument against this that a lower MTR could 
encourage people to save and invest less than before. 
An increase in a MTR increases an ATR. Therefore, a lower MTR reduces 
the total tax burden. It is argued that higher after-tax returns on savings or 
investments, due to tax-rate reduction, will encourage people to save or invest less 
than before for future consumption.435 Slemrod and Bakija give an example to 
illustrate this point. 
"If you have a fixed goal for your level of retirement income, or a fixed 
amount you need to save up to pay for your child's college education, a 
higher reward to saving makes it easier to achieve that goal."436 
It is also argued that a higher after-tax return due to a lower MTR will 
encourage people to spend more money now on "an improved standard of living."437 
Therefore, it seems that tax-rate reduction reduces incentives to save or invest. 
3.2.2.5.2 Other factors influencing saving and investment decisions 
There is a hypothesis that the effect of income tax on interest income is "the same as 
a reduction in the pre-tax interest rate.'.438 It is further assumed that "the response of 
savings to taxation is inferred - indirectly - from the interest elasticity of savings.'.439 
It is then assumed that "changes in the rate of interest have only a moderate influence 
on the propensity to save out of a given income; it was an obvious corollary to this 
argument that the reduction in the net return from savings, due to income tax, is not 
likely to have a quantitatively important influence either."440 
The above assumption therefore opposes the notion of the disincentive effect 
of a high MTR on saving. Additionally, empirical studies, as discussed below, 
suggest that the relationship between the savings rate and a higher after-tax rate of 
43s Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.ll 0 
436 ibid.p.ll 0 
437 Dalton, op.cit.(note30), p.75 
438 Atkinson and Stiglitz, op.cit.(note407), p.91 
439 'b'd 91 I I .p. 
44° Kaldor, op.cit.(note54), p.91 
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return on savings is small. The empirical evidence thus opposes the notion of the 
incentive effect of tax-rate reduction on savings. 
Although a study by Friend and Hasbrouck in 1983, based on a review of a 
number of previous studies, found that the response of the savings rate to the rate of 
interest was substantially positive,441 " their empirical evidence failed to support the 
view that higher after-tax rates of return increased saving"442, as concluded by James 
and Nobes. This finding is supported by other empirical studies refen-ed to by 
Slemrod and Bakija who state that "any response of the saving rate to the incentive 
effect of a higher after-tax rate of return is likely to be fairly small."443 
From the above, the response of the saving rate to a lower or higher after-tax 
rate of return, due to a high or low MTR, is small. This may be true because the 
possible cause of the phenomenon is that there are factors influencing individuals ' 
saving decisions other than the MTR on the return on savings. Messere supports the 
view that " ... the savings behaviour of households is also influenced by a number of 
factors having little or nothing to do with taxation.'"'44 
Other factors influencing the savings rate can be divided into two groups, 
namely (a) factors influencing a decline in saving and (b) those influencing an 
. . . 
mcrease m savmg. 
Factors under (a) include demographic shift, inflation, interest rates, financial 
liberalisation, and social welfare programmes. These undermine the argument that a 
high MTR causes a fall in the saving rate. (More detailed discussion on these factors 
can be found in Appendix XIV to Chapter Two). 
Factors under (b) include having some target for future consumption, 
deflation, decline in property prices, a big increase in government borrowing, 
inflation, and interest rates. These undermine the role of tax-rate reduction in the rise 
in the saving rate. (More detailed discussion on these factors can be found in 
Appendix XIV to Chapter Two). 
As with saving, there are other factors influencing investment decisions, 
which probably undermine the role of the MTR in the rise or fall in the investment 
441 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.68 
442 ibid.p.68 
443 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p. ll2 
444 Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.l37 
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rate. Silverman discovers that " the general conditions of industry and trade" or "the 
relative falling-off in trade" could influence decisions to invest more than tax rates 
could.445 "The desire to make a big gain"446could also effect a rise in investment. 
3.2.2.6 Evaluating tbe effects of the progressive rate structure on saving and 
investment 
My research so far agrees with the argument that "estimating [the effect of] the tax 
rate on the return to saving is a particularly vexing problem."447 As we have seen, 
assessment of the effect of the progressive rate structme on the return on investment 
is also a vexing problem. Despite the problem, this research can draw conclusions 
from the premises as discussed above. Such conclusions will be in the fotm of 
answers to the questions posed at page 100. 
Regarding the first question of the direction of the effects of the progressive 
rate structure on savings and investment rates, this research concludes that the 
progressive rate structure could have a negative effect on savings and investment 
rates, leading to a decline in both. 
Firstly, a high MTR and a high ATR on earned income reduce the ability to 
save and invest. 
Secondly, despite the fact that there are a number of factors other than 
taxation influencing decisions to save and invest, this does not completely dismiss 
the negative effect of the progressive rate structure on savings and investment rates. 
This is because of two psychological effects: (a) the disincentive effects on saving 
and investment caused by very high MTRs on returns on savings and investments, 
and (b) incentives to avoid or evade tax due to high MTRs on returns on savings and 
investments. 
Except for the two psychological effects above, the progressive rate structure 
is assumed either to discourage or to encourage saving and investment. 
Discouragement of saving and investment arises from the premise that high MTRs 
on income from saving and investment reduce the marginal returns on savings and 
investments. Encouragement of saving and investment arises from the premise that 
445 Silverman, op.cit.(note43), pp.l73 and 179 
446 Messere, op.cit.{note240), p.137 
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high ATRs resulting from an increase m MTRs on income from savmg and 
investment reduce the overall retums on savings and investments. Given this, the 
progressive rate structure could have influences on either a rise or a fall in saving and 
investment rates. 
Although the progressive rate stn1cture could create these opposing effects, 
this research concludes that the disincentive effect is likely to outweigh the incentive 
effect. This is because of: 
(a) the improbability of the incentive effect, and 
(b) the likelihood of the disincentive effect in practice. 
These reasons obtain when both effects on each particular group of people are 
weighed. 
According to Silverman, the effect of the progressive rate stmcture on the 
savings and investments of individuals varies with "the character" and "the amount 
of the respective incomes."448 As stated earlier, he further argues that low and 
moderate earners "are more concerned with making their position secure than with 
obtaining the maximum immediate return from their wealth."449 Silverman's view 
that low and moderate earners would be encouraged by the reduction in overall 
returns on savings and investments due to high A TRs to save and invest more than 
before is convincing. 
Nevertheless, in practice, most low and moderate earners would not be able 
to save and invest more if the limit of their earning opportunity did not allow them to 
afford greater saving and investment. Apart from this, in cases where low or 
moderate earners could afford it, the benefit that they would gain from greater saving 
and investment is not great. This is not only because of limits on their additional 
earnings but also because their incomes from greater saving and investment may be 
subject to higher MTRs. Therefore, I agree with Silverman when he suggests that to 
secure their livelihood and/or the livelihood of their dependents in the future, low 
and moderate earners tend to cut down their everyday expenditure rather than cut 
down their savings and investments.450 
447 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63); p.l11 
448 Silverman, op.cit.(note43), pp.168, 179-180 
449 ibid.p.168 
450 ibid.pp.165, 168 
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The above discussion suggests that generally, there is likely to be no 
incentive effect from the progressive rate structure on the decisions of low and 
moderate earners to save and invest more. 
Conversely, according to Silvem1an, high earners are concerned with " the 
maximum immediate return" from their savings and enrichment from their 
investments in addition to their security.45 1 As referred to earlier, Silvetman argues 
that high earners would be discouraged from saving and investment by the reduction 
in returns on savings and investments due to high MTRs. Silvem1an's idea is 
convincing. This is because the proportions of after-tax returns are smaller and much 
smaller when the returns on savings and investments are higher and much higher. 
Therefore, in practice there is likely to be a disincentive effect on high earners. 
The likelihood of a disincentive effect on the saving and investment decisions 
of wealthy people would significantly affect efficiency of taxation and the national 
economy as a whole. Perception of the negative effect on the national economy is 
derived from Silverman, who writes that "as is well known, the bulk of the national 
savings comes from the comparatively well-to-do classes."452 Similarly, "a larger and 
higher-quality capital stock" comes from the savings of the wealthy.453 If there were 
a lower level of national savings due to curtailment of saving by the wealthy, 
economic growth would be affected. This is because a low level of national savings 
restricts the level of investment. Additionally, if there were a low level of investment 
due to curtailment of investment by the wealthy, economic growth would also be 
affected. This is because a low level of investment restricts the level of production of 
any country. 
My research so far suggests, in answer to the first question, that the 
progressive rate structure is more likety to create negative than positive effects on 
saving and investment rates. Despite this conclusion, a reduction in MTRs for the 
purpose of boosting saving and investment rates is required with restrictions. This is 
an answer to the second question whether tax -rate reduction in income from saving 
and investment is needed to boost savings and investment rates. 
451 ibid.pp. l68, 169 
452 ibid.p.l69 
453 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.120 
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However, my research would suggest that MTRs on retums on savings and 
investments should not be excessively lowered, particularly on interest and dividend 
incomes for high earners. This is based on seven premises. 
Firstly, the psychological effects of the progressive rate structure are not the 
only factor influencing a decline in saving and investment rates. As discussed 
earlier, there are other factors influencing this. If the psychological effects were the 
only factor determining the decline in savings and investment rates, there would be 
no objection to the imposition of excessively low MTRs on returns on savings and 
investments. 
Secondly, tax-rate reduction is not the only factor to boost savmg and 
investment rates. As discussed earlier, there are other factors involved. If tax-rate 
reduction were the only factor determining the rise in savings and investment rates, 
there would be no objection to the imposition of excessively low MTRs on returns on 
savings and investments. 
Tbirdly, as discussed earlier, there is empirical evidence showing that the 
relationship between a rise in the saving rate and a higher after-tax rate of return on 
savings is fairly small. If the response of the saving rate to a higher after-tax rate of 
return on savings, due to a tax-rate reduction, were great, there would be no objection 
to the imposition of excessively low MTRs on returns on savings. 
Fourthly, as discussed·earlier, besides the incentive effect, tax-rate reduction 
is assumed to have a disincentive effect. As tax-rate reduction could cause these 
opposing psychological effects, MTRs on returns on savings and investments should 
not be excessively lowered. If tax-rate reduction were not supposed to have a 
disincentive effect, there would be no objection to the imposition of excessively low 
MTRs. 
Fifthly, higher-income groups would gam more benefit from tax-rate 
reduction than lower-income groups for two reasons. 
(a) Lower-income earners are concerned with their security. They may then 
have a tendency to save and invest more in order to benefit from the greater returns 
to savings and investments due to tax-rate reduction. However, in practice, most of 
them will be unable to save and invest more because of the limit of their earning 
opportunity. 
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(b) Higher-income earners are concerned with "maximum immediate return" 
and enrichment in addition to their security.454 They may then have a tendency to 
save and invest more in order to benefit from the greater returns on savings and 
investments due to tax-rate reduction. In practice, the tich are able to save and invest 
more because of their greater capacity to earn. 
If the rich gained greater benefit from greater saving and investment than the 
poor, this would thwart vertical equity/redistribution. For this reason, I completely 
agree with Kaldor when he wtites that "by making the tax sufficiently progressive, it 
would always be possible to prevent the rich from saving [and investing] too 
much."455 Therefore, MTRs on returns on savings and investments should not be 
excessively lowered. 
Sixthly, an excessive rise in saving and investment rates, due to tax-rate 
reduction, could bring about unpleasant economic consequences. Dalton argues that 
"if savings much exceed investment, there will be heavy unemployment, widespread 
business losses, rapidly falling prices and deflation.'"'56 Conversely, "if investment 
much exceeds savings, there may indeed be full employment, but also widespread 
business profits, rapidly rising prices and inflation.'A57 
The Economist supports the view that unpleasant economic consequences 
may arise from too much saving, claiming that " ... one reason for the country' s 
economic stagnation is that consumers . . . insist on keeping their wallets firmly 
shut.'"'58 
For the above reason, MTRs on returns on savings and investments should 
not be excessively lowered. If tax-rate reduction did not lead to unpleasant economic 
consequences, there would be no objection to the imposition of excessively low 
MTRs. 
Finally, if MTRs on income from saving and investment were excessively 
lowered, tax revenue from such income would decline. 
454 Silverman, op.cit.(note43),pp.168, 169 
455 Kaldor, op.cit.(note54), p.99 
456 Dalton, op.cit.(note30), pp. 72-73 
457 .b .d 73 I I .p. 
458 Author not identified, "Economics focus A saving grace", The Economist, Vol. 368, No. 8331, 
July 5tl' 2003, 83. 
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3.2.2.7 Changes in the tax-rate schedule and OSMTRS 
From the above discussion, an optimal reduction in a MTR is needed. As we have 
seen, under the cunent Thai law, interest and dividend income are subject to MTRs 
ranging from 0% up to 37% (it used to reach 65%). Meanwhile, under UK law for 
the tax year 2004-05, interest income is subject to MTRs ranging from 10%, 20%, 
and 40 %; and dividend income is subject to MTRs ranging from 10% up to 32.5 % 
(it used to reach 98%). 
Thus, MTRs on interest and dividend income under both laws have not been 
excessively lowered. They have now been set within the optimal range and are likely 
to be in agreement with part of the OSMTRS, which requires a reduction in the 
disincentive effect. This finding is also related to the third question posed at page 
100. 
4. Conflict between equity and efficiency, and proposed solutions 
4.1 Possible features of the conflict 
As discussed in section 2, the progressive rate structure achieves vertical 
equity/redistribution in two ways. 
Firstly, it imposes low tax burdens or low ATRs on low incomes. Low ATRs 
on the poor are obtained by imposing low MTRs on the earnings of low-income 
groups. 
Secondly, it imposes higher tax burdens or higher ATRs with an increase in 
income. Higher ATRs with higher incomes are obtained by imposing higher MTRs 
on larger incomes. By this way, high tax burdens or high ATRs on the rich can be 
obtained. 
The second method leads to inefficiency of taxation. The conflict between 
equity and efficiency can be categorized below. 
(a) Vertical equity/redistribution VS tax avoidance and evasion 
Although high MTRs on high-income groups promote vertical 
equity/redistribution, they provide incentives to avoid and evade tax. Tax avoidance 
and evasion by high-income groups thwart vertical equity/redistribution and lead to 
inefficiency of taxation (as discussed in 2.4.3 .1 and 3 .1.2). 
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(b) Vertical equity/redistribution VS low administrative and compliance 
costs 
Maintaining higher MTRs on higher incomes helps achieve ve11ical 
equity/redistribution. However, thi s requires there to be a greater number of MTRs 
and tax bands, causing complexity in the legislation. Additionally, complex 
legislation is enacted to prevent tax-avoidance schemes resulting from high MTRs. 
Complex legislation leads to high administrative and compliance costs (as discussed 
in 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2). 
(c) Vertical equity/redistribution VS the disincentive effect 
Although very high MTRs achieve vertical equity/redistribution, they have a 
disincentive effect on economic activities. This is because they are supposed to 
discourage taxpayers from doing extra work, saving more or investing (as discussed 
in 3.2.1.4, 3.2.1.6 and 3.2.2.6). 
4.2 Proposed solutions to the conflict 
The level ofMTRs in the tax-rate schedule is the major factor leading to the conflict 
between equity and efficiency. To reduce the conflict, MTRs must be designed to 
strike a balance between equity and efficiency. As noted earlier, OSMTRs are 
supposed to achieve vertical equity/redistribution and least affect efficiency of 
taxation. 
This research proposes the two tax-rate schedule system that is likely to bring 
about OSMTRs. MTRs and tax bands in the proposed two tax-rate schedules are 
likely to reduce the conflict between: 
(a) vertical equity/redistribution and tax avoidance and evasion, 
(b) vertical equity/redistribution and low administrative and compliance 
costs, and 
(c) vertical equity/redistribution and disincentive effects. 
4.2.1 Proposal for the two tax-rate schedule system 
This research proposes that net/taxable income will be subject to two tax-rate 
schedules, i.e. one schedule applicable to low-income groups and another to high-
mcome groups. 
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Each schedule consists of OSMTRs. The schedule for low-income groups 
contains two tax rates, and the schedule for hjgh-income groups also contains two tax 
rates with broad rate bands. Net/taxable income which does not exceed a specified 
amount (e.g. 500,000 baht or £ 10,000) will be taxed at the two tax rates ofO% and 
8% in the schedule for low-income groups. These amounts are assumed to represent 
the income of low-income and (lower) middle-income taxpayers. In the meantime, 
net/ taxable income which exceeds a specified amount (e.g. 500,000 baht or £1 0,000) 
will be taxed at the two tax rates of 8% and 35% in the schedule for high-income 
groups. These amounts are assumed to represent income of (upper) middle-income, 
high-income, and highest-income taxpayers. Tax bands in the proposed two tax-rate 
schedules will be adjusted in line with changes in the retail prices index in each tax 
year. Examples below will illustrate the proposed two tax-rate schedules. 
Example (1): The proposed two tax-rate schedules for Thai law 
Chai receives employment income. After subtracting tax reliefs from his 
assessable income, if his net/taxable income does not exceed 500,000 baht, he will be 
taxed at the 0% rate on the first 100,000 baht of net/taxable income, and at the 8% 
MTR on the next 400,000 baht, according to a schedule for low-income groups, as 
shown below. 
A schedule for low-income groups 






Noy also receives employment income. After subtracting tax reliefs from her 
assessable income, if her net/taxable income exceeds 500,000 baht (e.g. 1,000,000 
baht), she will be taxed at the 8% MTR on the first 500,000 baht of net/taxable 
income, and at the 35% MTR on the next 500,000 baht, according to a schedule for 
high-income groups, as shown below. 
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A schedule for high-income groups 
Bands of net/taxable Tax rates (%) 
income (baht) 
0-500,000 8 
over 500,000 35 
Example (2): The proposed two tax-rate schedules for UK law 
Tom receives employment income. After subtracting tax reliefs from his 
assessable income, if his net/taxable income does not exceed £10,000, he will be 
taxed at the 0% rate on the first £2,000 of net/taxable income, and at the 8% MTR on 
the next £8,000, according to a schedule for low-income groups, as shown below. 
A schedule for low-income groups 




Nancy also receives employment income. After subtracting tax reliefs from 
her assessable income, ifher net/taxable income exceeds £10,000 (e.g. £50,000), she 
will be taxed at the 8% MTR on the first £10,000 of net/taxable income, and at the 
35% MTR on the neX:t £40,000, according to a schedule for high-income groups 
below. 
A schedule for high-income groups 
Bands of net/taxable Tax rates(%) 
income(£) 
0-10,000 8 
over 10,000 35 
The further points to be discussed are to what extent the proposed two tax-
rate schedules reduce the conflict between equity and efficiency. 
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4.2.2 The two tax-rate schedule system and vertical equity/redistribution 
The schedule for low-income groups is designed to help reduce tax burdens on low-
income and (lower) middle-income earners. Meanwhile, the schedule for high-
income groups is designed to impose optimal tax burdens on (upper) middle-income, 
high-income, and highest-income earners and to discourage tax avoidance and 
evasion. 
4.2.2.1 A schedule for low-income groups 
As noted in 2.4.4.2, to achieve greater vertical equity/redistribution at a low-income 
level, the present number of Thai and UK low- or starting-rate taxpayers should be 
further 1owered. This wiH further lower the amount and share of income tax paid by 
4-9 low-income groups. :J 
A reduction in the number of low- or starting-rate taxpayers and in the 
amount and share of tax paid by these groups can be rea1ised by (i) lowering the low 
or starting rate, (ii) narrowing the low- or starting-rate band, and (iii) raising the level 
of income subject to the low or starting rate (as discussed in 2.4.4.3). 
This research proposes in 4.2.1 that there are two tax rates in the schedule for 
low-income groups, i.e. the 0% rate applying to the first 100,000 baht or the first 
£2,000 of net/taxable income, and the 8% MTR applying to the next 400,000 baht or 
the next £8,000_ Additionally, as will be discussed in full detail in Chapter Three, I 
propose an increase in personal allowances to cover private consumption expenditure 
per capita (under Thai and UK laws) and to be in line with price inflation (under Thai 
law). 
The proposed zero-rate bracket and the proposed increase in personal 
allowances will raise the level of income subject to the low or starting rate. As a 
result, there will be less income and a smaller number of poor people subject to the 
low or starting rate. This will reduce the present number of Thai and UK low- or 
starting-rate taxpayers or remove more low-income earners from the PIT system of 
Thailand and the UK. This will further lower the amount and share of income tax 
paid by l.ow-income earners and not cause income to be redistributed too much from 
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low-income earners, which will help achieve greater vettical equity/redistribution at 
a low-income level. 
Also, tax burdens on (lower) middle- income earners wil l be further reduced 
when the proposed tax-rate schedule for low-income groups is applied. This is for 
two reasons. Firstly, (lower) middle-income earners will receive tax benefits from a 
zero-rate bracket. Secondly, the tax rate applicable to (lower) middle-income earners 
is lowered. As proposed above, the tax rate for (lower) middle-income earners is 8%. 
This rate will be reduced from I 0% under existing Thai law and from 10% and 22% 
under existing UK law. Additionally, as a result of the proposed increase in personal 
allowances, tax burdens on (lower) middle-income earners will be further reduced. 
As discussed in 2.4, a low level of A TRs on low-income groups leads to tax 
progressivity, which achieves significant vertical equity/redistribution at a low-
income level. The following two examples will clarify this point. 
Example (i) 
Supposing a Thai (lower) middle-income earner has his/her taxable income in 
2005 in the amount of 500,000 baht.460 He/she pays 40,000 baht m tax 
((100,000x0%)+(400,000xl 0%)). His/her ATR is 8% (40,000/500,000). If this 
person paid tax under the proposed schedule for low-income groups, he/she would 
pay 32,000 baht in tax ((100,000x0%)+(400,000x8%)). His/her ATR would be 6.4% 
(32,000/500,000). His/her ATR decreases from 8% to 6.4%. A lower ATR on a Thai 
(lower) middle-income earner under the proposed schedule for low-income groups 
brings about greater tax progressivity, which promotes significant vertical 
equity/redistribution. 
Example (ii) 
Supposing a British (lower) middle-income earner has his/her taxable income 
m 2004-05 in the amount of £10,000.461 He/she pays £1,957.60 in tax 
((2,020x10%)+(7980x22%)). His/her ATR is 19.57% (1,957.60/10,000). If this 
person paid tax under the proposed schedule for low-income groups, he/she would 
pay £640 in tax ((2,000x0%)+(8,000x8%)). His/her ATR would be 6.4% 
459 In the past, three proposals are made to reduce tax burdens on low-income groups, as shown in 
Appendix XV to Chapter Two. However, my proposal to use the schedule for low-income groups is 
different from the previous proposals. 
460 This amount is assumed to represent the income of a (lower) middle-income taxpayer. 
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(640/1 0,000). His/her A TR decreases from 19.57% to 6.4%. A lower ATR on a 
British (lower) middle-income earner under the proposed schedule for low-income 
groups brings about greater tax progressivity, which promotes significant vertical 
equity/redistribution. 
4.2.2.2 A schedule for high-income groups 
As noted in 2.4.4.1 , to achieve greater ve11ical equity/redistribution at a high-income 
level, an increase in the present number of Thai and UK highest- or higher-rate 
taxpayers and in the amount and share of income tax paid by high-income groups is 
required. This proposal can come about via the widening of the present Thai and UK 
highest- or higher-rate band by 'lowering the highest- or higher-rate threshold (as 
discussed in 2.4.4.3). 
As noted in 2.3, the highest-rate threshold under the present Thai tax-rate 
schedule (2005) is 4,000,001 baht. According to the proposed tax-rate schedule for 
high-income groups, the highest-rate threshold is lowered to 500,001 baht. 
Meanwhile, as noted in 2.3, the higher-rate threshold under the present UK tax-rate 
schedule (2004-05) is £31,400. According to the proposed tax-rate schedule for high-
income groups, the higher-rate threshold is lowered to £10,001. 
Furthermore, according to the proposed schedule for high-income groups, 
(upper) middle-income, high-income and hjghest-income earners will not receive tax· 
benefits from a low rate in the proposed schedule for low-income groups, especially 
the 0% rate. As proposed above, there are only two tax rates under the proposed 
schedule for high-income groups (i.e.8% and 35%). Under the present Thai tax-rate 
schedule (2005), high-income groups receive tax benefits from a low rate, i.e. 
(upper) middle-income earners are taxed at 0%, 10% and 20%, high-income earners 
at 0%, 10%, 20% and 30%, and highest-income earners at 0%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 
37%. Under the present UK tax-rate schedule (2004-05), high-income groups also 
receive tax benefits from a low rate, i.e. (upper) middle-income earners are taxed at 
10% and 22%, high-income earners at I 0%, 22% and 40%, and highest-income 
earners at 10%, 22%, and 40%. 
461 This amount is assumed to represent the income of a (lower) middle-income taxpayer. 
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When high-income groups do not rece1ve tax benefits from a low rate 
including the 0% rate (if the proposed two tax-rate schedules are applied), this will 
achieve greater vertical equity/redistribution at a high-income level. This is because 
ATRs on high-income groups will be increased. As discussed in 2.4, a high level of 
ATRs on high-income groups leads to tax progressivity, which achieve significant 
vertical equity/redistribution. The following examples will clarify this point. 
Example (a) 
Supposing a Thai (upper) middle-income earner has his/her taxable income in 
2005 in the amount of 1,000,000 baht.462 He/she pays 140,000 baht in tax 
((100,000x0%)+(400,000x10%)+(500,000x20%)). His/her ATR IS 14 % 
(140,000/1,000,000). If this person paid tax under the proposed schedule for high-
mcome groups, he/she would pay 215,000 baht m tax 
((500,000x8%)+(500,000x35%)). His/her ATR would be 21.5 % 
(215,000/l ,OOO,OOO).llislher ATR increases from 14% to 21.5%. A higher ATR on a 
Thai (upper) middle-income earner under the proposed schedule for high-income 
groups brings about greater tax progressivity, which promotes significant vertical 
equity/redistribution.463 
Example (b) 
Supposing a Thai high-income earner has his/her taxable income in 2005 in 
the amount of 4,000,000 baht.464 He/she pays 1,040,000 baht in ' tax 
((1 OO,OOOxO%)+( 400,000x 1 0%)+(500,000x20%)+(3,000,000x30%)). His/her ATR is 
26% (1 ,040,000/4,000,000). If this person paid tax under the proposed schedule for 
high-income groups, he/she would pay 1,265,000 baht m tax 
((500,000x8%)+(3,500,000x35%)). His/her ATR would be 31.63 % 
(1,265,000/4,000,000). His/her ATR increases from 26% to 31.63%. A higher ATR 
on a Thai high-income earner under the proposed schedule for high-income groups 
462 This amount is assumed to represent the income of an (upper) middle-income taxpayer. 
463 To reduce the high tax burden on an (upper) middle-income earner and an (upper) middle-income 
married couple who have just entered into the proposed schedule for high-income groups, e.g. a 
person who has his/her taxable income which is slightly over a specified amount (500,000 baht) or a 
married couple who pay tax under the joint-taxation system in Thailand and whose combined taxable 
income is slightly over a specified amount (500,000 baht), such as 505,000 baht, the law should aUow 
this person or this married couple to be taxed at the 0% rate on the first 100,000 baht of net/taxable 
income, at the 8% MTR on the next 400,000 baht, and at the 35%MTR on income over 500,000 baht. 
464 This amount is assumed to represent the income of a high-income taxpay,er. 
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brings about greater tax progressivi ty, which promotes significant vertical 
equity/redistribution. 
Example (c) 
Supposing a Thai highest-income earner has his/her taxable income in 2005 
m the amount of 8,000,000 baht.465 He/she pays 2,520,000 baht in tax 
(( 1 OO,OOOxO%)+( 400,000x 1 0% )+(500,000x20% )+(3,000,000x30% )+( 4,000,000x3 7 
%)). His/her ATR is 31.5% (2,520,000/8,000,000). If this person paid tax under the 
proposed schedule for high-income groups, he/she would pay 2,665,000 baht in tax 
((500,000x8%)+(7,500,000x35%)). His/her ATR would be 33.31 % 
(2,665,000/8,000,000). His/her ATR increases from 31 .5% to 33.31 %. A higher ATR 
on a Thai highest-income earner under the proposed schedule for high-income 
groups brings about greater tax progressivity, which promotes significant vertical 
eq ui ty/redi stributi on. 
Example (d) 
Supposing a British (upper) middle-income earner has his/her taxable income 
m 2004-05 in the amount of £30,000.466 He/she pays £6,357.60 in tax 
((2,020x10%)+(27,980x22%)). His/her ATR is 21.19% (6,357.60/30,000). If this 
person paid tax under the proposed schedule for high-income groups, he/she would 
pay £7,800 in tax ((10,000x8%)+(20,000x35%)). His/her ATR would be 26% 
(7 ,800/30,000). His/her A TR increases from 21. 19% to 26%. A higher A TR on a 
British (upper) middle-income earner under the proposed schedule for high-income 
groups brings about greater tax progressivity, which promotes significant vertical 
equity/redistribution.467 
Example (e) 
Supposing a British high-income earner has his/her taxable income in 2004-
05 m the amount of £40,000.468 He/she pays £10,105.60 m tax 
((2,020x10%)+(29,380x22%)+(8,600x40%)). His/her ATR 1s 25.26% 
465 This amount is assumed to represent the income of a highest-income taxpayer. 
466 This amount is assumed to represent the income of an (upper) middle-income taxpayer. 
467 To reduce the high tax burden on an (upper) middle-income earner who has just entered into the 
proposed schedule for high-income groups, e.g. a person who has hi.slher taxable income which is 
slightly over a specified amount (£10,000), such as £10,500, the law should allow him/her to be taxed 
at the 0% rate on the first £2,000 of net/taxable income, at the 8% MTR on the next £8,000, and at the 
35%MTR on income over £10,000. 
468 This amount is assumed to represent the income of a high-income taxpayer. 
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(1 0,1 05.60/40,000). If this person paid tax under the proposed schedule for high-
mcome groups, he/she would pay £1 1,300 in tax ((1 0,000x8%)+(30,000x35%)). 
His/her ATR would be 28.25% (11 ,300/40,000). His/her ATR increases from 
25.26% to 28.25%. A higher ATR on a British high-income earner under the 
proposed schedule for high-income groups brings about greater tax progressivity, 
which promotes significant vertical equity/redistribution. 
Example (f) 
Supposing a British highest-income earner has his/her taxable income in 
2004-05 in the amount of £50,000.469 He/she pays £14,105.60 in tax 
((2,020xl 0%)+(29,380x22%)+(18,600x40%)). His/her ATR lS 28.21% 
(I 4,1 05.60/50,000). If this person paid tax tmder the proposed schedule for high-
income groups, he/she would pay £14,800 in tax ((10,000x8%)+(40,000x35%)). 
His/her ATR would be 29.60% (14,800/50,000). His/her ATR increases from 
28.21% to 29.60%. A higher ATR on a British highest-income earner under the 
proposed schedule for high-income groups brings about greater tax progressivity, 
which promotes significant vertical equity/redistribution. 
Additionally, when high-income groups do not receive tax benefits from a 
zero-rate bracket (if the proposed two tax-rate schedules are applied), this will also 
help achieve greater vertical equity/redistribution at a high-income level. This is 
because if there is the extension of a zero-rate bracket in the case where there is one 
tax-rate schedule, it will be more valuable to high-income groups than to low-income 
groups. (More discussion follows in Chapter Three.) 
As to be discussed in full detail in Chapter Three, to prevent the rich from 
receiving greater tax benefit from an increase in personal allowances, I propose to 
phase out or cancel personal allowances for the rich, particularly for high- and 
highest-income earners. This will also promote vertical equity/redistribution. 
Moreover, lowering the top rate in the proposed schedule for high-income 
groups (from 37% to 35% under Thai law, and from 40% to 35% under UK law) is 
unlikely to reduce the amount and share of income tax paid by high-income groups 
in Thailand and the UK for three reasons. 
469 This amount is assumed to represent the income of a highest-income taxpayer. 
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Firstly, even though the top rate is lowered, there are high ATRs on high-
income groups because these groups do not receive tax benefits fi:om a low rate (as 
discussed in examples (a) - (f) above) . 
Secondly, loweting the top rate and hav ing only two tax rates in the proposed 
schedule for high-income groups are likely to reduce incentives for the top-rate 
taxpayers in both countries to avoid or evade tax. (More discussion on thjs point 
follows in 4.2.3.1 ). 
Thirdly, it is likely to be a very large number of Thai and British people 
paying tax at the top rate because of the very width of the highest-rate band in the 
proposed schedule for high-income groups. 
4.2.3 The two tax-rate schedule system as a solution to the conflict 
As we have seen in 4.2.2, the proposed system of two tax-rate schedules is likely to 
generate OSMTRs, resulting in significant vertical equity/redistribution. The 
existence of MTRs and tax bands in the proposed two tax-rate schedules is also 
believed to mean that there will be OSMTRs which will least affect efficiency of 
taxation and help reduce the conflict between equity and efficiency. The analysis and 
discussion in 4.2.3.1 , 4.2.3.2 and 4.2.3.3 will support this supposition. 
4.2.3.1 The two tax-rate schedule system as a solution to conflict between 
vertical equity/redistribution and tax avoidance and evasion 
High MTRs on high incomes are supposed to achieve a desired redistribution (as 
discussed in 2.2). However, ifMTRs are made much higher on higher incomes, there 
may be more tax avoidance and evasion (as discussed in 2.4.3.4). 
As discussed in 2.4.3.4 and 2.4.3.5, changes in the tax-rate schedule via the 
four methods (i.e. (a) lowering MTRs, (b) reducing the number of tax bands and 
MTRs, together with widening tax bands, (c) setting the top MTR to be no different 
from the top rate of corporation tax, and (d) not to exceed 50%) are likely to 
discourage tax avoidance and evasiOn, which will promote vertical 
equity/redistribution at lower MTRs. 
As also discussed in 3 .1.2, having lower MTRs, fewer tax bands and MTRs, 
and wider tax bands at all income levels (except for expanding the low- or starting-
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rate band) is likely to promote efficiency of taxation. This is because they make tax 
avoidance and evasion less desirable, thus helping to reduce revenue loss and 
administrati ve and compliance costs (as discussed in 3.1.2.1 , 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.3). 
As we have seen, there are low MTRs (the top rate below 50%), very few tax 
bands and MTRs, and wide tax bands in the proposed two tax-rate schedules. Thus, 
the existence ofMTRs and tax bands in the proposed two tax-rate schedules is likely 
to reduce incentives for taxpayers to avoid or evade tax, which promote both vertical 
equity/redistribution and efficiency of taxation simultaneously. 
4.2.3.2 T he two tax-rate schedule system as a solution to conflict between 
vertical equity/redistribution and low administrative and compliance costs 
Multiple MTRs and tax bands, which are required to maintain higher MTRs with 
higher incomes to help achieve vertical equity/redistribution, cause the inherent 
complexity within the tax-rate schedule and complexity in tax legislation and in the 
taxing process (as discussed in 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2). This leads to high administrative 
and compliance costs. Simplicity in the tax-rate schedule, in tax legislation and in the 
taxing process is therefore required to reduce such costs (as discussed in 3.1.1.3). 
As we have seen, having very few MTRs and tax bands in the proposed two 
tax-rate schedules can help achieve vertical equity/redistribution. They are also likely 
to generate simplicity in the tax-rate-schedule. 
Moreover, simpler legislation is likely to occur since complex legislation to 
prevent tax-avoidance schemes may not be necessary if the proposed two tax-rate 
schedule system were put into practice to discourage tax avoidance and evasion. 
Simplicity in the taxing process will also occur when low-income earners are 
moved out of the PIT system. This will result from increasing the amount of personal 
tax allowances along with using a zero-rate bracket in the proposed schedule for low-
income groups. The removal of low-income earners from the PIT system promotes 
vertical equity/redistribution and generates low administrative and compliance costs 
at the same time. 
Finaiiy, the two tax-rate schedule system can be used to solve rate 
differentials. A reduction in rate differentials between earned and unearned income 
will strike the balance between equity and efficiency. 
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Rate differentials between earned and unearned income cause inequity in 
taxation. As noted in 2.3, all types of income (earned and uneamed income) are 
charged with tax at the same rate in the present Thai tax-rate schedule (0%, LO%, 
20%, 30% and 37%). However, under Thai law, a taxpayer who derives interest or 
dividend income may be taxed only at 15% or l 0% respectively; provided that 
his/her interest or dividend income is already taxed at source at the rate of 15% or 
10%, and he/she elects to pay tax on interest or dividend income through withholding 
at somce and not to include such income as assessable income in the end-of-year tax 
return. 
Comparing two Thai people with equal income but from different sources, 
one whose iFicome is taxed at 0%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 37% (e.g. a salary earner) has 
disposable income during the tax year less than another whose income is interest 
income which is taxed at 15%. Therefore, horizontal inequity emerges, and there is 
violation of vertical equity/redistribution since income is redistributed from the 
former to the latter. Horizontal inequity and violation of vertical equity/redistribution 
also occur under UK .law but are less severe than those under Thai law. This is 
because there are slight rate differentials between earned income, non-dividend 
savings income, and dividend income under UK law, as noted in 2.3. 
Rate differentials also cause complexity in tax legislation (as discussed in 
3.1.1.1). Reducing rate differentials will bring about simpler legislation and lower., 
administrative and compliance costs (as discussed in 3.1.1.3). 
There are still rate differentials between earned and uneamed income under 
the present Thai and UK tax-rate schedules. Therefore, this research proposes that 
earned and unearned income in both countries should be taxed at the same rates, i.e. 
those under the proposed two tax-rate schedules. Thus, this proposal is likely to bring 
about horizontal equity, avoid violation of vertical equity/redistribution, and lead to 
simpler legislation. 
4.2.3.3 The two tax-rate schedule system as a solution to conflict between 
vertical equity/redistribution and disincentive effects 
Despite helping achieve vertical equity/redistribution, high MTRs are thought to 
have a disincentive effect (as discussed in 3.2.1.1). Lower MTRs are therefore 
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Tequired to reduce the disincentive effect. However, a high ATR is believed to 
magnify the incentive effect. Increas ing MTRs as a means to increase the ATR is 
also believed indirectly to support incentives to work, save and invest (as discussed 
in 3.2.1.2). 
According to the theoretical analysis above, the progressive rate structure 
creates " the countervailing effects" of incentive and disincentive effects on work 
effort. As discussed in 3 .2.1.4, empirical studies support the countervai ling effects, 
but both disincentive and incentive effects on work eff011 are small in practice. In 
addition, tax-rate reduction has little impact on work incentives according to 
empirical studies, which is the opposite of the findings of theoretical analysis (as 
discussed in 3.2.1.5). 
This research established in 3.2.1.4 and 3.2.1.6 that very high MTRs of 
around 90% or more probably create disincentives to work when high-income 
taxpayers have no chance to avoid and evade tax. However, if the top rates were not 
very high, i.e. around 50-65% (as used to be the case in Thailand and the UK), these 
rates would have no significant effect on work decisions according to empirical 
evidence and the analysis in this research. Therefore, tax reform to reduce MTRs to 
reduce the disincentive effect on work effort seems unnecessary. 
As also established in 3.2.1.6, the current top rates of Thailand and the UK 
have been set optimally not only to discourage tax avoidance and evasion but also to • 
prevent probable disincentives to work. However, the greatest benefit of tax-rate 
reductions from 50-65% to 37% (under Thai law) and to 40% (under UK law) is 
likely to be the discouragement of tax avoidance and evasion rather than the 
prevention of probable disincentive effects or hope for incentive effects. It would be 
unacceptable if the current top rates of both countries were further cut down on 
labour supply grounds. 
The top rate in the proposed schedule for high-income groups is set slightly 
lower than the current top rates of Thailand and the UK. This is for the purpose of 
reducing incentives to avoid and evade tax rather than to prevent the disincentive 
effect on work effort. As we have seen, MTRs in the proposed two tax-rate schedules 
are not very high. Therefore, these rates would not certainly create disincentives to 
work. 
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According to theoretical ana lysis, the progressive rate stntcture also creates 
opposing psychological effects, i.e. negative/disincentive and positive/ incentive 
effects on saving and investment (as discussed in 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2). However, thi s 
research established in 3.2.2.6 that the progress ive rate structure is more li kely to 
create negative than positi ve effects on saving and investment rates. Despi te thi s 
establishment, an optimal reduction in MTRs fo r the purpose of boosting saving and 
investment rates is required. In other words, MTRs on returns on savings and 
investments should not be excessively lowered, particularly on interest and di vidend 
incomes for high-income earners. 
As compared to those in the past, MTRs on interest and dividend income 
tmder both Thai and UK laws have been considerably reduced. However, the MTRs 
of both countries have not been excessively lowered. MTRs on interest and dividend 
income under the current Thai and UK laws are likely to be set within the optimal 
range (as discussed in 3.2.2.7). Additionally, the highest MTRs on interest and 
dividend income under both laws are now below 50%, and so are unlikely to create 
disincentives to save and invest as is believed MTRs of 50% or more are likely to 
do.470 
This research proposes in 4.2.3.2 that unearned income in both countries 
should be taxed at the same rates as earned income, i .e. those under the proposed two 
tax-rate schedules. MTRs in the proposed two tax-rate schedules are not very high, 
and the highest MTR in the schedule for high-income groups is below 50%. 
Therefore, these rates are unlikely to create disincentives to save and invest. 
5. Conclusion 
In theory, the progressive rate structure requires the ATR to rise with higher incomes 
to achieve vertical equity/redistribution. The multiple rate system is the more 
effective method to approach to the progressive rate structure and to achieve 
significant vertical equity/redistribution. 
The multiple rate system requires can be designed to impose low MTRs on 
the poor, to impose high MTRs on the rich, and to increase MTRs on higher 
470 In my view, an MTR below 50% is unlikely to have a disincentive effect for psychological reasons. 
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incomes. Although high MTRs generate high ATRs on the rich and promote vertical 
equity/redistribution, they impede efficiency of taxation. 
The tax-rate schedules under Thai and UK laws adopt a multiple rate system. 
CwTently, neither schedule is progressive enough to achieve significant vertical 
equity/redistribution because there are lower and fewer MTRs on high incomes, 
wider and fewer tax bands, and a top MTR of below 50%. Therefore, the current 
features of both schedules achieve vertical equity/redistribution to some extent. 
However, both schedules promote efficiency because they bring about simplicity in 
the legislation and reduction in incentives to avoid and evade tax and in disincentive 
effects. 
This research has found that OSMTRs should be established to achieve 
vertical equity/redistribution to a greater extent and still promote efficiency. The 
proposed two tax-rate schedule system, i.e. one schedule for low-income groups and 
another for high-income groups, are believed to achieve these purposes. This is 
because MTRs in the two tax-rate schedules are supposed to generate OSMTRs to 
provide benefits for poor and rich people simultaneously. 
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Chapter Three 
An Optimal Income-Tax Base 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines (a) the structures of the income-tax base under Thai and UK 
laws, (b) their effects on equity and efficiency, (c) the conflict between equity and 
efficiency caused by the tax base. 
In analyzing the effect on equity, the broad tax base and the erosion of the tax 
base by tax reliefs will be taken into account. Proposals will also be made to promote 
equity as this research discovers that tax reliefs adversely affect equity. 
In analyzing the effect on efficiency, this research will discover to what 
extent the erosion of the tax base by tax reliefs affects tax revenue, administrative 
and compliance costs, and deadweight loss. Proposals will also be made to promote 
efficiency as tbis research discovers that such erosion leads to inefficiency of 
taxation. 
Finally, as tax reliefs are found to cause the conflict between equity and 
efficiency or lead to both inequity and inefficiency of taxation, proposals will be 
made to improve equity and efficiency simultaneously. 
2. Concepts and effects of an income-tax base on equity 
2.1 Income subject to tax 
Sandford points out that "further reduction in inequality of income by taxation 
should be sought by widening the income tax base."471 One method for widening the 
income-tax base is to defme broadly the terms of income. 
471 Sandford, op.cit.(note 19), p. l56 
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2.1.1 Definition of income in principle 
The PIT is a tax imposed on an individual's income. Income thus serves as the base 
for his/her liability to the PIT. Additionally, the PIT is required to apply the ability-
to-pay principle to achieve equity, and income can serve as a measure of this ability. 
If income were defined as net accretion to an individual's economic power, 
i.e. to his/her net worth and spending power during a given period, income would 
serve as an appropriate measure of the ability to pay.472 PIT law should therefore 
give a definition of income. 
According to the 'Haig-Simons' concept, whatever is recognized as net 
accretion to a person's economic power during a given period should be income 
subject to tax.473 This is widely recognized by scholars as "a comprehensive income-
tax base"474, or "a comprehensive income tax"475 ("the CIT"). 
Under the CIT, income subject to tax would include all types of item which 
amount to economic accretion, namely earned income (e.g. wages, salaries)476, 
unearned income (e.g. rent, interest, dividends)477, non-money income478iricluding 
income in kind479 or imputed income (e.g. imputed rent from owner-occupied 
housing)480and benefits in kind (e.g. fringe benefits)481 ; capital gains482, windfall 
gains483, winnings from bets484, gifts485, inheritances486, government transfer 
payments (e.g. social security benefits)487, etc. 
Accordingly, if the law defmes the terms of income under the CIT idea, this 
would help widen the income-tax base. This would serve not only as an appropriate 
472 James and Nobes., op.cit.(note5), p.166. 
473 Sandford, op.cit.(note195), p.42 
474 Shipwright and Keeling, op.cit.(note182), p.4 
475 Sandford, op.cit. (note195), p.42 
476 Kraiyudht Dhiratayakinant, Income Tax Theory and the Income Tax of Thailand (Bangkok: 
Duangkamol Publisher, 1978), 3. 
477 'b'd 3 I I .p. 
478 Rangsan Thanapompan, Taxation Theory (Bangkok: Kled Thai Publisher, 1973), 212. 
479 Dhiratayakinant, op.cit.(note476), p.3 
480 R.A. Musgrave and P.B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. (London: 
McGraw-Hill, 1980), 244. 
481 Sandford, op.cit.(note19), p.127 
482 Thanapompan, op.cit.(note478), p.212 




487 Eckstein, op.cit.(note49), p.60 
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measure of ability to pay488 but also as an appropriate base for income tax.489 This 
could achieve equity because "it treats individuals with different sources of income 
unifonnly''490; similarly, "income from all sources would be treated equally.':A91 The 
discussion below will elucidate this argument. 
Income is accepted as net accretion to economic power; therefore, people 
with higher income have greater ability to pay tax than those with lower income. If 
the former paid less tax than the latter (because the former' s income is not included 
in the definition of income but the latter's is included), there would be violation of 
vertical equity/redistribution. The broad definition of income could help prevent this 
violation. This is because under the broad definition of income, all forms of income 
of people with higher income will be included in the definition of income the same as 
the income of people with lower income. This fmding may dismiss the argument that 
the CIT is "strong on horizontal equity'', but "it could, of itself, provide no structure 
for vertical equity."492 Example 3.1 in Appendix I to Chapter Three helps clarify 
this point. 
Additionally, horizontal equity and the redistribution concept will not be 
violated. · This is because under the broad definition of income, all forms of income 
will fall within the same tax base. Consequently, a person who receives jewels, as 
gifts, which are worth about £200,000, will pay the same tax as another who receives 
a salary of £200,000. There is no income redistribution between the same income 
class. Example 3.2 in Appendix I to Chapter Three helps clarify this point. 
2.1.2 Income subject to tax in. practice 
The CIT would in principle achieve equity. However, the CIT has not been fully 
adopted because of three practical problems, i.e. 
(a) the difference between capital and income, 
(b) practical difficulties of ascertaining and measunng certain forms of 
income, and 
488 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note480), p.255 
489 Alan J. Auerbach, "Taxation of Income", The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, John 
Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman, eds. (London: The Macmillan Press Limited, 1987), 605. 
490 ibid.p.605 
491 Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.51 
492 Tiley, op.cit.(note 141 ), p.l3 
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(c) political consideration. 
As regards (a), capital gains are taxed separately from income in various 
countries493because capital and income are different. As Glover notes, "the trees 
represent the capital and the fruit the income.',494 Additionally, "the courts [in the 
UK] have adopted a view that capital gain should and can be distinguished from 
income."495 Capital gains are exempt from income taxation in the UK,496 and they 
have been charged to capital gains tax since 1965.497 However, capital gains are 
subject to the PIT in Thailand.498 
As regards (b), it is argued that "the precise meaning of income and its 
measurement are amongst the most difficult and controversial areas in 
accountancy.',499 It is difficult to measure and tax the equivalence of certain types of 
item to income, i.e. ''non-market sources of income."500 The imputed rent on owner-
occupied housing is an example of non-market sources of income.501 There are six 
EU states imposing tax on the imputed rent at present. 502 This "had been in force in 
the UK as the original Schedule A"503, and was abolished in 1963.504 One of the 
reasons why this tax was abolished concerns the measurement of income, e.g. "there 
was constant pressure for deductions for repairs in computing taxable income."505 
This tax has never come into force in Thailand. 
It is also argued that income in kind, such as fringe benefits "is often not 
taxed adequately, or even not taxed at all, mainly because it is simply too difficult to 
measure or administer."506 For example, the value of company cars for personal use 
and free health insurance could be worked out as a cash value "but this is a difficult 
493 Throop Smith,op.cit.(note40 1 ), p.916 
494 G.N. Glover, "Revenue Law", Introduction to English Law, 1th ed., PhilipS. James, ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 1989), 254. 
495 Tiley, op.cit.(note141), p.25 
496 Bannock et al., op.cit.(note249), p.I98 
497 Tiley, op.cit.(note141), p.25 
498 Paichit Rojanavanich et al., A Textbook on the Revenue Code (Bangkok: Samchareon-pranich 
(Bangkok) Co., Ltd., 2001), 1-001. 
499 Shipwright and Keeling, op.cit.(notel82), p.4 
500 Auerbach, op.cit.(note489), p.605 
501 ibid.p.605 
502 Author not identified, "Taxing houses: Hands off', The Economist, Vol. 369, No. 8347, October 
25th, 2003, 34. 
503 Tiley, op.cit.(note141), p.20 
504 The Economist, op.cit.(note502), p.34 
505 Tiley, op.cit.(note141), p.21 
506 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.31 
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and controversial process."507 Some of fringe benefits are charged to income tax in 
the UK and Thailand, but they are subject to special rules on computing taxable 
mcome. 
As regards (c), the CIT has not been fully put into practice due to 
"administration and politics."508 Imputed rent is exempt from income taxation in 
some countries not only because of "difficulties in measuring the value of the 
imputed rent", but also because of "the political unpopularity that would be 
associated with any attempt to tax this nonmonetary form of income."509 
Furthermore, legacies and most gifts are taxed separately from income in the UK, 
being charged to inheritance tax and capital gains tax.510 Meanwhile, in Thailand, 
legacies and gifts fall within the income-tax base. 
The main charging sections under Thai law are Sections 39 and 40 of the 
RCT. Under Section 39, "assessable income" means (a) all money income, including 
(b) properties, (c) any other benefits received which are ascertainable in terms of 
money, (d) any amount of tax and duty paid for the taxpayer by the payer of income 
or by any other person in respect of any category of income under Section 40, and (e) 
the tax credit under Section 47 bis.511 Under Section 40, there are 8 categories of 
assessable income, which will be dealt with below. 
Under Section 39 of the RCT, the income-tax base is defined to cover all 
money income and all types of item which are an accretion to individuals' economic 
power and equivalent to money income. Section 40 of the RCT specifies 8 categories 
of assessable income within the broad scope of income subject to tax. (The full text 
of Section 40 can be found in Appendix ll to Chapter Three). 
507 Andrew Leicester, "Thinking about inequality", Economic Review, Volume 21 , Number 2, 
November 2003, 32-33. 
508 Auerbach, op.cit.(note489), p.605 
509 Janet Stotsky, "The Base of the Personal Income Tax", Tax Policy Handbook, Parthasarathi 
Shome, ed. (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1995), 122. 
510 Bannock, op.cit.(note249), p.208 
51 1 The tax credit which is included in assessable income subject to PIT is the tax credit for dividends 
received from juristic companies and partnerships set up under Thai Jaw. The amount of tax credit is 
arrived at by taking into account the corporate income-tax rate to be paid by a company or partnership 
who is the payer of dividend divided by the difference between 100 minus such income-tax rate. The 
resultant quotient will then be multiplied by the amount of dividend received. The result will be the 
amount of tax credit. (Section 47 bis, RCT) (V.T.Associates, The Revenue Code as amended up to 
May 1993 (Bangkok: ACREV, 1993), 33.) 
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Category (1) applies to earned income, covering all money, property and 
fringe benefits from employment. 
Category (2) applies to earned income, covering all money, property and 
benefits in kind from a post, office of employment or self-employment. 
Category (3) applies to unearned income, covering income from intangible 
properties and from annuities. 
Categories (4) applies to (a) unearned income, covering interest, dividends 
and other income from investments, (b) capital gains from the amalgamation, 
acquisition or dissolution of juristic companies or partnerships512, and (c) capital 
gains from the sales of partnership holdings, shares, debentures, bonds, or bills or 
debt instruments.513 
Category (5) applies to unearned income from rent of tangible properties and 
from breach of contract. 
Category (6) applies to earned income, covering the income of self-employed 
persons from the liberal professions. 
Category (7) applies to earned income, covering the income of self-employed 
persons, such as contractors. 
Category (8) applies to earned income, unearned income, windfall gams, 
winnings from bets, gifts, inheritances, and the like because this category applies to 
income from business, commerce or any other activities not specified in (1) through 
(7). Capital gains are also taxed under this category. As Richupan notes, "it is clear 
that 'income from any other activities not specified in (1) to (7)' included capital 
gains other than those of (4)."514 Capital gains which are charged under Category (8) 
include gains from sales of immovable property. Windfall gains, winnings from bets, 
gifts, inheritances and miscellaneous income (e.g. the discharge from a debt and 
loans) are charged under Category (8), as explained above.515 Additionally, 
(a) there is no inheritance tax taking effect; 
512 Somchai Richupan, Analysis of the Personal Income Tax in Thailand (A Report to Fiscal Policy 
for Resource Mobilization Study sponsored by the World Bank), November 1980, 19-20; and Chaisith 
Trachudham, Revenue Law: Volume one, 2"ded. (Bangkok: T.Training Center, a year of publication 
not identified), 89. 
513 Richupan, op.cit.(note512), p.20; and Trachudham, op.cit.(note512), p.90 
514 Richupan, op.cit.(note512), p.20 
515 In practice, it is difficult to impose tax on income from bets. The taxation of income from bets 
requires efficient tax administration. 
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(b) the practice of the Revenue Department of Thailand (the "RD") asserts, 
"any income not exempt from tax nor defmed under paragraphs (1) 
through (7) shall be income under this paragraph (8)"51 6; 
(c) if there was no evidence proving that the income in question falls under 
Categories (1) through (7), such income would be treated as income under 
Category (8i17; and 
(d) Royal Decree No. 11 exemplifies a number of types of income which are 
treated as income under Category (8), for example, income from "the 
business of selling any articles which are not manufactured by the 
seller."518 
Altogether, it seems that Thai law has adopted the CIT idea to a great extent. 
However, it cannot be concluded that the Thai income-tax base effectively operates 
to promote equity because "the list of exemptions is rather extensive."519 
Meanwhile, the TA 1988 does not define the terms of income subject to tax. 
Income used to be charged to income tax according to the sources of income as listed 
in the Schedules of theTA 1988. At present, for the proposes of section 1(1) of the 
TA 1988 (the general charge to income tax), income is charged to income tax under 
the provisions of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (the "ITEPA 
2003") and of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (the "ITTOIA 
2005"). In other words, charges to income tax under the Schedules of the TA 1988 
are now replaced by those charges under the ITEP A 2003 (which has operated from 
6 April 2003) and the ITTOIA 2005 (which has operated from 6April 2005). 
Under the ITEP A 2003, income tax is charged on employment income, 
pension income and social security income. 520 Most of the Schedule E provisions of 
the TA 1988 were transferred to the ITEP A 2003 without fundamental changes under 
the Tax Law Rewrite project. 
5 16 Suvam Valaisathien, New Thai Taxation (Bangkok: Nititham, 1993), 9. 
517 The Supreme Court's decision No.320111973 
518 Subsection (25), Section 8, Royal Decree No.11 (1959) 
519 Richupan, op.cit. (note512), pp. 15-16 
520 Section 1(1), ITEPA 2003 
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Under the ITEPA 2003, employment income means earnings521 , any amount 
treated as earnings (such as payments where employee absent because of sickness or 
disability)522, or any amount which counts as employment income523(i.e share-related 
income).524 Pension income means the pensions, annuities and income of other types 
listed in the section (such as United Kingdom pensions, foreign pensions).525 Social 
security income that is taxable income means the United Kingdom social security 
benefits listed in Table A (including bereavement allowance, carer's allowance, 
incapacity benefit, income support, jobseeker's allowance, statutory adoption pay, 
statutory maternity pay, statutory paternity pay and statutory sick pay), any foreign 
benefit if (a) it is substantially similar in character to a benefit listed in Table A, and 
(b) it is payable to a person resident in the United Kingdom. 526 
Under the ITTOIA 2005, income tax is charged on trading income, property 
income, savings and investment income, and certain miscellaneous income.527 Most 
of the Schedules A, D, and F provisions of the T A 1988 were transferred to the 
ITTOIA 2005 without fundamental changes under the Tax Law Rewrite project. 
Under the ITTOIA 2005, trading income includes the profits of a trade, 
profession or vocation, amounts treated as adjustment income, and post-cessation 
receipts arising from a trade. 528 
Property income includes the profits of a UK property business or an 
overseas property business, amounts treated as adjustment income, rent receivable in 
connection with UK mines, quarries and other concerns, rent receivable for UK 
electric-line wayleaves, post-cessation receipts arising from a UK property business, 
and overseas property income of a person to whom the remittance basis applies.529 
521 Earnings means "(a) any salary, wages or fee, (b) any gratuity or other profit or incidental benefit 
of any kind obtained by the employee if it is money or money's worth, or (c) anything else that 
constitutes an emolument of the employment." (Section 62 (2), !TEPA 2003) 
Money' s worth means "something that is (a) of direct monetary value to the employee, or (b) 
capable of being converted into money or something of direct monetary value to the employee". 
~Section 62 (3), ITEPA 2003) 
22 Section 7 (5), Section 221, !TEPA 2003 
523 Section 7 (2), !TEPA 2003 
524 Section 7 ( 6), ITEP A 2003 
525 Section 566 (2) and (4), ITEPA 2003 
526 Sections 657 (2) (a) (c), 660 (1), and 678 (1), ITEPA 2003 
527 Section 1(1), ITTOIA 2005 
528 Section 3 (1), ITTOIA 2005 
529 Section 260 (1), ITTOIA 2005 
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Savings and investment income include interest, dividends and other 
distributions from UK resident companies, dividends from non-UK resident 
companies, stock dividends from UK resident companies, release of loan to 
participator in close company, purchased life annuity payments, profits from deeply 
discounted securities, gains from contracts for life insurance etc., distributions from 
unauthorised unit trusts, profits and gains from the disposal of deposit rights, 
disposals of futures and options involving guaranteed returns, and sales of foreign 
dividend coupons. 530 
Miscellaneous income includes receipts from intellectual property, income 
from non-trade businesses involving the exploitation of films or sound recordings, 
income derived from a relevant telecommunication right that is not used or held for 
the purposes of a trade, profession or vacation, amounts treated as income of a 
settlor, beneficiaries' income from estates in administration, annual payments not 
otherwise charged, and income not otherwise charged.531 
Unlike the RCT, theTA 1988, the !TEPA 2003 and the ITTOIA 2005 have 
not given a definition of income to cover all types of item equivalent to income. Any 
incomes that fall outside the provisions of the ITEP A 2003 and the ITTOIA 2005 are 
not included in the income-tax base and charged to income tax. Thus, some receipts 
are not subject to income tax, e.g. imputed rent, capital gains etc. 
Although there is no definition of income in the Acts532, Section 687 (1) of 
the ITTOIA 2005 provides that income tax is charged on "income from any source 
that is not charged to income tax under or as a result of any other provision of [the 
ITTOIA 2005] or any other Act."533 This provision replaces ScheduleD Case VI of 
the T A 1988 which applies to "any annual profits or gains not falling under any other 
Case of ScheduleD and not charged by [any other] Schedule." Morse and Williams 
note that Schedule D Case VI is necessary because "income is not defined in the 
530 Section 365 (1), moiA 2005 
53 1 Section 574 (1), ITIOIA 2005 
532 There is expansion of a word "income" in the ITIOIA 2005 without defining it. According to 
Section 878 (1) of the ITIOIA 2005, "income" includes (but does not mean) "amounts treated as 
income (whether expressly or by implication)." 
533 Section 687 ( 1 ), ITIOIA 2005 
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Acts, and it is clear that the tax on income is not a universal tax on all possible forms 
of income. "534 
Section 687 (1) of the ITTOIA 2005 is likely to widen the income-tax base 
more than Schedule D Case VI did. This is for two reasons 
Firstly, Section 687 (1) employs the phrases which are likely to catch more 
income subject to tax than the phrases employed by Case VI. Under Section 687 (1), 
what is taxable is "income from any source that is not. . ... " This phrase is likely to 
have wider meaning and to catch more income subject to tax than the phrase "any 
annual profits or gains not falling .. . " which is employed by Case VI. Morse and 
Williams note that "profits" and "gains" mean the same thing535, and "annual" mean 
that "the profits must be income profits and not capital profits.536 
Additionally, income which will be charged to income tax under Section 687 
(1) must be income "that is not charged to income tax under or as a result of any 
other provision of [the ITTOIA 2005] or any other Act." This phrase is likely to have 
wider meaning and to catch more income subject to tax than the phrase "[profits or 
gains] not falling under any other Case of Schedule D and not charged by [any other] 
Schedule" which is employed by Case VI. 
Secondly, Case VI has a limited use in practice because of the interpretation 
of the phrase "annual profits." As Tiley notes, 
"The courts have construed that phrase in a limited way - generally, profits 
are income only if they possess a quality of recurrence - and have confined 
Case VI to profits similar to those caught by the other Schedule and 
Cases."537 
However, Morse and Williams argue that "annual" does not mean that "the 
profits must be recurring."538 This interpretation of Case VI by the courts does not 
help considerably to widen the income-tax base. 
Altogether, Schedule D Case VI affects the comprehensive income-tax base. 
However, Section 687 (1) of the ITTOIA supports the CIT. In addition, the 
534 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note 15), 118 
535 ibid.p.ll9 
536 ibid.p.ll9 
537 Tiley, op.cit.(notel41 ), p.13l 
538 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note15), p. l19 
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adaptability of the tax system and the practice in the UK help support the CIT. This 
will be clarified below. 
Although capital gains, legacies, and most gifts are not charged to income 
tax, they are charged to other taxes, i.e. capital gains tax or inheritance tax. 
Moreover, capital gains have been taxed at the same income tax rates since 1988.539 
It is then argued that "some elements of the [CIT] idea have been adopted [into the 
UK tax system]."540 This adaptation solves the problem of the deficiency of the 
income-tax base and widens the base of the UK tax system. 
Employment income (the former Schedule E income) which is now charged 
under the !TEPA 2003 extensively covers any receipt by an employee in the course 
of employment. Employment income under the ITEP A 2003 includes money income 
and fringe benefits. To cope with the practical difficulties of ascertaining and 
measuring fringe benefits, there are special rules governing their valuation. As 
Melville notes, 
"For the purpose of assessing benefits, employees are divided into two 
classes, "PllD employees" and "lower-paid employees" . .... As a general rule, 
lower-paid employees are taxed only on benefits that are convertible into 
money, and then only on the amount of money that the employees could 
obtain in this way . .. ... PllD employees are generally taxed on the cost to the 
employer of providing the benefits, whether or not these benefits are 
convertible into money."541 
Melville also notes that some fringe benefits are assessable in the same way 
on both classes of employees. 542 Such benefits include "vouchers which may be 
exchanged for goods or services" and "living accommodation."543 For the former, 
employees are assessed on "the cost to their employer of providing vouchers which 
may be exchanged for goods or services."544 For the latter, an employee is taxed on 
"the annual value of the accommodation" where an employer is the owner of such 
539 Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.51 
540 ibid.p.51 
However, capital gains are subject to many more exemptions and reliefs as compared to income. 





accommodation.545 In this case, an employee is taxed on "the greater part of the rent 
paid by the employer and the accommodation's annual value."546 There are also 
special rules assessing for PllD employees certain fringe benefits such as cars, 
provided for private use.547 
In all, it seems that UK law has adopted the CIT idea to a great extent. 
Nevertheless, there are stil1 other matters that may adversely affect the widening of 
the UK tax base. 
(a) Although capital gains are chargeable to capital gains tax, this tax has 
operated unsatisfactorily.548 In 2000-2001, the capital gains tax amounted to 2.17% 
of the total sum raised by direct taxes. 549 
(b) Certain types of income are excluded from the tax base.550 
2.2 Tax-free income 
The tax base is in practice eroded by tax-free income. There are three assumptions 
relating to this erosion, namely 
(a) if an erosion meant a reduction in the tax burden on people with less 
ability-to-pay, this erosion would promote vertical equity/redistribution; 
(b) if it meant a reduction in the tax burden on people with greater ability-to-
pay, this erosion would thwart vertical equity/redistribution; and 
(c) if it did not take a different amount of income in tax from people with the 
same ability-to-pay, this erosion would promote horizontal equity and not 
violate the redistribution concept. 
545 ibid.p.93 
546 .b.d 93 I I .p. 
547 .b"d 94 1 I .p. 
548 Tiley, op.cit.(note 141 ), p.25 
549 Chris Whitehouse et al., Revenue Law-Principles and Practice, 21st ed. (London: Reed Elsevier 
(UK) Ltd., 2003), 6. 
550 ibid.p.17 
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2.2.1 Concepts of tax-free income 
Tax-free income can also be described as "tax reliefs." They are put into PIT law 
mainly to promote (a) satisfying the equity of income redistribution, and (b) 
benefiting particular types of individual or activity. 
The OECD defines tax reliefs as "a generic term to cover all the means of 
reducing income tax liability."551 Similarly, tax reliefs are termed by A Dictionary of 
Taxation as "a concession in respect of tax which would otherwise be payable."552 
Given this, "any credit, exemption or deduction allowed in calculating a liability to 
tax"553 can be regarded as tax reliefs. 
used: 
The Revenue notes that tax reliefs are termed "structural reliefs" if they are 
(a) to allow for "the costs incurred in generating incomes", 
(b) to reflect "the broad objectives ofthe tax", and 
(c) to simplify "compliance or administration." 554 
Income redistribution is one objective of the PIT system. Therefore, if tax 
reliefs were designed to reflect "the broad objectives of the tax", they are likely to 
promote the equity of income redistribution. Similarly, structural reliefs could satisfy 
the ability-to-pay principle and the concept of progressivity to achieve vertical and 
horizontal equity. However, most writers argue that structural reliefs (e.g. tax 
allowances) are designed to achieve horizontal equity. For example, the OECD 
states: 
"Both tax allowances and tax credits may be seen as means for achieving 
horizontal equity."555 
"One view is that vertical equity is best obtained through the operation of the 
progressive rate schedule. On this view, differences in taxable capacity 
should be reflected in the taxable income to which the tax schedule is applied. 
Any group of taxpayers whose taxable capacity is affected in the same way 
55 1 OECD, op.cit.(note70), p.l3 
552 James, op.cit.(note2), p.l52 
553 European Commission, Tacis: Dictionary of taxation terms (Brussels: European Commission, 
1996), Clause 351 
554 Inland Revenue, Tax Expenditures and Ready Reckoner: Main tax expenditures and structural 
reliefs (http://www.in landrevenue.gov.uk/stats/tax expendit. . .lg t05 l .ht, as of 11/09/03), 5. 
555 OECD, op.cit.(note70), p.51 
142 
by family responsibilities or expenditure for which relief is given should all 
have their taxable incomes reduced by the same amount. Each such group is 
then subject to the same degree ofprogressivity relative to taxable capacity as 
income increases. This view leads to the adoption of tax allowances."556 
I do not completely agree with both statements. As discussed in 2.1, income 
is the appropriate measure of taxable capacity. Nevertheless, other factors (i.e. 
personal circumstances) can determine differences in taxable capacity. Structural 
reliefs aim to reduce taxable income and tax liability. Therefore, if they reduced the 
taxable incomes and tax liabilities of people with less taxable capacity more than 
those of people with greater taxable capacity, they could achieve vertical equity. 
Accordingly, vertical equity can be obtained through structural reliefs m 
addition to the progressive rate structure, that is by dissimilar tax treatment for 
people with different taxable capacity. These differences can be reflected in two 
stages. 
Firstly, they can be reflected in personal circumstances to which structural 
reliefs are applied. 
Secondly, they can be reflected m the taxable mcome to which the 
progressive rate structure is applied. 
This standpoint therefore refutes the idea that taxable capacity depends only 
on taxable income, i.e. the surplus of income after subtracting tax reliefs. 557 
HM Treasury supports the use of structural reliefs to promote vertical equity 
as follows: 
"Many allowances and reliefs can reasonably be regarded (or partly regarded) 
as an integral part of the tax structure - called 'structural reliefs'. Some do 
no more than recognise the expense incurred in obtaining income. Others 
reflect a more general concept of "taxable capacity'' - the personal 
allowances are a good example. To the extent that income tax is based on 
556 ibid.p.Sl 
551 Silverman notes, "the surplus over [tax allowances] constitutes the true taxable capacity of the 
individual." (Silverman, op.cit.(note43), p. 74) 
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ability to pay, it does not seek to collect tax from those with the smallest 
incomes. "558 
To promote equity, structural reliefs should be introduced to achieve both 
vertical and horizontal equity. If structural reliefs could be applied to achieve vertical 
equity, they would be consistent with the assumptions under (a) and (b) as noted in 
2.2. Meanwhile, if structural reliefs could be applied to achieve horizontal equity, 
they would be consistent with the assumption under (c) as noted in 2.2. 
Another objective of tax reliefs is to encourage particular types of individual 
or activity which governments favour. Tax reliefs used for thjs are non-structural 
elements of the PIT (i.e. tax reliefs which deviate from generally accepted tax 
structure). 
According to the OECD, the widely accepted tax structure includes "the rate 
structure, accounting conventions, the deductibility of compulsory payments, 
provisions to faci litate administration and those relating to international fiscal 
obligations. "559 According to Willis and Hardwick, the structural elements of the PIT 
include "the graduation of the tax, the single and married personal allowances and 
the child allowance, and double taxation relief."560 
Non-structural reliefs that are introduced to benefit certain individuals are 
also known as "tax expenditures." This is because they are designed to reduce tax 
burdens and are equivalent to cash payment made out of general tax revenue. The 
Inland Revenue and HM Treasury support this conclusion as follows: 
"The effect of some reliefs is to help or encourage particular types of 
individuals, activities, or products. Such reliefs are often alternatives to public 
expenditure and have similar effects. They are therefore called 'tax 
expenditures.' "561 
To achieve equity, tax expenditures designed to reduce the tax burden on 
high-income groups should be reduced. Meanwhile, those designed to reduce the tax 
558 HM Treasury, Tax Ready Reckoner and Tax Reliefs, http://www.treasury.gov.uk/pbr2000/tax-
ready.pdf, 2. 
559 OECD, Tax Expenditures: Recent Experiences (Paris: OECD, 1996), 9. 
560 J R M Willis and P J W Hardwick, Tax Expenditures in the United Kingdom (London: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1978), 10. 
561 Inland Revenue, op.cit.(note554), p.5; and HM Treasury, op.cit.(note558), p.2 
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burden on low-income groups should be promoted, which are consistent with the 
assumptions under (a) and (b), as noted in 2.2. 
2.2.2 Structural reliefs 
Personal allowances and expenses of earning income could promote equity, if they 
were designed to achieve both horizontal and vertical equity. 
2.2.2.1 Personal allowances562 
Under Thai law, personal allowances are those for (a) the taxpayer ("the basic 
allowance"), (b) the taxpayer's spouse, and (c) the taxpayer's lawful or adopted 
children, including lawful children ofthe taxpayer' s spouse.563 These allowances will 
be deducted from the taxpayer's assessable income, after the subtraction of 
deductible expenses, to arrive at net/taxable income. 
Meanwhile, personal allowances under UK law include those for (a) 
taxpayers aged under 65 ("the basic allowance")564, (b) taxpayers aged 65-74 ("the 
age-related allowance")565, (c) taxpayers aged 7 5 or over ("the age-related 
allowance")566, (d) married couples where either spouse was born before 61h April 
1935 ("the married couple's allowance")567, and (e) blind persons ("the blind 
person's allowance").568 
Horizontal equity can be achieved to a large extent via personal allowances 
because they reduce the income-tax base of people with the same taxable capacity by 
the same amount. (At least if taxable capacity is measured by income.) 
Under Thai law, for the tax year 2005, every taxpayer can claim the basic 
allowance of30,000 baht. A group of taxpayers whose taxable capacity is reduced in 
the same way by marriage can claim an allowance of 30,000 baht for the spouse in 
addition to the basic allowance, provided that the spouse does not earn, or earn but 
562 Personal allowances that will be discussed in this subsection are the basic allowance, age-related 
allowances, allowances for married couples, the blind person' s allowance, and allowances for 
children. Reasons for discussion can be found in Appendix Ill to Chapter Five. 
563 Section 47 RCT 
564 Section 257( I), T A 1988 
565 Section 257(2), TA1988 
566 Section 257(3), TA1988 
567 Section 257A, TA1988 
568 Section 265, TA1988 
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elect not to file a separate tax return.569 A group of taxpayers whose taxable capacity 
is reduced in the same way by raising children can claim an allowance of 15,000 baht 
for each child, up to a maximum of three children. 
Meanwhile, under UK law, every taxpayer aged under 65 receives the basic 
allowance of £4,745 for the tax year 2004-05. Those whose taxable capacity is 
reduced in the same way by age can claim an allowance of £6,830 (for those aged 
65-74) or of £6,950 (for those aged 75 or over). Taxpayers whose taxable capacity is 
reduced by blindness are entitled to a special allowance of £1,560 above the basic 
allowance. 
However, personal allowances achieve vertical equity to some extent. One 
way to promote vertical equity is to reduce the tax burden on people with less taxable 
capacity. However, as we shall see later, there are three main factors preventing the 
operation of personal allowances from achieving desired equity. 
Basic aUowance 
This allowance is found in both Thai and UK laws. It helps remove the lowest 
group on the income scale from the PIT system. Additionally, the basic allowance 
helps low-and middle-income earners pay less tax. Example 3.3 in Appendix IV to 
Chapter Three helps illustrate this point. 
Age-related allowance 
This allowance helps reduce the tax burden on the elderly, who are likely to 
have less taxable capacity than the young. As noted in Chapter One, personal factors, 
such as age, can determine differences in taxable capacity. Older people have less 
earning capacity than younger people because the former are generally less able to 
work and tend to be unemployed. Additionally, even with the same income, future 
earning opportunities differ between these two groups. Thanapompan supports the 
view that taxable capacity depends not only on income at present but also on 
opportunity to earn in the future. 570 Therefore, the amount of tax paid by older people 
should be less than that paid by younger people. UK law via the age-related 
allowance helps achieve this by allowing older people to deduct a higher personal 
allowance than younger people. 
569 Election to file a separate tax return by the spouse will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
570 Thanapornpan, op.cit.(note478), pp.212-213 
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The above argument refutes Brunori' s idea. Brunori writes, "[tax preferences 
for senior citizens] are a stark indication of the horizontal inequities of the tax."57 1 
According to this statement, age should not make a difference in taxable capacity 
between people with the same income.572 It can be argued against Brunori that tax 
preferences or age-related allowances for the elderly actually bring about: 
(a) horizontal equity between people with the same income and the same age, 
and 
(b) vertical equity between people with the same income but different taxable 
capacity on the basis of age. 
Additionally, according to UK law, where the taxpayer's total income 
exceeds an income limit (£ 18,900 for 2004-05), the amount of age-related allowance 
(£6,830 for those aged 65-74, or £6,950 for those aged 75 or over) is reduced by one-
half of the excess of income limit. However, the age-related allowance will not be 
reduced below the basic allowance (£4,745).573 Example 3.4 in Appendix IV to 
Chapter Three helps illustrate this point. 
The age-related allowance is designed to help only people of "limited 
means."574 This allowance should therefore be phased out when an older taxpayer's 
total income increases. The age-related allowance and the income limit both promote 
vertical equity because the former helps reduce the tax burden on people with less 
taxable capacity; whilst the latter does not encourage people with greater taxable 
capacity to pay less in tax. 
Allowance for a spouse 
This allowance is found in Thai law. Personal circumstance, such as marital 
status, can determine differences in taxable capacity in addition to income. As we 
shall see in Chapter Four, a married couple is likely to have less taxable capacity 
than a single person with the same income. This allowance helps reduce the tax 
burden on a marTied couple. 575 
571 Brunori, op.cit.(note261), p.l96 
572 ibid.p.l96 
573 Section 257 (5), TA1988 
-74 
~ Anthony Foreman and Gerald Mowles, Zurich Tax Handbook 2002-03 (Harlow: Pearson 
Education Limited, 2002), 220. 
575 The allowance for a spouse will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
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Married couple's allowance (the "MCA") 
This allowance is found in UK law. However, the MCA for younger couples 
was abolished from 6 th April 2000. It is still available for older couples who are a 
needy group and have less taxable capacity. 576 
Blind person's allowance 
This allowance is found in UK law. It helps reduce the tax burden on blind 
persons who are likely to have less taxable capacity than the sighted with equal 
incomes. Personal factors, such as handicap, can determine differences in taxable 
capacity in addition to income. The blind have less taxable capacity than the sighted 
because in general, they are unable to work well and tend to be unemployed. 
Therefore, the blind should pay less tax than the sighted even with the same income 
in the current year. This allowance helps the blind to deduct a higher allowance than 
the sighted; consequently, the blind have less taxable income and pay less tax. This 
allowance then promotes vertical equity. 
However, it is argued against the blind person's allowance as follows: 
"[Firstly,] the blind who pay income tax benefit from the deduction, but not 
those below the tax threshold. Secondly, it does not seem equitable to favour 
the blind and not the deaf, paralysed, or other handicapped people."577 
Blind people below the tax threshold have less taxable capacity than those 
above the threshold. Although the former do not benefit from this allowance, they do 
not pay tax as a result of the basic allowance; whereas the latter are still required to 
pay tax because the basic allowance cannot move them from the tax net as in the case 
of the former. The blind person's allowance is the raising of the tax threshold for the 
blind. This can further move the blind from the tax net or help them to pay less tax. 
This is reasonable when comparing the blind and the sighted. 
As regards the second argument, I agree that there should be a similar 
additional allowance for people who suffer any other disability. 
Allowance for children 
This allowance is found in Thai law. It helps reduce the tax burden on people 
with dependent children. Personal circumstance, such as family responsibility, can 
576 The MCA will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
148 
determine differences in taxable capacity m addition to income. People with a 
number of dependent children have greater family expenditure than those with no or 
few children. Thus, raising children reduces taxable capacity. The former need a 
higher subsistence income than the latter in order to raise children. 
The allowance for children under Thai law helps a couple or individual with 
dependent children to deduct a higher allowance than a couple or single person 
without children; the former have less taxable income and pay less tax than the latter. 
This allowance thus promotes vertical equity. Conversely, the help for people with 
dependent children under UK law is not in the form of a tax allowance; but in the 
form of a social security benefit called "child tax credit."578 
Schnitzer notes that "[family allowances] tend to redistribute income from 
small to large families" who have the same income.579 This implies that where two 
families with the same income pay different tax as a result of the allowance for 
children which increases as the size of the family increases, this brings about 
"horizontal redistribution" in Schnitzer's words.580 Similarly, this allowance 
encourages income redistribution among members of the same income class, not 
among different income classes. It seems that (a) this allowance leads to horizontal 
inequity, and (b) it does not correspond with the concept of vertical equity. Similarly, 
Steinmo notes that "deductions for dependents" affects "the real progressivity of the 
tax code."581 This argument can be dismissed on the following grounds. 
A family with a number of children has higher family expenditure and needs 
a higher subsistence income than one with few children. Thus, although two families 
have the same income, they have different taxable capacity, i.e. the former has less 
taxable capacity than the latter. When the allowance for a child means the former 
pays less tax than the latter, (a) it does not lead to horizontal inequity, and (b) it 
corresponds with the concept of vertical equity. 
577 N.A.Barr et al., Self-Assessment for Income Tax (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977), 
16. 
578 Morse and Williams note that child tax credit (CTC) could be described as "child benefit plus" and 
is "additional payment to go with the child benefit payable for a child and payable to the same person 
that claims the child benefit for that child [;] the difference is that child benefit is a universal flat-rate 
weekly benefit, while CTC is income-based, adjusted to specific circumstances of the child and 
claimant, and payable for a tax year." (Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note15), p.169) 
579 Schnitzer, op.cit.(note22), p.192 
580 ibid.p.192 
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Altogether, personal allowances satisfy the ability-to-pay principle by 
reducing the tax burden on people with less taxable capacity. However, they cannot 
achieve the desired equity of income redistribution because of: 
(i) the amount of personal allowances, 
(ii) the progressive rate structure, and 
(iii) the adjustment of personal allowances in line with price inflation. 
(i) and (ii) The amount of personal allowances and the progressive rate 
structure 
One approach to make the PIT system more progressive is to increase the 
personal allowances further to reduce the tax burden on low-income earners (or 
"raising the tax threshold.") 
Various countries have experimented raising the tax threshold to protect the 
poor. In the UK, "from 1979 to 1997 ... important changes to the structure helping the 
poor were made but were general - lowering the rate of tax, ... and raising the tax 
threshold."582 However, Marshall notes one disadvantage from this experiment as 
follows: 
"Raising the tax threshold takes some income earners out of the income tax 
net, but it does nothing positive to improve the relative positions of those 
whose earned incomes are initially too low to be liable for income tax."583 
Although raising the tax threshold does not benefit lowest-income earners, it 
can benefit low-income earners. Raising the tax threshold can eliminate al1 low-
income earners, or move some of them from the tax net and further reduce the tax 
burden on other low- and middle-income earners. Therefore, raising the tax threshold 
corresponds with one side of the concept of progressivity to reinforce equity. When 
we look at the concept of progressivity from the lower end of the income scale, this 
concept requires a smaller proportion of income to be taken in tax from those with 
less taxable capacity. 
From the above, this research supports raising the tax tlu·eshold to benefit 
low- and middle-income earners for the purpose of equity, provided that this raising 
581 Sven Stein.mo, Taxation and Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 37. 
582 Tiley, op.cit.(note141 ), p.8 
583 Marshall, op.cit.(note31 ), p.361 
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is optimal. A further point to be examined is how high the tax threshold should be 
raised. The World Bank proposes the following: 
"To relieve the tax burden on the poor, a portion of household income, 
approximately equivalent to per capita GDP (and up to twice per capita GDP 
where income tax administration is not well developed), can be exempted 
from the base of[the PIT]."584 
Lent and Hirao note that "personal allowances serve in part a useful function 
in protecting living standards"585; and "the general level of the allowances should be 
governed primarily by the cost of a reasonable standard of living."586 Likewise, 
personal allowances are given to leave a subsistence income to individuals before 
they pay the tax, and the amount of personal allowances should correspond to the 
real cost of a standard of living.587 
The basic allowance under Thai law has been 30,000 baht since 1992. 
Meanwhile, the per capita GDPs in Thailand in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 
were 75,026, 79,098, 81 ,915, 86,249 and 93,164 baht respectively.588 Additionally, 
average monthly expenditure per capita in 2004 was 3,512 baht589 (42,144 baht per 
year). Meanwhile, private consumption expenditure per capita in 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002 and 2003 was 41 ,988 baht, 44,394 baht, 46,930 baht, 49,309 baht and 52,794 
baht respectively.590 These data show that the basic allowance is lower than the 
above amounts. 
This research proposes that the basic allowance should be increased to 
45,000-55,000 baht. This increased amount is likely to cover private consumption 
expenditure per capita representing the cost of living in 2005. The allowance for a 
spouse should also be increased to 45,000-55,000 baht (equivalent to the basic 
allowance). And the allowance for children should be increased to 22,500-27,500 
baht for each child (half of the adult's allowance). According to the National 
584 The World Bank, op.cit.(notell2), p.6 
585 Lent and Hirao, op.cit.(note 185), p.30 
586 ibid.p.30 
587 Dhiratayakinant, op.cit.(note476), p.l01 
588 Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, 
http://www .nesdb.go. th/econSocial/rnacro/gpp data/index.htrnl,as of 22/07 I 2005 
589 Source: The National Statistical Office of Thailand, op.cit.(note259) (Table 7.1 Average Monthly 
lncome and Expenditure by Region 2004), p.172 
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Statistical Office of Thailand, consumption expenditure includes "the amount spent 
on purchasing goods and services needed for living essentials."591 
Therefore, these proposed amounts are likely to correspond to the real cost of 
a standard of living, which would further move some low-income earners from the 
tax net. 
As this research agrees that the amount of the basic allowance should be tied 
to the cost of living, the basic allowance under UK law should not be below private 
consumption expenditure per capita. According to a report on the 2002-03 
Expenditure and Food Survey,592average weekly expenditure on commodities and 
services per person was £170.50593 (£8,866 per year). According to this report, 
average weekly expenditure on commodities and services per person in the lowest 
income decile group was £10659\£5,512 per year). From these data, the basic 
allowance should be in the range between £5,500 to £9,000 in the tax year of 2004-
05. However, Saatchi and Warburton argue that there should be a significant increase 
in the basic personal allowance. 595 They note that the amount of the basic personal 
allowance should be related to average earnings and yet this amount is actually lower 
than average earnings. 596 They then propose as follows: 
"The personal tax threshold for 2000-01 was £4,385. Over the past 50 years 
this threshold has dropped lower and lower in relation to average earnings. 
For a single person, it would need to be £6,200 in the tax year 2000-01 to 
restore the value that it had in 1950."597 
Nevertheless, they argue that the basic allowance should have been increased 
to £10,000 in 2000-01. This significant increase would help 8,000,000 low-income 
590 ibid. (Table 9.1 National Income, Gross National Product and Consumption Expenditure: l999-
2003), p.198 
591 ibid.p.l68 
592 Expenditure items are similar to items under consumption expenditures in Thailand. 
593 Source: The Office for National Statistics, Family Spending: A report on the 2002-03 Expenditure 
and Food Survey, Anthony Craggs, ed., (London: TSO, 2004), 15. 
594 ibid.p.14 
595 Maurice Saatchi and Peter Warburton, Poor People Stop Paying Tax: The War of Independence: A 
Call to Arms (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 2001), 12. 
596 ibid.p.l2 
597 .b .d 12 1 1 .p. 
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earners not to pay income tax.598 Additionally, it would simplify the overlap between 
complicated systems of tax and benefits. As they write, 
"Higher net incomes [as a result of higher personal allowances] reduce the 
need for government benefit payments, because people no longer qualify for 
means-tested benefits. The motivations for millions of minor tax and benefit 
transfers would simply disappear. "599 
Despite agreement about raising the tax threshold to help the poor, this 
research and Saatchi and Warburton have a different view on the level of rise. The 
question then arises as to which level is optimal, (a) raising the tax threshold to meet 
the real cost of living or (b) a significant increase in the basic allowance. This is 
because a significant increase will lead to greater loss of tax revenue than an increase 
to meet the real cost of living. Additionally, a significant increase will considerably 
reduce tax progressivity when we look at the concept of progressivity from the upper 
side of the income scale. 
Despite causing a reduction in the tax burden on low-income earners, both 
existing and higher personal allowances can also reduce the tax burden on higher-
income earners. A reduction in the tax burden on high-income earners reduces tax 
progressivity, and a reduction in tax progressivity depends on the amount and 
increase of personal allowances. The higher the tax threshold, the lower the taxable 
income and ATRs of high-income earners. Additionally, the progressive rate 
structure helps higher-income earners to gain more tax benefit (or a larger 
proportionate reduction in the tax burden) from higher personal allowances than 
lower-income earners. (Example 3.5 in Appendix V to Chapter Three help clarify 
these points.) Hence, the progressive rate structure is another factor that prevents the 
operation of personal allowances from achieving desired equity. 
This research so far shows two opposing views of the effect of increasing 
personal allowances. The fust is that an increase in the personal allowance reduces 
the tax burden on low-income earners, which makes the tax more progressive and 
reinforces equity. The second is that a higher personal allowance reduces tax 




(or a higher proportionate reduction in the tax burden) to higher-income earners than 
to lower-income earners. Neither of them is completely true. 
The first view disregards the tax benefits accruing to high incomes, whereas 
the second disregards the tax benefits accruing to low incomes. Tax progressivity 
must serve both lower and upper ends of the income scale, i.e. reducing the 
proportion of income paid in tax by lower-income taxpayers and increasing the 
proportion of income paid in tax by higher-income taxpayers. Thus, it is necessary to 
seek a method to satisfy this idea of progressivity for desired equity. 
Other methods are proposed or used to protect low incomes m place of 
personal allowances. Stotsky refers to one proposal for tax credits as follows: 
"Some tax codes have converted [personal allowances] into a credit against 
taxes to enhance the equity of the tax system because a credit reduces the tax 
burden by the same nominal amount regardless of the taxpayer's [MTR]."600 
Although tax credits can protect the poor and not allow the rich to gain more 
tax benefits than the poor, the rich can still receive tax benefits. This does not 
conform to the idea of progressivity (which partly requires an increase in the tax 
burden of the wealthier). 
The OECD refers to another proposal for a zero-rated first bracket as follows: 
"In some countries, the basic relief takes the form of a zero-rated first 
bracket. ... In some circumstances the effect of substituting a zero rate in the 
first bracket is to produce the same effect as giving a tax credit. But the 
extension of an existing zero-rate bracket produces the same result as 
increasing a tax allowance (i.e. it gives greater relief to top-rated taxpayers 
than to those whose highest rate is at the lower end of the scale) unless the 
extension is balanced by a reduction of the next higher bracket or brackets. 
, 601 
The IMF proposes that Thailand should replace personal allowances with a 
zero-rate bracket. It writes, 
"The effective threshold should be significantly increased compared to the 
present level. The increased threshold could most conveniently be 
600 Stotsky, op.cit.(note509), p.l23 
601 OECD, op.cit.(note70), p.21 
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implemented through a zero-rate bracket compnsmg, say, the first Baht 
I 00,000 of income. This would effectively eliminate the need for all low 
income individuals and families to file a return."602 
However, although a zero-rate bracket works like a tax credit, the rich can 
still receive tax benefits. Additionally, the extension of a zero-rate bracket is more 
valuable to the rich than to the poor. Although there is a solution to prevent the rich 
from receiving more benefit from the extension, the rich can still receive tax benefits. 
Altogether, tax credits and a zero-rate bracket cannot work much better than 
personal allowances. To satisfy the concept of progressivity which reqmres a 
reduction in poorer taxpayers' liabilities and an increase in richer taxpayers' 
liabilities, this research proposes the following: 
(a) maintaining personal allowances, 
(b) increasing personal allowances to cover private consumption expenditure 
per capita, and 
(c) cancelling or phasing out personal allowances for the rich. 
The reason for maintaining personal allowances is that it can be designed and 
applied to satisfy the ability-to-pay principle to achieve horizontal and vertical 
equity. If personal allowances were increased further to reduce the tax burden on 
low-income earners (not on high-income earners), they would promote vertical 
equity and make the tax more progressive.603 This would achieve the desired equity. 
The first personal allowance which should be increased in value is the basic 
allowance. The other allowances should be increased thereafter. The optimal level of 
basic allowance is one which can meet the real cost of living standard, which is 
likely to be per capita private consumption expenditure. Nevertheless, the existing 
personal allowance and its modest increase to reach the cost of living cannot avoid 
giving tax benefits to the rich. This is because the allowance is available to 
everybody. 
602 George T. Abed et al., Thailand: Improving the Structure and Performance of the Revenue System 
(Washington, D.C.: Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund, 1998), 62. 
603 An increase in personal allowances only for low-income earners will have the following effects: 
(a) helping them to pay much less income in tax than high-income earners, which promotes 
vertical equity; and 
(b) helping them to pay a much smaller proportion of income in tax than high-income 
earners, which makes the tax more progressive. 
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Tax benefits resulting from the allowance (which reduces taxable income 
subject to the progressive rate structure) cause the rich not to pay the higher amount 
and proportion of income in tax. This probably increases the economic power of the 
rich, which will increase the income gap between rich and poor. This violates tax 
progressivity which needs to take a greater amount and proportion of income from 
the rich. Given this, the allowance does not work exactly like the progressive tax 
rate. The operation of progressive tax rate conforms to the concept of progressivity, 
by applying lower rates for low-income earners, and higher rates for high-income 
earners. Thus, the allowance should also be reformed on the upper side of the income 
scale to work like the progressive tax rate. The proposed reform is that the allowance 
should stop giving tax benefits to the rich. This reform can be made by cancelling or 
phasing out personal allowances for this group. 
The result of this would be an increase in the tax burden on high-income 
earners, satisfying the ability-to-pay principle and the concept of progressivity.604 
Likewise, this result would achieve desired equity because it ceases to contribute to 
widening the gap between rich and poor through personal allowances. 
Dhiratayakinant seems to support this argument. He notes that the tax system can be 
designed to counter income inequality by not encouraging high-income groups to 
increase their income greatly. 605 And this is a better tax measure for reducing income 
inequality than taxation based on highly MTRs.606 
Moreover, denying tax benefits to the rich through personal allowances seems 
to achieve the real objective of personal allowances: that is, ensuring that those with 
less taxable capacity have a subsistence income before any tax is paid. This inference 
is drawn from both the outright and the partial views of policy makers and scholars. 
The outright view includes those of HM Treasury, Dalton, Pond, Richupan 
and Dhiratayakinant. HM Treasury states that personal allowances "reflect a more 
general concept of taxable capacity", and "to the extent that income tax is based on 
604 Canceling or phasing out personal allowances only for the rich will have the following effects: 
(a) causing the rich to pay a much greater amount of income in tax than the poor, which 
satisfies the ability-to-pay principle and promotes vertical equity; and 
(b) causing the rich to pay a much greater proportion of income in tax than the poor, which 
satisfies the concept ofprogressivity on the upper side of the income scale. 
605 Kiaiyudht Dhiratayakinant, Public Economics: Volume one Fiscal and Tax Systems (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkom University, 2002), 1.1-32. 
606 ibid.p.l.l-32 
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ability to pay, it does not seek to collect tax from those with the smallest incomes."607 
As Dalton notes, it is "a system of exemptions and allowances ... principally 
affecting the smaller incomes."608 Pond also notes that in the UK, personal 
allowances "are intended to exempt those on the lowest incomes from tax 
altogether."609 Likewise, Richupan states that, "the deduction of allowances is an 
adjustment of the tax base, for equity purposes, that takes into account the 
maintenance expenditure for the taxpayer's family."6.10 He also notes elsewhere that 
allowances are given to take low-income earners out of the tax net.611 
Dhiratayakinant argues that allowances are given to exempt people with high family 
expenditure and small gross incomes from tax.612 
Meanwhile, there is a view that the objective of personal allowances is to 
relieve the tax burden on individuals based on personal circumstances. This view is 
found in the statements of former and present Thai tax policy-makers61 3 and may be 
influenced by the wording of the RCT.614 Likewise, Whitehouse notes, ''the 
availability of [personal] reliefs [under UK law] depends not on the type of income 
involved, but on the taxpayer's personal circumstances."615 Melville also says, 
"personal allowances [under UK law] are intended to adjust the income tax liability 
of a taxpayer so as to reflect his or her personal circumstances."6 16Although there is 
no outright expression that allowances are given to relieve the tax burden on those 
with less taxable capacity, it may be said that this is the hidden objective of 
allowances as we shall see below. 
607 HM Treasury, op.cit.(note558), p.2 
608 Dalton, op.cit.(note30), p.95 
609 Chris Pond, "Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Welfare", Taxation and Social Policy, Cedric Sandford, 
Chris Pond and Robert Walker (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1980), 53. 
610 Richupan, op.cit.(note512), p.30 
61 1 Somchai Richupan, "Problems and Proposals on the Reform of Personal Income Tax", RD Tax 
Journal, Year No.29, Issue No. 2, March-April, 1982, 42. 
6 12 Dhiratayakinant, op.cit.(note476), p.117 
613 Paichit Rojanavanich et al., Taxes under Revenue Code (Abridged Version) (Bangkok: 
Samchareon-pranich (Bangkok) Co., Ltd., 2001), 28; and Vit Tantayakul, Revenue Law (Publisher 
and Year of Publication not identified), 70. 
614 According to Section 40 of the RCT, the deduction of allowances is made to relieve tax burdens on 
individuals. 
615 Chris Whitehouse, Revenue Law: Principles and Practice, 171h ed. (London: Butterworths, 1999), 
56. 
616 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.31 
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The personal circumstances to which personal allowances are applied are 
mostly related to those of people with less taxable capacity, i.e. poverty, old age, 
handicap, and marital and family status. Because of these circumstances, the 
provision of subsistence income in the form of personal allowances is made by the 
tax law to help people in such circumstances. Simultaneously, wealthy taxpayers 
have income far beyond subsistence; therefore, they are not people in need of that. 
Given this, the law is unlikely to have an intention to help wealthy taxpayers, but to 
help the poor and other people in need instead. This inference means that the 
objective of personal allowances will correspond to one of the main objectives ofthe 
PIT.617 
To implement the proposed reform, the following changes in the system of 
personal allowances in question may be considered. 
Under Thai law, people with gross/assessable incomes not exceeding the 
amount representing the incomes of low-income and (lower) and (upper) middle-
income earners (e.g.l ,OOO,OOO baht), would still receive all existing personal 
allowances. People with gross/assessable incomes not exceeding the amount 
representing the incomes of high-income earners ( e.g.l ,000,000-4,000,000 baht) 
would receive half of all existing personal allowances. People with gross/assessable 
incomes exceeding the amount representing the incomes of highest-income earners 
(e.g. over 4,000,000 baht) would not receive any existing personal allowances. 
Under UK law, people aged under 65 with a total income not over the amount 
representing the incomes of low-income and (lower) and (upper) middle-income 
earners (e.g. £20,445 in 2004-05)61 8, would still recejve the basic allowance. (In 
cases where people are blind, they would receive the blind person's allowance in 
addition to the basic allowance). People aged under 65 with a total income not over 
the amount representing the incomes of high-income earners (e.g. £20,445-
36,145)619, would receive half the basic allowance. (In cases where people are blind, 
they would receive the blind person's allowance and the basic allowance. This is 
because the blind have less taxable capacity than the sighted). People aged under 65 
617 Income redistribution is made from the wealthy to people in need. 
618 This is the basic allowance (£4,745) plus the first half of the basic-rate limit (£15,700). 
619 This is the amount above the basic allowance plus the first half of the basic-rate limit but not over 
the amount of the basic allowance plus the second half of the basic-rate limit 
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with an income above a certain amount representing the incomes of highest-income 
earners (e.g. £36,145)620, would not receive the basic allowance. (In cases where 
people are blind, they would receive half the basic allowance and the blind person's 
allowance. This is because the blind have less taxable capacity than the sighted). 
People aged 65-74 with a total income below £38,230 in 2004-0562 1 would 
still receive the age-related allowance. (In cases where people are blind, they would 
receive the blind person's allowance in addition to the age-related allowance). In 
cases where people aged 65-74 had a total income exceeding the income limit, 
£18,900 in 2004-05 but not over £38,230 in 2004-05, the age-related allowance 
(£6,830) would be reduced by one-half of the excess limit. However, the age-related 
allowance would not be reduced below the basic allowance (£4,745). (In cases where 
people are blind, they would still receive the blind person's allowance). Meanwhile, 
people aged 65-74 earning over £38,230 would not receive the age-related 
allowance, but would receive half the basic allowance. This is because older people 
have less taxable capacity than younger people. (In cases where people are blind, 
they would receive the blind person's allowance in addition to half the basic 
allowance). 
People aged 75 or over with a total income below £38,350 in 2004-05622 
would still receive the age-related allowance. (In cases where people are blind, they 
would receive the blind person's allowance in addition to the age-related allowance). 
In cases where people aged 75 or over had a total income exceeding the income 
limit, £18,900 in 2004-05 but not over £38,350 in 2004-05, the age-related allowance 
(£6,950) would be reduced by one-half of the excess limit. However, the age-related 
allowance would not be reduced below the basic allowance (£4,745). (In cases where 
people are blind, they would still receive the blind person's allowance). Meanwhile, 
people aged 75 or over earning over £38,350 would not receive the age-related 
allowance, but would receive half the basic allowance. This is because older people 
have less taxable capacity than younger people. (In cases where people are blind, 
they would receive the blind person's allowance in addition to half the basic 
allowance). 
620 This is the amount over the basic allowance plus the basic-rate limit (over £4,745+31,400). 
621 This is the amount of the age-related allowance (£6,830) plus the basic-rate limit (£31 ,400). 
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(iii) Adjustment of personal allowances in line with price inflation 
Personal allowances might not entirely achieve equity if they failed to keep 
up with price inflation. This is because price inflation reduces the real value of 
personal allowances, and it puts a greater tax burden on low-income earners. 
The cost of living normally increases with price inflation. As discussed 
earlier, personal allowances are primarily given to cover the cost of living. If 
personal allowances were not increased in line with price inflation, they could not 
cover the real cost of living. In this situation, low-income earners and people 
receiving a number of allowances (e.g. those having dependent spouses and children) 
suffer most. Therefore, personal allowances should be adjusted for price inflation to 
cover the cost of living. 
Money income tends to rise with price inflation. 623 In cases where earnings 
increase with price inflation but personal allowances do not rise for price inflation, a 
heavier tax burden will fall on low-income earners. This is because under this 
situation, some low-income people who are below the tax threshold before price 
inflation are pushed past the tax threshold into the starting-rate band after price 
inflation. Others who are already in the starting-rate band before price inflation are 
pushed into higher tax liability after price inflation. Under this situation, the tax 
burden on low-income earners was increased because of increases in their nominal 
not their real incomes accompanied by the unchanged nominal value of their 
alJowance. (Musgrave points out that ability to pay relates to "real rather than 
nominal income.")624 Consequently, both vertical equity and tax progressivity (which 
partly requires lower-income earners to pay a less amount and a smaller proportion 
of income in tax) are affected. Therefore, the nominal values of allowances should be 
raised in line with price inflation to avoid this phenomenon. Example 3.6 in 
Appendix VI to Chapter Three will clarify these points. 
The question then arises as to how personal allowances can be increased with 
price inflation. We have seen that these are given to cover the cost of living, which 
rises with price inflation. The rate of price inflation and the cost of living are 
622 This is the amount of the age-related allowance (£6,950) plus the basic-rate limit (£31 ,400). 
623 Kovit Posayanon, "A change in tax revenue during the period of economic development", RD Tax 
Journal, Year No.44, Issue No.9, September, 1997, 69. 
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measured by the retail prices index or the consumer price index.625 Therefore, to keep 
pace with the rate of price inflation and to maintain real value to cover the cost of 
living, the nominal value of allowances should be adjusted annually in line with 
changes in the retail prices index. 
Personal allowances can be increased with wage inflation. However, we are 
unlikely to annually adjust the nominal value of allowances in line with the rate of 
wage inflation. It is unusual to measure the rate of wage inflation or "to index link 
wage rates" because "changes in supply and demand in the labour market make it 
desirable for wage rates to be more flexible."626 
According to UK law, unless Parliament determines otherwise, the amount of 
the basic allowance, age-related allowances, married couple's allowances for older 
couples and the blind person's allowance are increased annually by the same 
percentage as the percentage increase in the retail prices index for the previous 
year.627 Therefore, UK law promotes tax progressivity and vertical equity. 
However, the basic allowance for 2003-04 remained at the same amount as 
that for 2002-03. This freezing has intensified "fiscal drag."628 This unchanged 
nominal value causes a higher portion of nominal income to be subject to higher tax 
liability, which can increase the tax burden on the poor. 
Unlike UK law, Thai law has no provision to index personal allowances for 
price inflation. The Thai government has a policy on the adjustment of personal 
allowances from time to time to mitigate the tax burden due to the higher cost of 
living and change in labour costs.629 However, judging from Thailand's experience, 
occasional changes in the nominal values of allowances are not good enough to 
maintain their real values. According to Sahasakul, 
"[Price] inflation has reduced the real value (in 1972 prices) of a personal 
exemption from 4,000 baht in 1972 to 2,778 baht in 1978 in spite of the 
624 R.A. Musgrave, "Taxation", The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, John Eatwell, Murray 
Milgate and Peter Newman, eds. (London: The Macmillan Press Limited, 1987), 1058. 
625 Bannock, op.cit.(note249), p.359; and Black, op.cit.(note140), p.404 
626 Nancy Wall, Complete A-Z Economics Handbook, 2"d ed. (London: Hoddler &Stoughton, 2003), 
149. 
627 Sections 257C and 265, TA1988 
628 Author not identified, "Taxation: Truth hurts", The Economist, Vol. 367, No. 8330, June 281h, 
2003, 41. 
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government's raising the nominal value of the personal exemption to 5,000 
baht since 1974. In 1979, the nominal value of the personal exemption was 
raised to 7,000 baht but its real value was still below 4,000 baht."630 
Similarly, a significant increase in allowances in 1980 was not "adequate to 
keep up with [price] inflation."631 Also, Chandra-ruang-phen and Sayakanit find that 
despite increases in allowances in 1972, 1974 and 1978, the proportionate increases 
were lower than the proportionate increases in the consumer price index.632 Their 
conclusion is consistent with my earlier analysis. As they say, allowances grew more 
slowly than the real cost of living, resulting in a reduction in their real value. 633 
Additionally, the Thai government increased the nominal value of allowances 
constantly before 1992. However, as Table 3.1 shows, there has not been an increase 
in allowances since 1992, although 'price inflation has occurred every year during this 
period. As noted in Chapter Two, the rates of price inflation from 1992-2004 were 
4.1%, 3.4%, 5.1%, 5.8%, 5.9%, 5.6%, 8.1%, 0.3%, 1.6%, 1.6%, 0.7%, 1.8%, and 
2. 7%respecti vely. 
Table 3.1634 
Personal 1972- 1974- 1979 1980- 1982- 1985- 1989- 1991 
Allowances 1973 1978 1981 1984 1988 1990 
For the 4,000 5,000 7,000 10,000 12,000 13,000 15,000 20,000 
taxpayer 
For 4,000 5,000 7,000 10,000 12,000 13,000 15,000 20,000 
taxpayer's 
spouse 
For each 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 10,000 
lawful child 
The Thai tax policy cannot deal with the impact of pnce mflatlon on the tax 
burden of the poor. The OECD notes, "a policy of not adjusting thresholds for 
[price]inflation may have ... unintended effects in relation to the poverty trap."635 It is 
therefore advisable to adopt provisions for price-level indexation into Thai law. The 
World Bank supports this suggestion as follows: 
629 The group of Thai tax academicians, Taxation According to Revenue Code 2002 (Bangkok: Ruan-
Gaow Printing, 2002), 39. 
630 Sahasakul, op.cit.(note257), p.30 
63 1 Richupan, op.cit. (note512), pp.52-53 
632 Chomp1oen Chandr-ruang-phen and Ratana Sayakanit, The Thai Tax Structure and Its Effects on 
Economic Development (Bangkok: Chu1alongkom University, 1981), 106. 
633 ibid.p.106 
634 Source: The group of Thai tax academicians, op.cit.(note629), cover page 







"[In Thailand], there are no automatic adjustments of ... monetary allowances, 
so the inflationary effect on ... thresholds has gradually eliminated much of 
[tax progressivity] ..... Also, consideration should be given to creating an 
automatic inflation adjustment methodology to update ... thresholds in the 
PIT."636 
2.2.2.2 Deductible expenses 
The costs of earning income are regarded as structural reliefs. Both Thai and UK 
laws allow taxpayers to claim certain expenses against assessable income from 
particular sources to determine income. 637 
To satisfy the ability-to-pay principle, income should be determined net of 
the costs of obtaining that income. Similarly, "only income net of business expenses 
increases potential consumption power."638 Consequently, a person who has an 
outlay to obtain income has less economic and taxable capacity than another who 
earns an equal income with less or no outlay. 
Both Thai and UK laws adopt the above concept. According to these, among 
three people with equal income, a self-employed person or a business owner claims 
greater deductible expenses than another who is a wage-earner. 639 A person with 
investment income however is not entitled to deductible expenses. It is assumed that 
(a) the self-employed incur more expenses in connection with their income than 
wage-earners, and (b) people with investment income are unlikely to incur expenses 
in respect of this income. Thuronyi points out that: 
"[The] nature of employment is such that the costs incurred by employees are 
relatively small, given that the employer provides the conditions for work. It 
636 The World Bank, op.cit.(note262), p.27 
637 Expenses will be deducted from assessable income before subtracting other deductions and 
allowances. 
638 Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.341 
639 Under Thai law, people with self-employment or business income can claim actual expenses or 
standard deductions without a maximum limit. Meanwhile, employees can claim only a standard 
deduction with a maximum limit. 
Under UK law, Melville notes, "a much wider range of expenses is allowed against the income of 
self-employed people than against the income of employees." (Melville, op.cit., p.82) 
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is therefore less critical (in terms of tax equity) to allow a deduction for 
employee expenses than it is for the self-employed."640 
James and Nobes support assumption (b) stating that "the favourable 
treatment of earned income is that there are expenses incurred in obtaining it which 
are greater than those incurred in obtaining investment income."641 
Although Thai and UK laws adopt the same principle of deductible expenses, 
how they determine expenses against assessable income is not the same in every 
respect. Under Thai law, there are (a) a standard deduction (i.e."a fixed percentage 
deduction")642, and (b) a deduction of actual expenses (i.e. a deduction of necessary 
and reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining income).643 UK law principally 
applies a deduction of actual expenses. 
Under Thai law, taxpayers can claim expenses against each category of 
income as follows: 
(i) for income under categories (1), (2), (3) (only for copyright income), (5) 
(b), (5) (c), and (8) (for a particular type of income), taxpayers can claim only 
a standard deduction644; 
(ii) for all income under categories (3) (except for copyright income) and (4), 
taxpayers cannot claim any deduction as expense645; 
(iii) for income under categories (5) (a), (6), (7), and (8) (for a particular type 
of income), taxpayers can choose either a standard deduction or a deduction 
of actual expenses646; 
(iv) for income under category (8) (for a particular type of income), taxpayers 
can claim only a deduction of actual expenses. 647 
Additionally, the percentage of standard deduction for self-employment and 
business income is higher than that for employment income. For example, a 
640 Thuronyi, op.cit.(notelO), p.253 
641 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l60 
642 Ministry of Finance, Information Handbook on Taxation in Thailand, 2"d ed. (Bangkok: 
Thammasat University Press, 1982), 5. 
643 Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 8 bis., Royal Decree No.ll (1959) 
644 Sections 42 bis., 42 ter., and 48 (4) (a), RCT; 
Sections 5 (2), 5 (3), Royal Decree No.I! ( 1959) 
645 Section 42 ter., RCT 
646 Sections 5 (1), 6, 7, and 8, Royal Decree No.I! (1959); 
Section 4, Royal Decree No.165 (1986) 
647 Sections 8 bis., Royal Decree No.ll ( 1959) 
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contractor can claim a 70% standard deduction of expenses; while a wage earner can 
claim a 40% standard deduction but not exceeding 60,000 Baht in total. (More details 
can be found in Appendix VII to Chapter Three). This corresponds to the concept 
that business expenses are greater than employee expenses. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that differences in the percentage of standard 
deduction bring about the following: 
(a) unfairness/discrimination between people with different sources of 
income, and 
(b) unfairness/discrimination between people with the same source of 
income.648 
Differences in the percentage of standard deduction between income from 
difference sources, particularly between employment income and self-employment 
income, are unlikely to cause unfairness. This is because self-employed or business 
owners incur more expenses than wage-earners. This justification refutes both 
arguments above and the similar argument that standard deductions cause wage-
earners to pay a higher ATR than other income earners, which creates horizontal 
inequity.649 
However, differences in the percentage of standard deduction between self-
employment or business income from different categories may lead to unfairness. 
Differences in the percentage of standard deduction between income from the same 
category are also likely to cause horizontal inequity. This is because taxpayers with 
equal income may pay different taxes. For example, between two people with equal 
income under the same category (3), one deriving income from the sale of authorship 
(copyright income) will pay less tax than another deriving income from the sale of 
patent rights. This is because the latter cannot claim any expense deduction, whilst 
the former enjoys a 40% standard deduction. 
Additionally, the percentage deduction makes Thai law does not satisfy the 
ability-to-pay principle for three reasons. 
648 Dhiratayakinant, op.cit.(note476), p.l 03 
649 Fugfaipon, op.cit.(note 168), p.63 
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Firstly, standard deductions may help taxpayers to deduct expenses exceeding 
those actually incurred in obtaining income.650 
Secondly, there is no sure criterion for setting the percentage of standard 
deduction.651 Therefore, it is unclear why there are inconsistencies such as there 
being no standard deduction for income from patents, whereas there is for income 
from copyright. 
Thirdly, Dhiratayakinant notes that the method of standard deduction 
assumes that all taxpayers make profits from their businesses (or, no taxpayer makes 
a loss in a tax year). This is illogical. In doing business, people can make either profit 
or loss. If a taxpayer makes a loss, he/she will not get benefit from a tax computation 
under the method of standard deduction. 652 
For the above reasons, taxpayers ' real economic and taxable capacity are 
unlikely to emer:ge after standard expense deductions. Moreover, if higher-income 
taxpayers deducted expenses exceeding the real costs of earning (by applying 
standard deductions as expenses or choosing standard deductions in place of actual 
expenses), this would undermine tax progressivity and vertical equity/redistribution. 
Nevertheless, a maximum limit of standard deduction for income under 
categories (1) (or employment income), (2) (or income from a post), and (3) (only for 
copyright income) can help to promote vertical equity/redistribution. Under Thai 
law, taxpayers who derive income under categories (1), (2) or (3) above can claim a 
40% standard deduction, but they cannot deduct expenses exceeding 60,000 baht 
from their gross income. Therefore, the percentage of standard deduction available to 
them may be lower than 40%. For example, Noi derives employment income of 
100,000 baht. She can claim a full standard deduction of 40% as expenses. 
Meanwhile, Som earns employment income of 4,000,000 baht. He can deduct only 
60,000 baht as expenses because a 40% standard deduction (equivalent to 1,600,000 
baht) exceeds 60,000 baht. In other words, the percentage of standard deduction that 
Soro can claim is 1.5%, which is much lower than Noi's. Therefore, a ceiling of 
standard deduction helps promote vertical equity/redistribution because higher-
650 Richupan accepts that "standard deductions are rather high." (Richupan, op.cit. (note512), p.74) 
651 Dhiratayakinant, op.cit.(note476), pp.l02, and 104-105 
652 ibid.p.104 
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income taxpayers claim a lower percentage of deduction than lower-income 
taxpayers. 653 
Where there is no ceiling of standard deduction, this undermines tax 
progressivity and vertical equity/redistribution. This is because higher-income 
taxpayers receive a greater proportionate reduction in tax burden from standard 
deductions than lower-income taxpayers since they are subject to higher MTRs. A 
standard deduction reduces taxable income for both lower- and higher-income 
earners. A reduction in taxable income subject to the high MTR will make a greater 
reduction in tax burden than a reduction in taxable income subject to the low MTR. 
Example 3.7 in Appendix VTII to Chapter Three helps clarify these points. 
From the above, a standard deduction is likely to dissatisfy the ability-to-pay 
principle and the concept of progressivity, which undermines equity. However, the 
Thai government has no policy to abolish the standard deduction. Instead, it has 
reduced the percentage of standard deductions from time to time since 1959. In 
1980, Richupan, the then tax policy-maker, wrote: 
"[The] idea of standard deduction was based on the socio-economic situation 
in Thailand in 1959, more than 20 years ago . .. .... But now we are in 1980 
and the Thai socio-economic situation has substantially changed from what it 
was in 1959. There should now be a policy to encourage taxpayers to keep 
accounts. The rate of standard deduction should gradually be reduced so that 
it will pay for the taxpayer to keep accounts. 654 
The above recommendation is meant to encourage taxpayers to keep accounts 
for the deduction of actual expenses.655 This implies that the Thai government 
perceives that a deduction of actual expenses is better than a standard deduction. 
However, the percentage of standard deduction for most categories of income has 
remained the same, and that for certain categories has been increased since 1980.656 
Furthermore, standard deductions have been allowed for four additional types of 
653 Chandr-ruang-phen and Sayakanit, op.cit.(note632), p.114 
654 Richupan, op.cit. (note512), p.74 
655 Somchai Richupan, "Problems and Proposals on the Reform of Personal Income Tax", The Journal 
of the Revenue Department of Thailand, Year No.29, Issue No.3, May-June, 1982, 13. 
656 For example, the percentage of standard deductions for income under categories 5, (6), (7) and 
(8)remains unchanged. The percentage under categories (I) and (2), and (3) is increased. 
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income under category (8) since 1980.657 This finding is supported by the IMF paper, 
saymg, 
"In 1989, Thailand carried out further tax reforms aimed at simplification, 
neutrality and revenue generation. . . . . . No attempt was made to reduce 
expense deductions and allowances for business incomes."658 
This research proposes the abolition of standard deductions, for the purpose 
of equity, based on the justification above. Thai law should apply only a deduction of 
actual expenses for all categories of income, except for savings and dividends 
mcomes. 
In principle, a deduction for actual expenses is more likely to correspond to 
the ability-to-pay principle than a standard deduction. It means that taxpayers cannot 
deduct expenses exceeding those incurred in obtaining income. Additionally, it is 
logical. If taxpayers incur losses in their businesses in a tax year because deductible 
expenses exceed income, they should not pay tax. Tax laws must clearly set out what 
are and what are not regarded as actual expenses in respect of each category of 
mcome. 
UK law sets out more specific rules than Thai law. The ITEP A 2003 and the 
ITTOIA 2005 have their own rules for determining deductible expenses. In general, 
there are no expenses to set against pension income and social security income under 
the !TEPA 2003, and against savings and investment income under ITTOIA 2005. 
However, there are expenses to set against employment income under the ITEP A 
2003, against trading income, property income, and miscellaneous income under the 
ITTOIA 2005. Meanwhile, Thai law sets out general rules for the deduction of actual 
expenses from income under categories (5) (a) and (6)-(8), as we shall see later. 
Expenses against employment income under the ITEPA 2003 
Expenses are deductible if they are not reimbursed by the employer.659 Where 
reimbursement is made, expenses can be deductible if the reimbursement is included 
657 Such incomes are those deriving from (a) salt fam1ing, (b) sale of ships, (c) sale of land by 
installment payments, and (d) the income of entertainers. 
658 Ke-young Chu et al., Income Distribution and Tax and Government Social Spending Policies in 
Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2000), 34. 
659 Melville, op.cit.(note54l ), p.88 
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in the employee's earnings.660 Additionally, expenses are subject to the general rule 
laid down in Section 336, the ITEP A 2003 that 
(a) expenses are incurred and paid by the employee who is obliged to do so 
as holder of the employment, and that 
(b) expenses are incurred wholly, exclusively and necessarily m the 
performance of the duties of the employment. 
'Wholly and exclusively' means that expenses must be incurred for the 
purpose of the employment and not for any personal purpose.661 
The meaning of 'necessarily' is that "an expense will not be allowed unless it 
can be shown that the duties of the employment could not be performed (by anyone) 
if the expense were not incurred. "662 
The meaning of 'in the performance of the duties of the employment' is that 
"any expenses incurred before the employee's duties commence or after they 
terminate will not be allowed as a deduction."663 
Furthermore, the ITEP A 2003 sets out some specific rules for particular 
employee expenses. According to specific rules, deductible expenses incurred by 
employees include, but are not limited to, fees and subscriptions to professional 
bodies664, travel expenses for the performance of employment duties (which are 
neither ordinary commuting nor private travel).665 The !TEPA 2003 also sets out 
specific rules on disallowed expenses. These include, but are not limited to, business 
entertainment and gifts expenses incurred· by employees. However, these expenses 
are deductible, if they are (1) reimbursed by the employer, (2) included in the 
employee's earnings, (3) disallowed in computing the employer's profit from 
trade,666and (4) subject to the general rule in Section 336. 
Expenses against property income under ITTOIA 2005 
These are deducted, in general, according to "the capital prohibition rule" and 
"the wholly and exclusively rule." According to the capital prohibition rule, 
660 Section 334, ITEPA 2003 
661 Whitehouse eta!., op.cit.(note549), p. l 04 
662 Melville, op.cit.(note541), p.89 
663 CCH Tax Handbook , op.cit.(note 12), p.l ,307 
664 Sections 343,344, ITEPA2003 
665 Sections 337, 338, ITEPA2003 
666 Sections 356, 357, ITEPA2003 
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deductible expenses do not include capital expenditure, i.e. in calculating the profits 
of a property business, "no deduction is allowed for items of a capital nature". 667 
According to the wholly and exclusively rule, a deduction for the 
expenditure is allowed when the expenditure is incurred wholly and exclusively for 
the purposes of property businesses.668 For example, in calculating the amount of 
rent receivable in connection with letting a right to work minerals in the UK, "a sum 
wholly and exclusively [paid] as an expense of management or supervision of the 
minerals" is deductible. 669 
Expenses against income from trading income under ITTOIA 2005 
Expenses must be revenue and not capital expenditure.67° For example, 
interest is a deductible expense if "interest is an. item of a revenue nature, whatever 
the nature ofthe loan."671 
The difference between revenue and capital expenditures is as follows: 
"[The] cost of purchasing business premises is capital expenditure, while rent 
paid for business premises is revenue expenditure, and the cost of alterations, 
additions, improvements or renovations is capital, while the cost of repairs is 
revenue. "672 
Additionally, deduction is not allowed for ''expenses not incurred wholly and 
exclusively for the purposes of the trade", profession or vocation. 673 And deduction 
is not allowed for "losses not connected with or arising out of the trade", profession 
or vocation.674 If an expense is incurred for more than one purpose (e.g. partly for the 
purposes of the trade, profession or vocation and partly for personal purposes), ''any 
identifiable part or identifiable proportion of the expense which is incurred wholly 
and exclusively for the purposes of the trade"> profession or vocation will be 
deductible. 675 
667 Section 33 and Section 272, ITTOIA 2005 
668 Section 34 and Section 272, ITIOIA 2005 
669 Section 339 (I) (a) (b), ITTOIA 2005 
670 Section 33, ITTOIA 2005 
671 Section 29, ITTOIA 2005 
672 CCH Tax Handbook, op.cit.(note 12), p.l ,3 19 
673 Section 34 (1) (a), ITIOIA 2005 
674 Section 34 (I) (b), ITTOIA 2005 
675 Section 34(2), ITTOIA 2005 
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Furthermore, the profits of the trade, profession or vocation must be 
calculated in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice.676 The 
ITTOIA 2005 sets out special rules on disallowed expenses. The special rules 
include, but are not limited to, a debt owed to the person carry on the trade, 
profession or vocation677, and crime-related payments.678 The ITTOIA 2005 also sets 
out special rules allowable expenses. The special rules include, but are not limited to, 
bad debts679, employee benefit contributions680, gifts to employees681 , gifts to a 
charity682, and pre-trading expenses.683 (More details can be found in Appendix IX 
to Chapter Three). 
Expenses against miscellaneous income under ITTOIA 2005 
As regards expenses against royalties and other income from intellectual 
property other than annual payments, they must be incurred wholly and exclusively 
for the purposes of generating the income. 684 If an expense is incurred for more than 
one purpose, "any identifiable part or identifiable proportion of the expense which is 
incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of generating the income", will be 
deductible.685 In addition, expenses which would not have been allowable as a 
deduction in calculating the profits of a trade, if they had been incurred for its 
purposes, are not deductible. 686 
As regards expenses against income from non-trade businesses involving the 
exploitation of films or sound recordings, the above rules also apply. 687 
As regards expenses against income from a relevant telecommunication right 
that is not used or held for the proposes of a trade, profession or vacation, the above 
rules also apply.688 
676 Section 25 (I), IITOIA 2005 
677 Section 35 (I), IITOIA 2005 
678 Section 55, IITOIA 2005 
679 Section 35 (1) (a), ITIOIA 2005 
680 Section 38 (1) (b), ITIOIA 2005 
681 Section 47 (4) (a) (b), ITIOIA 2005 
682 Section 47 (5) (a), ITIOIA 2005 
683 Section 57, IITOIA 2005 
684 Section 582 (2), ITIOIA 2005 
685 Section 582 (3), ITIOIA 2005 
686 Section 582 (4), ITIOIA 2005 
687Section 612 (2), (3), (4), ITIOIA 2005 
688Section 617 (2), (3), (4), ITIOIA 2005 
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As regards expenses against amounts treated as income of a settlor, the same 
deductions are allowed if the amount treated as the settlor's income had been 
received by the settlor as income.689 
Actual expenses against business and self-employment incomes under 
Thai law 
General rules are laid down as follows: 
(a) taxpayers must produce evidence and prove that expenses under such 
evidences are necessary and reasonable, and 
(b) rules on the deduction of expenses for computing the net profits of juristic 
companies and partnership shall apply mutatis mutandis.690 
When we apply rule (a), deductible expenses must be incurred necessarily 
and reasonably for the purposes of letting property, profession or any other business. 
Additionally, when rule (b) is applied, capital expenditure is not deductible.691 
However, the following expenses may be deductible. 
( 1) certain reserves, 
(2) contributions to a provident fund, 
(3) expenses not connected with private purposes, 
(4) donations to public charity or for public benefit, 
(5) certain expenses on entertainment or services, 
(6) wear and tear and depreciation of assets, 
(7) costs of repair and maintenance of properties, 
(8) the net losses brought forward from periods no longer than five years 
preceding the current tax year, and 
(9) expenses incurred exclusively for the purpose of acquiring profits or 
doing any business. 
From the above, the following conclusions and suggestions can be made to 
bring about equity. 
Firstly, as there is no rule on actual expenses against employment income 
under Thai law, one should be introduced, similar to UK law. That is, employee 
689Section 623 (2), ITIOIA 2005 
690 Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 8 bis., Royal Decree No.ll ( 1959) 
691 Section 65 ter. (5), RCf 
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expenses are subject to the "wholly, exclusively and necessarily" rule (unless there 
are specific rules for particular employee expenses). 
This research also proposes that employees' training costs and costs of 
updating professional skills or knowledge incurred during the period of employment 
should be deductible as employee expenses. This is because more educational and 
training opportunities will boost earning opportunities and reduce income difference. 
If employees' training costs and costs of updating professional skills or knowledge 
are deductible, this is likely to benefit employers also. 
However, expenses for this purpose should also be incurred necessarily and 
reasonably. For example, if an employer installs the latest model of computers on 
which no employee can work, and some employees have to pay for a computing 
course so that they will be able to operate them. 
Secondly, Thai law should set out specific rules on what are allowed or 
disallowed as actual expenses for each category of business and self-employment 
income (including any profits or gains, e.g. receipts from the sales of copyright, 
patent rights, trademark rights and know-how). This is because the application of 
specific rules would (i) identify the actual expenses in respect of each category of 
income, and (ii) avoid the problem of interpreting general rules. The following 
expenses should be the core of specific rules: 
(1) expenses incurred wholly, exclusively, necessarily and reasonably in 
letting property, exercising a profession, doing any business, or making 
any profits or gains, 
(2) revenue and not capital expenses, 
(3) expenses not connected with private or domestic purposes, and 
(4) staff training and business owners' costs of updating professional skills 
or knowledge.692 
Thirdly, the laws ofboth countries should keep the rules on actual expenses 
updated because of the emergence of new businesses and professions. 
692 The reason for (4) is similar to that for expenses against employment income. If expenses under (4) 
are deductible, they are likely to help create earning opportunities for employees and proprietors. In 
other words, well-trained employees will possibly be promoted and earn more income. Meanwhile, 
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2.2.3 Tax expenditures (non-structural reliefs) 
Exempt income and itemized deductions are regarded as tax expenditures because 
neither is an essential part of the tax structure and both have been introduced to 
discharge or reduce the tax burden on particular types of individual. 
As regards exempt income under Thai law, many provisions have been laid 
down to serve various purposes, which include exemptions relating to: 
(a) the avoidance of double taxation, 
(b) inheritance, 
(c) capital gains, 
(d) savings in bank accounts or savings products, 
(e) expenses for the purpose of employment or service rendered, 
(f) welfare money and benefits in kind of civil servants and employees of 
state enterprises, 
(g) benefits in kind of employees of private enterprises, 
(h) income and benefits in cash for state service, 
(i) medical expenses and casualty losses, 
(j) education and research, 
(k) prizes, 
(1) the promotion of certain business activities, 
(m)compensation, 
(n) compensatory benefits, 
( o) moral obligation, ceremonies and traditions, 
(p) transfers of immovable property without payment, 
(q) stimulation of economic recovery of the country from recessiOn by 
persuading people to invest in immovable property, 
(r) particular groups of foreigners working in Thailand, 
(s) savings in pension or retirement funds, and 
(t) savings through the life-insurance policies. 
(More details on (a)-(t) can be found in Appendix X to Chapter Three). 
proprietors or professional people who update their professional skills or knowledge are likely to 
secure their businesses or professions and to earn more income. 
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Meanwhile, the income-tax base under UK law is narrowed by "too many 
exceptions."693 Exemptions include those relating to: 
(a) social security benefits, 
(b) savings in bank accounts, savmgs products, and savings through the 
purchase of shares or securities, 
(c) savings through personal pension schemes, 
(d) savings through life insurance and life annuity, 
(e) compensation, 
(f) education, research and training 
(g) prizes and winnings, 
(h) benefits in cash and in kind relating to employment, 
(i) income and benefits in cash for state service, 
(j) welfare money to civil servants and politicians, 
(k) moral obligation, ceremonies and traditions, 
(1) casualty losses, 
(m)non-UK resident taxpayers, 
(n) an annual payment, and 
(o) other purposes. 
(More details on (a)-(o) can be found in Appendix X to Chapter Three). 
As regards itemized deductions, Thai law allows a taxpayer to deduct 
certain payments (or "tax allowances") from his/her chargeable income, after the 
subtraction of deductible expenses and personal allowances, to obtain net/taxable 
income. Such payments/allowances are: 
(a) 2,000 baht for the education of each child, 
(b) life insurance premiums for the actual amount but not exceeding 10,000 
baht, 
(c) an employee's contribution to the Provident Fund for the actual amount 
but not exceeding 10,000 baht, 
(d) mortgage interest payment for the actual amount but not exceeding 
I 0,000 baht, 
693 Geoffrey Howe, Simplicity and Stability: The Politics of Tax Policy (London: Centre for Policy 
Studies, 2001 ), 31. 
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(e) social security contributions for the actual amount (no ceiling), and 
(f) monetary charitable contributions for the actual amount but not exceeding 
10% of chargeable income after the subtraction of deductible expenses, 
personal allowances and allowances as mentioned in (a)-( e) above.694 
Under UK law, certain types of payment which are known as charges on 
income can be deducted from the taxpayer's chargeable income after the subtraction 
of allowable expenses in arriving at total income.695 Charges on income which are 
eligible for tax-deduction include: 
(a) patent and copyright royalties696; 
(b) eligible interest payments697, i.e. the interest paid gross on loans for the 
following purposes: 
(i) to buy machinery or plant698, 
(ii) to buy an interest in a closed company699, 
(iii) to buy an interest in a co-operative or employee-controlled 
company700, 
(iv) to buy into partnership701 , 
(v) to pay inheritance tax702, and 
(vi) to buy life annuity703; 
(c) "gifts of listed shares or securities to a charity''704; 
(d) "gifts efland or buildings to a charity''705, and 
(e) "certain annual payments made for bonafide commercial reasons."706 
Additionally, contributions to approved pension funds (i.e. occupational 
pension, personal pension, and stakeholder pension funds) are tax-deductible.707 For 
694 Section 47 RCT 
695 Section 83S, TA1988 
Chris Whitehouse and Peter Vaines, Revenue Law: Principles and Practice, 201h ed. (London: Reed 
Elsevier (UK) Ltd., 2002), 43. 
696 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.42 
697 "b"d 42 I I .p. 
698 Section 359, TA1988 
699 Section 360, TA1988 
700 Section 361 , T A 1988 
701 Section 362, TA1988 
702 Section 364, T A 1988 
703 Section 365, TA1988 
704 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.42 
705 ibid.p.42 
706 Whitehouse and Vaines, op.cit.(note695), p.48 
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example, a contribution of up to 15% of earnings to an occupational pension fund is 
deductible from employment income.708 Premiums of up to £3,600 per year paid to a 
personal pension fund are also deductible irrespective of age and eamings.709 
Tax exemptions and itemized deductions tend to have a negative rather than a 
positive effect on equity. This is because they undermine horizontal and vertical 
equity and lower the effective tax rates of higher-income groups below statutory 
rates. 
Exempt income and itemized deductions are only available to particular types 
of individual. Consequently, taxable income of some individuals are narrowed and 
reduced, whereas those of others are unchanged. Comparing two persons with equal 
income but from different sources, one whose income is excluded from taxable 
income pays no tax, while another whose income is included in the income-tax base 
is taxed. Altogether, exempt income and itemized deductions bring about horizontal 
inequity. 
Exempt income and itemized deductions also undermine vertical equity. 
Firstly, the poorest whose income falls below the tax threshold gain no 
benefit from tax expenditures.710 This is because "to benefit from a tax relief, it is 
necessary to have a tax liability to be reduced."711 
Secondly, although the tax liability of poorer taxpayers is discharged or 
reduced, that of richer taxpayers is also discharged or reduced as a result of tax 
expenditures. Consequently, 
(a) the rich are discharged from a greater tax liability than the poor; 
(b) the rich may pay the same amount of income in tax as the poor; and 
(c) the rich may pay less income in tax than the poor.712 
Finally, exemptions and deductions generate the possibility of discharging or 
reducing the tax liability ofhigher-income groups for two reasons. 
(i) Tax expenditures may be intentionally or unintentionally designed to 
benefit these groups, i.e. significant sources of the income of the wealthy are non-
707 Lymer eta!., op.cit.(note120), pp. 3/15,5/23, 5/24, and 5/26. 
708 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.204 
709 ibid.p.2 14 
710 James, op.cit.(note2), p.146 
711 Willis and Hardwick, op.cit.(note560), p.12 
712 Examples for (a) - (c) can be found in Appendix XI to Chapter Three. 
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taxable713; and the wealthy are more likely to incur expenses which are allowable 
against chargeable income.714 
Capital/financial income715 is a substantial source of the income of the 
wealthy.716 However, many types of capital gains (in Thailand) and the return on 
savings/financial products (both in Thailand and the UK) are non-taxable. For 
example, Richupan notes, "tax exemption of interest from government bonds induces 
a higher degree of inequity since this is equivalent to paying higher rates of interest 
to high income investors."717 Meanwhile, wealthier, older households in the UK tend 
to hold TESSAs and PEPs.718 The benefits from PEPs, TESSAs, and ISAs 
"inevitably, have largely accrued to the relatively well-off, who save much more than 
those on low incomes. 719 
(ii) Tax expenditures are legal loopholes for high-income people to avoid 
tax.720 This is because high-income groups have considerable resources to shift to 
tax-free or tax-preferred activities. For example, "in 1995 the £9.3 billion of tax 
relief for occupational contributions was distributed as follows: 2.3 per cent to the 
poorest quintile of taxpayers; '.. .. and 67.2 per cent to the top quintile."721 
Additionally, high-income groups can afford a tax expert's fee to take advice on tax-
free or tax-preferred activities. 
Thus, this research agrees with Harrington (referred to in Steinmo) when he 
says, "a tax system [via tax expenditures] is a welfare system for the rich."722 
Tax expenditures can also make PIT less vertically equitable by undercutting 
the degree of tax progressivity. This is because although the poor pay a smaller 
proportion of their income in tax as a result of tax expenditures, the rich pay a much 
smaller proportion. This results from the fact that tax expenditure make effective tax 
rates less than statutory tax rates. 
7 13 The World Bank, op.cit.(notell2), p.27 
7 14 Stotsky, op.cit.(note509), p.l23 
715 i.e. interest, dividends, capital gains 
71 6 Richupan, op.cit.(note512), p.16; Stotsky, op.cit.(note509), p.l22; and Stiglitz, op.cit.(note68), 
pp.512-513 
7 17 Richupan, op.cit.(note512), p.79 
718 William Gale, "What Can America Learn from the British Tax System?", Fiscal Studies (1997) 
Vol. 18, No.4, 356. 
7 19 The Commission on Taxation and Citizenship, op.cit.(note22), p.244 
720 Hyman, op.cit.(note35), p.500 
721 Maurice Saatchi, The Science ofPolitics (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001), 81. 
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Since tax exemptions reduce effective tax rates (both A TR and MTR) to zero 
on income from certain activities, the rich who derive such income receive a greater 
proportionate reduction in their tax burden than the poor. (Example 3.8 in Appendix 
XII to Chapter Three helps clarify these points.) 
Itemized deductions also reduce effective ATRs. As certain payments are 
allowable against chargeable income, they reduce taxable income and effective 
ATRs. However, higher-income taxpayers are more likely to benefit from these 
advantages than lower-income taxpayers for two reasons. 
(i) Itemized deductions are given at the actual amount of payment (up to a 
maximum limit) to certain taxpayers. The rich tend to make larger payments than the 
poor, giving them a greater reduction in taxable income. 
(ii) A reduction in taxable income subject to the high MTR makes a greater 
reduction in the effective ATR than a reduction in taxable income subject to the low 
MTR. Consequently, high-income taxpayers receive a greater reduction in the 
effective ATR than low-income taxpayers. 
Therefore, a reduction in the effective ATR relies on (a) the number of 
itemized deductions claimed and (b) statutory MTRs applied. (Example 3.9 in 
Appendix XII to Chapter Three helps clarify these points.) 
Altogether, exempt income and itemized deduction affect equity. We should 
therefore de-emphasize tax expenditures. Similarly, if we want the structme ofPIT to 
have the effect of promoting a more equal distribution of income, tax expenditures 
should be reformed.723 Nevertheless, we cannot abolish all of tax expenditures for 
two reasons. 
(i) They have a positive effect on equity to some extent when we look at the 
lower end of the income scale, i.e. low-income earners can pay less and a smaller 
proportion of their income in tax. 
(ii) Certain tax expenditures can achieve other social objectives and a more 
equitable tax system. As Willis and Hardwick claim, "it would be quite wrong to 
conclude that tax expenditures are necessarily bad."724 
722 Steinmo, op.cit.(note581 ), p.l57 
723 Chandr-ruang-phen and Sayakanit, op.cit.(note632), p.l24 
724 Willis and Hardwick, op.cit.(note560), p.l5 
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This research proposes that the following tax expenditures should be 
removed to promote equity: 
(a) those which benefit the rich more than the poor, 
(b) those which add to the taxpayer' s net worth, 
(c) those which can be replaced by direct subsidy/grant, 
(d) those which lead to tax avoidance and tax arbitrage, and 
(e) those which are not equivalent to the costs of earning income. 
(a) Tax expenditures beneficial to tbe rich 
A tax allowance for life insurance premiums and tax exemption for income 
paid as life insurance premiums (under Thai law) should be removed because high-
income groups are more likely to purchase life-insurance policies. In the UK "no tax 
relief is available for the premiums on life assurance policies that come into force on 
or after 14 March 1984."725 
Additionally, the wealthy in Thailand trade in, invest in and/or accumulate 
valuable movable property, immovable property and securities. However, many 
capital gains and income paid for buying immovable property or paid as interest on 
loans to buy or invest in immovable property are non-taxable income. Moreover, 
mortgage interest payment is tax-deductible. These tax expenditures benefit rich 
rather than poor people; therefore, they should be removed from Thai law. In the UK, 
a mortgage interest relief was abolished from 6 April 2000.726 
The poor are unlikely to receive benefit from a mortgage interest relief. As 
Whittington notes, "home ownership is closed to those on low incomes who cannot 
offer security for a mortgage."727 Moreover, low-income earners in Thailand may be 
refused housing loans because their earnings do not satisfy the criteria of lenders. 
Rosen points out that the rich are more likely to benefit from a mortgage interest 
relief because they tend to have "good access to borrowing."728 Saatchi notes that 
"tax breaks that accrue disproportionately to the higher income groups" include a 
mortgage interest relief. 729 Since this relief is more likely to benefit th.e rich, Sanford 
suggests (1977) that "ceasing to allow the mortgage interest on owner-occupied 
725 Foreman and Mowles, op.cit.(note574), p.218 
726 ibid. p.207 
727 Whittington, op.cit.(note53), p.164 
728 Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.353 
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houses as a tax allowance" could increase "the proportion of tax paid by those with 
the highest incomes and the most expensive houses."730 
The wealthy in both Thailand and the UK are also more likely to save money 
m savings accounts/products. However, interest on certain forms of savings 
accounts/products is non-taxable. Given this, I agree with Kaldor who notes, "the 
exemption of savings would lead to greatly enhanced savings by the richer classes, 
and thus to an even more unequal distribution of wealth in the long run."731 
Therefore, these tax exemptions (under both laws) should be removed 
(b) Tax expenditures as an increase in net worth 
Tax expenditures that can add to individuals' net worth should be abolished. 
The World Bank notes, "if [tax expenditures] are not carefully designed, they can 
confer windfall gains on existing and inframarginal activities.'m 2 
The exemption of prizes and winnings (under both laws) and certain capital 
gains (under Thai law) should be abolished because they are windfall gains for 
particular individuals. 
The exemption of inheritance and proceeds from the sale of movable and 
certain kinds of immovable property acquired by inheritance (under Thai law) should 
be abolished because they are windfall income to inheritors.733 The exemption of the 
transfer of immovable property to the taxpayer's lawful child without any 
consideration (under Thai law) should also be abolished because it increases net 
worth to a child (including an adult child). 
The exemption of income paid to buy immovable property or paid as interest 
on loans to buy or invest in immovable property (under Thai law) should also be 
abolished. This is because this exemption increases the buyer's ability to pay. 
The exemption of income from certain business activities, not including 
income from the sale of rice cultivated by the farmer (under Thai law), should be 
abolished because the spending power of the business owners increases. 
729 Saatchi, op.cit.(note721), p.81 
730 Sandford, op.cit.(note19), pp.l54-155 
73 1 Kaldor, op.cit.(note54), p.88 
732 The World Bank, op.cit.(notell2), p.60 
733 Additionally, tax exemption of inheritance should be abolished because Thailand has no 
inheritance tax. 
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The exemption of interest and any form of return on saving accounts/products 
and on securities (under both laws) should be abolished because they increase savers' 
and investors' economic power. 
The exemption of certain fringe benefits (which are neither related to an 
employee' s, a civil servant's or a politician's carrying out his/her duty nor to 
expenses incurred in relation to his/her employment or service rendered) should be 
abolished. Such benefits are part of certain individuals' payment, and exemptions 
add to their net worth. In addition, fringe benefits are likely to benefit highly paid 
employees, undermining tax progressivity.734 Such benefits include: 
(i) welfare money and benefits in kind to civil servants and employees of 
state enterprises (under Thai law), 
(ii) welfare money of civil servants and politicians (under UK law), 
(iii) benefits in kind to employees of private enterprises (under Thai law), 
(iv) benefits in cash and in kind (under UK law) which are related to 
employment, and 
(v) income and benefits in cash for state service (under Thai law). 
Contributions to personal pension funds (under both laws) are tax-deductible. 
The contributions are made for employees to receive benefits (or lump sums) from 
the funds in the future. Under both laws, lump sums received from pension funds are 
tax exempt. 
As we shall see later, these lump sums can be justified as non-taxable because 
they are paid out when individuals have less taxable capacity (i.e. in older ages). So, 
such benefits can compensate for a reduction in individuals' ability to pay. 
Meanwhile, the tax deduction of contributions to pension funds is likely to add to an 
individual's net worth and should be abolished. This is because deductibility reduces 
taxable income and income tax while an individual is still in working life.735 
Under Thai law, an employee's contribution to the Social Security Fund 
(from which compensatory benefits are paid) is allowable against chargeable income. 
(This differs from an employee's National Insurance contribution (under UK law) 
which is not deductible). Social security contributions are made so that employees 
734 Stotsky, op.cit.(note509), p.l22 
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receive compensatory benefits m the future. And under Thai law, compensatory 
benefits are tax exempt. 
According to Stotsky, 
"To the extent that social security taxes were not deducted from taxable 
income when they were contributed, the benefits are properly excluded from 
income when paid out. Many income tax systems, however, allow taxpayers 
to exclude social security taxes from taxable income. In this case, the benefits 
are properly included in income when paid out."736 
The Thai tax treatment of social security contributions and compensatory 
benefits differs from that quoted above. As we shall see later, compensatory benefits 
can be justified as non-taxable because they are paid out when individuals are needy 
or have less taxable capacity (e.g. the sick, the unemployed, or etc.). Conversely, tax 
relief on social security contributions adds to an individual's net worth and should be 
abolished. This is because it reduces taxable income and income tax while an 
individual is in good health and employed. 
(c) Tax expenditures being replaced by direct subsidy 
Those under (c) should be withdrawn, as assistance to certain groups of 
people or activities can be made more efficiently and equitably through direct 
subsidies/grants than through tax expenditures.737 Direct subsidies/grants can work 
more efficiently and equitably in certain circumstances, e.g. assistance for home-
ownership and education, because direct subsidies/grants can help the poorest 
whereas tax expenditures cannot. As Willis and Hardwick note, "in order to benefit 
from a tax relief, it is necessary to have a tax liability to be reduced whereas a direct 
grant may be available irrespective of income."738 Additionally, high-income earners 
can be prevented from taking direct subsidies/grants. 
One possible reason to encourage home-ownership is that it can "make 
people more stable and secure, reduce juvenile delinquency and so on."739 A 
735 Another reason for abolishing relief for personal pension contributions is that this relief accrues 
disproportionately to higher income groups. (Saatchi, op.cit.(note721 ), p.81) 
736 Stotsky, op.cit.(note509), p.l22 
737 Sven Steinmo, "Taxes and Taxation", The Oxford Companion to Politics of The World, 2"d ed., 
Joel Krieger ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 829. 
738 Willis and Hardwick, op.cit.(note560), p.l2 
739 Eckstein, op.cit.(note49), p.66 
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mortgage interest relief can encourage people to buy their homes. However, this 
relief benefits the rich more than the poor, while direct subsidies could be designed 
to provide financial assistance or low-cost housing for lower-income groups. As 
Willis and Hardwick note, "it might give the same subsidy to all or it might treat the 
poorer owner-occupiers preferentially but it would hardly give an explicit preference 
to the richer ones."740 Therefore, a mortgage interest relief and tax exemption of 
income paid for immovable property or paid as interest on loans to invest in 
immovable property should be removed from Thai law. 
(d) Tax expenditures leading to tax avoidance 
Those under (d) should be abolished. Thirsk points out that "reluctance to tax 
interest income when combined with the deductibility of interest expense opens up 
significant opportunities for both tax arbitrage and tax evasion."741 Likewise, 
"interest deductibility in conjunction with preferential treatment of certain capital 
income can create major money-making opportunities."742 These arguments match 
the fact that the wealthy have more chance to access loans and to incur interest 
expenses, and may manipulate their resources (under contrived schemes) for tax-
preferred activities and tax arbitrage. 
James gives an example of tax arbitrage as follows: 
"[In] some circumstances it may be profitable to borrow money, deduct the 
interest payable from taxable income, and invest the money elsewhere. "743 
For the above reasons, governments should consider abolishing (a) the 
exemption of capital gains (under Thai law), (b) the exemption of any fonn of return 
on financial products or savings (under both laws), (c) the deduction of mortgage 
interest payment (under Thai law), (d) the deduction of life insurance premiums, and 
(e) the exemption of income paid as life insurance premiums (under Thai law). 
(e) Tax expenditures not equivalent to revenue costs 
Those under (e) should be abolished. That is, reliefs for interest on loans for 
personal purposes, e.g. housing loans (under Thai law), loans to pay inheritance tax 
and loans to buy life annuity (under UK law). 
740 Willis and Hardwick, op.cit.(note560), p.12 
741 Thirsk, op.cit.(note64), p.40 
742 Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.353 
743 James, op.cit.(note2), p.142 
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Conversely, the following exempt income and itemized deductions should 
be maintained or further introduced: 
(a) those which are equivalent to the costs of earning income, 
(b) those which are designed to benefit those with less taxable capacity, 
(c) those which compensate for a reduction in a taxpayer's ability to pay, 
(d) those which promote socially important activities, 
(e) those which are justified on social and moral grounds, and 
(f) those which prevent double taxation. 
(a) Tax expenditures as revenue costs 
Income tax is paid after the deduction of costs incurred in generating income. 
Therefore, governments should maintain the following: 
(i) tax exemption for expenses incurred in relation to employment and 
service rendered (under Thai law), 
(ii) tax exemption for fringe benefits (under UK law) which an employee 
receives for carrying out his/her duty of employment, or for expenses 
incurred in relation to employment and service rendered, and 
(iii) relief for charges on income (under UK law), which are patent and 
copyright royalties, annual payments made for commercial reasons, 
and interest paid on loans for business purposes (e.g. to buy 
machinery), but not for personal purposes (e.g. to pay inheritance tax). 
As regards interest expenses, only interest paid on loans for business 
purposes is tax-deductible because it is a cost of doing business which generates 
income subject to tax.744 It appears that "most countries allow a deduction for interest 
expense only if the interest is traceable to borrowing for business or investment."745 
Conversely, interest on loans for personal purposes is not a cost of generating income 
subject to tax. Therefore, the Thai government should consider the removal of 
mortgage interest relief and the exemption of income paid as personal interest on 
loans to buy or invest in immovable property. Interest on a housing loan would be 
deductible if "the imputed income from homeownership were taxed."746 Meanwhile, 
744 Rosen, op.cit.(note250}, p.352; and Hyman, op.cit.(note35), p.499 
745 Thuronyi, op.cit.(note lO), p .245 
746 Stotsky, op.cit.(note509}, p.l23 
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the UK government should consider the removal of tax relief on personal interest on 
loans to pay inheritance tax. 
(b) Tax expenditures beneficial to people with less taxable capacity 
The World Bank claims that "if exclusions are appropriately targeted, the tax 
burden on the poor can be minimized."747 Thus, tax expenditures that can reduce the 
tax burden on those with less taxable capacity should be maintained. In Thailand, 
farmers have the lowest taxable capacity as the poorest group. The exemption of 
income from the sale of rice cultivated by the farmer should then be maintained. 
Older people have less taxable capacity than younger people. The pension is 
the main source of income of this group. This should therefore be excluded from 
taxable income. Under Thai and UK laws, lump sums derived from personal pension 
funds are non-taxable. However, it is argued that if part of the lump sums received 
from any pension fund has been contributed by employers, such benefits and interest 
thereof should count as taxable income. This is because employers' contributions are 
fringe benefits which add to "the employees' net worth."748 
In my view, investments (or contributions) of employees paid out of pension 
money/income are eligible for tax exemption because they now provide income to 
the elderly who have less taxable capacity. Additionally, (a) any benefit or interest 
arising from such investments, and (b) employers' contributions to pension funds (if 
any), including any benefit or interest thereof, should be eligible for tax exemption 
because: 
• benefits under (a) and (b) are not received when the individuals are 
young; therefore, they do not appear to add to their net worth; and 
• benefits under (a) and (b) are received when individuals are old, which 
reduces their ability to pay; consequently, they are likely to offset such 
reduction rather than add to individuals' economic power. 
This can weaken the argument that employers' contributions to pension funds 
are part of employees' wages. (More discussion will be made below). Therefore, this 
research supports tax exemption of lump sums derived from pension funds in both 
laws. Nevertheless, to prevent richer pensioners (e.g. highly paid employees who 
747 The World Bank, op.cit.(notell2), p.26 
748 Hyman, op.cit.(note35), p.492 
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may have made large investments and benefited from substantial employers' 
contributions during their working lives) from receiving greater benefit from tax 
exemption than poorer pensioners, a ceiling of tax exemption should be required. For 
example, lump sums not exceeding 600,000 baht or £10,000 would be non-taxable. 
Employees whose income is disrupted by other causes also have less taxable 
capacity, as pointed out by Chandravithun and Vause: 
"Many employees find it difficult to support themselves and their families 
when income is disrupted by illness, injury, pregnancy, disability, old age or 
unemployment." 749 
In Thailand, such employees are entitled to compensatory benefits paid from 
the Social Security Fund. This fund is compulsorily and equally contributed to by 
three parties, i.e. the government, the employer and the insured employee under the 
Social Security Act. There are seven types of compensatory benefit paid from this 
fund, namely injury or sickness benefit, maternity benefit, physical disability benefit, 
death benefit, child welfare, old-age pension benefits, and unemployment 
compensation. 75° Compensatory benefits are non-taxable in Thailand. 
UK social security benefits, however, are given to other people than 
employees. The benefits are financed by general taxation and the National Insurance 
Fund.75 1 They are classified in three groups: 
(a) "means-tested, available to people whose income and savings are below 
certain levels", 
(b) "contributory, paid to people who have made the required contributions 
to the National Insurance Fund", and 
(c) "benefits which are neither means-tested nor contributory (mainly paid to 
cover extra costs, for example of disability, or paid universally, for 
example Child Benefit)."752 
UK tax treatment of social security benefits is also different from that of 
Thailand. Compensatory benefits under Thai law are all non-taxable, while not all 
749 Nikom Chandravithun and W. Gary Vause, Thailand's Labor and Employment Law: A Practical 
Guide (Bangkok: Manager Publishing, 1993 ), 4 7. 
750 Section 54, Social Security Act (B.E. 2533) 
751 ONS, UK 2003: The Office Yearbook of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland (London: TSO, 2002), 140. 
752 ibid.pp.140-141 
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UK social security benefits are. According to a survey in 2003, "most means-tested 
social security benefits are not liable to income tax."753 And "many non-means-tested 
benefits are taxable (e.g. the basic state pension), but some (notably child benefit) are 
not."754 
In my view, social security benefits can be justified as tax-free income if 
beneficiaries are those having less taxable capacity, e.g. the unemployed, the elderly, 
the injured, the sick, the disabled, the poor, and those with dependent children. This 
is because if the benefits were taxed, such beneficiaries would pay tax or pay more in 
tax, which would thwart income redistribution. There is evidence that social security 
or cash benefits play "the largest part in reducing [income] inequality'' in the UK.755 
And "the majority of cash benefits for non-retired households come from non-
contributory benefits and, for retired households, from contributory benefits, 
particularly the state pension."756 
Given this, means-tested benefits are justified as tax-free income. For 
example, housing benefit is designed to help "people who rent their homes and have 
difficulty meeting their housing costs"757, and council tax benefit designed to help 
"people on low incomes pay their council tax."758 Benefits which are neither means-
tested nor contributory are also justified as tax-free income, for example, child 
benefit designed to help "families with two or more children"759, and disability living 
allowance designed to help "people who became disabled before the age of 65."760 
Meanwhile, from my standpoint, certain means-tested or income-related 
benefits (e.g. income support) and contributory benefits (e.g. incapacity benefit, 
jobseeker's allowance) which are taxable at presene61 and can also be treated as non-
taxable under condition762 should be non-taxable without condition. This is because 
753 Stuart Adam and Jonathan Shaw, A Survey of the UK Tax System: IFS Briefing Note No. 9, 
~http://www.ifs.org.uk!taxsystem/taxsmvey.pdf), 4. 
54 "b"d 4 I I .p. 
755 Caroline Lakin, "The effects of taxes and benefits on household income, 200 1-02", Economic 
Trends, No. 594, May 2003, 34. 
756 "b"d 34 I I . p. 
757 Department for Work and Pensions, Work and Pension Statistics 2002 (Newcastle: Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2002), 149. 
758 ibid.p.l56 
759 ibid.p.l05 
760 ibid.p. l 63 
761 See page 137 
762 See Appendix X to Chapter Three at pages 457 and 458 
188 
they are designed to help those with less taxable capacity. For example, income 
support designed to help "pensioners, lone parents, carers and sick/disabled 
people"763, incapacity benefit designed to help "people who are assessed as being 
incapable of work (at present taxable after 28 weeks of incapacity)"764, jobseeker's 
allowance designed to help "people under state pension age who are available for, 
and actively seeking, work of at least 40 hours a week."765 
One possible reason why many contributory benefits are taxable under UK 
law is that these benefits are paid from the National Insurance Fund. This fund is 
financed by National Insurance contributions comprising employers' and employees' 
contributions?66 Since employers' contributions are argued to be part of employees' 
wages, contributory benefits are taxable. Sandford also argues that employers' 
contributions to national insurance constitute "a part of the employee's wage and 
therefore should count as income of the employee."767 
As discussed earlier, compensatory benefits in Thailand are all non-taxable 
although they are paid from the Social Security Fund which is financed by the 
government, employers and employees. Compensatory benefits differ from 
contributory benefits. Therefore, what should be the proper tax treatment of 
compensatory benefits and contributory benefits, whether taxable or non-taxable. 
Both types of benefit merit being non-taxable for the following reasons. 
Compensatory benefits are financed by three parties and contributory benefits 
by two parties. Benefits partly financed by the government (compensatory benefits) 
are reasonably non-taxable because they are transfer payments (or government 
spending) to help those in financial need, and thus promote income redistribution. 
Additionally, benefits partly financed by employees (in both cases) are reasonably 
non-taxable because they provide income for those having less taxable capacity (as 
reasoned earlier). 
The question then arises whether or not benefits partly financed by employers 
(in both cases) are reasonably non-taxable. This question is raised because 
employers' contributions are claimed to be part of employees' wages that should be 
763 Department for Work and Pensions, op.cit.(note757), p.l41 
764 ibid.p.l23 
765 ibid.p.l16 
766 ONS, op.cit.(note751), p.l41; and Lakin, op.cit.(note755), p.44 
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included into taxable income. In my opinion, benefits financed by employers should 
be non-taxable if they can be justified as compensation for a reduction in an 
individual's ability to pay or on social and moral grounds (other than helping those in 
financial need). 
In general, both compensatory and contributory benefits are likely to be 
justified as compensation for a reduction in individuals'ability to pay or on social and 
moral grounds. Old age, injury, sickness, maternity, disability, incapacity, 
unemployment and death reduce ability to pay. Compensatory benefits (such as old-
age pension benefits, injury or illness benefits, maternity benefits, physical disability 
benefits, unemployment compensation, and death benefit) and contributory benefits 
(such as retirement or state pensions, incapacity benefit, and jobseeker's allowance) 
can compensate. Stotsky notes, "death benefits and disability or sickness benefits are 
also typically excluded from income on the grounds that they represent compensation 
for a loss rather than an increase in an ability to consume."768 Additionally, death 
benefit and child welfare as compensatory benefits can be justified on social and 
moral grounds. 
Furthermore, the argument that employers' contributions are part of 
employees' wages can be refuted. The refutation is that despite appearing to be part 
of employees' wages, employers' contributions do not add to employees' economic 
power but are likely to offset a reduction in employees' ability to pay or in their 
economic power.769 Income subject to tax is accretion to a person's economic power. 
Income that is not accretion but which offsets a decrease in economic power should 
not be taxed. Therefore, employers' contributions should not be regarded as taxable 
income. 
Altogether, compensatory benefits are reasonably non-taxable. This research 
supports tax exemption of these benefits under Thai law. Similarly, contributory 
benefits (under UK law) which are taxable at present should be non-taxable without 
condition if they meet the above criteria (e.g. state pensions, incapacity benefit, and 
jobseeker's allowance). Nevertheless, in the case of old-age or state pensions, a 
767 Sandford, op.cit.(note19), pp.l27-128 
768 Stotsky, op.cit.(note509), p.122 
769 Similarly, employers'contributions are regarded as another tax on employers without effects on 
employees' economic power. 
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ceiling for tax exemption of benefits partly financed by employers may be required 
to prevent richer pensioners from receiving greater benefits from tax exemption than 
poorer pens10ners. 
(c) Tax expenditures as compensation for taxable capacity 
Sickness, injury, and casualty (e.g. losses from accident, :fire, etc.) reduce a 
person's well-being. As Stotsky notes, "[casualty and theft losses] impair ability to 
pay."770 In addition to social security benefits, medical expenses, damages and 
indemnities are money paid for the recovery of a loss in a person's welfare. 
Similarly, Rosen writes, "medical expenses do not really contribute to an individual's 
ability to pay." 771 Therefore, they should not be counted as taxable income. 
This research therefore supports the view that tax exemptions for medical 
expenses paid by employers (under Thai law), the provision for an employee of 
medical treatment outside the UK (under UK law), and damages and indemnities for 
casualty losses (under both laws) should be maintained. 
(d) Tax expenditures as encouragement of beneficial activities 
Those under (d) (such as foundation or charity donations, education, research 
and training) should be maintained. In general, the function of foundations and 
charities is to help the poor or needy. The more donations the better off make to 
these, the more income will be redistributed. Therefore, such non-governmental 
organizations can help governments to implement the policy of income 
redistribution. Governments should therefore encourage foundational and charitable 
donations through tax exemption and relief. Many support this argument. Hyman 
writes, "the tax deduction for charitable contributions seems to be a very effective 
means of encouraging donations."772 Likewise, deduction for charitable giving 
encourages "a higher level of these activities and they are socially beneficial 
activities."773 
Tax exemption for the transfer of immovable property to foundations (or 
temples) without any payment (under Thai law) should therefore be maintained. Tax 
relief for charitable donations under both laws should also be maintained. However, 
770 Stotsky, op.cit.(note509), p.123 
771 Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.350 
772 Hyman, op.cit.(note35), p.500 
773 Stotsky, op.cit.(note509), p.123 
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the wealthy are likely to receive most tax relief because they can best make such 
donations. Most governments seem to recognize this. Hence, the deductibility of 
charitable contributions is "subject to strict definitions and limitations."774 
According to Thai law, only monetary charitable donations are deductible. 
And they are deductible for an actual amount subject to a maximum limit. 
Furthermore, donations must be made to specified charities, i.e. government-owned 
clinics and educational institutions, and public charity organizations or institutions, 
or clinics and educational institutions. According to UK law, charitable donations 
eligible for tax relief can be made in the form of (a) gifts of listed shares or 
securities, (b) gifts ofland or buildings, and (c) money. 
In my view, charitable donations eligible for tax relief should not be limited 
only to monetary donations. Donations of assets that can be realized should also be 
deductible at market value (as in the UK). However, donations should be made only 
to specified charities, the main objective of which is to help people in need. 
(Therefore, I disagree that Gift Aid relief should be available for donations made to 
community amateur sports clubs as well as charitable donations).775 Additionally, 
the deductibility of charitable donations should not be subject to a ceiling. Without a 
ceiling, the PIT might encourage the wealthy to increase charitable giving in order to 
qualify for more tax relief. (Deductibility without a ceiling is unlikely on its own to 
persuade the wealthy to increase charitable giving by very much, which would lead 
to tax avoidance and tax arbitrage).776 In return, the poor would receive more 
financial assistance from charities. This is likely to be another way to achieve 
vertical redistribution. 
Education and research are also socially important activities. Differences in 
educational and training opportunities cause unequal distribution of income. More 
such opportunities will boost earning opportunities and thus reduce differences in 
income. Therefore, governments should encourage education, training and research 
through tax exemption and relief in addition to direct subsidies. Therefore, 
governments should maintain tax exemptions for income received for education and 
774 Throop Smith, op.cit.(note401), pp.915-916 
775 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.51 
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research (under both laws). An educational allowance for dependent children (under 
Thai tax law) should also be maintained. 
In my view, a subsidy for education should go to the poorest, whose income 
is below the tax threshold. Meanwhile, an educational allowance under the tax 
system should be maintained because (a) education is important (as reasoned above), 
(b) this allowance will encourage low-income families to send their children to 
school, and (c) the tax burden on these groups will be reduced at the same time. 
However, this allowance should be cancelled for high-income taxpayers because 
these groups can afford the costs of education for their children. 
Finally, training is a beneficial activity. It helps create earning opportunities 
for employees and those becoming employed. Similarly, well-trained employees and 
people will probably be employed and promoted, and earn more income. This 
research therefore supports the view that tax exemptions for the provision for an 
employee of work-related training, the payment of training grant, and the payment of 
retraining course expenses (under UK law) should be maintained. 
(e) Tax exemptions justified on social and moral reasons 
Governments should maintain tax exemptions under (e) which include: 
(i) maintenance income derived from moral obligation (under Thai law), 
(ii) gifts relating to ceremonies or traditions (under both laws), 
(iii) pensions and gratuities paid for state or am1ed force services, e.g. war 
widow's pensions (under UK law), and special pension, special 
gratuity, inherited pension or inherited gratuity (under Thai law), 
(iv) maintenance payments following divorce or separation (under UK 
law), and 
(v) compensation (under both laws). 
(f) Tax exemptions as prevention of double taxation 
Tax exemptions that can prevent double taxation should be maintained and 
promoted. 
776 Although charitable donations provide tax relief for the taxpayer (the donor), they do not benefit 
the donor. (Charitable donations benefit the donee rather than the donor). Thus, the deductibility of 
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3. Concepts and effects of an income-tax base on efficiency 
3.1 Revenue loss 
As we have seen, the income-tax base is eroded by tax reliefs, leading to revenue 
loss. This is because structural reliefs reduce the taxable income of most individuals; 
meanwhile, tax expenditures discharge or reduce tax burdens on particular types of 
individuals. Additionally, the wealthy can shift resources to tax-preferred 
activities. 777 
From the UK experience, tax reliefs have reduced tax revenue. In 1973/4, 
Willis and Hardwick (referred to in Pond) estimated revenue loss as follows: 
"[Only] 45% of total (aggregate) gross income was subject to tax. Structural 
allowances and deductions accounted for 32% of total gross income, while 
non-structural deductions accounted for 15%."778 
In 1997-98, Saatchi discovered that "the unrelieved taxable potential of the 
present tax structure levied by the Exchequer on companies and individuals 
amounted to £434.9 billion [;] [but] £134.9 billion almost a third of the total, was 
given back in the form of reliefs and allowances."779 The estimated costs of principal 
tax expenditures and structural reliefs for income tax for 2003-04 and 2004-05 can be 
found in Appendix XIII to Chapter Three. 
Although the costs of tax reliefs under Thai law have never been worked out, 
extensive tax exemptions have resulted in inadequate government revenue.780 It is 
suggested that the costs of tax reliefs be worked out annually in order that "policy 
makers are fully aware of the fmancial impact of[tax reliefs]."781 
The income-tax base should be broadened by limiting tax reliefs in order to 
maintain the revenue-raising role. In the previous section, proposals were made for 
the limitation of tax reliefs for equity. If the proposed limitation were implemented, 
charitable donations without ceiling is unlikely to lead to tax avoidance or tax arbitrage. 
777Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Anwar Shah, "Introduction and Overview", Tax Policy in 
Developing Countries, Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Anwar Shah, eds. (Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1991), xviii 
778 Pond, op.cit.(note609), p.53 
779 Saatchi, op.cit.(note721), p.78 
780 Richupan, op.cit.(note512), pp.l5-I 6 
781 The World Bank, op.cit.(note262), p.27 
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both revenue and equity purposes would probably be achieved. According to my 
proposal, tax reliefs can be limited as follows: 
(i) phasing out personal allowances for some high-income taxpayers 
(under both laws), 
(ii) abolishing the standard deduction and applying a deduction of actual 
expenses for all categories of income (except for savings and 
dividends income) under Thai law, and 
(iii) removing certain tax exemptions and itemized deductions (under both 
laws). 
There is evidence showing that the abolition of certain tax reliefs could 
increase tax revenue and promote equity. For instance, in Thailand prior to 1982, 
proceeds from the sale of an immovable property which was not acquired for the 
purpose of trade or obtaining profit was tax exempt. However, "the abolition of [this] 
exemption in 1982 was a direction towards income redistribution and also generates 
higher tax revenues for the government."782 In the UK, when the mortgage tax relief 
and the married couple's allowance for younger couples were abolished, the income 
of the top 10% was reduced.783 
3.2 Administrative and compliance costs 
3.2.1 Complex tax system 
There are five factors in the structure of the income-tax base that complicate the PIT 
system. 
The number of relief provisions is the primary factor. As Sandford notes 
that "the UK income tax is complicated by many and complex reliefs."784 
Secondly, the PIT system becomes complex because it is used (through both 
structural and non-structural reliefs) for many purposes, i.e. equity, and other 
economic and social purposes.785 
782 Sussangkarn et al., op.cit.(note23), pp.l6-17 
783 BBCNews/Budget2000/Tacking tax inequalities, http://news.bbc.co.uk, as of 10/3/2000, p.l 
784 Sandford, op.cit.(note58), p.l54 
785 e.g. the increasing number of Thai tax reliefs has been used to stimulate the country's economic 
system following economic recession since 1977. 
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Thirdly, the inherent characteristics of tax reliefs bring about complexity. 
The availability of personal allowances depends on differences in taxable capacity. 
Older people, blind people and people with dependent children, for example, have 
less taxable capacity, so can claim more personal allowances. However, "differences 
in individual and family circumstances have resulted in a complex code of personal 
income taxation."786 For example, although the provisions relating to age-related 
allowances and the income limit promote equity, they complicate the tax code. The 
blind person's allowance also increases the complexity of UK law.787 Additionally, 
tax expenditures complicate the system.788 
Fourthly, if personal allowances were too low, more poor people would 
become taxpayers, and if they were not adjusted for price inflation, more poor people 
would become taxpayers. A greater number of small-income taxpayers complieates 
tax administration. 
Finally, tax expenditures provide large loopholes for tax avoidance. The PIT 
system becomes more complex when complex anti-avoidance provisions are 
introduced. Similarly, "attempts by the authorities to prevent evasion and avoidance 
lead to more complicated tax law."789 
A complex tax system arising from the structure of the income-tax base 
increases administrative costs. For example, tax exemptions increase ''monitoring 
costs on the part of the [Thai] government."790 Likewise, administering exemptions 
and allowances incurs an additional cost of collection.791 
A complex tax system arising from the structure of the income-tax base also 
increases compliance costs. As a result of complex tax reliefs under the UK law, the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, as referred to in Saatchi, says, "it is now 'extremely 
difficult' for people to calculate how much tax they are due to pay."792 
As noted earlier, if the personal allowances are low and not adjusted for price 
inflation, more smal1-income people will become taxpayers. Administration costs 
786 Hockley, op.cit.(note315), p.207 
787 Barret ai., op.cit.(note577), p.l6 
788 Sandford, op.cit.(note195), p.46 
789 Barret a!., op.cit.(note577), p.ll 
790 Sahasakul, op.cit.(note257), p.25 
791 Dalton, op.cit.(note30), p.l13 
792 Saatchi, op.cit.(note721), p.77 
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may be increased disproportionate to the tax collected, because tax gatherers have to 
deal with a greater number of small-income taxpayers, but collect only tiny amounts 
of tax. Meanwhile, these small-income taxpayers "will tend to incur compliance 
costs that are disproportionate to the tax they pay."793 
Non-complia11ce costs may also be incurred by complex legislation. Complex 
tax reliefs result in different tax treatment of taxpayers with equal income. 
Consequently, dishonest taxpayers may spend extra resources searching for tax 
loopholes in complex legislation. 
High administrative and compliance costs mean a large loss of tax revenue. 
To reduce costs in the taxing process, the PIT system should be made simpler for 
administration and compliance by modification of the structure of the income-tax 
base. To do this, authorities should: 
(i) eliminate certain tax expenditures, 
(ii) increase personal allowances to cover the costs of living and to be in 
line with price inflation. 
As regards measure (i), the OECD has found that "most governments have 
been keen to reduce tax expenditures because they introduce added complexity in the 
tax system."794 However, we cannot remove all tax expenditures because "there are, 
for some [tax expenditures], strong administrative reasons."795 Similarly, "there are 
numerous exceptions to the bases for the various taxes, based on a mixture of 
practicality and expediency. "796 
The exception of certain fringe benefits can be justified on grounds of 
expediency because they are difficult to measure or administer. The exemption of 
farm income under Thai law can also be justified on grounds of expediency, because 
Thai farmers keep "very inadequate records [of income]. "797 
Tax expenditures that cannot be justified on grounds of expediency should be 
removed. This will not only lessen the complexity of the structure of the tax base but 
also facilitate administration and compliance. Furthermore, the elimination of certain 
tax expenditures facilitates administration and compliance because it is harder for 
793 The World Bank Group, op.cit.(note 162), p.2 
794 OECD, Spending via the tax system, http://www.oecd.org/daf/fa/stats/spend.htm,as of 14/ 12/00, 1. 
795 Atkinson and Stiglitz, op.cit.(note407), p.64 
796 Tiley, op.cit.(note 141 ), p.25 
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dishonest taxpayers to find loopholes to avoid or evade the tax 798, and it is simpler 
for honest taxpayers not to comply with many anti-avoidance rules. 
If the personal allowances are increased according to measure (ii), fewer 
low-income earners will become taxpayers and be required to file returns. This will 
reduce compliance and administrative costs. 
3.2.2 Tax avoidance and evasion 
Tax reliefs provide incentives for tax avoidance and evasiOn, which mcrease 
administrative and compliance costs and generate revenue loss. 
Astin argues that "tax avoidance may involve not only the transformation of 
income but the exploitation of reliefs and allowances."799 The exemptions of capital 
gains and interest income as well as interest deductibility may provide incentives for 
higher-income earners to manipulate their capital income (under contrived 
schemes)to receive favorable tax treatment and to exploit interest deductibility. 
Additionally, tax expenditures that are likely to provide incentives for tax avoidance 
include: 
(a) the deductibility of life insurance premiums (under Thai law), 
(b) the deductibility of contributions to personal pension funds (under both 
laws), 
(c) the exemption of inheritance (under Thai law), 
(d) the exemption of certain fringe benefits (under both laws), 
(e) the exemption of per diem (under Thai law). 
Tax reliefs under (a), (b), and (c) provide incentives for taxpayers to 
manipulate their capital income to receive favorable tax treatment. Those under (d) 
and (e) provide incentives for employees to shift to jobs that can offer non-taxable 
emoluments.800 
Additionally, a standard deduction of expenses provides incentives for tax 
avoidance. Differences in the percentage of standard deduction between income from 
different sources may cause taxpayers to manipulate their tax affairs from low 
797 Lent and Hirao, op.cit.(notel85), p.28 
798 The World Bank, op.cit.(note262), p.39 
799 Astin, op.cit.(notell8), p.l63 
800 Prest, op.cit.(note40), p.270 
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percentage to higher percentage deduction. Similarly, "the different tax treatment of 
different sources of income [is] among the factors which enable some citizens to 
avoid or reduce their tax bill."801 
In 2.2.2, the Thai government IS recommended to abolish the standard 
deduction and apply a deduction of actual expenses for equity. This is likely to help 
achieve efficiency as well as equity. However, it may lead to tax evasion by 
taxpayers overstating expense deductions, producing false evidence of expenses, and 
bribing tax-gatherers. Therefore, it is further recommended to apply a deduction of 
actual expenses in Thailand together with improvements in tax enforcement, 
especially the enforcement of taxpayers to keep accounts and records, and severe 
punishments for bribery. 
Tax evasion may also result from tax expenditures, i.e. taxpayers may 
misrepresent income and payments in order to exploit exempted income and itemized 
deductions. 802 
Tax avoidance and evasion generate high administrative and compliance 
costs, and a large loss of tax revenue. The abolition of reliefs that are tax loopholes 
can reduce incentives to avoid and evade the tax, which will bring about lower 
administrative and compliance costs, and greater tax revenue. These reliefs include 
the abolition of standard deductions, the exemptions of capital gains, interest income, 
fringe benefits and per diem, and the deductions of personal interest, life insurance 
premiums and contributions to personal pension funds. 
3.3 Deadweight loss 
Tax reliefs reduce taxable income and the tax burden. Therefore, people may take up 
tax-free or tax-preferred activities in place of taxed activities. Similarly, tax reliefs 
produce distortions in resource reallocation, resulting in deadweight loss. 
Personal allowances may have work disincentive effects. If personal 
allowances were neither increased to cover the costs of living nor adjusted for price 
inflation, more poor people would become taxpayers. Low-income earners may 
decide to live on state benefits rather than enter the labor force. 
801 OECD, op.cit.(note70), pp.43-44 
802 Tbirsk, op.cit.(note64), p.l7 
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Expense deductions may distort incentives to engage in economic activity. 
People may choose economic activities in which they can claim a high percentage of 
standard deduction. 
Tax expenditures are introduced to promote particular economic activities by 
discharging or reducing the tax burden on particular individuals. Consequently, 
individuals may reallocate resources to tax-preferred activities. Tax expenditures that 
are likely to distort resource reallocation include: 
(a) the exemption of certain fringe benefits (under both laws), 
(b) the deductibility of contributions to personal pension funds (under both 
laws), 
(c) the deductibility of life insurance premiums (under Thai law), 
(d) the exemption of interest or returns on certain forms of savings accounts/ 
fmancial products (under both laws), 
(e) the deductibility of mortgage interest payment (under Thai law), and 
(f) the exemption of certain capital gains (under Thai law). 
Tax expenditure under (a) distorts the choice of jobs and reallocation of 
human resources for three reasons. Firstly, individuals may seek, or shift to, a job 
that provides tax-free fringe benefits as a large part of their remuneration.803 
Secondly, employees may demand higher remuneration in the form of tax-free fringe 
benefits. 804 Finally, finns may induce individuals to work for them by offering 
these. 805 
Tax expenditures under (b) and (c) discriminate against other forms of saving 
on which interest earned is taxed.806 Consequently, there is an unnatural incentive for 
individuals to transfer their current income to pension and insurance schemes for 
future income. 807 Therefore, these tax expenditures distort savings decisions. 808 
Tax expenditure under (d) distorts the choice of savings and investment. It 
discriminates against forms of savings and investment on which interest or returns 
are taxed. Trotman-Dickenson points out that "by exempting from tax income 
803Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.230 
804 Stotsky, op.cit.(note509), p.122 





derived from certain forms of investments, e.g. national savmgs certificates, a 
government can increase the appeal to investors of its own stocks and thereby 
discriminate against shares of companies."809 
Tax expenditure under (e) distorts savmgs and investment decisions. 
According to Whitehead, in Sandford, "tax concessions to house owners raise the 
value of houses, providing a capital gain to present owners but reducing the capacity 
of would-be purchasers to buy their first house."810 That is, the mortgage interest tax 
relief discriminates in favor of home ownership because 
(a) it increases "the demand and therefore the price ofhousing";811 
(b) "the beneficiaries were those who already owned houses when the relief 
was introduced, rather than those who sought to purchase them."812 
This may provide an unnatural incentive for individuals to switch savings into 
investment in houses. Furthermore, tax reliefs given to housing (as well as to 
insurance policies and pension funds) provide incentives to reallocate resources to 
"safe and rentier-type investments"81 3 rather than to "innovation and risk-taking."814 
Tax expenditure under (f) distorts investment decisions, discriminating in 
favour of certain forms of investment from which the gains are non-taxable, for 
example, gains deriving from the sale of securities listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand. There is therefore an unnatural incentive for individuals to reallocate 
resources to tax-preferred sources of capital gains. 
Altogether, tax reliefs provide artificial incentives to reallocate resources to 
tax-free or tax-preferred activities. The World Bank notes that "distortions in 
resource allocation arising as individuals respond to the tax structure" are regarded as 
deadweight loss.815 
809 Trotman-Dickenson, op.cit.(note 138), p.l 05 
81° Cedric Sandford, "Taxation and Social Policy: An Overview", Taxation and Social Policy, Cedric 
Sandford, Chris Pond and Robert Walker, eds., (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1980), 
4-5 
811 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.88 
812 "b"d 88 I 1 .p. 
813 Sandford, op.cit.(note81 0), p.8 
81 4 ibid.p.8 
815 The World Bank Group, op.cit.(notel62), p.l 
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The least interference of the PIT with economic decisions is likely to 
counteract the distortion of the PIT in incentives. Therefore, the following measures 
are recommended:-
(i) an increase in personal allowances to cover the costs of living and to 
be in line with price inflation, 
(ii) abolition of standard deductions, and 
(iii) elimination of certain tax expenditures. 
Raising the tax threshold under measure (i) will move more small-income 
taxpayers out of the PIT system. Consequently, work disincentive effects should 
decrease. 
As regards measure (ii), this will reduce the distortion in incentives to engage 
m economic activities. The deduction of actual expenses to replace standard 
deductions is unlikely to distort such incentives. It is, however, argued that the 
deduction of actual expenses also affects decisions on the choice of jobs if the law 
allows a greater deductible expense for one than another. As James and Nobes note, 
"[In] practice more deductions are available to the self-employed than to 
employees. In effect, this can mean that self-employment income is taxed at 
lower rates. The result again may be a reallocation of resources. In this case, 
individuals may seek to become self-employed, even though from an 
economic viewpoint it might be more efficient for them to work as 
employees."81 6 
They further suggest that "the Inland Revenue, of course, also has the 
additional task of ensuring that taxpayers do not manipulate their employment status 
illegally."817 As we have seen in 2.2.2, in terms of equity, it is impossible for 
legislation to allow the same deductible expenses for different economic activities. It 
is correct to allow the self-employed to claim more deductible expenses than 
employees. Therefore, I agree with the suggestion by James and Nobes. 
Finally, the abolition of certain tax expenditures under measure (iii) will 
reduce distortions in resource reallocation. Tax expenditures that should be removed 
816 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.33 
817 ibid.p.l79 
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include those mentioned under (a)-(f) above. There are arguments for and against this 
measure as discussed below. 
Chappel in Nightingale suggests that to achieve neutrality "perks, privileges 
and allowances should be phased out", and "the system should not distort between 
different forms of saving and ideally there should be no distortion between spending 
and saving."818 The OECD states that "most governments have been keen to reduce 
tax expenditures because they distort consumption, savings and investment 
decisions."819 For example, the abolition of mortgage interest tax relief has helped 
remove economic distortions since the mid 1980s. 820 The UK government abolished 
mortgage interest tax relief on the grounds that the abolition would "remove a 
distortion in the housing market"821 , and would "improve the functioning of the 
housing market and contribute to the long-term stability of the economy."822 
Conversely, the Thai government has been in favor of mortgage interest tax 
relief. 823 Valaisathien proposes that the amount of this relief should be increased 
from 50,000 to 300,000 baht because this would encourage saving in the form of 
home equity and borrowing to buy houses which would also stimulate real estate 
business during the economic recession in Thailand.824 However, according to my 
analysis, the Thai government should consider the abolition of this tax relief to solve 
both the equity problem and the problem of economic distortions. 
There are three other arguments against the removal of certain tax 
expenditures in spite of distortions in resource reallocation. That is, there are 
argwnents for tax expenditures that can be used to encourage (a) socially beneficial 
activities, (b) domestic saving, and (c) risk-taking. 
818 Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.Sl 
819 OECD, op.cit.(note794), p.l 
820 Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.SO 
821 Author not identified, Simon' s Direct Tax Service, Budget Bulletin Tuesday 9 March 1999, 39. 
822 HM Treasury, Financial Statement and Budget Report March 1999, 
http://archive.ITeasm-v.gov.ukJbudget/ l999/fsbr/29805.htm ,as of 11105/02, 11. 
823 In addition to an allowance for mortgage interest payment of I 0,000 baht, income paid as mortgage 
interest on a housing loan (the part exceeding 10,000 baht but not exceeding 50,000 baht) is tax 
exempt. The provision of tax exemption was enacted in 2000 (during the recession). 
824 Suvam Valaisathien, To overcome tax problems, 2"d ed. (Bangkok: Nititham Publishing, 2001), 
152. 
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Socially beneficial activities 
Certain tax expenditures are believed to provide incentives to reallocate 
resources to beneficial activities. As Stotsky notes, 
"The rationale for allowing charitable contributions, educational expenses, 
pension contributions, and life insurance contributions, to be deducted rests 
primarily on the argument that the deduction encourages a higher level of 
these activities and they are socially beneficial activities."825 
Tax deductions under Thai law are introduced on the same argument as 
Stotsky's. As Trachudham notes, 
(a) the deduction of life insurance premiums is meant to encourage saving 
and security for individuals and their families; 
(b) the deduction of contributions to the Provident Fund 1s meant to 
encourage saving and investment; 
(c) the deduction of educational expenses is meant to promote education; and 
(d) the deduction of charitable donations is meant to promote generosity in 
society.826 
In 2.2.3, it was stated that tax allowances for charitable donations and for the 
education of children should not be removed for reasons of equity because they 
encourage activities which benefit low-income groups. Although such reliefs may 
provide incentives to reallocate resources to charitable and educational activities, 
they should not be removed because reasons of equity outweigh distortions in 
resource reallocation. 
In 2.2.3, it was stated that tax allowances for life insurance premiums and for 
pension contributions should be removed for equity since the former relief benefits 
high-income groups, while the latter adds to an individual's net worth. In this 
subsection, I have found that these reliefs should be abolished for efficiency, i.e. they 
distort savings decisions. Therefore, despite the argument that such reliefs are 
socially beneficial, they should be abolished for reasons of both equity and 
efficiency. 827 
825 Stotsky, op.cit.(note509), p.123 
826 Trachudham, op.cit.(note512), p.l50 




There is an argument referred to in Richupan that if interest income were 
included in the tax base, "net yield of the interest earners [would] be reduced and 
savings [would] consequently be discouraged. "828 The exemption of interest income 
is believed to encourage savings. The arguments for the exemption of interest income 
to encourage savings include: 
(a) tax exemption will ensure that "everyone has a nest egg for retirement or 
ill health, both to avoid poverty and to reduce the demands on the state's 
social welfare resources"829, 
(b) tax exemption will help "dependents who survived when a wage earner 
died"830 and 
' 
(c) tax exemption will prevent mobility of capital income. 
As regards (a) and (b), "savings by individuals - particularly individuals with 
limited incomes - are encouraged."831 
As regards (c), it is supposed that capital mobility results from the 
globalization of the world economy and the development of global financial and 
capital markets. Thirsk notes that "fear of capital flight and the inability to tax 
residents' worldwide income have persuaded a number of cow1tries to exempt 
interest income from the [PIT]. "832 
Thirsk further notes that the favorable treatment of interest income due to the 
fear of capital mobility probably leads to the exemption of other fonns of capital 
income, such as dividend income and capital gains. He explains that such exemptions 
will "mitigate the financial distortions that would otherwise occm."833 Thailand has 
followed this pattern of tax treatment. Certain interest income and gains from the sale 
of securities in the Stock Exchange of Thailand are non-taxable. This pattern refutes 
my analysis. As analyzed earlier, the exemption of certain interest income and capital 
"A major part of the insurance premium goes to the broker. Therefore, if you put the 
premium in a saving account, you will end up with more money than what you get from the 
insurer." 
Valaisathien, op.cit.(note824), p.l81 
828 Richupan, op.cit.(note512), p.l7 
829 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note 15), p.l77 
830 ibid.p.117 
831 ibid.p.117 
832 Thirsk, op.cit.(note64), p.lO 
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gains distorts the choice of savings and investment because it discriminates against 
other forms of savings and investment. Slemrod, referred to in Steinmo, seems to 
support the pattern that Thirsk has found. According to Slemrod, 
"(Tax policy] has traditionally been thought of as an entirely domestic matter. 
[But] in an increasingly global world economy, nations can no longer afford 
to design their tax systems without accounting for the effects on international 
trade and investment. "834 
Nevertheless, the argument in favor of exemption of interest income may be 
weakened since tax exemption is unlikely to be the only factor to encourage saving 
in practice. In Chapter Two, it was established that there are other factors influencing 
the decline and the increase in saving, such as interest rates. Richupan supports the 
view that the argument that tax exemption can encourage savings is not valid because 
"the increase in the net yield on savings could be accomplished in another way, i.e. 
to increase interest rates on savings deposits."835 Additionally, Gale notes that saving 
trends depend on "many factors other than tax policy."836 He has also found that 
"the run-up in equity values, social security reform, budget deficits and other factors 
may also have played important roles in saving trends."837 Furthermore, according to 
evidence presented by Banks, Blundell and Dilnot referred to in Gale, "TESSAs 
probably did not raise private saving much, if at all, and may well have reduced 
national saving. "838 
The arguments for the exemption of interest income to encourage the savings 
of individuals with limited incomes might also be weakened if interest income was 
taxed at the rates under the two tax-rate schedules as proposed in Chapter Two. This 
is because the interest income of such individuals would be subject to the 0% rate in 
the schedule for low-income groups, which would encourage such individuals to 
save without the exemption of interest income for all groups of people. 
833 "b "d 40 1 1 .p. 
834 Steinmo, op.cit.(note581 ), p.l56 
835 Richupan, op.cit.(note5l2), p.l7 





There is an argument referred to in Auerbach that "favourable capital gains 
treatment serves to encourage risk-taking, which is otherwise discriminated against 
by the income tax system."839 This argument contradicts my analysis that the 
exemption of certain capital gains distorts investment decisions. Nevertheless, the 
argument in favor of exemption of capital gains may be weakened since tax 
exemption is unlikely to be the only factor to encourage risk-taking in practice. 
According to one of the investors in a survey conducted by Aharoni referred to in 
Morisset and Pimia, "tax exemption is like a dessert; it is good to have, but it does 
not help very much if the meal is not there."840 The survey concludes that "income 
tax exemption was considered a very weak stimulant; those investors, who did 
consider it, did it only marginally."841 
Altogether, despite the argument against abolition of the exemptions of 
interest income and capital gains, these reliefs should be abolished. The abolition 
will solve both the equity problem and the problem of economic distortion. 
4. Conflict between equity and efficiency, and proposed solutions 
4.1 Structural reliefs and the conflict 
Although personal allowances under existing Thai and UK laws help reduce the tax 
burden on low-income earners, they generate vertical inequity and negate tax 
progressivity. Tlus is because: 
(a) they also reduce the burden on high-income eamers; and 
(b) along with the progressive rate structure, high-income eamers receive a 
larger proportionate reduction in the tax burden from personal allowances 
than low-income earners. 
Additionally, personal allowances under both laws probably lead to 
inefficiency of taxation because: 
(a) they lead to revenue loss; 
(b) numerous items of personal allowances complicate the PIT system; 
839 Auerbach, op.cit.(note489), p.605 
840 Morisset and Pirnia, op.cit.(note130), p.5 
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(c) the inherent characteristics of personal allowances bring about complexity 
in the PIT system; 
(d) personal allowances which are too low and not adjusted in line with price 
inflation probably complicates tax administration; and 
(e) personal allowances which are neither increased to cover the costs of 
living nor adjusted for price in.flation probably cause more poor people to 
decide to live on state benefits. 
The deduction of actual expenses under UK law is likely to satisfy the ability-
to-pay principle and the concept of progressivity. Conversely, although a standard 
deduction of expense under Thai law reduces taxable income for low-income 
earners, it dissatisfies the ability-to-pay principle and the concept of tax 
progressivity. 
A standard deduction dissatisfies the ability-to-pay principle because it 
undermines horizontal equity, i.e. differences in the percentage of standard deduction 
cause taxpayers with equal income (but from different sources) to pay different taxes. 
A standard deduction will also undermine vertical equity and tax progressivity 
because: 
(a) it probably helps high-income taxpayers to deduct expenses exceeding the 
real costs of earning; 
(b) along with the progressive rate structure, high-income taxpayers receive a 
greater proportionate reduction in the tax burden from a standard 
deduction than lower-income taxpayers; and 
(c) a standard deduction lowers effective MTRs below statutory MTRs. 
Additionally, deductible expenses probably lead to inefficiency of taxation 
because: 
(a) revenue loss will probably occur if taxpayers deduct expenses exceeding 
the real costs of earning; 
(b) differences in the percentage of standard deduction between income from 
different sources possibly provide incentives for tax avoidance and distort 
incentives to engage in economic activity because people may choose 
841 ibid.p.S 
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economic activities in which they can claim a high percentage of standard 
deduction; and 
(c) the deduction of actual expenses may lead to tax evasion by overstating 
expense deductions, producing false evidence of expenses, and bribing 
tax -gatherers. 
4.2 Tax expenditures and the conflict 
Although tax expenditures under existing Thai and UK laws reduce taxable income 
for low-income earners, they dissatisfy the ability-to-pay principle and the concept of 
tax progressivity. This is because: 
(a) tax expenditures bring about horizontal inequity since exempt income and 
itemized deductions are only available to particular types of individual; 
(b) tax expenditures bring about vertical inequity since: 
(i) the poorest do not benefit from them; 
(ii) the tax liability of high-income taxpayers is discharged or reduced 
as a result of tax expenditures; 
(iii) tax expenditures may be intentionally or unintentionally designed 
to benefit high-income taxpayers; and 
(iv) tax expenditures are legal loopholes for tax avoidance; and 
(c) tax expenditures undercut tax progressivity since: 
(i) the rich who derive exempt income receive a greater proportionate 
reduction in their tax burden than the poor; 
(ii) high-income taxpayers tend to make larger payments than low-
income taxpayers to have the benefit of itemized deduction; 
consequently, high-income taxpayers obtain a greater reduction in 
taxable income than low-income taxpayers; and 
(iii) while itemized deductions reduce effective A TRs, high-income 
taxpayers receive a greater reduction in effective A TRs than low-
income taxpayers. 
Additionally, tax expenditures under both laws probably lead to inefficiency 
of taxation because: 
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(a) they reduce tax revenue since they discharge or reduce the tax burden on 
particular types of individuals and act as the tax shelter for the wealthy; 
(b) numerous items of tax expenditure complicate the PIT system, and result 
in high administrative and compliance costs; 
(c) the inherent characteristics of certain tax expenditures also bring about 
complexity in the PIT system; 
(d) tax expenditures provide large loopholes for tax avoidance; and 
(e) tax expenditures probably distort resource allocation, which generates 
deadweight loss. 
4.3 Proposed solutions to the conflict (an optimal tax base) 
As indicated in 4.1 and 4.2, tax reliefs are the major factor leading to the conflict 
between equity and efficiency. An optimal tax base should be established by limiting 
the use of tax reliefs. 
4.3.1 Proposed structural reliefs 
As discussed in 4.1, personal allowances and deductible expenses adversely affect 
equity and efficiency. This research proposes that these structural reliefs should be 
modified to help broaden the tax base, which will promote equity and efficiency 
simultaneously. 
As regards the modification of personal allowances, two proposals are put 
forward, namely 
(a) increasing personal allowances to cover private consumption expenditures 
per capita (under Thai and UK laws) and to be in line with price inflation 
(under Thai law), and 
(b) phasing out personal allowances for the rich (under both laws). 
The two proposals would have the following effects at the same time. 
Firstly, the proposed personal allowances would not generate vertical 
inequity nor negate tax progressivity. This is because if personal allowances were 
increased and phased out according to the proposals above, their real value would be 
maintained to cover the real cost of a standard of living, which would reduce the tax 
burden on low-income earners (not on high-income earners). The proposed personal 
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allowances would serve both lower and upper ends of the income scale, i.e. reducing 
the proportion of income paid in tax by low-income earners and increasing the 
proportion of income paid in tax by high-income earners. This would promote 
vertical equity. 
Secondly, the proposed personal allowances would promote economic 
efficiency of taxation for the following reasons. 
(i) Phasing out personal allowances for the rich means broadening the tax 
base for the rich, which would generate a greater amount of tax revenue, as 
discussed in 3.1. 
(ii) If personal allowances were increased according to the proposal (a), this 
would simplify tax administration and compliance, which would reduce 
administrative and compliance costs. This is because more low-income 
earners would be moved out of the PIT system, as discussed in 3.2.1. 
(iii) If personal allowances were increased according to the proposal (a), this 
would reduce work disincentive effects. This is because it would encourage 
low-income earners to enter the labor force rather than living on state 
benefits, as discussed in 3.3. 
As regards the modification of deductible expenses, three proposals are made. 
Firstly, the standard deduction (under Thai law) should be abolished. This 
would eliminate differences in the percentage of standard deduction (which cause 
horizontal inequity) and remove the greater number of tax benefits received by high-
income taxpayers from the standard deduction (which causes vertical inequity and 
the negation of tax progressivity). It would also eliminate incentives for tax 
avoidance or resource allocation to economic activities in which taxpayers can claim 
a high percentage of standard deduction. 
Secondly, a deduction of actual expenses should be applied for all sources of 
income (except for savings and dividends incomes) under both laws. A deduction of 
actual expenses (under suggestions made in 2.2.2.2) would not allow taxpayers to 
deduct expenses exceeding the real costs of earning nor distort incentives in resource 
allocation (as discussed in 3.3). This would promote horizontal and vertical equity, 
generate a greater amount of tax revenue, and reduce deadweight loss. 
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Thirdly, the enforcement of account and record keeping should be improved 
at the time of introducing a deduction of actual expenses in Thailand. This proposal 
would prevent tax evasion by overstatement of expense deductions, production of 
false evidence of expenses, and bribery of tax-gatherers. 
4.3.2 Proposed tax expenditures 
As exempt income and itemized deductions adversely affect equity and efficiency, 
they should be modified. Three proposals are made, namely:-
( a) the discontinuation of new tax expenditures that cannot be justified on the 
grounds of expediency (under both laws). 
(b) the abolition of certain tax expenditures (under both laws), and 
(c) the maintenance of certain tax expenditures (under both laws). 
As regards (a), the exception of certain fringe benefits, for example, can be 
justified on grounds of expediency because they are difficult to measure or 
administer. Therefore, income that is not difficult to measure and administer should 
not be exempt from the PIT. 
As regard (b), tax expenditures that should be abolished in order to promote 
equity and efficiency simultaneously include the following: 
(a) the deduction of life insurance premiums and the exemption of income 
paid as life insurance premiums (under Thai law), 
(b) the exemption of capital gains (under Thai law), 
(c) the exemption of income paid for buying immovable property or paid as 
interest on loans to buy or invest in immovable property (under Thai law), 
(d) the deduction of mortgage interest payment (under Thai law), 
(e) the exemptions of any form of return on financial products or savings 
(under both laws), 
(f) the exemption of prizes and winnings (under both laws), 
(g) the exemptions of inheritance and proceeds from the sale of movable and 
certain kinds of immovable property acquired by inheritance (under Thai 
law), 
(h) the exemption of the transfer of immovable property to the taxpayer's 
lawful child (under Thai law), 
212 
(i) the exemption of income from certain business activities (under Thai 
law), 
G) the exemption of certain foreigners' income working in Thailand (under 
Thai law), 
(k) the exemption of fringe benefits which cannot be justified on grounds of 
expediency (under both laws), 
(I) the deduction of contributions paid to personal pension funds (under both 
laws), 
(m)the deduction of social security contributions (under Thai law), 
Tax expenditures under (a)-(e) should be abolished because they benefit the 
rich more than the poor (as discussed in 2.2.3)842, provide incentives for tax 
avoidance and evasion (as discussed in 2.2.3, 3.2.2), distort resource allocation (as 
discussed in 3.3), and lead to revenue loss (as discussed in 3.1). Meanwhile, tax 
expenditures under (f)-(m) should also be abolished because they increase the 
taxpayer's ability to pay (as discussed in 2.2.3) and lead to revenue loss (as discussed 
in 3.1). Additionally, some of them are likely to provide incentives for tax avoidance 
and evasion, and to distort resource allocation (as discussed in 3.2.2 and 3.3). 
Therefore, the abolition of tax expenditures under (a)-(m) is likely to promote both 
equity and efficiency simultaneously. The following are six prospective outcomes in 
terms of equity and efficiency from the abolition of these tax expenditures. 
Firstly, the proposed abolition could reduce horizontal inequity. Similarly, 
hmizontal equity can be achieved with "minimal use of exclusions and 
deductions."843 
Secondly, the proposed abolition would reduce both vertical inequity and 
erosion in tax progressivity. As World Bank staff point out, "vertical equity increases 
because tax expenditures that offer disproportionate levels of benefits to the rich are 
curtailed."844 Additionally, the IMF claims that "effective rate progressivity could be 
842 Another reason for abolishing tax expenditure under (b) is that it increases the taxpayer' s ability to 
pay, as discussed in 2.2.3. 
Other reasons for abolishing tax expenditure under (c) are that this tax expenditure increases the 
taxpayer's ability to pay and can be replaced by direct subsidy, as discussed in 2.2.3. 
Other reasons for abolishing tax expenditure under (d) are that it can be replaced by direct subsidy 
and is not equivalent to revenue costs, as discussed in 2.2.3. 
843 Brunori, op.cit.(note261 ), 196 . 
844 Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Shah, op.cit.(note777), p.xviii 
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improved by reducing exemptions and deductions."845 The proposed abolition 
promotes vertical equity and tax progressivity because it would make the rich not 
only pay more but pay a greater proportion of their income in tax. 
Thirdly, the proposed abolition would prevent tax avoidance and evasion. 
Sandford points out that "[the] more the exemptions, concessions, reliefs, etc 
accorded within a tax, the more opportunities for avoidance are created."846 The 
abolition of tax expenditures means plugging tax loopholes, thereby preventing 
opportunities for tax avoidance. The abolition of tax expenditures also prevents tax 
evasion by misrepresenting income and payments in order to exploit exempt income 
and itemized deductions. 847 Thirsk supports the view that "fewer tax incentives [and] 
the development of broader tax bases can help make tax evasion both less feasible 
and less desirable."848 
The prevention of tax avoidance and evasion would promote vertical equity 
because it would make the rich (who are believed to be more commonly tax avoiders 
and evaders than the poor) not only pay more but pay a greater proportion of their 
income in tax. In addition, it promotes economic efficiency of taxation. As the World 
Bank notes, the elimination of exemptions "can simplify administration by making it 
harder for taxpayers to evade their payment."849 Similarly, extra government 
resources would not be needed to prevent and detect tax avoidance and evasion. In 
addition, honest taxpayers would not need to comply with too many anti-avoidance 
rules. 
Fourthly, the proposed abolition means not only preventing tax avoidance 
and evasion but also broadening the tax base, which would increase tax revenue. 
Increased tax revenue would be further redistributed to the poorest through public 
expenditure or spent on improving or funding existing public services instead of 
borrowing money or introducing new forms of tax. 
Fifthly, the proposed abolition could simplify the PIT system, thereby 
lowering administrative and compliance costs. 
845 Tanzi and Zee, op.cit.(note l08), p.6 
846 Sandford, op.cit.(note58), p.l61 
847 Thirsk, op.cit.(note64), p.l7 
848 ibid.p.25 
849 The World Bank, op.cit.(note112), p.39 
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Sixthly, the proposed abolition could reduce distortions in resource allocation 
to tax-preferred activities, thereby lowering deadweight loss. 
As regards the maintenance of tax expenditures, tax expenditures that should 
be maintained are those proposed in 2.2.3, e.g. those which are equivalent of the 
costs of earning income, and those which are designed to benefit those with less 
taxable capacity. It may be argued that the maintenance of these tax expenditures 
adversely affects efficiency of taxation, by leading to revenue loss and deadweight 
loss. For example, the deduction of charitable donations and educational expenses for 
children distort resource reallocation to charitable and educational activities. 
Nevertheless, these tax expenditures should be maintained because reasons of equity 
outweigh these of inefficiency of taxation. The following are two prospective 
outcomes in terms of equity from the maintenance of these tax expenditures. 
Firstly, the proposed maintenance is unlikely seriously to undermine 
horizontal equity because it is mainly made not only to help people with less taxable 
capacity but also for other reasons, i.e. promoting fairness (a) among persons850, (b) 
in society85 1, and (c) in taxation. 852 Consequently, although people with equal income 
may pay different tax, this can be justifiable if they are in different positions. 
For example, as between two wage-earners with equal income, one who is 
married with three dependent children and receives tax relief for children's education 
will pay less tax than another who is single and childless (under Thai law). And 
between a pensioner and a wage-earner with equal income, the former receives a tax-
free pension income, while the latter pays tax. 
Secondly, the proposed maintenance could reduce the amount and proportion 
of income paid in tax of the poor. This would also promote vertical equity and tax 
progressivity. However, the rich might still benefit. This can be weakened on the 
grounds that the purpose of the proposed maintenance is not only to help the poor but 
for other reasons as mentioned above. It is therefore unavoidable that the rich might 
receive the benefit of tax expenditures such as the proposal for the removal of a 
85° For example, an individual whose tax capacity is reduced or disrupted by certain causes should not 
ray tax on income that offsets such reduction. 
51 For example, tax exemptions that can be justified on social and moral grounds and on promotion of 
socially important activities should be maintained. 
852 For example, the tax system should not lead to double taxation. Certain exemptions can prevent 
double taxation. 
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ceiling for the deduction of charitable donations (under Thai law), as discussed in 
2.2.3. 
However, in order to prevent rich taxpayers from receiving benefits from the 
proposed maintenance of tax expenditures, this research proposes that a ceiling be 
imposed on certain tax expenditures and that tax deduction be phased out for the rich. 
For instance, a ceiling should be imposed for the exemption of pension income 
(under both laws), and there should be no educational allowance for the rich (under 
Thai law). As the World Bank claims "if tax bases are properly redesigned, vertical 
equity can be improved."853 
5. Conclusion 
It is argued that the CIT could achieve both equity and efficiency. 854 However, there 
is a disagreement referred to in Tiley that the CIT idea is "the single idea of equity'', 
which "could not accommodate ideas such as economic efficiency as part of its 
base."855 This research has found that if the income-tax base were defined and 
reformed in line with the CIT idea, it would become an optimal tax base to achieve 
both equity and efficiency. 
In theory, the CIT reqmres all types of item which amount to economic 
accretion to fall within the income-tax base. Therefore, if the terms of income subject 
to tax are defined broadly under the CIT idea, this will help broaden the income-tax 
base to achieve equity and efficiency. 
However, the definition of income under the CIT idea has not been fully put 
into practice in many countries because of certain practical problems. This research 
has found that Thailand has adopted the CIT idea into the PIT law to a great extent 
because Thai law bas given a definition of 'income subject to tax' in line with the 
CIT idea. However, this does not mean that the income-tax base under Thai law 
operates effectively to achieve equity and efficiency. This is due to many tax reliefs. 
Meanwhile, although there is no definition of income in UK law, this research has 
found that UK law has also adopted the CIT idea to a great extent. This is because 
UK law bas many provisions on chargeable income, and Section 687 (1) of the 
853 The World Bank, op.cit.(notell2), p.26 
854 Auerbach, op.cit.(note489), p.605; and Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.51 
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ITTOIA 2005 can catch more income subject to tax. Nevertheless, the extensive use 
of tax reliefs adversely affects the widening of the UK tax base. 
The use of tax reliefs under Thai and UK laws (i.e. structural reliefs and tax 
expenditures) prevents the income-tax base from becoming a broad-based tax or 
realizing the CIT idea. Although these tax reliefs help narrow the income-tax base 
and reduce taxable income for low-income earners, both cause horizontal and 
vertical inequity, the negation of tax progressivity, and inefficiency of taxation. This 
means that these tax reliefs cause conflict between equity and efficiency. Therefore, 
the income-tax base should be reformed to be consistent with the CIT idea and to 
become an optimal tax base. The proposed reform is to broaden the income-tax base 
by limiting the use of these tax reliefs. 
855 Tiley, op.cit.(note 141 ), p.1 3 
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Chapter Four 
Optimal Tax Unit for Treatment of Married Couples 
1. Introduction 
The OECD points out that "the tax unit may be the individual, the couple, or the 
family."856 The unit of income taxation under Thai Jaw is the couple ("joint 
taxation"). Meanwhile, the individual is the tax unit under UK Jaw ("individual 
taxation"). 
Most literature on the tax unit points out that the issue of the tax unit is 
complicated and controversial in tax policy. 857 The adoption of either joint or 
individual taxation raises anomalies in tax law and conflicting considerations in the 
PIT system.858 The proper tax treatment of married couples, it has sometimes been 
proposed, should use the tax unit which provides compromises between equity and 
efficiency859 or incorporates the best elements of both joint and individual 
taxation.860 These proposals will be examined to see whether they can reduce the 
conflict between equity and efficiency. 
2. Concepts of joint and individual taxation 
2.1 Relevant taxing provisions 
The main provision on the tax unit under Thai law is Section 57 ter of the RCT, i.e. 
the wife's income is treated as the husband 's for income tax purposes if they have 
lived together throughout the tax year; and the husband has the duty and liability to 
file a return and pay tax. Thai law therefore treats the husband and wife as one tax 
entity861 and adopts the basic structure of joint taxation. 
856 OECD, op.cit.(note70), p.41 
857 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.366; Tiley, op.cit.(notel41), p.151 ; and Janet Stotsky, "The 
Choice of Taxable Unit", Tax Policy Handbook, Parthasarathi Shome, ed. (Washington, D.C: IMF, 
1995),129. 
sss IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.377; and Simon James, "The Reform of Personal Taxation: A Review 
Article", Accounting and Business Research, Volume 17, Number 66, Spring 1987, 119 
ss9 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.378 
860 C N Morris and N A Warren, "Taxation of the Family", Fiscal Studies, Volume 2, Number 1, 
March 1981 , 28. 
861 Ministry of Finance, op.cit.(note642), p.1 
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The previous unit of taxation of spouses in the UK was the couple. Tbis is 
folmd in Section 37 of theTA 1970 and Section 279 ofthe TA 1988. The present tax 
unit in the UK is the individual. Tbis results from Section 32 of the Finance Act 
1988, in which it is stated: 
"Section 279 of the Taxes Act 1988 (which treats the income of a woman 
living with her husband as his income for income tax purposes) shall not have 
effect for the year 1990-91 or any subsequent year of assessment." 
As a result of Section 32 of the Finance Act 1988, the system of individual 
taxation (which is also known as "independent taxation") has been in effect since 6 
April 1990. Under this system, "a husband and wife will be taxed independently on 
income of all kinds. "862 A husband and wife are each responsible for dealing with the 
Revenue on their own tax affairs. Each spouse is entitled to his/her own personal tax 
allowance to set against his/her own income regardless of its sources. 
2.2 Rationale for joint and individual taxation 
Arguments for joint taxation 
Family values 
The fami ly is deemed to be the basic social unit and the basic economic unit 
m society.863 A husband and wife earn and pool their income. Afterwards their 
spending is done from their common budget.864 Likewise, spouses share the material 
benefits and standard of living from their income865, and they have joint consumption 
within the family. 866 Income earned by both spouses is then regarded as that of the 
family. Thus, the family/couple should be taken as the unit of taxation for married 
couples. 
862 The Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Rt Hon Nigel Lawson MP, Budget Speech, 15 March 1988 
863 Tiley, op.cit.(note 141 ), p.153; 
The 1966 Carter Commission in Canada quoted in Messere (Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.255); and 
The 1966 Report of the Royal Commission quoted in Rosen (Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.365) 
864 OECD, The Treatment of Family Units in OECD Member Countries under Tax and Transfer 
Systems, (Paris: OECD, 1977), para.56 
865 Tiley, op.cit.(notel41), p.l54; and Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), pp.28-29 
866 Janet G. Stotsky, How Tax Systems Treat Men and Women Different!~, 
www. worldbank.org/fandd/english/0397/articles/070397. htm, 6. 
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Dependency 
The second argument is based on the idea of dependency of a married woman 
upon her husband.867 Married men are the key earners outside the home and take 
responsibi lity for their wives' welfare.868 Meanwhile, most married women stay at 
home looking after the children: few wives go out to work.869 The wife is regarded as 
the second earner of the household.870 Therefore, the husband should be responsible 
for the tax affairs ofboth.871 
Tax revenue 
Joint taxation ts believed to help ratse more tax revenue because the 
aggregated income is raised to a higher tax band and wi ll increase tax revenue. 
Fair tax burden 
It is argued that joint taxation can produce an equitable distribution of tax 
burdens among households. 872 Many agree and call fo r the same tax treatment of 
married couples with the same joint incomes.873 Joint taxation can work to succeed in 
this requirement. More discussion will be supplied on this point later. 
A couple as one person 
This argument favours the adoption of joint taxation in Thai law. Joint 
taxation corresponds with the provision of the Civil and Commercial Code of 
Thailand ("the CCCT") relating to the legal status of a husband and wife. Under the 
CCCT, a husband and wife are regarded as one person.874 
867 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.377 
868 ibid.p.377 
869 ibid.p.377 
870 Tiley, op.cit.(note141), p.l55 
871 This argument can be refuted on the grounds that married women go out to work in the same way 
as married men in the current economic and social climate of many countries. 
872 J.A. Kay and C. Sandler, "The Taxation of Husband and Wife: A View of the Debate in the Green 
Paper", Fiscal Studies. Volume 3, Number 3, November 1982, 174. 
873 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.378; Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.363; and Morris and Warren, op.cit 
(note860), p.41 
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Arguments for individual taxation 
Gender equality 
There is an increasing number of married women m paid employment or 
otherwise economically active. 875 Married women require to achieve the same 
equality in the tax system as in other matters. It has been argued that individual 
taxation "has particular value in recognising gender equality [and] ensures that the 
tax system treats women in the same way as men."876 
Privacy and independence 
Under individual taxation, wives have privacy and independence in dealing 
with their tax affairs because they can look after their tax affairs. Young supports this 
view that "from a feminist perspective, the recognition of the autonomy of women is 
the strongest argument in favour of the individual as the unit oftaxation."877 
Tax neutrality 
Rosen points out that "the tax system should be marriage neutral."878 A tax is 
marriage neutral if the tax burdens of two single taxpayers do not change after 
marriage. 879 
A tax that is not neutral may distort taxpayers' decisions on marriage and 
possibly deter marriage.880 The Meade Report also agrees, " the decision to marry or 
not to marry should not be affected by tax considerations."881 As noted earlier, under 
joint taxation, married couples pay more tax than they did as two single 
adults882because combined incomes are raised to higher tax bands. Thus, joint 
taxation is not marriage neutral, and it is considered a tax penalty on marriage.883 
874 Viroj Laohapun, Income Tax Avoidance and Evasion in Thailand (Bangkok: National Defence 
College, 1980), 194. 
875 Ruth Lister, ''Taxation, Women and the Family", Taxation and Social Policy, Cedric Sandford, 
Chris Pond and Robert Walke, eds. (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), 138; and Peter 
Curwen, "Spending, Taxing and Borrowing", Understanding the UK Economy, 3rd ed., Peter Curwen, 
ed. (Hampshire: The Macmillen Press, 1994), 161. 
876 The Commission on Taxation and Citizenship, op.cit.(note22), p.l 06 
877 Claire Young, ' 'Taxing Times for Women: Feminism confronts Tax Policy", Tax Conversation: A 
Guide to the Key Issues in the Tax Reform Debate, Richard Krever, ed. (London: Kluwer Law 
lntemational, 1997), 264. 
878 Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.363 
879 Stotsky, op.cit.(note857), p.l25 
880 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p. 367 
881 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.378 
882 Lawson, op.cit.(note862); and Sandford, op.cit.(notel95), p.56 
883 Lawson, op.cit.(note862); and the Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.367 
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Individual taxation IS advocated as a possible means of removing such a tax 
penalty.884 It is marriage neutral as it no longer refers to the combined income of 
spouses. 
Incentive to work 
Individual taxation is likely to provide wives with an incentive to earn outside 
the home because the wife's income will not be taxed at her husband's MTR since 
there is no aggregation ofboth spouses' income. 
3. Effects of joint and individual taxation on equity 
The choice of tax unit for the treatment of married couples should respond to the 
requirements of both horizontal and vertical equity. 
According to Young, 
"The issue of what is the appropriate unit for income tax purposes has 
generated a significant body of literature. Much of this debate has focused on 
criteria such as horizontal and vertical equity .... to the question of what the 
appropriate unit should be.885 
Many agree that the taxation of married couples concerns horizontal equity, 
i.e. married couples with equal incomes to be taxed equally.886 However, it is also 
related to vertical equity, i.e. married couples with different taxable capacity should 
pay different tax. Furthermore, it is argued that an income tax system should be fair 
between different groups.887 Similarly, single and married persons with equal 
incomes should receive equal tax treatment.888 Messere proposes that, "governments 
have to decide what should be the relationship between the taxes paid by single and 
married taxpayers with the same level of pre-tax income."889 
Thus, (a) a comparison of the taxable capacity of the same and different 
groups of taxpayers and (b) a comparison of the tax treatment of low- and high-
884 Financial Statement: The Budget Tax Proposals, Simon's Tax Intelligence (London: Butterworths, 
1988), 151. . 
885 Young, op.cit.(note877), p.263 
886 For example, Young, op.cit.(note877), p.378; Gale, op.cit.(note718), p.351; Rosen, 
op.cit.(note250), p.363; Tiley, op.cit.(notel41 ), p.l53; James, op.cit.{note858), p.l19; the Mus graves, 
ogcit.(note5), p.366; and Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), p.41 
8 Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), p.41 
888 Sandford, op.cit.(note 195), p.55 
889 Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.252 
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income married couples are required to consider to what extent joint and individual 
taxation achieve equity. 
3.1 Tax treatment of couples and singles 
A comparison of taxable capacity will be made between the fo llowing groups of 
taxpayers: -
(i) two-earner vs. two-earner married couples, 
(ii) one-earner vs. two-earner married couples, 
(iii) one-earner vs. one-earner married couples, 
(iv) two single persons living separately vs. a two-earner married couple, 
(v) two single persons living separately vs. a one-earner married couple, 
(vi) an unmarried couple vs. a married couple, 
(vii) an unmarried couple vs. two single persons living separately, 
(viii) a single person vs. a one-earner married couple, and 
(ix) a single person vs. a two-earner married couple. 
Taxpayers that are brought into each comparison will have equal taxable 
incomes, but their taxable capacity may be the same or different. They may therefore 
pay the same or different tax. To achieve equity, the premises are (a) those with 
greater taxable capacity should be taxed more than those with less, and (b) those with 
equal taxable capacity should be taxed equally. 
3.1.1 Comparison between two-earner mar ried couples 
Two married couples with both spouses working and with equal incomes (regardless 
of how much income is earned by each spouse) are regarded as having the same 
taxable capacity. Tllis is because both couples have two partners to earn and to spend 
money, the same real income, and approximately the same costs of living. Married 
couples with the same income should be taxed equally.890 
Joint taxation under Thai law achieves equity because it imposes equal taxes 
on two-earner married couples with equal incomes. Spencer also asserts, "a system 
that imposes the same tax burden on couples with the same joint income must be unit 
890 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.378; the Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.366, Rosen, op.cit.{note250), p.363; 
James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l61 ; and Stiglitz, op.cit.(note68), p.528 
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- (or househo ld-) based."891 Example 4.1 in Appendix l to Chapter Four helps 
clarify this point. 
Conversely, individual taxation under UK law violates equity because it does 
not impose equal taxes on two-earner married couples with equal incomes. Rosen 
agrees that " individual filing would lead to a violation of the [equity] principle: equal 
taxation of families with equal incomes."892 
Individual taxation produces different treatment of two-earner married 
couples, depending on the distribution of income between a couple.893 Under this 
system, a married couple where spouses earn income equally pays less tax than a 
married couple in which the spouses earn income unequally. Example 4.2 in 
Appendix I to Chapter Four helps clarify thi s point. 
3.1.2 Comparison between one-earner and two-earner married couples 
Morris and Warren raise the question, "Are couples where income is equally earned 
by both partners similar to, or fundamentally different from, couples where similar 
income levels are achieved by the income of one partner alone?"894 
The above question is related to the taxable capacity of one-earner and two-
earner married couples, where both couples have the same joint income. Between 
two groups of married taxpayers, which has the greater taxable capacity? To answer 
these questions, there are two arguments to be taken into account. 
Firstly, if one-earner and two-earner married couples have equal incomes, 
they can be regarded as having the same taxable capacity. Many agree that married 
couples with the same joint income should be taxed equally.895 In comparing the 
taxable capacity of married couples, they concentrate on the aggregation of income 
received by married couples. According to the Musgraves, 
"The requirement is that equals should be treated equally. It need only be 
noted that it is a matter of indifference, for gauging ability to pay in the 
891 N.S. Spencer, "Taxation of Husband and Wife: Lessons from Europe", Fiscal Studies, Volume 7, 
Number 3, August 1986, 84. 
892 Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.366 
893 Stotsky, op.cit.(note857), p.l25 
894 Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), p.29 
895 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.378; the Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.366; Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.363; 
James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l6 1; and Stiglitz, op.cit.(note68), p.528 
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family-unit context, whether the given income is contributed by a single 
earner or by multiple earners. "896 
Secondly, it can be argued that one-earner and two-earner married couples 
have different taxable capacity, even though both couples have the same total 
income. This is because imputed income from housework by the non-earning 
member of a one-earner married couple and extra costs incurred by a two-earner 
married couple are taken into consideration. 
For a couple with one spouse working outside the home, the other who stays 
at home can do housework, look after the children and enjoy leisure. Meanwhile, a 
couple with both spouses earning outside the home may employ someone to care for 
their children (if any) and to provide housekeeping services. If they provide 
household services themselves, they may lose some of their leisure time.897 The 
value of childcare and housework done by the nonworking spouse who stays at home 
enhances the taxable capacity of a one-earner couple. This value is referred to as 
"imputed income"898, "earned income in kind"899, or "non-pecuniary income"900 
which should be considered as an accretion to taxable capacity.901 An optimal 
economic approach also suggests that imputed income should be taken into account 
in designing the tax unit.902 Meanwhile, extra costs such as childcare and housework 
costs or the forgone leisure time (where housework is done by the couple) lower the 
taxable capacity of a two-earner couple. Therefore, with equal incomes, a one-earner 
couple has a greater taxable capacity and should pay more tax than a two-earner 
couple. 
l agree with the second argument. However, in certain circumstances, one-
earner and two-earner married couples with equal incomes may not have different 
taxable capacity. As discussed above, some argue that the nonworking spouse can 
earn imputed income from the self-done housework and caring for children. 
However, such imputed income may not occur in the following circumstances. 
896 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.366 
897 Young, op.cit.(note877), pp.267-268 
898 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.370 
899 Yow1g, op.cit.(note877), pp.267-268 
900 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l61 
901 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.370 
902 Tiley, op.cit.(note 141 ), p.l55 
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(a) The nonworking spouse decides to stay at home because he/she is old or 
unhealthy and unable to do housework or care for children by 
himself/herself. 
(b) Messere points out, "at high income levels, financial considerations may 
be secondary to the desire on the part of the wife to pursue a career."903 
On this basis, the wife of a wealthy man may stay at home; but with a lot 
of money to spend, she can afford to purchase household services or 
chi ldcare expenses ifthere are children. 
In the above circumstances, one-earner and two-earner couples with equal 
incomes have the same taxable capacity because both couples may require to pay for 
the same household services and the same childcare. 
Where one-earner and two-earner couples with equal incomes are viewed to 
have the same taxable capacity, joint taxation can impose equal taxes on both 
couples. Thus, it does not violate equity. Example 4.3 in Appendix II to Chapter 
Four helps clarify this point. Conversely, individual taxation does not impose equal 
taxes on one-earner and two-earner couples with equal incomes. A one-earner couple 
pays more tax than a two-earner couple904because a progressive income tax will fall 
more heavily upon a couple with one earner than upon a couple in which each spouse 
earns income equally.905 Thus, individual taxation violates equity. Example 4.4 in 
Appendix II to Chapter Four helps clarify this point. 
In the case of the implied imputed income, one-earner and two-earner 
married couples with equal incomes are viewed to have different taxable capacity. In 
this case, individual taxation imposes unequal taxes on both couples, which does not 
violate equity. Conversely, joint taxation imposes equal taxes on both couples, which 
vio lates equity. Example 4.3 and Example 4.4 in Appendix II to Chapter Four help 
clarify this point. 
903 Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.253 
904 Dalton, op.cit.(note30), p.96 
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3.1.3 Comparison between one-earner married couples 
Many agree that married couples with equal incomes should be taxed equally.906 
One-earner married couples with equal incomes should therefore pay equal taxes. 
It has been found that two married couples with one spouse working and with 
equal incomes have the same taxable capacity. This is because in both couples, they 
have the same real income and imputed income, and approximately the same costs of 
living. 
Both joint and individual taxation can achieve equal taxation of one-earner 
couples. Therefore, there is no violation of equity. Example 4.5 and Example 4.6 in 
Appendix III to Chapter Four help clarify this point. 
3.1.4 Comparison between two single persons living separately and a two-earner 
married couple 
On the same income, a two-earner married couple can have more real incorne907 or 
live more cheaply than two single persons living separately.908 Similarly, the costs of 
two people living together "are much lower than twice the costs of two individuals 
living singly"909 This is because a married couple shares accommodation and 
housekeeping services.910 The share of household expenses or services generates "the 
economics of scale of joint living"911 , "economic benefits"912, or "a higher standard 
ofliving"913 to a married couple. 
Thus, if two individual taxpayers have the same income before and after 
marriage, they will find that they have a greater taxable capacity and are subject to a 
higher tax after marriage. 
Joint taxation can impose a higher tax on a married couple than if they were 
single adults living separately. Conversely, individual taxation imposes the same tax 
burden on two people whether as a married couple or as two single adults. Thus, Thai 
90S ibid.p.96 
906 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.378; the Musgraves, op.cit.(noteS), p.366; Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.363; 
James and Nobes, op.cit.(noteS), p.l6l ; and Stiglitz, op.cit.(note68), p.S28 
907 The Musgraves, op.cit.(noteS), p.367 
908 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.378; and James and Nobes, op.cit.(noteS), p.161 
909 Stiglitz, op.cit.(note68), p.S28 
910 Lister, op.cit.(note875), p.139; and Tiley, op.cit.(note 141), p.lSS 
911 The Musgraves, op.cit.(noteS), p.367 
912 James and Nobes, op.cit.(noteS), p.161 
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law is more likely to achieve equity than UK law. Similarly, James notes, "individual 
basis does not allow for the likelihood that a person 's taxable capacity partly depends 
on his or her family arrangements."914 Example 4.7 and Example 4.8 in Appendix 
IV to Chapter Four help clarify this point. 
3.1.5 Comparison between two single persons living separately and a one-earner 
married couple 
Where a married couple with one spouse earning outside and two single persons 
living separately have equal incomes, the f01mer is likely to have a greater taxable 
capacity than the latter. If two people live together, their costs of living are lower 
than the combined costs of two people living separately.915 Two people living 
together do not require two houses, two gardens etc. in the same way as two people 
living separately. 
Furthermore, two people living separately have to go out to work and may 
not have enough time to do housework. Therefore, they may have to purchase 
household services (or, if they do housework themselves, they may lose some of their 
leisure time). Meanwhile, a married couple with one spouse staying at home may 
earn imputed income from housework. As James and Nobes note, "marriage will 
normally generate non-pecuniary income; a bachelor employs housekeeping and 
similar services."916 Also, imputed or non-pecuniary income is non-taxable since it is 
"immeasurable."917 Thus, imputed income increases the taxable capacity of a one-
earner married couple. James and Nobes propose that "marriage [with non-pecuniary 
income] confers a greater taxable capacity, which on equity grounds, should be 
taxed."918 
A one-earner married couple should therefore be taxed more than two single 
persons living separately, with equal incomes. Both joint and individual taxation can 
impose a heavier tax burden on the former than the latter.919 Therefore, both achieve 
913 Tiley, op.cit.(note l41), p.l55 
91 4 James, op.cit.(note858), p.ll9 
915 Stiglitz, op.cit.(note68), p.528 
916 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l62 
917 Tiley, op.cit.(note 141 ), p.l55 
918 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l62 
919 However, with equal incomes, a one-earner married couple may be viewed to have a slightly 
greater taxable capacity than two persons living separately. This is because a non-earning spouse of 
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equity. Example 4.9 and Example 4.10 in Appendix V to Chapter Four help clarify 
this point. 
The point to be further analyzed is the marriage penalty and marriage 
neutrality of joint taxation. As noted earlier, joint taxation is considered to impose a 
tax penalty on marriage and to be non-neutral with respect to marriage.920 This is not 
correct in all respects. An increase in the tax burdens of two people takes place only 
in the case where, before marriage, two people live singly and earn outside income, 
and after marriage, the combined income of two people is lifted to a higher tax band. 
On the other hand, joint taxation does not increase the tax burdens of two people who 
are marri ed to each other if, before marriage, one lives singly and earns outside 
income, while the other is dependent and does not earn. This means that joint 
taxation is marriage neutral and not a tax penalty in certain situations. This is 
illustrated in Example 4.11 in Appendix V to Chapter Four. 
3.1.6 Comparison between an unmarried, cohabiting couple and a married 
couple 
An unmarried couple with two partners working and a married couple with both 
spouses working, with equal incomes, have equal taxable capacity. Like a married 
couple, two people who cohabit can live more cheaply than two people who live 
separately.92 1 An unmarried, cohabiting couple should then pay more tax than if they 
live singly.922 Likewise, an unmarried couple should receive the same tax treatment 
as a married couple. 
However, under joint taxation, an unmarried couple pays less tax than a 
married couple. Conversely, an unmarried couple pays the same tax as a married 
couple under individual taxation. Thus, individual taxation achieves equity, but joint 
taxation violates it. As Stotsky asserts, "tax systems that are based on joint taxation 
create inequalities in taxation between married and unmarried couples .... with the 
the former may be old or unhealthy to do housework. Consequently, the former and the latter require 
to purchase the same household services. In this case, a one-earner married couple should have a 
slightly heavier tax burden imposed than two persons living separately. Nevertheless, under joint and 
individual taxation, a one-earner married couple may not have imposed a slightly heavier tax burden 
imposed than two persons living separately. 
920 This is because the tax burdens of two people increase after marriage. 
921 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.377 
922 Stiglitz, op.cit.(note68), p.528 
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same income."923 Example 4.12 and Example 4.13 m Appendix VI to Chapter 
Four help clarify this point. 
3.1.7 Comparison between an unmarried couple and two single persons living 
separately 
With equal incomes, two individuals working and cohabiting have a greater taxable 
capacity than two individuals working and living separately. Like a married couple, a 
cohabiting couple can live more cheaply than two persons Jiving separately. This is 
because they share accommodation, household services and expenses, thereby 
reducing their cost of living.924 A cohabiting couple should therefore be taxed more 
than two single persons living separately.925 
Neither joint nor individual taxation systems can differentiate between the 
taxation of an unmarried couple and that of two persons living separately. Both 
groups oftaxpayers, with the same joint income (but different taxable capacity), have 
the same taxes imposed under both systems. Therefore, both systems violate equity. 
According to Stotsky, "tax systems that are based on joint taxation create inequalities 
in taxation between .... unmarried couples and individuals with the same income."926 
Example 4.14 and Example 4.15 in Appendix VII to Chapter Four help clarify this 
point. 
3.1.8 Comparison between a single person and a one-earner married couple 
With equal incomes, a single person has a greater taxable capacity than a one-earner 
married couple. Income earned by the former supports only one person, but income 
earned by the latter supports at least two persons. Therefore, the latter has a lower 
taxable capacity than the former. As James and Nobes assert, "if the wife (or 
husband) does not have paid employment, the remaining breadwinner has a 
dependent and therefore a lower taxable capacity."927 
923 Stotsky, op.cit.(note857), p.I29 
924 Stiglitz, op.cit.(note68), p.528; IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.377; and Lister, op.cit.(note875), p.l39 
925 Stiglitz, op.cit.(note68), p.528; and Sandford, op.cit.(notel95), p.55 
926 Stotsky, op.cit.(note857), p.l29 
927 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l61 
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Similarly, a single person has lower costs of living than a manied couple 
because a single person need not purchase as many goods and services as two people. 
The Musgraves give an example to support this as fo llows: 
"While certain consumption items (e.g. the light in the living room) serve two 
persons as well as one, others (e.g. chairs to sit on) are more costly for 
two."92s 
Even if a single person should pay more tax than a married couple, neither 
joint nor individual taxation systems satisfies this requirement. A single person pays 
the same tax as a married couple. Therefore, both systems violate equity. Example 
4.16 and Example 4.17 in Appendix VIII to C hapter Four help clarify this point. 
3.1.9 Comparison between a single person and a two-earner married couple 
With equal incomes, a single person has a greater taxable capacity than a two-eamer 
married couple because a single person has lower costs of living than a married 
couple. Therefore, a single person should pay more tax than a two-earner married 
couple. As the Musgraves assert, "among units with the same income, the unit with 
the smaller number should pay more."929 
However, joint taxation imposes the same tax burden on a single person and a 
married couple. Conversely, individual taxation imposes a higher tax on a single 
person than a married couple. Accordingly, joint taxation violates equity, but 
individual taxation achieves it. Example 4.18 and Example 4.19 in Appendix IX to 
Chapter Four help clarify this point. 
A summary of the taxable capacity of the same and different groups of 
taxpayers, and the operation of joint and individual taxation to achieve equity can be 
found in Appendix X to Chapter Four. 
3.2 Tax t reatment of low- and high-income married couples 
The tax unit should impose a lower tax on worse-off married couples and a higher 
tax on better-off married couples in order to boost vertical equity/redistribution. 
928 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.366 
929 ibid.p.366 
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3.2.1 Joint taxation helpful to redistribution 
Under joint taxation, married couples pay more tax than they would as single adults. 
For this reason, many agree that joint taxation imposes tax penalties on marriage.930 
Kay and King note, "aggregation of joint incomes involves a tax penalty [;] 
[the] underlying concept is self-evidently anachronistic."931 Additionally, 
according to Mr. Justice Asprey as referred to in Tiley, 
"Is it that it is considered more equitable that two persons, because they are 
married to each other, should each be more heavily taxed than if they were 
unmarried persons?"932 
Gaow-kiow, the Thai academician, also criticizes the possibility that joint 
taxation discourages two people from getting married933 because a married couple 
incurs greater expenses and responsibilities than two single persons, yet a married 
couple has to pay a heavier tax.934 
Nevertheless, on equity and redistributive grounds, I would argue in favour of 
joint taxation in relation to certain aspects of the tax penalty. Although joint taxation 
imposes heavier tax burdens on married couples, this is not an absolute tax penalty. 
As analyzed in 3.2.4 and 3.2.5, a married couple has a greater taxable capacity and 
should therefore pay more tax than if they were single adults living separately. This 
analysis refutes Gaow-kiow's argument. 
Furthermore, heavier tax burdens on high-income married couples can 
reinforce vertical equity/redistribution. Conversely, heavier tax burdens on low-
income married couples undermine vertical equity/redistribution. Therefore, if joint 
taxation can impose a lower tax burden on low-income married couples, it will work 
perfectly to achieve vertical equity/redistribution. 
In 1970, the IMF made a survey of Thailand's tax structure. Its report said 
that the use of the combined incomes of both spouses under joint taxation had 
imposed heavier tax burdens on married couples, not only wealthy couples but also 
930 Lawson, op.cit.(note862); the Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.367; Stiglitz, op.cit.(note68), p.527; 
James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l62; Sandford, op.cit.(notel95), p.56; Hockley, op.cit.(note315), 
f:.l80; and Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), p.43 
31 Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), p.43 
932 Tiley, op.cit.(note l41), p.I52 
933 Perrnboon Gaow-kiow, "Paying income tax in the case where the income of a wife is treated as that 
of a husband", Dharrnniti Tax Journal, Year No.15, Issue No. 176, May 1996, 94. 
934 ibid.p.94 
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poorer ones.935 As discussed in Chapter Two, Thailand has now reduced tax rates and 
the number of tax bands as well as widening tax bands. Consequently, tax penalties 
on low-income married couples in Thailand have been reduced. In other words, the 
combined incomes of low-income married couples will be slightly raised to a higher 
tax band, and the combined incomes of (lower) middle-income married couples will 
not be raised to a higher tax band. This results from changes in the progressive rate 
structure. Consequently, the tax liabilities of low-income and (lower) middle-income 
married couples do not increase too much after marriage. Example 4.20 in Appendix 
XI to Chapter Four wi ll c larify this point. 
In addition, if the tax-rate schedule for low-income groups (which contains 
only two tax rates of 0% and 8%) in the proposed two tax-rate schedules (as 
discussed in Chapter Two) were put into practice, tax penalties on low-income and 
(lower) middle-income married couples in Thailand would be further reduced. In 
other words, the tax liabilities of low-income and (lower) middle-income married 
couples would increase slightly after marriage. Example 4.20 in Appendix XI to 
Chapter Four will clarify this point. 
However, changes in the progressive rate structure under the present Thai 
tax-rate schedule also benefit (upper) middle-income and high-income married 
couples, but do not benefit the highest-income married couples. This is because the 
tax liabilities of (upper) middle-income and high-income married couples do not 
increase too much after marriage, but the tax liabil ities of the highest-income married 
couples increase too much after marriage, as compared to the past. Example 4.21 in 
Appendix XI to Chapter Four will clarify this point. However, although the tax 
liabilities of (upper) middle-income and high-income married couples do not 
increase too much after marriage under the present Thai tax-rate schedule, they still 
pay more tax than if they would as single persons. This means that heavier tax 
burdens on (upper) middle-income and high-income marriage couples after marriage 
under the present Thai tax-rate schedule still promote vertical equity/redistribution. 
In addition, if the tax-rate schedule for high-income groups (which contains 
only two tax rates of 8% and 15%) in the proposed two tax-rate schedules (as 
discussed in Chapter Two) were put into practice, (upper) middle-income, high-
935 Lent and Hirao, op.cit.(note 185), p.45 
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income and highest-income married couples would pay higher tax (after marriage) 
than if they would as single persons. It has also been found that after marriage, the 
tax liabilities of (upper) middle-income married couple would increase too much 
under the proposed two tax-rate schedules, as compared to their tax liabilities (after 
marriage) under the present Thai tax-rate schedule. But, after marriage, the tax 
liabilities of high-income and highest-income married couple would not increase too 
much under the proposed two tax-rate schedules, as compared to their tax liabilities 
(after marriage) under the present Thai tax-rate schedule. Nevertheless, (upper) 
middle-income, high-income and highest-income married couples would pay more 
tax w1der the proposed two tax-rate schedules than they pay under the present Thai 
tax-rate schedule. This would promote vertical equity/redistribution. Example 4.21 in 
Appendix XI to Cha pter Four will clarify this point. 
3.2.2 Individua l taxation unhelpful to redistribution 
As we have seen, under individual taxation, married couples pay the same tax as they 
would as single adults. Although the tax liabilities of worse-off couples do not 
increase after marriage, individual taxation does not help the progressive rate 
structure to achieve vertical equity/redistribution. 
Firstly, wealthy couples benefit from individual taxation because they do not 
pay more tax after marriage. Many agree with this factor.936 
Secondly, as the income of each spouse is taxed separately, wealthy couples 
may reduce their tax liabilities by inter-spousal transfer of investment income.937 
Thus, individual taxation tends to benefit wealthy couples rather than low-
income couples. The evidence, according to Messere, also indicates "generally 
separate taxation favours high income two-earner couples and penalises low income 
two-earner couples."938 
936 Sandford, op.cit.(notel95), p.l24; Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), p.44; Kay and Sandler, 
op.cit.(note872), p. l80; and Ken Messere, "An Overview", The Tax System in Industrialized 
Countries, Ken Messere, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 124. 
937 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l63; and Lister, op.cit.(note875), pp.l41-142 
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3.2.3 Comparison between joint and individual taxation for redistribution 
Joint taxation is more likely to help the progressive rate structure to reinforce vertical 
equity/redistribution than individual taxation in three ways. 
Firstly, heavier tax burdens are still imposed on high-income couples after 
marnage. 
Secondly, joint taxation does not encourage a reduction in tax liabil ity by the 
transfer of income-producing property between spouses. 
Finally, even though some low- and middle-income married couples still pay 
higher tax than they would as single people, in comparison with the past, tax burdens 
on such married couples have been lessened. The higher tax liabili ty of married 
couples after marriage is the remaining problem in progressive taxation.939 However, 
if this problem is looked at in terms of taxable capacity as discussed in 3.1.4, it does 
sti ll exist. This is because a married couple has a greater taxable capacity and should 
pay more tax than two single persons living separately. 
4. Effects of joint and individual taxation on efficiency 
4.1 Administrative and compliance costs 
The tax unit can reduce admjnistrative and compliance costs by using simple rules 
and discouraging tax avoidance and evasion. 
4.1.1 Simplicity and convenience 
It is argued that the tax treatment of married couples should be "reasonably simple 
for the taxpayer to understand and for the tax authorities to administer."
940 
This 
would reduce administrative and compliance costs. 
4.1.1.1 Simple rules for administration 
The rules of joint taxation under Thai law are simple for two reasons. 
Firstly, there are only two sections relating to the taxation of spouses. As 
referred to earlier, Section 57 ter of the RCT deals with (a) the general rule of joint 
938 Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.249 
939 Hockley, op.cit.(note315), p.l80 
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income of both spouses and (b) the rule of spouses' election for separate assessment. 
Additionally, Section 57 quinque of the RCT lays down the rule on the wife's 
election fo r separate taxation of employment income. 
Secondly, Thai law does not provide complicated rules to prevent tax 
avoidance by inter-spousal transfer. 
Meanwhile, the present UK law is simpler to administer than the law pre 
1990. This is due to there being a reduction in the tax provisions to be administered. 
The T A 1988 has two main rules for the taxation of spouses, which are: 
(a) Section 282 concerning the construction of references to a husband and 
wife living together, 
(b) Sections 282A and 282B concerningjointly held property, and 
Additionally, the ITTOIA 2005 has two main rules concerning settlements 
(Sections 620 and 624) and outright gifts between a husband and wife (Section 626). 
Morris and Warren note other aspects of simplification of individual taxation 
as follows: 
"The possibilities for simplification of the UK tax system which individual 
taxation would bring are quite extensive. Taxation of earned income under 
PAYE will then no longer need to keep track of the married status of each 
individual, or to make adjustments where the wife has paid too little, or too 
much tax."941 
4.1.1.2 Simple rules for compliance 
I agree with Morris and Warren when they write, "from the taxpayer's point of view, 
simple responsibility for his/her own tax will be easier to comprehend."942 The rule 
that treats each spouse like a single taxpayer wi II help each spouse to understand and 
comply because: 
(a) each spouse will comply with the law in the same way as he/she did 
before marriage; 
(b) neither spouse has to take responsibility for the other spouse's tax affairs. 
9~0 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.378 
941 Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), p.39 
942 ibid.p.40 
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Compared to the rule of individual taxation, joint taxation gives a husband 
responsibility for his wife's tax in addition to his own tax. Therefore, it may be 
slightly difficult for a married man to comply with the rules of joint taxation. 
Meanwhi le, the rules of joint taxation do not give a married woman much 
responsibility for dealing with her tax affairs.943 
4.1.1.3 Convenience for administration 
Joint taxation is convenient to administer because tax-gatherers deal with only one 
individual (i.e. a married man.)944 However, it may cause some inconvenience to tax-
gatherers who have to pay attention to each taxpayer's marital status. This is because 
if the husband fai ls to file a return and pay tax, tax-gatherers must send a notice to 
the wife to be jointly liable with the husband to settle the arrears.945 
Individual taxation is also convenient to administer because "the Inland 
Revenue would no longer need to keep track of each taxpayer' s marital status.''946 
However, it may be inconvenient for tax-gatherers to administer since they have to 
deal with at least two individuals in one family. 
4.1.1.4 Convenience for compliance 
As noted above, joint taxation requires one tax return from one couple. This makes it 
straightforward for a couple to comply with. Laohapun supports the view that the 
aggregation of a wife's income with her husband 's makes it convenient for taxpayers 
to file tax returns and pay taxes.947 However, joint taxation may cause inconvenience 
for two reasons. 
Firstly, wives are regarded as unable to declare their own income for tax.948 
Secondly, if a wife does not tell her husband the full details of her income, a 
husband cannot compel her to make a full disclosure.949 Consequently, the husband 
943 A wife only has a duty to give the details of her income to her husband for making a tax return. 
944 Hugh McCrossan, Revision Workbook: Revenue Law, 2"d ed. (London: Old Bailey Press, 2000), 
110. 
945 Section 57 ter, RCT 
946 James, op.cit.(note858), p.119 
947 Laohapun, op.cit.(note874), p.194 
948 Stotsky, op.cit.(note866), p.6 
949 This statement is summarized from George Bemard Shaw's letter to the tax-man in 1910. (Lister, 
op.cit.(note875), p.140) 
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may fail to declare his wife's income in full. Also, the husband may be unable to 
answer questions of tax-gatherers about his wife's income. The wife's failure to give 
fu ll detai ls of her income to the husband may lead to "a major marital upset".950 
Conversely, individual taxation gives wives as much privacy and 
independence in their tax affairs as their husbands. This may compensate for any 
inconvenience. 
4.1.2 Tax avoidance and evasion 
4.1.2.1 Joint taxation and avoidance schemes 
There are two possible forms oftax avoidance under joint taxation in ThaiJand. 
Firstly, if two single persons are not married to each other, they may avoid 
paying a heavier tax by avoiding marriage, choosing to live together without 
registration of marriage. 
Secondly, a married couple may avoid paying a heavier tax on their combined 
income by (a) getting a divorce at any time during the tax year and (b) not living 
together throughout the tax year. 
The second method of tax avoidance results from the loophole in Section 57 
ter. However, Mr. Justice Trachudham observes that Section 57 ter employs the 
words "a husband and wife live together throughout the tax year" instead of "a 
husband and wife's marital status exists throughout the tax year."951 As a result of 
this loophole, a husband and wife do not need to divorce to avoid paying a heavier 
tax on their joint income, but only have to live separately in a pem1anent manner 
throughout the tax year. If a husband and wife occasionally live in different localities 
or occasionally live apart, they are deemed to live together and are still taxed on their 
joint income.952 
I agree with Mr. Justice Trachudham that a married couple can avoid paying 
a heavier tax by living separately in a permanent manner throughout the tax year. 
This is because in interpreting the words used in the relevant tax provision, a strict 
interpretation is called for. But, if a husband and wife do not choose to live apart 
950 James, op.cit.(note858)), p.ll8 
951 Trachudham, op.cit.(note5 12), pp.l80-181 
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permanently, they still have alternative ways of avoiding tax by getting a divorce or 
living together without registration of marriage. 
Besides tax avoidance, a married couple may evade payment of tax. A 
husband may (a) report false or inadequate information of his own income and/or his 
wife's income in his tax return, or (b) fail to file the tax return of his own income 
and/or of his wife's income. 
4.1.2.2 Individual taxation and avoidance schemes 
Under individual taxation, a married couple where both spouses earn income equally 
pays less tax than a married couple where spouses earn income unequally or one 
spouse earns all the income. Consequently, the transfer of some income from one 
spouse to another in order to equalize taxable income between spouses can reduce 
spouses' tax liabilities. In this regard, income will be transferred from a spouse who 
is subject to higher MTRs to another who is subject to lower MTRs or no tax. 
Tax avoidance by inter-spousal transfer mostly occurs with investment 
income such as dividends, interest and rent. This point is well supported953 because 
"it is much more difficult to transfer earned income to another before tax is paid."954 
In fact, the transfer of investment income to reduce tax liability is the transfer 
between spouses of ownership of property such as shares, bank accounts, land and 
buildings. This property is referred to as "income-yielding property"955, "income-
producing investment"956, or "the associated income-earning assets."957 The 
ownership of such property is not difficult to transfer before tax is paid in practice. 
952 The last Paragraph, Section 57 ter, the RCf 
953 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.369; Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.365; Gale, op.cit.(note718), p.352; 
Hockley, op.cit.(note315), p.179; Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), pp.32-33; and Lister, 
o;.:-cit.(note875), pp.l41-l42 
9 4 Hockley, op.cit.(note315),p.l79 
955 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.384 
956 McCrossan, op.cit.(note944), p.lll 
957 Bill Robinson and Graham Stark, "The Tax Treatment of Marriage: What has the Chancellor 
Really Achieved?", Fiscal Studies, Volume 9, Number 2, May 1988, 52. 
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4.2 Deadweight loss 
The tax unit for the taxation of married couples has a disincentive effect by distorting 
married couples ' decisions on work, saving and investment. This will result in 
revenue loss, which is deadweight loss. 
4.2.1 Distortions in work decisions 
Joint taxation creates a disincentive for a wife to take paid employment because her 
income will be subject to tax at her husband's highest MTR as a result of the 
aggregation of spouses' income.958 Consequently, some wives may work less or 
substitute staying at home for earning outside the home.959 Slemrod and Bakija 
support this argwnent, stating that "nearly all [empirical research) found that female 
labor-force participation are responsive Lto changes in after-tax wages, and therefore 
to MTRs. )"960 
Distortion in wives' work decision possibly leads to revenue loss because if 
there are no earnings arising from paid employment, the government cannot impose 
income tax on wives. Furthermore, revenue loss can arise from there being no tax 
imposed on imputed income from housework done by wives who stay at home. 
According to the Office for National Statistics, "if housework was paid, it would be 
worth £700 bi llion to the UK economy."961 In Thailand, according to the survey by 
the National Statistical Office, married women spend on average at least 2.6 hours a 
day doing housework at present. 962 
Under individual taxation, the wife does not start paying tax at her husband's 
highest MTR. The MTR on the wife's income under individual taxation is therefore 
lower than that under joint taxation.963 Thus, many support the argument that 
individual taxation encourages married women to take paid employment.964 
958 Stotsky, op.cit.(note866), p.6; and Spenser, op.cit.(note891 ), p.84 
959 Stotsky, op.cit.(note857), p. l26; and Tiley, op.cit.(note 141), p.155 
960 Slemrod and Bakija, op.cit.(note63), p.l06 
961 BBC News "Housework worth 700 billion pounds", on Wednesday, 24 April, 2002, ~ 
bbc.co.uk. 
962 The National Statistical Office, Statistics Newsletter, 13th Year, Number 7, July 2002, 5. 
963 Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), p.28 
964 Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.255; Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), p.28; Tiley, 
op.cit.(note 141 ), p.153; and Spenser, op.cit.(note891 ), p.85 
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4.2.2 Distor tions in saving and investment 
Joint taxation may discourage a wife from saving and investing because the wife's 
investment income will be taxed at her husband's highest MTR as a result of the 
aggregation of spouses' income. The wife may therefore save and invest Jess or 
substitute spending her money now for saving or investing for the future. 
Joint taxation may also distort couples' decisions on saving and investment 
after marriage. Under joint taxation, a married couple pays more tax on their 
investment income than they would as single adults since the aggregation of spouses' 
investment income can be raised to higher MTRs. Kay and Sandler assert, 
"investment income can be aggregated . . .. married couples with such income are 
worse off than if they were just living together."965 When the investment income of 
married couples is taxed at a higher rate, some married couples may therefore save 
and invest less. Stotsky asserts, "evidence from both industrialized and developing 
countries suggests that changes in the [MTRs] ...... alter savings and investment 
behavior. "966 
Under individual taxation, the tax burdens on the investment income of 
married women or married couples do not increase after marriage because there is no 
aggregation of spouses' income. Therefore, individual taxation is neutral to married 
women's or couples' decisions on saving and investment after marriage. 
5. Conflict between equity and efficiency, and proposed solutions 
5.1 C onflict under joint taxation 
As analyzed in previous sections, joint taxation has both positive and negative 
impacts on equity and efficiency as summarized below. 
(1) Joint taxation achieves equity in the six cases below. It imposes: 
(i) equal taxation between two married couples with both spouses 
working and with equal incomes; 
965 Kay and Sandler, op.cit.{note872), p.l79 
966 Stotsky, op.cit.(note857), p. l26 
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(ii) equal taxes on a one-earner married couple and a two-earner married 
couple, with equal incomes, where there is no implication of imputed 
income from housework; 
(iii) equal taxes on two married couples with one spouse working and with 
equal incomes; 
(iv) a heavier tax burden on a two-earner married couple than two single 
persons living separately, with equal incomes; 
(v) a heavier tax burden on a one-earner married couple than two single 
persons living separately, with equal incomes; and 
(vi) it encourages the transfer of resources from the rich to the poor. 
(2) Joint taxation violates equity in the six cases below, in that it does not 
impose: 
(i) unequal taxes on a one-earner married couple and a two-earner 
married couple, with equal incomes, where there is imputed income 
from housework; 
(ii) a slightly heavier tax burden on a one-earner married couple than two 
persons living separately, with equal incomes, where the former 
cannot earn imputed income from housework; and 
(iii) equal taxes on an unmarried couple and a married couple, with equal 
incomes. 
It does not differentiate between: 
(iv) the taxation of an unmarried couple and that of two persons living 
separately, with equal incomes; 
(v) the taxation of a single person and that of a one-earner married 
couple, with equal incomes; and 
(vi) the taxation of a single person and that of a two-earner married 
couple, with equal incomes. 
(3) Joint taxation encourages efficiency by minimizing administrative 
and compliance costs in the four cases below. 
(i) Its rules are uncomplicated to administer. 
(ii) It does not place any responsibility on a married woman for dealing 
with her tax affairs. 
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(iii) It is convenient to administer in that tax-gatherers deal with only one 
partner of the married couple. 
(iv) It is simple to comply with because only one partner of the married 
couple is required to deal with tax-gatherers, and one tax return from 
one couple is required. 
(4) Joint taxation impedes efficiency by not minimizing administra tive 
and compliance costs in the three cases below. 
(i) It gives a married man responsibility for his wife's tax affairs 
additional to his own tax affairs. 
(ii) It is inconvenient to administer in that tax gatherers have to pay 
attention to each taxpayer's marital status. 
(iii) It is cumbersome to comply with, fo r example, by the lack of 
independence and privacy for married women in their tax affairs, or 
the husband 's fai lure to make a tax return because he does not receive 
full details of the wife's income. 
(5) Joint taxation leads to some forms of tax avoidance and evasion, which 
impedes efficiency and affects redistribution. 
(6) Joint taxation impedes efficiency by distorting married women's or 
married couples' decisions on work, saving and investment. 
From the above, joint taxation achieves equity as summarized m (1), but 
impedes efficiency as summarized in (4) and (6). Therefore, there is a conflict 
between equity and efficiency. Legal solutions to this conflict will be discussed in 
5.3.1. Furthermore, legal solutions to the violation of equity as summarized in (2) 
will be explored in 5.3.1.4. Moreover, legal solutions to prevent tax avoidance and 
evasion as summarized in (5) will be discussed in 5.4.2. 
5.2 Conflict under individual taxation 
As analyzed in previous sections, individual taxation has both positive and negative 
impacts on equity and efficiency as summarized below. 
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(1) Individual taxation achieves equity in the five cases below. It 
imposes: 
(i) unequal taxes on a one-earner married couple and a two-earner 
married couple, with equal incomes, where there is imputed income 
from housework; 
(ii) equal taxes on two married couples with one spouse working and with 
equal incomes; 
(iii) a heavier tax burden on a one-earner married couple than two persons 
living separately, with equal incomes; 
(iv) equal taxes on an unmarried couple and a married couple, with equal 
incomes; and 
(v) a heavier tax burden on a single person than a two-earner married 
couple, with equal incomes. 
(2) Individual taxation violates equity in the seven cases below. 
(i) It does not achieve: 
(a) equal taxation of two married couples with both spouses 
working and with equal incomes, where the distribution of 
income between couples is different, and 
(b) equal taxation of a one-earner married couple and a two-
earner married couple, with equal incomes, where there is 
no implication of imputed income from housework. 
(ii) It does not impose a heavier tax burden on a two-earner married 
couple than two persons living separately, with equal incomes. 
(iii) It may not impose a slightly heavier tax burden on a one-earner 
married couple than on two persons living separately, with equal 
incomes, where the former cannot earn imputed income from 
housework. 
(iv) It does not differentiate between the taxation of an unmarried couple 
and that of two persons living separately, with equal incomes. 
(v) It does not differentiate between the taxation of a single person and 
that of a one-earner married couple, with equal incomes. 
(vi) It is not helpful to the transfer of resources from the rich to the poor. 
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(3) Individual taxation encourages efficiency by minimizing 
administrative and compliance costs in the four cases below. 
(i) Its mles are simpler to administer now than rules pre 1990. 
(ii) It helps each spouse to understand easily and comply. 
(iii) It is convenient to administer, in that tax-gatherers need not keep track 
of each taxpayer's marital status. 
(iv) It is convenient to comply with because married women are given as 
much privacy and independence in their tax affairs as their husbands. 
(4) Individual taxation encourages efficiency because it is neutral to married 
women's or married couples' decisions to work, save and invest. 
(5) Individual taxation leads to tax avoidance by the transfer of investment 
income between spouses, which impedes efficiency and affects redistribution. 
From the above, individual taxation encourages efficiency as summarized in 
(3) and (4), but violates equity as summarized in (2). Therefore, there is a conflict 
between equity and efficiency. Legal solutions to this conflict wi ll be discussed in 
5.3.2. Furthermore, legal solutions to prevent tax avoidance and evasion as 
summarized in (5) wi ll be discussed in 5.4.1. 
5.3 Proposed solutions (optimal tax unit) 
Joint taxation achieves equity, leading to redistribution rather than bringing about 
efficiency. Conversely, individual taxation encourages efficiency rather than 
achieving equity and redistribution. To reduce the conflict, the assumption is that 
laws on the taxation of spouses should incorporate the basic concepts of both joint 
and individual taxation. However, the question arises as to how these concepts 
should be integrated. 
5.3.1 Solutions to the conflict under joint taxation 
Some concepts of individual taxation have been adapted to Thai law in addition to 
the joint approach, i.e. 
(a) Section 57 ter dealing with separate assessment; and 
(b) Section 57 quinque dealing with the wife's election for separate taxation 
of her employment income. 
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5.3.1.1 Rules of separate assessment 
Section 57 ter, Paragraph Two, provides that: 
"The husband or wife who wishes to file a separate return may do so by 
giving notice to that effect to the assessment officer within the time limit for 
filing returns; provided that such separate filing shall in no way affect the 
total amount of tax payable." 
Section 57 ter, Paragraph Three, provides that: 
"The assessment officer may at his discretion divide the tax in proportion to 
the respective amotmts of the assessment income obtained by the husband 
and wife and notify each of them to pay tax separately." 
The above provisions are similar to those under previous UK law. Before the 
introduction of individual taxation, Sections 283-286 of the TA 1988 dealt with 
separate assessment. The UK separate assessment was recognized to give a married 
couple independence and privacy in dealing with their tax affairs.967 However, it was 
criticized for being complicated and expensive to administer, and not widely 
adopted.968 This implies that separate assessment under previous UK law could not 
satisfy the efficiency requirement. 
In examining whether separate assessment under Thai law can reduce the 
conflict between equity and efficiency, there are two points to be considered: -
(1) whether joint taxation can still satisfy the equity requirement, and 
(2) whether separate assessment can lead to greater efficiency. 
Joint taxation can still achieve equity under separate assessment because 
separate assessment does not affect the total amount of tax payable by a married 
couple. However, Teeratayakeenun argues that a separate return under Section 57 ter 
will affect the total amount of tax that the couple must pay.969 In his view, a separate 
return can reduce the tax liability of a husband and wife because there is no 
combined income of spouses.970 In this regard, he construes Paragraph Two of 
Section 57 ter regardless ofParagraph Three.971 
967 McCrossan, op.cit.(note944), p.llO 
968 ibid.p.ll 0 
969 Teeratayakeenun, op.cit.(note476), p.ll9 
970 ibid.p.ll9 
971 In other words, he construes a separate retum under Paragraph Two as one resulting from the 
individual-taxation system. 
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In my opinion, a separate return under Section 57 ter is separate only in terms 
of separate assessment. It is not a separate return under individual taxation. In 
construing the rules of separate assessment, Paragraphs Two and Three must be read 
and construed together.972 When they are read and construed together, the following 
outcomes will apply. 
(a) A separate return under Paragraph Two can work only when the 
assessment officer approves and makes separate assessment under 
Paragraph Three. 
(b) In making separate assessment, the assessment officer will first calculate 
the married couple's tax bill in the same way as a joint return, namely 
(i) the incomes of both spouses are aggregated to calculate the total 
amount of tax payable by a married couple, 
(ii) the total tax will subsequently be divided up in proportion to the 
married couple's respective incomes. 
After receiving notification of the assessment officer, each of spouses will 
file a separate return and pay tax separately in proportion to his/her 
income. 
(c) Consequently, a separate return does not affect the total amount of tax 
that the couple must pay. 
It has also been found that separate assessment can promote efficiency in the 
following ways: 
Firstly, it gives each spouse independence and privacy in dealing with their 
tax affairs.973 
Secondly, a married man does not take responsibility for his wife's tax affairs 
under separate assessment. 974 
Thirdly, tax-gatherers may not need to pay attention to taxpayers' marital 
status at all times, because taxpayers disclose their marital status by applying for 
separate assessment. 
972 Paragraphs Two and Three cannot be read and construed separately. 
973 Sandford, op.cit.(note 195), p.58 
974 Peter G. Whiteman et al., British Tax Library: Whiteman on Income Tax, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, I 988), 1262. 
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However, separate assessment depends on the discretion of the assessment 
officer. This condition may impede the achievement of efficiency, particularly where 
some assessment officers are reluctant to implement it.975 
Altogether, separate assessment under Thai law cannot completely eliminate 
the conflict between equity and efficiency because of the condition mentioned above. 
The following measures are therefore recommended. 
Firstly, separate assessment should be retained m Thai law without the 
condition mentioned above. 
Secondly, Paragraphs Two and Three of Section 57 ter should be combined 
and amended to read as follows: 
"The husband or wife who wishes to file a separate return may do so by 
giving notice to that effect to the assessment officer within the time limit for 
filing returns; provided that such separate filing shall in no way affect the 
total amount of tax payable. The assessment officer, after receiving such 
notice, will have to estimate the total amount of tax payable by the husband 
and wife and then divide the tax in proportion to the respective amounts of 
assessment income obtained by the husband and wife and notify each of them 
to file a separate return and pay tax separately." 
Thirdly, tax-gatherers may make delegated legislation on technical rules 
regarding methods, guidelines or directions for supplementing the operation of 
separate assessment under Section 57 ter. The amended Section 57 ter (as proposed 
above) and delegated legislation are likely to solve the problem of how to construe 
rules of separate assessment.976 
Finally, tax-gatherers should publicize the system of separate assessment. 
This idea arises from the criticism of separate assessment under previous UK law by 
Lister. She complains that few married women opted for separate assessment 
because of"the lack of publicity for separate assessment."977 
975 Lister, op.cit.(note875), p.136 
976 On this basis, separate assessment under the proposal is likely to be less cumbersome and complex 
to administer and to be widely adopted by married couples. 
977 Lister, op.cit.(note875), p.l36 
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5.3.1.2 Ru les of wife's election for separate taxation of employment income 
Section 57 quinque, Paragraph One, provides that: 
"If a wife had assessable income under Section 40 (I) [employment income] 
during the tax year, whether with or without any other assessable income, she 
may file a return and pay tax separately from the husband only in respect of 
the assessable income under Section 40 (1) [employment income], in which 
case such assessable income shall not be treated as income of the husband in 
accordance with Section 57 ter." 
The rules of the wife's election for separate taxation under Thai Jaw ("the 
mles of wife's election") are similar to those under previous UK law. Before the 
introduction of individual taxation, Sections 287-288 of the TA 1988 dealt with 
election for the separate taxation of wife's earnings ("the wife's earned income 
election. ")978 The similarity is that when the wife's election takes place, there will be 
the following results: -
(a) the wife's earnings (under previous UK law) or the wife's employment 
income (under Thai law) will be taxed as if the wife were a single woman 
with no other income; and 
(b) the husband 's other income will be taxed as if the wife's earnings (under 
previous UK tax law) or the wife's employment income (under Thai law) 
were ni1.979 
There are however two dissimilarities between the rules under Thai law and 
previous UK law. 
Firstly, the wife's earnings under previous UK Jaw cover more income than 
the wife's employment income under Thai law. The wife's earnings include income 
from an employment, trade, profession and vocation.980 Meanwhile, the wife's 
employment income under Thai law is income under Section 40 (1) of the RCT, 
excluding income from business, commerce, or professions, and any investment 
mcome. 
Secondly, under previous UK law, both husband and wife had to agree jointly 
to opt fo r the separate taxation of wife's earnings. However, under Thai law, a wife 
978 ibid.p.l36 
979 Section 287(3), TA 1988; and Section 57 quinque, RCT. 
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can elect to be taxed separately on her employment income without he( husband 's 
pemuss10n. 
The wife's earned income election under previous UK law was recognized as 
leading to efficiency of taxation because it provided an incentive for married women 
to enter the labor force and discouraged tax evasion and avoidance.981 
ln examining whether the rules of wife' s election under Thai law can reduce 
the conflict between equity and efficiency, the following questions will be examined: 
(1) whether joint taxation can still satisfy the equity requirement, and 
(2) whether the rules of wife's election for separate taxation can lead to 
greater efficiency. 
Joint taxation cannot achieve equity under the rules of wife's election for two 
reasons. 
First ly, with equal taxable incomes, a couple in which the wife has 
employment income will pay less tax than another couple in which the wife has 
income from other sources than employment. This brings about horizontal inequity. 
Example 4.22 in Appendix XII to C h a pter Four helps clarify this point. 
Secondly, the rules of wife's election widen the gap between high-income 
and low-income married couples. This is because the rules do not bring spouses ' 
combined incomes into higher MTRs. Consequently, the rules considerably reduce 
the tax liabilities of high-income spouses whose combined incomes fall within high 
MTRs. The UK experience supports this point. According to Tiley, the wife's earned 
income election benefited those "whose combined incomes took them significantly 
into higher rate liability."982 
It has also been found that the rules of wife's election can encourage 
efficiency, but only in certain ways. 
Firstly, the rules give wives independence and privacy 111 tax matters 
concerning their employment income. However, the wife's other incomes are still 
combined with the husband's income for income tax purposes. Therefore, the rules 
cannot completely solve the problem in joint taxation of its inconvenience, as 
discussed in 4.1.1. 
980 Section 287(2), T A 1988 
981 Sandford, op.cit.(note30), p.58 
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Secondly, although the husband does not take responsibility for his wife's tax 
matters concerning employment income, he still has to take responsibility for his 
wife's other incomes. Therefore, the rules cannot completely solve the problem of 
married men in complying with joint taxation, as discussed in 4.1. 1. 
Thirdly, the rules of wife's election provide incentives for wives to take paid 
employment. This is because the wife's employment income is not aggregated with 
the husband's for income tax purposes. From the UK experience, the wife's earnings 
election has been introduced to provide an incentive to work.983 
However, since the wife's other incomes are still combined with the 
husband's income, the rules of wife's election under Thai Jaw do not provide 
incentives for married women to save, invest or produce income other than 
employment income. Therefore, the rules cannot completely reduce the disincentive 
effect, as discussed in 4.2.2. 
Finally, the rules of wife's election may reduce incentives for some married 
couples to avoid or evade tax because some married couples pay less tax under such 
rules than they would under the basic rules of joint taxation. From the UK 
experience, earning couples tend to evade and avoid tax when the highest MTR 
exceeds 70%. The wife's earnings election has been introduced to discourage tax 
avoidance and evasion.984 
Furthermore, the rules of wife's election help joint taxation to prevent tax 
avoidance by inter-spousal transfer of investment income. This is because even if 
such transfer occurs, the wife's investment income continues to be combined with 
the husband's income for income tax purposes. In this regard, some analysts agree 
that the joint approach should apply to investment income. For example, Messere 
notes, "most countries with separate taxation for earned income required joint 
taxation for dividend and interest income to prevent tax avoidance by couples 
artificially splitting their investment incorne."985 In the UK, Morris and Warren 
propose separate taxation for earned income and joint taxation for investment 
982 Tiley, op.cit.{note 131 ), p.l50 
983 Sandford, op.cit.(note 195), p.58 
984 ibid. p.58 
98s Messere, op.cit.(note936), p.l2 
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income.986 They claim that "to avoid the need for inter-spousal transfers, the couple 
should be the unit for investment income which should be aggregated."987 
Altogether, the rules of wife's election under Thai law undermine equity and 
impede redistribution. Also, they cannot completely fulfil the efficiency requirement. 
5.3.1.3 Suggestions for reducing the conflict under joint taxation 
As analyzed earlier, the basic rules of joint taxation can achieve equity but impede 
efficiency in some respects. Measures for increasing efficiency and sustaining equity 
should therefore be introduced to reduce the conflict between equity and efficiency. 
Four measures for achieving this purpose are recommended below. 
The first measure deals with revision of the basic rules in Paragraph One of 
Section 57 ter. This section presently provides that: 
"For the purpose of charging income tax on a husband and wife, the 
assessable income ofthe wife shall be treated as the income of the husband, if 
they have lived together throughout the tax year. In this regard, the husband 
shall have the duty and liability to file a return and pay tax; provided that if 
the tax falls in arrears and the wife has received a prior notice of not less than 
seven days, the wife shall be jointly liable to settle the arrears." 
I propose to revise the above provision to read: 
"For the purpose of charging income tax on a husband and wife, the husband 
and wife shall be taxed on their joint assessable income if they have lived 
together throughout the tax year. In this regard, the husband and wife shall 
both have the duty and liability to file a return and pay tax." 
Like Thai law, previous UK tax law was based on the joint-taxation system, 
under which married women were considered to be receiving unequal treatment. 
And, as noted earlier, the joint-taxation system was much criticized in the UK. One 
criticism is referred to in Morris and Warren: 
"What is it about the [the joint-taxation system] which has drawn so much 
criticism? Perhaps the main feeling is that a tax system which treats the wife 
merely as her husband's chattel is out-of-date; but it is not relevant today 
986 Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), p.28 
987 ibid.p.46 
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when many wives are equal partners in providing the income to support the 
family. The removal of this problem alone is simple - to make the couple 
jointly responsible for tax rather than the husband. This could be done by 
rewording the income tax acts to make the couple jointly liable for their tax 
while leaving their overall tax liability unchanged."988 
In my view, the combined income of both spouses under joint taxation has 
the merits of equity and efficiency in certain respects. Although the unfair treatment 
of wives devalues the system, the system should not be removed as a whole. 
Conversely, the problem of gender inequality should be resolved; meanwhile, the 
basic concept of the combination of both spouses' incomes should be retained. The 
basic rules in Paragraph One of Section 57 ter should therefore be revised, according 
to my proposed revision above, to make the husband and wife jointly responsible and 
liable for their taxes. 
The proposed revision will not affect the operation of joint taxation but 
remove the problem of gender inequality in the tax system. The problem is solved 
because a wife would enjoy an equal right with her husband to deal with their joint 
tax affairs. This will correspond with the provision of the CCCT relating to the 
management of the major assets of married couples, which requires both spouses to 
manage jointly the major assets derived from marriage.989 The tax payment concerns 
money matters, which is as important as the management of the spouses' maJor 
assets; therefore the spouses should jointly look after their tax affairs. 
In terms of increasing efficiency, the proposed revision will solve the 
problem of the inconvenience of joint taxation, as discussed in 4.1.1. Joint taxation 
may cause certain inconveniences for some married couples because: 
(a) the men may not be responsible for their wives' tax affairs, and 
(b) the women may not tell their husbands the full details of their income. 
The duty and liability of spouses jointly to file a return and pay tax, as 
proposed above, may solve these problems. 
Besides, the joint duty and liability of spouses wi ll reduce the responsibility 
of some husbands for their wives' tax affairs, which will solve the problem for 
988 Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), p.29 
989 Section 1476, CCCT 
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husbands of complying with the rules of joint taxation. Furthermore, such joint duty 
and liability will not need the proviso on the wife's liability for arrears. This will be 
convenient for tax-gatherers to administer. Moreover, the proposed revision will still 
help prevent tax avoidance by the inter-spousal transfer of investment income. 
The second measure is that the rules of separate assessment under Paragraph 
Two and Paragraph Three of Section 57 ter should be retained; provided that there is 
an amendment to this section as proposed in 5.3.1.1. 
The third measure involves the abolition of the rules of wife' s election for 
separate taxation under Section 57 quinque. This is because the rules undermine 
equity, impede redistribution and cannot completely fu lfil the efficiency requirement, 
as analyzed in 5.3. 1.2. If Section 57 quinque were abolished as proposed, joint 
taxation would continue to operate under {a) the revised basic ru les in Paragraph One 
of Section 57 ter, and (b) the revised rules of separate assessment in Paragraph Two 
and Paragraph Three of Section 57 ter. 
The fourth measure concerns a reduction in a disincentive effect. Low MTRs, 
few and wide tax bands, can reduce distortion in married couples' economic 
decisions. This is because the combined incomes of some married couples may not 
be lifted to higher tax bands. If the combined incomes of other married couples are 
still pushed into higher tax bands, they will face a lower number of tax bands with 
lower MTRs. As also discussed in subsection 3.2.1, the tax-rate schedule which 
designed to contain low MTRs, few and wide tax bands helps joint taxation to 
achieve equity by imposing lower tax burdens on most married couples, particularly 
on low-income and (lower) middle-income married couples. Therefore, these 
features of the tax-rate schedule will promote both equity and efficiency. 
5.3.1.4 Solutions to other violations of equity arising from joint taxation 
Even though joint taxation may achieve equity in some cases, it violates equity in six 
other cases, as summarized in 5.1 (2). Inequities arising from such cases should 
therefore be lessened. 
Case one 
As analyzed in 3.1.2, a one-earner married couple may be believed to have a 
greater taxable capacity and be liable for higher tax than a two-earner married 
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couple, with equal incomes. However, under joint taxation, a one-earner couple does 
not pay more but pays the same tax as a two-earner couple. This inequity would be 
lessened if imputed income were taxed. However, imputed income is non-
measurable for taxation; consequently, this inequity still exists under joint taxation. 
Case two 
As analyzed in 3.1.6, a cohabiting couple has the same taxable capacity as a 
married couple, with equal incomes. The fonner must pay the same tax as the latter. 
However, under joint taxation, the fonner pays less tax than the latter. This inequity 
would be lessened if cohabitation could be monitored. However, tax-gatherers cannot 
monitor cohabitation for taxation; consequently, this inequity still exists under joint 
taxation. 
Case three 
As analyzed in 3.1.7, a cohabiting couple has a greater taxable capacity and 
must pay more tax than two single persons living separately, with equal incomes. 
However, under joint taxation, the former does not pay more but pays the same tax as 
the latter. This inequity would be lessened if cohabitation could be monitored. 
Case four 
As analyzed in 3.1.8, a single person has a greater taxable capacity and must 
pay more tax than a one-earner married couple, with equal incomes. However, under 
joint taxation, the fonner does not pay more but pays the same tax as the latter. 
Reduction ofthis inequity can be achieved through tax reliefs. 
Each Thai taxpayer is entitled to the basic personal allowance. If a Thai 
taxpayer has a spouse who does not have any assessable income, the taxpayer also 
claims an allowance for the spouse additional to the basic allowance. This means that 
a one-earner married couple has two allowances, while a single person receives one 
allowance. Consequently, entitlement to two allowances is like ly to help a one-earner 
married couple to pay Jess tax than a single person, with equal incomes. 
Case five 
As analyzed in 3.1.9, a single person has a greater taxable capacity and must 
pay more tax than a two-earner married couple. However, under joint taxation, the 
fom1er does not pay more but pays the same tax as the latter. Reduction of this 
inequity can be achieved through tax reliefs. 
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Under Thai law, where both husband and wife have assessable income, they 
are entitled to two basic allowances.990 Meanwrule, a single person receives one 
basic allowance. Consequently, a two-earner married couple pays less tax than a 
single person, with equal incomes. Entitlement to two allowances for a two-earner 
married couple helps lessen inequity. 
Case six 
In footnote 919, it was noted that a one-earner married couple may have a 
slightly greater taxable capacity than two persons living separately, with equal 
incomes. This is because a non-earning spouse of the fo rn1er may be too old or 
unhealthy to do housework. In this case, the former should then have a slightly 
heavier tax burden imposed than the latter. 
As discussed in Case four, each taxpayer can claim the basic allowance. Two 
persons living separately therefore receive two basic allowances. Meanwhile, a 
married couple with one spouse earning outside and another staying at home is also 
entitled to two allowances (the basic allowance and an allowance for the taxpayer's 
spouse.) As a result of equal allowances, a one-earner married couple may pay a 
slightly higher tax than two single persons living separately. Conversely, if a one-
earner married couple receives only one allowance, this couple could pay a much 
higher tax than two persons living separately. 
Although an allowance for the taxpayer's spouse who stays at home may help 
reduce inequity, it may create a disincentive for a non-earning spouse to work 
outside the home. The following measures are therefore recommended. 
Firstly, an allowance for the taxpayer's spouse should be given to a married 
person whose spouse stays at home because he/she cannot find out a job and to a 
married person whose spouse stays at home but cannot do housework because of old 
age, poor health, illness, disability, or the need to spend time caring for his/her 
parents or relatives who cannot look after themselves. 
Secondly, an allowance for the taxpayer's spouse should not be given to a 
married person whose healthy spouse chooses not to earn outside but to stay at home 
whether to enjoy leisure or do housework. The reason is that imputed income from 
990 Section 47 (2), RCT 
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housework is non-taxable, and such an allowance (if given) would discourage a non-
earning spouse from labor participation, resulting in inefficiency of taxation. 
5.3.2 Solutions to the conflict under individual taxation 
As analyzed earlier, individual taxation promotes efficiency rather than equity. To 
strike the right balance between them, methods that reduce inequity and maintain 
efficiency must be established. 
5.3.2.1 Proposed integration of joint taxation with individual taxation, and rules 
to prevent inter-spousal transfer 
As analyzed in 3.2.2, the taxation of spouses' separate income may help wealthy 
married couples to reduce their tax liabilities by transfers of investment income 
between spouses. Inter-spousal transfer may therefore undermine equity. This leads 
to conflict between equity and efficiency. 
To prevent inter-spousal transfer, joint taxation has sometimes been proposed 
to apply to investment income, while individual taxation is applied to eamings.991 
Nevertheless, the proposed integration of joint taxation with individual taxation has 
not been brought into the UK tax law. The possible reason for this is that "most 
organizations favour disaggregation of investment income, and its treatment on an 
individual basis."992 
Rules to prevent the inter-spousal transfers of investment income are another 
alternative. However, Morris and Warren disagree about such rules993 arguing that 
such prevention requires complex rules, leading to high administrative costs.994 
The question arises whether (1) the integration of joint taxation for 
investment income with individual taxation for earnings or (2) rules to prevent inter-
spousal transfer is the better method to create a more equitable redistribution of 
income while maintaining efficiency under individual taxation. It is found that the 
first method cannot achieve both equity and efficiency at the same time for the 
following reasons. 
991 Kay and Sandler, op.cit.(note872), p.l84 
992 ibid.p.179 
993 Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note872), p.32 
99~ ibid.p.40 
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The first reason concerns violation of equity. Where two married couples 
have equal taxable income, a couple with earned income will pay less tax than 
another couple with investment income. This is because: 
(a) the former is taxed on their separate incomes, while the latter is taxed on 
their joint incomes; and 
(b) as a result of the progressive rate structure, tax burdens will fall more 
heavily upon the latter than upon the fom1er. 
The second reason involves efficiency of taxation. The integration of joint 
with individual taxation may encourage efficiency because it may: 
(a) prevent inter-spousal transfer of investment income; and 
(b) reduce incentives for some married couples to avoid or evade tax on their 
earned income because they will pay less tax than they would under the 
pure form of joint taxation. 
However, the integration of joint taxation with individual taxation may 
impede efficiency because it may not: 
(a) create incentives for some married women to save and invest even if it 
creates incentives for other married women to enter the labor force; 
(b) give some married women independence and privacy in tax matters 
regarding their investment income even if it gives other married women 
independence and privacy in tax matters regarding their earned income; 
(c) reduce the greater responsibilities of some married men in dealing with 
their wives' tax matters regarding investment income even if it does not 
put greater responsibilities on other married men in dealing with their 
wives' tax matters regarding earned income. 
Rules to prevent inter-spousal transfer are likely to be a better method of 
creating a more equitable redistribution of income while maintaining efficiency 
under individual taxation. This is because in addition to undermining equity, inter-
spousal transfer affects administrative and compliance costs. Therefore, if rules to 
prevent inter-spousal transfer work effectively, they will achieve both equity and 
efficiency. However, such anti-avoidance rules will achieve this objective if they are 
not too complex to administer and to comply with. Anti-avoidance rules will be 
further discussed in 5.4.1. 
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5.3.2.2 Abolition of married couple's allowance in the UK 
As analyzed in 3. 1.4, if two individual taxpayers have the same income before and 
after marriage, they have a greater taxable capacity and should therefore pay higher 
tax after marriage. However, under individual taxation, the spouses pay the same tax 
as they would if they were single adults. Furthermore, since wealthy couples do not 
pay higher tax after marriage, this also affects equity. Such inequities lead to conflict 
between equity and efficiency. Reducing these inequities will reduce the conflict. 
There is no effective method completely to resolve the above conflict. 
However, it can be lessened through the abolition of the married couple's allowance. 
Under individual taxation, each spouse is entitled to the basic personal allowance that 
can reduce his/her taxable income and tax liability in the same way as other single 
taxpayers. Additionally, in the years before 2000-2001, a married couple who lived 
together was entitled to a married couple's allowance ("the MCA"). 
From April 1994, the MCA was given as a reduction in the tax bill at the 
fixed rate of the amount of the allowance. The MCA was therefore a tax credit or a 
tax reducer.995 The MCA was calculated as 20% of the amount of the allowance for 
1994-1995, as 15% for 1995-1999, and as 10% for 1999-2000.996 
The MCA could only be claimed by married couples, not by single people. 
Consequently, the tax liabilities of married couples were further reduced below those 
of single people. Such reductions increased inequity. Robinson and Stark support the 
view that "the favourable treatment of childless two-earner couples [with the MCA] 
relative to two single people living apart is manifest injustice."997 Furthermore, as 
Sandford notes, "to have a system of independent taxation but a married couple's 
allowance was an anomaly."998 
Moreover, the MCA did not help boost redistribution from the rich to the 
poor because wealthy couples not just those on low incomes benefited from the 
MCA. However, the MCA encouraged redistribution from the single, widowed, and 
divorced to married couples.999 
995 Inland Revenue, Tax Allowances and Reliefs, http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/pdfs/ir90.htm, 3. 
996 Inland Revenue, Tax Structure and Parameters, 
http://www.inlandrevenue.lwv.uk/stats/tax stmc .. ./OOap a lc 2.ht, I. 
997 Robinson and Stark, op.cit.(note957), p.56 
998 Sandford, op.cit.(note 195), p.61 
999 Kay and King, op.cit.(note60), p.44 
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It is clear that the MCA increased the inequity of income redistribution. The 
MCA also affected efficiency of taxation because it constituted substantial tax 
expenditure. 1000 The MCA was abolished in April 2000. 1001 However, the MCA is 
still available for pensioner couples.1002 This may be reasonable because elderly 
couples have less taxable capacities. 
The abolition of the MCA bas lessened inequity and increased efficiency. 
HM Treasury estimates that "the full yield from abolition for all married couples 
would be 2.5 bill ion pounds in 2001-02."1003 The abolition of the MCA therefore 
helps lessen the conflict between equity and efficiency under individual taxation. 
5.3.2.3 Reduction in the conflict caused by different treatment of one-earner and 
two-earner married couples 
As analyzed in 3. 1.2, a one-earner married couple may have the same taxable 
capacity as a two-earner married couple, with equal incomes. This would arise when 
a non-earning spouse of the former could not do housework because of old age or 
poor health; consequently, both couples would pay for the same household services. 
However, under individual taxation, a one-earner couple pays more tax than a two-
earner couple with equal incomes. Individual taxation thus violates equity, leading to 
conflict between equity and efficiency. 
To reduce the inequity and conflict, the tax liability of a one-earner couple 
should be reduced through tax reliefs. It is found that up to 5 April 2000, "a married 
person whose spouse was unable to look after himself or herself at all, for the whole 
tax year, because of illness or disability", could claim the additional personal 
allowance. 1004 This allowance is given as a reduction in tax at a fixed rate in the same 
1000 Robinson and Stark, op.cit.(note957), p.56 
lOCH Section 31, the Finance Act 1999 
1002 The MCA is still available for married couples where one of the spouses was born before 6April 
1935 and whose ages are 75 or above. In 2004/05, the MCA reduces a taxpayer's tax bill by £572.50 
( 10% of £5725) for those aged under 75 and born before 6 April1935 and by £579.50 (10% of £5795) 
for those aged 75 or above. However, the amounts of the MCA (£5725and£5795) are reduced by £1 
for every £2 of income above the income limit (18,900). However, they cannot be reduced below the 
minimum amount of £2210. 
1003 HM Treasury, Financial Statement and Budget Report March 1999: 1 Budget Measures. 
http://archive.treasury. gov.uk/budget/1999/fsbr/29807 .htm, 31. 
1004 Inland Revenue, op.cit.(note995), p.3 
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way as the MCA. 1005 However, this allowance was available only to a married person 
who had a qualifying child. 1006 It was abolished in Apri l 2000. 1007 
The above additional personal allowance could reduce the tax liability of a 
married person whose spouse cannot look after himself/herself. This allowance 
helped reduce inequity arising from the different treatment of a one-earner couple 
and a two-earner couple with equal incomes. Nevertheless, this allowance only 
benefited a one-earner married couple who had a qualifying child. Although this 
additional personal allowance was abolished, a one-earner married couple is now 
eligible for the CTC if they have at least one child. 
By contrast, a childless married person whose spouse cannot do housework 
because of illness or disability could not claim the additional personal allowance, and 
cannot claim the CTC in the present system. Consequently, there is sti ll inequity 
arising from the different treatment of a one-earner couple and a two-earner couple, 
with equal incomes. The following proposals are therefore put forward. 
Firstly, an additional personal allowance should be available to a childless 
married person whose spouse stays at home but cannot do housework or look after 
himself/herself because of old age, poor health, illness, disability, or the need to 
spend time caring for parents or relatives who cannot look after themselves. 
According to Kay and Sandler, the tax and benefit system should provide for 
allowances to "people who look after elderly relatives, the blind, the disabled, and so 
on."1oos 
The proposed additional allowance should be given as a reduction of taxable 
income. However, to enhance redistribution, the proposed allowance should not be 
available to a one-earner childless couple with a high income. 
Secondly, the law should not give an additional personal allowance to a 
childless married person whose spouse chooses not to work but to stay at home. 
Spencer puts forwards the idea that "[the] individual system may give one spouse 
allowance for a non-earning spouse."1009 Morris and Warren disagree that the state 
1005 ibid.p.4 
For example, this allowance reduced a taxpayer' s tax bill by up to a set amount of £ 197 in 1999. 
1006 ibid.p.3 
1007 Section 33, the Finance Act 1999 
1008 Kay and Sandler, op.cit.(note872), p.l83 
1009 Spencer, op.cit.(note891), p.89 
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has no duty to give tax advantages to wives who choose to stay at home. 1010 I agree 
with Morris and Warren. This is because if such an allowance were available, it 
would discourage a non-earning spouse from going out to work, which might result 
in inefficiency of taxation. Robinson and Stark support the view that the role of the 
tax system in redistributing income and providing incentives to work is bound up 
with the size of allowances. 1011 
5.3.2.4 Reduction in the conflict caused by different treatment of a one-earner 
married couple and two single persons living separately 
In footnote 919, a one-earner married couple may have a slightly greater taxable 
capacity than two single persons living separately, with equal incomes. The former 
should therefore pay a slightly higher tax than the latter. Under individual taxation, a 
one-earner couple will not pay a slightly higher tax (but may pay a much higher tax) 
than two persons living separately. Individual taxation therefore violates equity, 
leading to conflict between equity and efficiency. 
To reduce the above inequity and conflict, the tax liability of a one-earner 
couple should be reduced through tax reliefs. The law should allow an additional 
personal allowance to be available to a childless married person1012 whose spouse 
stays at home but cannot do housework because of old age, poor health, illness, 
disability or time spent caring for parents or relatives. The proposed allowance 
should be given as a reduction of taxable income. 
However, the proposed allowance should not be available to a childless 
married person whose healthy spouse chooses not to earn outside but to stay at home 
whether to enjoy leisure or do housework. This is because (a) imputed income from 
housework is non-taxable, and (b) as discussed in Sub-section 5.3.2.3, if the 
proposed allowance were available to such a childless married person, it would 
discourage a non-earning spouse from going out to work. 
1010 Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), p.46 
101 1 Robinson and Stark, op.cit.(note957), p.52 
1012 A one-earner married couple with dependent children is now eligible for the CTC. Therefore, the 
proposed additional personal allowance should not be available to them. 
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5.3.2.5 Reduction in the conflict caused by different treatment of a single person 
and a one-earner married couple 
As analyzed in 3.1.8, a single person has a greater taxable capacity and should pay 
more tax than a one-earner married couple, with equal incomes. However, under 
individual taxation, the former does not pay more but pays the same tax as the latter. 
Individual taxation therefore violates equity, leading to conflict between equity and 
efficiency. 
To reduce the above inequity and conflict, the tax liability of a one-earner 
couple should be lower than that of a single person through tax reliefs. I would 
recommend that proposals made in 5.3.2.4 (i.e. the introduction of an additional 
personal allowance available to a one-earner couple with childless) should apply to 
reduce inequity in this case. 
5.3.2.6 Reduction in the conflict caused by different treatment of hvo-earner 
married couples 
As analyzed in 3.1.1, two-earner married couples with equal incomes have equal 
taxable capacity and should pay equal taxes. However, under individual taxation, a 
couple where both spouses earn income equally pays less tax than a couple where 
both spouses earn income unequally. Individual taxation thus violates equity, leading 
to conflict between equity and efficiency. 
To reduce the above inequity and conflict, all two-earner married couples 
with equal incomes should pay equal taxes. A reduction in this inequity cannot be 
achieved through tax reliefs because two-earner couples can claim the same personal 
allowances. Therefore, a reduction in this inequity should be made through the 
progressive rate structure. 
It has been found that changes in the tax-rate schedule under the present UK 
tax-rate schedule by reducing tax rates and tax bands as well as widening tax bands 
help reduce the likelihood of different treatment of low-income couples where the 
distribution of income between couples is different. However, these features of the 
tax-rate schedule are unlikely to reduce the different treatment of two high-income 
couples where the distribution of income between both couples is different. Example 
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4.23 and Example 4.24 in Appendix XIII to Chapter Four will elucidate these 
points. 
Therefore, the present UK tax-rate schedule (2004-05) which contains few 
tax rates and bands as well as wide tax bands cannot completely resolve the problem 
of different treatment of married couples with equal incomes. Nevertheless, these 
features of the tax rate structure possibly reduce inequity in taxing low-income 
couples. Meanwhile, they maintain efficiency of taxation because they still create 
incentives to work and discourage tax avoidance and evasion. 
It has been found that if the proposed two tax-rate schedules (as discussed in 
Chapter Two) were put into practice, they would reduce the different treatment of 
two low-income married couples where the distribution of income between both 
couples is different. Additionally, the proposed two tax-rate schedules would reduce 
the different treatment of two high-income couples where the distribution of income 
between both couples is different. Example 4.23 and Example 4.24 in Appendix 
XIII to Chapter Four will elucidate these points. Therefore, the proposed two tax-
rate schedules would possibly reduce inequity in taxing low- and high-income 
married couples under individual taxation. 
5.3.2.7 Reduction in the conflict caused by the same treatment of an unmarried 
couple and two persons living separately 
As analyzed in 3.1.7, a cohabiting couple has a greater taxable capacity and must pay 
more tax than two single persons living separately, with equal incomes. However, 
under individual taxation, the former does not pay more but pays the same tax as the 
latter. Individual taxation thus violates equity, leading to conflict between equity and 
efficiency. 
To reduce the above inequity and conflict, a cohabiting couple must pay more 
tax than two persons living separately. However, this cannot be achieved through tax 
reliefs because both groups of taxpayer are entitled to the same personal allowances. 
Additionally, a reduction in this inequity cannot be made through changes in the 
progressive rate structure because they are subject to the same tax rates. Therefore, 
the tax law should not provide any additional tax reliefs for cohabitees other than 
personal allowances since such reliefs would increase inequity. 
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5.4 Measures to prevent tax avoidance schemes 
In this section, measures to prevent avoidance schemes under individual taxation will 
first be examined, the ideas of which will be helpful to analyze measures under joint 
taxation thereafter. 
5.4.1 Prevention of tax avoidance under individual taxation 
Inter-spousal transfer for tax avoidance affects equity for two reasons. Firstly, 
income wi ll be redistributed from married couples who do not make the transfer to 
those who make the transfer. Wealthy couples are in a better position to make the 
transfer. A reduction .in the tax liabilities of wealthy couples through inter-spousal 
transfer enhances inequity. Secondly, income will be redistributed from a single 
person (who cannot transfer his/her income-producing property to his/her spouse) to 
a married couple who can make the transfer. 101 3 
Inter-spousal transfer for tax avoidance also affects efficiency of taxation for 
four reasons. Firstly, married couples' rearrangement of assets to reduce tax 
increases non-compliance costs. Secondly, administrative costs are increased due to 
the need to administer special rules to prevent inter-spousal transfer. Thirdly, greater 
compliance and administrative costs would be incurred if anti-avoidance rules were 
more complex. Finally, there is revenue loss.1014 
There are five possible measures that help prevent avoidance schemes, i.e. 
(a) rules on jointly held property, 
(b) rules on settlements and outright gifts, 
(c) high rates of divorce, 
(d) rules to prevent the shifting of property to children, and 
(e) reduction in tax rates. 
5.4.1.1 Rules on jointly held proper ty 
It is argued that "where a married couple who live together hold investments, bank 
accounts etc in their joint names it can be hard to decide how to split the income 
1013 Hockly, op.cit.(note315), p.l80 
1014 Morris and Warren, op.cit.(note860), pp.32-33; Lister, op.cit.(note875), pp.l41-142; and Kay and 
Sandler, op.cit.(note872), p.I80 
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between them."1015 However, rules on jointly held property as found in Sections 
282A and 282B of the TAl988 can help the Revenue to deal with this problem. 
According to the basic rule in Section 282A, each spouse will be taxed on 
half the income arising from property (other than shares in a c lose company)1016 held 
in the married couple's joint names. However, if the spouses own such property in 
unequal shares and they make a declaration to this effect to the Revenue, each spouse 
will be taxed on the portion of the income to which he/she is entitled.1017 This rule is 
found in Section 282B. These rules on jointly held property help the Revenue and 
married couples to decide what amounts are taxable for each spouse. 1018 
When the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA) is enforceable from 5 December 
2005, civil partners (same-sex couples) will be treated in the same as (or a similar 
way to) married couples for tax purposes. 1019 Therefore, rules on jointly held 
property in Section 282A and 282B will also apply to civil partners from 5 December 
2005. On this basis, each partner will be taxed on half the income arising from 
property (other than shares in a close company) held in the same-sex couple's joint 
names. However, if a same-sex couple own such property in unequal shares and they 
make a declaration to this effect to the Revenue, each partner will be taxed on the 
portion of income to which he/she is entitled. These rules on jointly held property 
help the Revenue and same-sex couples to decide what amounts are taxable for each 
partner. 
Rules on jointly held property do seem to ease the tasks of the Revenue and 
of married and same-sex couples to collect and to pay tax on income arising from 
jointly held property. However, rules on jointly held property hardly help prevent the 
transfer of the property between spouses or between civil partners to reduce tax. 
These rules may have incentive effects on the transfer of the property to the married 
couple's joint names or to the same-sex couple's joint names. Similarly, a married 
10 15 Revenue Internal Guidance-Independent taxation handbook, Simon's Direct Tax Service, Binder 
12 (London: Butterworths, 1995), 13111. 
10 16 From 6 April 2004, each spouse will not be taxed on half dividends or distributions from jointly 
owned shares in close or family companies but will be taxed according to the actual ownership. Close 
companies are "those under the control of five or fewer persons and their associates." (Walter Sinclair, 
STJames 's Place Tax Guide 2005-2006 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 35 and 168.) 
1017 Inland Revenue' s Press Release, Simon's Weekly Tax Service 171h March, Simon's Tax 
Intelligence (London: Butterworths, 1988), 175. 
10 18 Revenue Internal Guidance, op.cit.(notel015), p.l3 11 2 
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couple or a same-sex couple can save tax by transferring the property into the 
married couple's joint names or to the same-sex couple's joint names. Any kind of 
property (other than close company shares) such as land and buildings, non-close 
company shares, bank accounts, etc. can be transferred. 1020 Example 4.25 in 
Appendix XIV to Chapter Four helps elucidate this point. 
The inter-spousal transfer of the property to joint ownership will further 
reduce tax, "where one spouse would be paying a higher rate tax while the other did 
not fully use the basic rate band."1021 Example 4.26 in Appendix XIV to Chapter 
Four helps elucidate this point. Also, a partner (within the CPA 2004) paying a 
higher rate tax will receive income tax savings when he/she transfers the property to 
joint ownership where his/her partner who does not fully use the basic rate band. 
Additionally, the transfer of the property between spouses or between civil 
partners into joint ownership in which the spouses or the civil partners own unequal 
shares will further reduce tax. This will work out if-
( a) the husband and wife or the civil partners are subject to different tax rates, 
(b) the high-earning spouse or the high-earning partner is willing to make a 
significant transfer to the low-earning spouse or to the low-earning 
partner, 
(c) the transfer is straightforward or outright, and 
(d) both the husband and the wife or both civil partners make a declaration 
that they own the property in unequal shares. 
Example 4.27 in Appendix XIV to Chapter Four helps elucidate this point. 
From the above, the rules on jointly held property hardly help prevent the 
transfer of the property between spouses or between civil partners to reduce tax, but 
may encourage such transfer to reduce tax, provided that such transfer 1s 
straightforward or outright, which will be discussed below. It is confirmed that: 
"Where there is a straightforward gift or transfer of asset from the sole 
ownership of a husband or wife into joint ownership by the couple, the 
1019 Section I 03, Finance Act 2005 
1020 Arnold Homer and Rita Burrows, Tolley's Tax Guide (2004-05) (London: Lexis Nexis UK, 2004), 
580. 
1021 Arnold Homer and Rita Burrows, Tolley's Tax Guide (2000-01), 19th ed. (Surrey: Tolley 
Publishing, 2000), 501. 
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income from the asset should be divided between the husband and wife in 
accordance with the normal rules for jointly held property."1022 
5.4.1.2 Rules on settlements and outright gifts 
The above rules help prevent tax avoidance by inter-spousal transfer. The basic rule 
on settlements in Section 624 (1) of the ITTOIA 2005 says, 
"Income which arises under a settlement is treated for income tax purposes as 
the income of the settlor and of the settlor alone if it arises-
(a) during the life of the settlor, and 
(b) from property in which the settlor has an interest." 
As for a settlement made by the spouse, Tiley illustrates this as follows: 
"Where one spouse has carried out a transaction falling within [the] definition 
of settlement, and income arises to the other spouse as a result of that 
transaction, the income is treated as that of the settlor-spouse and not of the 
other spouse."1023 
The term "settlement" is defined in Section 620 ( I) of the ITTOIA 2005 as 
including any disposition, trust, covenant, agreement, arrangement or transfer of 
assets (except that it does not include a charitable loan arrangement). As a result of 
the settlement rule, the transfer of property from one spouse to the other with a view 
to reducing tax may be ineffective. This is because (a) the transfer of property is a 
transaction within the definition of settlement, and (b) income arising from the 
transferred property is still treated as that of the transferor-spouse and not as that of 
the transferee-spouse. The settlement rule thus prevents tax avoidance by inter-
spousal transfer. Tiley confirms that "this [settlement] rule appears to prevent 
income-splitting between the spouses by the device of transferring either assets or 
income between them."1024 
However, inter-spousal transfer can reduce the tax liability of the transferor-
spouse if such transfer is an outright gift between the spouses. Likewise, an outright 
gift of property between the spouses is treated as outside the settlement rule. 1025 This 
1022 Revenue Internal Guidance, op.cit.(note l 0 15), pp.l3143-l3144 




is because income arising from an outright gift of property is treated as that of the 
spouse who receives the gift (the donee-spouse), and not as that of the spouse who 
makes the gift (the donor-spouse). 1026 The donee-spouse will then be taxed on the 
income arising from such gift. This is found in Section 626 (1) (2) (3) of the ITTOIA 
2005. However, the donor-spouse will be taxed on income arising from the gift of 
property if (a) the donor-spouse can still control and retain a benefit in the given 
property, or (b) the gift is a right to receive income. This is because according to 
Section 626 (I) (2) (3) of the ITTOIA 2005, it is treated as an outright gifts where 
"the gift carries a right to the whole of that income", and " the property given is not 
wholly or substantially a right to income." 
Furthermore, if the gift made by one spouse to the other i.s not an outright 
gift, income arising from such gift will still be treated as that of the donor-spouse. 
The donor-spouse will then be taxed on the income arising from such gift. In this 
regard, Section 626 ( 4) of the ITTOIA 2005 provides that a gift is not an outright gift 
if-
"(a) it is subject to conditions, or 
(b) there are any circumstances in which the property, or any related 
property -
(i) is payable to the giver, 
(ii) is applicable for the benefit of the giver, or 
(iii) will, or may become, so payable or applicable." 
Additionally, although an outright gift of property between the spouses is 
outside the settlement rule, the Revenue consider that in some circumstances a gift of 
ordinary shares in a family company from one spouse to another is within the 
settlement rule. 1027 In other words, the donor-spouse wi ll then be taxed on the income 
arising from such gift. Furthermore, "taking a spouse into partnership, ... with the 
spouse's share [not] being appropriate to his or her contribution to the business . . .. ", 
will be treated as a settlement, "in which case the income would remain that of the 
other spouse"1028 
1026 Revenue Internal Guidance, op.cit.(notel015), pp.l3143-1 3144; 
Section 660A(6), TA 1988 
1027 Homer and Burrows, op.cit.(notel020), p.351 
1028 ibid.p.450 
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However, the Revenue do not regard the inter-spousal transfer of property to 
joint ownership as joint tenants, as breaching the rule on outright gifts. 1029 'Joint 
tenants ' means that "each (spouse] has equal rights over the property and when one 
dies, it goes automatically to the other." 1030 
It is clear that rules on settlements and outright gifts help prevent tax 
avoidance via inter-spousal transfer. When we apply rules on settlements and 
outright gifts to civi l partners, the transfer of the property between civil partners can 
reduce the tax liability of a wealthier partner (or a transferor partner) if such transfer 
is an outright gift between civil partners. However, the donor-partner will be taxed 
on income arising from the gift of property if (a) the donor-partner can still control 
and retain a benefit in the given property, (b) the gift is a ri ght to receive income, (c) 
the gift is subject to conditions, or (d) the gift could revert to the donor-partner in any 
circumstances whatsoever. 
5.4.1.3 High rates of divorce 
A change in social patterns regarding divorce may discourage inter-spousal transfer. 
The divorce rate in Britain is the highest in the European Union. 1031 
The high rates of divorce may affect a high-earning spouse's decision to 
transfer property to the low-earning spouse to avoid tax. The reason is that if such 
transfer occurred, "[it] could become permanent and inaccessible on a breakdown in 
a marriage." 1032 Tax avoidance via inter-spousal transfer is therefore a risky 
strategy1033, which wealthy couples may be reluctant to pursue. 1034 
1029 Homer and Burrows, op.cit.(notel02l), p.501 
1030 ibid.p.502 
103 1 Anne Barlow, Simon Duncan, Grace James and Alison Park, "Just a piece of paper? Marriage and 
cohabitation", British Social Attitudes the l8lh Report, Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, 
Lindsey Jarvis and Catherine Bromley, eds., (London: SAGE PubJjcations, 2001), 29. 
1032 McCrossan, op.cit(note944), p.lll 
1033 Rosen, op.cit.(note250), p.365 
1034 James, op.cit.(note858), p. 119 
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5.4.1.4 Rules to prevent tbe switching of property to children 
The transfer of income-producing property to children is another means of tax 
avoidance. This is because the income of children is their income and taxed 
separately from that of their parents. 1035 
However, the parental settlement rule in Section 629 ( I ) of the ITTOIA 2005 
helps prevent this form of tax avoidance. This section provides that 
"Income which arises under a settlement is treated for income tax purposes as 
the income of the settlor and of the settlor alone for a tax year if, in that year 
and during the life of the settlor, it -
(a) is paid to, or for the benefit of, and unmarried minor child1036 of the 
settlor, or 
(b) would otherwise be treated (apart from this section) as income of an 
unmarried minor child of the settlor." 
As referred to earlier, a settlement includes any transfer of assets.1037 This 
implies that the resulting income from the transfer of property to or for the benefit of 
an unmarried minor child will be taxed as if it belonged to the parent. Tax avoidance 
by the transfer of property to unmarried mjnor children is therefore prevented by this 
rule. However, this rule does not apply where the gross amount paid to an unmarried 
minor child under a settlement does not exceed £100 per annum. 1038 
Therefore, the rule in Section 629 (1) of the ITTOJA 2005 prevents the 
transfer of property to an unmarried child under 18. The question then arises whether 
the parent can transfer their property to a married chi ld under 18 or a chi ld over 18 to 
reduce tax. This form of tax avoidance will be prevented by the settlement rule in 
Section 624 (1) the ITTOIA 2005 for following reasons. 
(a) Section 629 (1) does not apply where income arising from a settlement is 
received by a child who is under 18 and married or a child who is over 18. 
1035 Tiley, op.cit.(notel4 1), p.I49 
1036 Section 629 (7) (a), the ITTOIA 2005 defines that "child" includes a stepchild. 
Section 629 (7) (b), the ITTOIA 2005 defines that "minor" means a person under the age of 18 years, 
and "minor child" is to be read accordingly. 
1037 Section 620 (I), ITTOIA 2005 
1038 Section 629 (3) , IITOIA 2005 
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(b) Section 629 (1) does not apply where income arising from a settlement is 
treated as the income of the settlor under Section 624 ( 1 ). 
(c) Section 624 (1) (b) applies where income arising from the settled property 
in which the settlor has an interest shall be treated as the income of the 
settlor. 
(d) Section 620 ( 1) defines the term "settlement" as including any 
disposition, trust, covenant, agreement, arrangement or transfer of assets. 
The above reasons imply that where Section 629 (1) does not apply to income 
arising from the transfer of property to a married chi ld under 18 or a child over 18, 
the income will be treated as that of the transferor-parent under Section 624 (1). 
Accordingly, the income will be taxed as if it belonged to the transferor-parent, 
unless the transferor-parent can prove that he/she has no interest in the transferred 
property. 
5.4.1.5 Reductions in tax rates 
Reductions in tax rates may discourage tax avoidance by married couples 
transferring their investment income. As Messere notes, " ... with the flattening of tax 
rate schedules, [tax avoidance by couples artificially splitting their unearned income] 
has become a less serious problem."1039 
The UK tax rates for savings income and dividends are at some levels lower 
than those for earned income. This impljes that the present UK law may affect 
spouses' decisions on the transfer of investment income to lower-earning spouses or 
children to avoid tax. However, reductions in tax rates for savings income and 
dividends will lead to inequity. This is because with equal taxable incomes, married 
couples who have only earned income will pay more tax than those who have 
savings income and dividends. 
In Chapter Two, my research proposed that unearned income should be taxed 
at the same rates as earned income, i.e. those under the proposed two tax-rate 
schedules. As we have seen, the proposed two tax-rate schedules contain few and 
low tax rates. Therefore, the proposed two tax-rate schedules are likely to djscourage 
1039 Messere, op.cit.(note240), p.257 
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tax avoidance by married couples transferring their investment income and to reduce 
inequity of taxation. 
5.4.2 Prevention of tax avoidance under joint taxation in Thailand 
Tax avoidance actions under joint taxation could include cohabitation, divorce, and 
separation of a married couple throughout the tax year. Besides these, underreporting 
incomes and failing to file a return are tax evasion. Such avoidance and evasion can 
be prevented by social and legal measures as follows: 
(a) difficulty in finding evidence, 
(b) social and legal problems, 
(c) penalties and punishments, and 
(d) anti-avoidance rules. 
5.4.2.1 Difficulty in finding evidence 
Where a married couple avoids paying higher tax on their joint income by claiming 
that they live separately in a permanent manner throughout the tax year, a husband 
must produce evidence to convince tax-gatherers that he and his wife live apart in 
such a manner. It is not easy for a husband to find such evidence because he and his 
wife may not do as they claim in practice. 
If a husband and wife occasionally live in different local ities or occasionally 
live apart, they are deemed by law to be living together and they are sti ll taxed on 
their joint income. If a husband produces any false evidence of permanent separation, 
he will be punished with imprisonment of three months to seven years and a fine of 
2,000 to 200,000 baht. 1040 However, if a husband and wife permanently live apart 
throughout the tax year in reality1041 , this may not be difficult to prove and may 
convince tax-gatherers but may cause family trouble. 
5.4.2.2 Social and legal problems 
Tax avoidance by divorce is not difficult for a married couple. They may simply go 
to the Thai Registrar's Office to register the divorce. As for cohabitation, no 
1040 Section 37, RCT 
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evidence is required to support tax avoidance. However, the subsequent social and 
legal problems of tax avoidance are likely to affect taxpayers' decisions to avoid tax 
by divorce or cohabitation. 
Divorce for tax saving that is a disguised divorce in the legal sense may lead 
to divorce in fact, which causes family1042 and social problems. 1043 Furthennore, a 
married couple getting a divorce and continuing to live together without marriage 
registration or two single persons cohabiting may lead to the following legal 
problems. 
(a) The ownership rights of money and property that a couple gains during 
cohabitation are different from those received during marriage under Thai 
family law. 1044 
(b) The status of chi ldren born of cohabitants differs from the legal status of 
children born of a married couple under Thai family law. 1045 
(c) The inheritance rights of partners of a cohabiting couple and illegitimate 
children are not the same as those of a married couple and legitimate 
children under Thai succession law.1046 
Owing to the social and legal problems mentioned above, tax avoidance may 
not of interest to some married couples. 1047 
5.4.2.3 Penalties and punishments 
A husband who reports false or inadequate information about his own income and/or 
his wife's income in his tax return is liable to a penalty equal to the amount of tax 
additionally payable1048, and shall pay a surcharge of 1.5% per month, or fraction 
thereof, of the tax payable exclusive of penalties. 1049 Additionally, the husband will 
1041 For example, a husband lives with a mistress; or, a husband and wife have separated permanently 
under an order of the court. 
1042 Somchai Richupan, "Tax laws of other countries on taxation of married couples", RD Tax Journal, 
September-October 1976, 76. 
104 Laohapun, op.cit.(note874), p.l95 
1044 Section 1533, CCCf 
IG-IS Section 1547, cccr 
IG-1
6 Section 1629, CCCT 
1047 However, other couples may be interested in tax avoidance if they think they can gain more 
benefit from tax avoidance than loss from social and legal problems. 
1048 Section 22 RCf 
1049 Section 27, Rcr , 
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be punished with imprisonment of three months to seven years and a fine of 2,000 
baht to 200,000 baht. 1050 
As for failing to file the tax retum on his own income and/or on his wife's 
income, a husband is liable to a penalty equal to twice the amount of tax payable1051 , 
and shall pay a surcharge of 1.5% per month, or fraction thereof, of the tax payable 
exclusive of penalties.1052 Additionally, the husband will be punished with a fine not 
exceeding 5,000 baht or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both.1053 
5.4.2.4 Anti-avoidance rule 
As noted earlier, joint taxation prevents tax avoidance by inter-spousal transfer. 
Additionally, there is an anti-avoidance rule to prevent the switch ing of investment 
income from parents to children under Thai law. 
Children pay tax separately from their parents under Thai law. As a 
consequence of this loophole, parents could reduce their tax liabilities by shifting 
their investment income or income-producing assets so as to be in their children's 
names. However, Thai law has rules to prevent this form of tax avoidance. The rules 
are found in Paragraphs Two and Three of Section 40 (4) of the RCT as fo llows:-
(1) the dividend income of a lawful child1054 or an adopted child who is a 
minor shall be treated as the income of the father if such child is a minor 
and the marital status of parents has been stable throughout the tax year; 
(2) however, if the marital status of parents has not been stable throughout 
the tax year for reasons such as divorce, the child's dividend income shall 
be treated as the income of the parent who exercises parental power, or of 
the father if parental power is jointly exercised. 
However, there are still loopholes in these rules. 
Firstly, the above rules only apply to the dividend income of a lawful child 
and an adopted child who is a minor. The rules should also app ly to the dividend 
income of an illegitimate child1055 who is a minor. 
1050 Section 37 RCT 
105 1 Section 26, RCT 
1052 Section 27' RCT 
1053 Section 37,bis, RCT 
1054 A lawful child means a child whose parents make marriage registration at the Registrar's Office. 
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Secondly, the above rules only apply to the dividend income of a minor1056 
child. This implies that parents may switch their shares to their aclult1057 son or 
daughter who has no other income or has other income which is subject to a lower 
tax rate. To prevent the transfer of shares from parents to their adult son or daughter, 
it is recommended that the rules on settlements and outright gifts in Section 624 (1) 
and Section 626 (1) (2) (3) ( 4) of the ITTOIA 2005 should be adapted to Thai law. 
The following are the proposed additional rules. 
(a) The parent who transfers shares will be taxed on dividends if the 
transferor-parent or his/her spouse still retains an interest in the 
transferred shares; or the transferred shares could be app licable for the 
benefit of the transferor-parent or his/her spouse or returned to the 
transferor-parent or his/her spouse in the future, except where the 
transferred shares revert to the transferor-parent or his/her spouse as an 
estate. 
(b) An adult son or daughter who receives shares as outright gifts will be 
taxed on dividends arising from such shares; but the parent who makes 
the gift will be taxed on dividends if-
(i) the donor-parent can sti ll control and retain a benefit in the 
given shares, or 
(ii) the gift is a right to receive income (dividends), or 
(iii) the gift that is made is subject to conditions, or 
(iv) the gift that is made will be applicable for the benefit of the 
donor-parent or returned to the donor-parent in the future, 
except where the gift reverts to the donor-parent as an estate. 
In thi s regard, the term adult should include lawful, adopted and illegitimate 
son or daughter. 
toss An illegitimate child under Thai Family Law means a child whose parents fail to make marriage 
re~istration at the Registrar's Office. 
10 6 A minor under Thai Family Law means:-
( I) a person whose age is under 20, or 
(2; a person whose age is under 17 and unmarried. 
10 7 An adult under Thai Family Law means:-
( I) a person whose age is above 20, or 
(2) a person whose age is above 17 and married. 
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Thirdly, the rules in Paragraphs Two and Three of Section 40 (4) only 
prevent tax avoidance by the shifting of shares from parents to children, but do not 
prevent the shifting of interest income or the transfer of bank accounts from parents 
to children. To close this loophole, the rules in Paragraphs Two and Three of Section 
40 (4) should also apply to the shifting of interest income or the transfer of bank 
accounts from parents to minor children. In this regard, the term minor should 
include lawful, adopted and illegitimate child. 
Furthermore, in order to prevent the shifting of interest income or the 
transfer of bank accounts from parents to an adult son or daughter, the rules on 
settlement and outright gifts in Section 624 (1) and Section 626 (1) (2) (3) (4) ofthe 
ITTOIA 2005 should be adapted into Thai law. The adaptation in this case should be 
similar to that tor preventing the transfer of shares from parents to their adult son or 
daughter as discussed above. In this regard, the term adult should include lawful, 
adopted and illegitimate son or daughter. 
Fourthly, the rules in Paragraphs Two and Three of Section 40 (4) do not 
prevent the shifting of rental from parents to children. Additionally, a person who is 
a lessor need not be the owner of leased premises.1058 If the parents who own 
property want to let it, they may make a lease contract under the name of their son or 
daughter as a lessor. Consequently, the rental income will be treated as that of the 
child who is liable to income tax. This is tax avoidance by shifting rental from 
parents to children. To prevent this form of tax avoidance, the following five 
measures are recommended. 
(a) The child's rental income should be treated as the income of the father, if 
such chi ld is a minor, or as the income of the parent who exercises 
parental power. In other words, the rules in Paragraphs Two and Three of 
Section 40 ( 4) should also apply in this case. 
(b) The rental arising from a lease contract made under the name of an adult 
son or daughter as a lessor will be treated as that of the parent who is the 
owner of the leased property. 
1058 Section 537, CCCT 
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(c) The parent who lets out property and thereafter transfers the right to 
receive the rental to an adult son or daughter will be taxed on such 
mcome. 
(d) Where the parent transfers property (such as land and buildings) to an 
adult son or daughter in order for them to Jet it out later on, the transferor-
parent will be taxed on the rental income if-
(i) the transferor-parent or his/her spouse can still control and 
retain an interest in the transferred property, 
(ii) the transferred property is subject to any condition under 
which the transferor-parent or his/her spouse may benefit, or 
(iii) the transferred property could be appl i.cable for the benefit of 
the transferor-parent or his/her spouse or returned to the 
transferor-parent or his/her spouse in the future, except where 
the transferred property reverts to the transferor-parent or 
his/her spouse as an estate. 
(e) The tenn minor should include lawful, adopted and illegitimate child. The 
tenn adult should include lawful, adopted and illegitimate son or 
daughter. 
Measures (c) and (d) are adapted from the rules on settlements and outright 
gifts in Section 624 (1) Section 626 (1) (2) (3) (4) ofthe ITTOIA 2005. 
6. Conclusion 
Neither joint nor individual taxation is better than the other. The transformation of 
one system into another may bring about efficiency of taxation but discourage equity, 
or vice versa. The following methods would reduce the conflict between them. 
Firstly, the rules of separate assessment under Thai law should be revised to 
reduce the discretion of the assessment officer. 
Secondly, the rules of wife's election under Thai law should be abolished. 
Thirdly, the progressive rate structure, which contains low MTRs together 
with few and wide tax bands, should be used with joint taxation. This would help 
reduce the disincentive effect while achieving equity. This type of rate structure also 
helps reduce inequity and maintain efficiency under individual taxation. 
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Fourthly, the abolition of a married couple's allowance is supported on the 
grounds that it has lessened inequity between married and single taxpayers while 
increasing efficiency under individual taxation. 
Fifthly, Thai law should provide an allowance for the taxpayer' s spouse only 
to a manied person whose spouse stays at home because of old age, poor health, or 
the necessity of staying at home to care for relatives. 
Sixthly, the additional personal allowance available to a childless married 
person whose spouse stays at home but cannot do housework because of old age, 
poor health, or the need to stay at home to care for a relative should be introduced to 
individual taxation. 
Seventhly, UK anti-avoidance rules should be supported. They help prevent 
tax avoidance by the transfer of property between spouses and by the transfer of 
property to an unmarried child under 18, a married child under 18 or a child over 18. 
Consequently, they encourage equity and efficiency. 
Finally, the rules on settlements and outright gifts should be adapted to Thai 
law. This would close loopholes to avoid tax by shifting investment income from 
parents to children. 
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Chapter Five 
Efficiency in Tax L egisla tion and Administration 
1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses efficiency in Thai and UK tax legislation and administration. 
Simplicity and certainty of tax laws are supposed to help tax policies and optimal tax 
structures to promote efficiency of taxation and the equity of income redistribution. 
Meanwhile, simple, certain and convenient methods of tax collection are believed to 
help generate efficiency in tax administration, which would reduce administrative 
and compliance costs and prevent tax avoidance and evasion. 
2. Characteristics and effects of efficient tax legislation and administration 
Complex legislation is difficult to understand, making it hard to comply with and 
administer, and contributing to high compliance and administrative costs. 1059 
Complexity also leads to tax avoidance and evasion, arbitrariness and bribery. 1060 
Simplicity and certainty of tax laws and simple, certain and convenient methods of 
tax collection are therefore believed to have the opposite effects. This view is well 
supported. 1061 
However, Morse and Williams argue that: 
"The simpler the rules are, the less fair they are (because they ignore justified 
differences). But the fairer they are, the more complex they are. The more 
complex they are, the harder they are to understand and put into effect. 
Therefore, they are less certain and, arguably, appear less fair. If both 
simplicity and complexity lead to unfairness, is there a happy medium?"1062 
I agree that the complex rules bring about fairness. Complex rules result from 
a complex policy on the tax structure. However, the complex rules are difficult to 
understand, to comply with and to administer. There are two stages to making the 
rules less complex and bringing about fairness at the same time. 
1059 Sandford, op.cit.(note58), p. I 55; The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.290; and James and Nobes, 
o£ocit.(note5), pp.38-39 
1 The World Bank, op.cit.(notel 12), pp.26-27 
1061 The Musgraves, op.cit.(note5), p.291; and The World Bank, op.cit.(notel12), p.7 
1062 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(notel5), p.8 
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First, we must use a Jess complex policy on tax structures, for example a 
policy on optimal tax structures as proposed in Chapters Two, Three, and Four. As 
we saw, optimal tax structures can be achieved by less complex rules. Although mles 
on optimal tax structures are less complex than some possibi lities, they can still 
promote fairness and efficiency of taxation. For example, optimal tax rates that 
require few marginal tax rates and tax bands, and the optimal tax base that require 
the abolition and maintenance of certain tax reliefs could reduce tax burdens on low-
income earners, and administrative and compliance costs. 
Secondly, the rules will be easy to comprehend and to access and bring about 
fairness simultaneously, when a policy on optimal tax structures is enacted to 
become a tax law, if its characteristics (i.e. the structure of tax code, the wording of 
tax provisions and the rules of structural elements) are simple and certain. 
Simplicity and certainty in tax laws 
'Simplicity' of the tax law should mean that 
(a) the structure of tax code or a set of tax provisions is straightforward and 
consistent; and that 
(b) the wording of tax provisions is plain, understandable, straightforward 
and consistent. 
As the Meade Report notes, "a good tax system should be coherent, simple, 
and straightforward." 1063 · 
Meanwhile, 'certainty' of the tax law should mean that 
(a) rules on structural elements (including tax rates, tax base, and tax unit) 
are clear, reliable, foreseeable and non-arbitrary; 
(b) the wording of tax provisions is clear and unambiguous; and that 
(c) the structure of tax code must be clear. 
Many scholars support and comment on these tenns. As regards (a), Tiley 
notes, "certainty means first that the scope of the tax should be clear." 1064 Smith also 
claims (a) that "the tax which an individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and 
not arbitrary." 1065 Similarly, Eckstein notes, "tax collectors should have little 
1063 IFS, op.cit.(note98), p.18 
1064 Tiley, op.cit.(note 141 ), p. ll 
1065 Adam Smith, The Wealth ofNations, Edwin Cannan, ed. (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 
888. 
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discretion about how much to assess taxpayers." 1066 Richupan suppo11s both (a) and 
(b) that a good tax must be clear with regard to tax rates, tax base, and tax unit; and 
that tax provisions must employ clear and undoubted wording. 1067 Pinitpuvadol also 
supports both (a) and (b) that rules on tax structures must be enacted clearly and 
unambiguously so that taxpayers can calculate the taxes they will pay. 1068 
Simple, certain and convenient methods of tax collection 
'Simple ' should mean easy, plain and straightforward without complication. 
'Certain ' should mean transparent. 
Smith supports these two meanings. As he notes, "the time of payment, the 
manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought to be clear and plain to the 
contributor, and to every other person."1069 Tanzi and Zee also support these two 
meanings. As they note, "the system should have simple and transparent 
administrative procedures so that it is clear if the system is not being enforced as 
designed."1070 Pinitpuvadol understands 'certain' methods to mean that tax 
assessment and collection must be enacted clearly and unambiguously. 1071 
As regards 'convenient' methods, Smith notes, "every tax ought to be levied 
at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the 
contributor to pay it."1072 However, the place, time and methods of collection and 
payment of taxes should be convenient not only for taxpayers but also for tax-
gatherers. 
Effects of efficient tax legislation on efficiency of taxation 
If tax laws are enacted under the definition of simplicity above, it will be easy 
for taxpayers to understand and to comply with them, and easy for tax-gatherers to 
understand and administer them. This will result m low compliance and 
administrative costs. Additionally, it is likely that few tax loopholes result from 
simplicity. 
1066 Eckstein, op.cit.(note49), p.58 
1067 Somchai Richupan, "General Knowledge of Taxation", RD Tax Journal, Year 29, Issue 5, p.l78 
1068 Supparak Pinitpuvadol, Fiscal and Taxation law (Bangkok: Vinyuchon, 1999}, 67. 
1069 Smith, op.cit.(note 1 065), p.888 
1070 Tanzi and Zee, op.cit.(notel08), p.6 
1071 Pinitpuvadol, op.cit.(note 1 068), p.67 
1072 Smith, op.cit.(note 1 065), p.889 
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One cause of tax loopholes is the complexity of many tax provisions. For 
example, " the more exemptions, concessions, reliefs, etc accorded within a tax , the 
more opportunities for avoidance are created." 1073 A reduction in tax provisions (e.g. 
by abol ishing certain tax reliefs) is likely to reduce legal complexity and close tax 
loopholes. Ln the UK, during the 1980s and 1990s, there was an attempt to reduce a 
number of provisions relating to tax rel iefs to simplify the legislation and close tax 
loopholes. 1074 
Another cause of tax loopholes is that complex legislation, which is difficult 
to understand and interpret, causes disputes over the language in tax provisions. Such 
disputes lead to loopholes for tax avoidance. Simplicity would close such loopholes 
because it is not difficult to understand and to interpret simple rules and words. 
Consequently, disputable language would not be found in tax provisions. 
If tax laws are enacted under the term 'certainty' above, tax avoidance and 
evasion will be reduced. Clear, reliable and foreseeable rules help determine the 
precise amount of tax due. Consequently, they will prevent any opportunity for tax 
avoidance. They will also prevent tax evasio.n because they make it "more easily 
detectable."1075 Consequently, administrative costs on the prevention and detection of 
tax evasion wi ll be reduced. 
Additionally, if tax laws do not rely on arbitrary decisions, tax-gatherers will 
have less chance to abuse their power in collecting taxes or to take b-ribes. 
Conversely, "the uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favours the 
corruption of an order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are 
neither insolent nor corrupt." 1076 Consequently, discouraging the abuse of power and 
corruption of tax-gatherers will help increase tax revenue. 
Effects of efficient tax collection on efficiency of taxation 
If collecting methods are established under the terms 'simple, certain and 
convenient', taxpayers and tax-gatherers will save resources in paying and levying 
tax. Low compliance costs are likely further to reduce resentment and resistance to 
pay tax, discouraging tax evasion. 
1073 Sandford, op.cit.(note58), p.161 
1074 Lymer, et al., op.cit.(notel20), pp.1 /20-1 /21 
1075 Adrian Shipwright and Elizabeth Keeling, Textbook on Revenue Law (London: Blackstone Press 
Limited, 1997), 11. 
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Fm1hem1ore, tax evasion will be probab.ly discouraged because it is easily 
discovered under certain or transparent methods. Certain or transparent methods also 
provide fewer opportunities for tax-gatherers to abuse their power and to take bribes. 
Moreover, tax avoidance is li kely to be prevented because simple and certain 
methods will reduce complication in collection. This will further reduce tax 
loopholes and avoid disputes in collection methods. 
It can be concluded that simplicity and certainty of tax laws and simple, 
certain and convenient methods of tax collection generate low compliance and 
administrative costs and prevent tax avoidance and evasion, arbitrariness and bribery. 
This encourages efficiency of taxation. 
Effects of efficient tax legislation and collection on income redistribution 
As noted in Chapter One, any means of encouraging efficiency of taxation 
would further promote income redistribution. Simple and certain tax laws and 
simple, certain and convenient methods of tax collection facilitate greater equitable 
redistribution of income. This is because: 
(a) they would prevent avoidance and evasion (such prevention promotes 
both efficiency of taxation and redistribution, as discussed in previous 
chapters); and 
(b) they would raise more tax revenue because there would be (i) more 
people willing to pay tax because of lower costs on compliance, (ii) less 
tax avoidance and evasion, and (iii) less arbitrariness and bribery. 
Greater tax revenue would contribute to a greater transfer of resources via the 
tax system to the system of public expenditure. Consequently, the poorest would be 
better off from improvements in public services. Furthermore, low- and middle-
income groups would also be better off from better public services funded by greater 
tax revenue. Moreover, lower costs of tax compliance incurred by these groups 
would encourage equity because these groups would bear a smaller burden in the 
taxing process. 
1076 Smith, op.cit.(note I 065), p.889 
284 
3. Acts of Parliament and legislative process 
3.1 Features and problems 
As noted above, efficient tax legislation must be simple and certain. Here, I will 
examine whether Thai and UK primary tax laws satisfy this criterion and the passing 
of taxing Acts in both countries produces simple and certain legislation. 
3.1 .1 Acts of Thai Parliament and legislative process 
The main source of Thai tax law is Acts ofParliament. 1077 Parliament is the supreme 
institution of the state with power to enact tax laws subject to the Constitution. 1078 
Under the Constitution, the enactment of taxing Act depends on the introduction by 
members of the House of Representatives with the endorsement of the Prime 
Minister. 1079 A taxing bill is enacted as taxing Act when it is examined and consented 
by the National Assembly. 1080 
The National Assembly or Parliament consists of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. Members of the House of Representatives and of the 
Senate are elected by Thai citizens. Therefore, Thai taxing Acts are subject to 
political debate and proper parliamentary scrutiny. This complies with a good tax 
system which requires tax legislation to be enacted by statute and "subject to proper 
democratic scrutiny by Parliament." 1081 
Parliament has the right to pass taxing Acts at any time to impose taxes or 
duties, or to make changes to existing tax provisions (deletions from or amendments 
to existing provisions, or the introduction of new provisions). Nevertheless, such 
changes have not contributed to legal complexity and confusion. Evidence for this is 
that between 1938 and 1998, there were 310 sections in the Revenue Code of 
Thailand (the RCT) although changes to the RCT were made 54 times during this 
1077 These include the Excise Tax Act, the Customs Act, and the Act promulgating the Revenue Code 
governing PIT, VAT, corporation tax, specific business tax, and stamp duty. 
1078 The provisions of the Constitution concerned are found in Appendix I to C hapter Five. 
1079 Sections 92, 93 and 169, the Constitution 
1080 Section 92, the Constitution 
1081 Francesca Lagerberg, "Ten Tax Tenets", Taxation, 28 October 1999, p.76 
285 
period.1082 There are presently 311 sections m the RCT. Reasons why Acts of 
Parliament have not caused complexity and confusion are that: 
(a) Parliament does not pass taxing Acts to change tax prov1s1ons 
frequently, 1083 nor pass an annual Finance Act in re lation to taxation 108-t; 
and 
(b) Thailand has adopted the system of codification. 
Codification makes Thai primary tax Jaw to satisfy the criteria of simplicity 
and certainty because according to this codification, there is a single/parent Act (e.g. 
the RCT) with a consistent and well-organized structure. All changes to the parent 
Act by any subsequent Act of Parliament (e.g. the Revenue Code Amendment Act) 
will be placed in that structure. Such changes will therefore result in consistency of a 
set of tax provisions in that structure (i.e. compliance with simplicity) and not create 
confusion and difficulty in the application of tax law (i.e. compliance with certainty). 
3.1.2 Acts of UK Parliament and legislative process 
The main source of UK tax law is Acts of Parliament. Parliament has the sole 
authority to enact tax laws as shown in Article 4 of the Bill of Rights (1688) which 
provides: 
"That levying money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence of 
prerogative without grant of Parliament for longer time or in other manner 
than the same is or shall be granted is illegal." 
It may be surprising that while so much of the UK legal system is based on 
common law, there is no tax based on common law. 1085 Therefore, if British people 
want to know whether or not they are subject to taxes, they need initially to seek Acts 
of Parliament imposing taxes1086 rather than a court decision. 
However, since the UK has been a member state of the European Community 
(now the European Union), there has been a limitation on the sovereignty of the UK 
1082 Suthep Pongpitak, "Question-Answer", RD Tax Journal, Year 46, Issue 4, pp.69 and 73. 
1083 Instead, Thai tax provisions are frequently changed by delegated legislation. 
IOS4 Each year Parliament is only required to pass an Act in connection with the Government's public 
s~ending plans ("the Annual Budget Expenditure Act.") 
1 85 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(notel5}, p.35 
1086 These include theTA 1988, the !TEPA 2003, and the ITTOIA 2005 (as well as annual Finance 
Acts). 
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Parliament by the EC Treaty, and this includes tax matters. As Tena and Wattel 
confinn, "several fundamental principles of the EC Treaty limit Member States' 
freedom to arrange their national tax systems."1087 The EC Treaty contains tax 
provisions which influence the power of enactment of the UK Parliament. 1088 
Parliament has the right to pass annual Finance Acts to amend existing 
provisions and to introduce new provisions to tax statutes. income tax and 
corporation tax must be reimposed each year by the annual Finance Act. Income tax 
and corporation tax are also known as "annual taxes". 
Each year (in March or April) the Chancellor of the Exchequer presents to 
Parliament the Budget proposing both the Government's revenue and taxation plans 
(the reimposition of annual taxes, amendments to existing tax statutes, and the 
introduction of new tax rules) and its public expenditure plans. The taxation matters 
announced in the Budget are incorporated in the annual Finance Bill . When 
Parliament passes the Bill under parliamentary procedures and the Bill is 
subsequently given the Royal Assent, the Bill will become law in the form of the 
Finance Act of that year. 
Regarding parliamentary procedures, after the Budget debate1089, the Finance 
Bill is proceeded to the following stages: First Reading, Second Reading, 
Committee, Report and Third Reading. 109° First Reading is a formality at present. 1091 
Second Reading is a general debate. 1092 Regarding the Committee Stage, "after the 
Second Reading debate, certain clauses are committed to a Committee of the whole 
House1091, and the remainder to a Standing Committee of about 30 members who 
consider every clause and Schedule, make amendments and add new clauses."1094 At 
the Report Stage, "the House of Commons reconsiders the Bill as amended at the 
1087 Ben Terra and Peter Wattel, European Tax Law, 2"d ed. (London: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), 2. 
1088 The provisions concerned can be found in Appendix U to Chapter Five. 
1089 Maas notes that "the Budget debate, i.e. the debate on the Ways and Means resolutions, is a 
general debate, not directed at specific provisions." (Robert Maas, "Why Parliament Fails Taxpayers", 
The Tax Journal, Issue 536, Monday, 21 February 2000, II .) 
1090 Simon's Direct Tax Servic:Binder 2, op.cit.(note79) p.ll 06 
1091 Maas, op.cit.(notel 089), p.ll 
1092 ibid.p.l l 
1093 Maas notes that "from 1968 onwards only a few clauses, selected by the Opposition, are debated 
in a Committee of the whole House [;] [the] remainder of the Bill is considered by a Standing 
Committee." (ibid.p. ll ) 
1094 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder 2, op.cit.(note79), pp.1106-1107 
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Committee Stage." 1095 In other words, at the Report Stage, "only new clauses, and 
clauses and Schedules to which amendments are proposed, are discussed."1096 At the 
Third Reading Stage, " there is usually a short debate" and there is no amendment to 
the Bill. 1097 
When the Finance Bill has been passed by the House of Commons, it may be 
certified as a "money bill" by the Speaker. 1098 Additionally, the Bill is reprinted as 
amended and is presented to the House of Lords for consideration. 1099 After the Bill 
is given Second and Third Readings by the House of Lords, the Bill will receive the 
Royal Assent and become the Finance Act. 11 00 Where the House of Lords has not 
passed the Bill within one month, the Bill can become an Act if it is certified as a 
money bill. 11 01 Section 1 (2), Parliament Act 1911 defines a money bill as ''one 
dealing only with matters of national (as opposed to local) taxation, public money or 
loans or their management; the Speaker's certificate is conclusive." 11 02 
Although tax provisions in annual Finance Acts are subject to parliamentary 
procedures above, they do not receive proper parliamentary scrutiny. This stems 
from at least two factors. 
First, parliamentary time does not allow for technical debate on every tax 
provision in the House of Commons. 1103 Certain tax provisions are passed without 
comment by the House of Commons.1104 Similarly, "Parliament is given little time to 
study and debate proposed legislation."1105 This stems from "a vast increase in the 
volume of parliamentary business and in particular the vast increase in the size of 
Finance Bills"1106, and "the speed of introduction of much new legislation."1107 
1095 Maas, op.cit.(notel089), p.ll 
1096 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder2, op.cit.(note79), p.ll 07 
1097 ibid.p.ll 07 
1098 ibid.p.ll07 
1099 ibid.p.ll 07 
1100 ibid.p. ll 07 
1101 ibid.p. ll 07 
1102 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.49 
1103 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(notel5}, p.36 
1104 "b"d 36 I I .p. 
1105 Lagerberg, op.cit.(note I 081 ), p.76 
1106 Maas, op.cit.(note I 089), p.ll 
1107 Lagerberg, op.cit.{note I 081 ), p.76 
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AdditionaJly, parliamentary time is "dominated by the needs of the Budget, rather 
than the Finance Bill which follows." 1108 
Secondly, even though the Finance Bill is presented to the House of Lords, 
the House of Lords has no power to initiate or amend tax provisions.1109 This is 
because the House of Commons ' financial privileges limit the powers of the House 
of Lords. 111 0 Likewise, " the powers of the House of Lords are Limited in relation to a 
money bill." 1111 It is noted that " in practice the House of Lords has never sought to 
amend or reject a Finance Bill since its rejection of the 1909 BiJl precipitated the 
passage of the 1911 Parliament Act."111 2 
Amendment to existing tax statutes and the introduction of new rules by the 
enactment of annual Finance Acts make UK tax legislation flexible to economic and 
social changes. The question arises whether this enactment makes UK tax legislation 
complex. The enactment in respect of the reimposition of income tax (charge and 
rates) which includes the adjustment of personal tax allowances and tax bands for 
price inflation every year does not make UK legislation more complex. This IS 
because it does not increase the number of tax provisions from previous years. 
However, annual Finance Acts that change other existing tax statutes and 
introduce new tax rules increase the number of tax provisions.111 3 The growth in the 
volume of tax legislation result in legal complexity. 1114 Tiley refers to Butterworths 
Yellow and Orange Tax Handbooks (2004-05) and notes, "the number of pages of 
UK legislation on income and corporation tax and CGT (and statutory instruments) 
1108 Geoffrey Howe, "Tax Law Simplification in the United Kingdom", Further Key Issues In Tax 
Reform, Cedric Sandford ed., (Bath: Fiscal Publications, 1998), 92. 
·
1109 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder2, op.cit.(note79), p.ll 07 
1110 ibid.p.ll 07 
1111 David Collision and John Tiley, Simon's Tiley and Collision UK Tax Guide 2004-05, 22"d ed., 
(London: LexisNexis UK, 2004), 5. 
1112 TLRC, Making Tax Law: Report of a Working Party on the Institutional Processes for the 
Parliamentary Scrutiny of Tax Proposals and for the Enactment of Tax Legislation Chaired by Sir 
Alan Budd, (London: IFS, 2003), 4. 
1113 For example, the Finance Act 2002 added "another 500 or so pages to the already enormous mass 
of tax legislation." (Arnold Homer and Rita Burrows, Tolley's Tax Guide 2002-2003, 21st ed. (Surrey: 
Lexis Nexis Butterworths Tolley, 2002), xliv.) 
1114 Adam Broke, "Simplification of Tax or I Wouldn' t Start from Here", British Tax Review 2000 
(London: Sweet&Maxwell, 2000), p.l9 
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[in these handbooks) amounted to 6,908." 111 5 However, in 1968- 1969, "there were 
[only) 998 pages in Bullenvorths Yello w Tax Handbooks."1116 
Additionally, annual Finance Acts create legal complexity by making 
frequent changes to the same legislation year after year. 1117 Furthem1ore, annual 
Finance Acts which introduce specific anti-avoidance provisions1118 contribute to the 
large number of complex provisions. 1119 Moreover, annual Finance Acts which 
contain very long or highly detai led provisions result in complexity. As Wallworth 
notes, "tax law is written in traditional legal language, full of ... very long sentences 
in which subclauses are nested several deep so that when one reaches the end of the 
sentence one has forgotten how it began or what it is about."1120 
It has been found that the frequency of change in tax law, the introduction of 
anti-avoidance provisions, and the growth in the number and length of tax provisions 
(through annual Finance Acts) stem from many factors, including the need to: 
• keep up with and respond to "an increasing~y global and sophisticated 
business environment"1121 , 
• respond to "changes in the general legal framework within which 
businesses and other taxpayers operate" 1122, 
• avoid " injustice in special cases"1123 or implement "the desire for 
faimess" 1124; and 
• ensure legal certainty, which reqmres more detailed and prectse 
provisions.1125 
In addition to causing complexity, annual Finance Acts make UK tax laws 
lacking in clarity and almost in their inaccessibility to anybody except for skilled 
practitioners. This results from (a) the language used, (b) the style of drafting and (c) 
the lack of structure. 
1115 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.S l 
1116 ibid.p.51 
1117 Howe, op.cit.( note I I 08), p.89 
1118 This issue will be further discussed in subsection 6.2. 
1119 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), pp.viii and x.iii. 
112° Christopher Wallworth, "Simplifying the System", Taxation, 25 January 1996, p.413 
1121 Howe, op.cit.(note II 08), p.89 
1122 ibid.p.89 
1123 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(notel5), p.43 
1124 Richard Baron, "Why Is Tax Complex", The Tax Journal, Issue 469, Monday, 28 September 
1998, p.7 
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As regards (a), a result of tax statutes amended and supplemented by annual 
Finance Acts, tax statutes consist of archaic language and modem language. As 
Lagerberg notes, "some are relics from another age, while others are of a more 
modem vintage."1126 
As regards (b), "the trend in fiscal legisl.ation has been towards ever tighter 
drafting in an attempt to forestall avoidance." 1127 To prevent tax avoidance, the Tax 
Law Review Committee (the TLRC) notes that the draftsman uses a particular style 
"which avoids narrative passages or any repetition, but expressly links different parts 
of the text."1128 Likewise, tax legislation is w1itten in "an impenetrable style with no 
obvious way in." 1129 Additionally, the income tax Jaw is written in a "convoluted 
style."1130 
As r egards (c), it is hard to find all the law dealing with a particular tax 
because the provisions of annual Finance Acts must be read in conjunction with the 
principal taxing Act. 11 31 Likewise, the tax legislation is lacking in structure. 1132 Tiley 
notes that the legislation is understood when "one goes to secondary sources such as 
Hansard or the Inland Revenue background Materials where these are available." 11 33 
Parliament has dealt with the above difficulty by adopting the system of 
consolidation, i.e. all the provisions (from various Acts) dealing with a particular tax 
is consolidated into a new Act from time to time. 11 34 As regards the law relating to 
income tax, it was consolidated in ·1918, 1952, 1970 and 1988. 11 35 However, there 
are still problems arising from consolidation, namely: 
(a) "its language and approach are not always consistent, and the old words 
are used in the consolidation legislation which are not always appropriate 
to modem conditions"1136· 
' 
1125 Howe, op.cit.(note ll08), p.89; and Wallworth,op.cit.(note 1120), p.411 
1126 Lagerberg, op.cit.(note1081), p.76 
1127 Broke, op.cit.(note lll4), p.l9 
1128 TLRC, Interim Rep011 on Tax Legislation (London: IFS, 1995), 5. 
1129 ibid.p.5 
1130 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(notel5), p.51 
1131 Wallworth,op.cit.(note 1120), p.412 
1132 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.45 
1133 ibid.p.50 
1134 Melville, op.cit.(note 541 ), p.4 
1135 Tiley, op.cit.(note141), p.45 
And in effect the new statutes deriving from the Tax Law Rewrite Project involve consolidation. 
1136 Shipwright and Keeling, op.cit.(note I 075), pp.51-52 
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(b) a consolidation Act "can create its own problems of 
. . , 1137 d mterpretatJon ; an 
(c) "frequent consolidating Acts are a source of major inconvenience to 
practitioners, who have to learn new section numbers and , usually, a new 
structure." 1 138 
3.2 Improvements 
3.2.1 Improvement in Thai primary legislation and legislative process 
As we saw, the Thai Parliament is not required to pass annual Finance Acts in 
relation to taxation. Consequently, there is no adjustment of tax allowances and 
bands for inflation every year. Additionally, although Parliament can enact taxing 
Acts at any time, there may be a delay of Acts of Parliament to deal with economic 
and social changes if there is a delay by members of the House of Representatives 
(who are not directly responsible for taxation) to introduce a taxing bill. As a taxing 
bill is a money bill, it must be introduced to Parliament by members of the House of 
Representatives with the endorsement of the Prime Minister, under section 169, the 
Constitution. 
If there were an annual compulsory Act relating to taxation introduced by the 
government (who is directly responsible for taxation), this would make Thai tax 
legislation more flexible to respond to social and commercial changes in addition to 
more equitable (because adjustment of tax allowances and bands for inflation would 
be made annually). I therefore propose to adapt the concept of an annual compulsory 
Act relating to taxation. 
The enactment of the proposed Act would be subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution. It would make Thai tax legislation greatly efficient (simple and certain) 
if four subject-matters below were implemented. 
First, section 169 of the Constitution must be amended to enable the Thai 
government to introduce a money bill. 
1137 Michael Wyatt, "A Futuristic Framework", Taxation, 12 December 1996, p.302 
1138 ibid.p.302 
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Secondly, the proposed Act must be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny. As 
noted above, a taxing bill is examined by the House of Representatives and the 
Senate. This ensures that the proposed biJI would receive full parliamentary scrutiny. 
Additionally, the proposed bi ll should be presented to Parliament at a different 
timetable from the Annual Budget Expenditure Bill to allow Parliament to have 
much time to study and debate the proposed bill. 
Thirdly, the process of public consultation before a bill to be presented to 
Parliament should be taken by the Revenue Department to enhance the quality of the 
proposed Act. This process should be adopted from that in the UK (to be discussed 
below.) 
Fourthly, the proposed Act must not make Thai tax legislation unClear, 
inaccessible, incomprehensible and complex. To make Thai tax legislation clear, 
accessible and comprehensible, the wording in the proposed Act must be plain, 
unambiguous, straightforward, consistent, and not contain jargon and archaic words. 
Language should also not be too tight (e.g. no narrative passages and repetition) into 
which users cannot find a way. Furthermore, provisions in the proposed Act should 
not contain very long sentences, nor be written in a convoluted style (e.g. the use of 
much cross references.) The proposed Act should be written from detailed viewpoint 
to ensure legal precision and certainty. 
The proposed Act would not tremendously increase the volume of tax 
legislation and legal complexity. This is because: 
(a) there would be no provision for the reimposition of income tax and 
corporation tax (charge and rates) since these taxes are not annual taxes in 
Thailand; 
(b) the adj ustment of tax allowances and bands for inflation every year would 
not increase the number of tax provisions; and 
(c) the introduction of new rules and amendments to the Revenue Code 
would be made where clearly inevitable and necessary (to be discussed 
more below). 
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3.2.2 Improvement in UK primary legislation and legislative process 
In this subsection, I will examine and discuss (a) the improvement of parliamentary 
process, (b) the improvement for clearer and simpler primary legislation, and (c) 
solutions to the problems of consolidation. 
3.2.2.1 Improvement of parliamentary process 
As we saw, annual Finance Acts have not received proper parliamentary scrutiny, 
resulting from the time constraints for scrutinizing the Finance Bills and the 
limitation of the powers of the House of Lords in relation to a money bill. Here, I 
will examine and discuss the improvement of parliamentary process for proper 
scrutiny of tax legislation. 
Greater time for the Pre-Budget Report 
The first improvement is the greater time allowed to debate the Pre-Budget 
Report. 11 39 The Pre-Budget report is presented in November of the previous year. 
The Budd Committee Report says, "this provides the Chancellor with the opportunity 
to expose for debate measures that he is currently considering for the following 
spring Budget."1140 However, "the House of Commons has not taken advantage of 
this earlier notification to debate the government's proposals more extensively." 1141 
The process of the Pre-Budget Report in Parliamentary terms starts with a 
government statement by the Chancellor proposing changes in the tax system and 
spending plans 1142, and "followed by responses from the Opposition front bench and 
questions from backbenchers." 1143 In each of 2000, 2001 and 2002, this whole 
process took under 2 hours.1144 
The Budd Committee Report proposes that Parliament should allow more 
time to debate the Pre-Budget Report. 1145 The advantage is that Members of the 
House of Commons could have more time for scrutinizing the government's tax 
proposals (before the Chancellor presents them in his spring Budget). And this would 
1139 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1112),p.l 
1140 .b.d 7 I I .p. 
1141 ibid.p.7 
1142 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.27 
1143 TLRC, op.cit.(notelll2), p.7 
1144 ibid.p.7 
1145 .b .d 7 I I .p. 
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give Parliament a chance to engage in the parliamentary process to scrutinse tax 
legislation at an earlier stage1146, which would help improve the quality of the annual 
Finance Act. 
Extension for the deadline for enacting the annual Finance Bill 
The resolutions of the Houses of Commons on tax measures announced in the 
Budget shall have temporary effect even though the Finance Act has not become the 
law. The temporary statutory effect to tax measures through Budget Resolutions 
derived from the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1913 (now PCT A 1968). 1147 It 
is noted that "[tax] measures given temporary effect in Budget Resolutions must be 
enacted by early August."1148 Therefore, the time allowed for parliamentary scrutiny 
is restricted from the spring Budget to early August. 
The Budd Committee Report proposes that the time required by the PCTA 
1968 for giving this temporary statutory effect (and therefore the deadline for the 
enactment of annual Finance Bill) should be extended "from 5 August to 5 October 
for resolutions passed in February or March (and from four to six months for 
resolutions passed at other tirnes)." 11 49 This extension would give Parliament more 
time to scrutinize tax measures before they are enacted. This would be another 
improvement of parliamentary process to scrutinize tax legislation. 
However, the government should not use this extension to introduce other 
new tax measures, particularly "substantial change to the Finance Bill increasing 
taxation or otherwise unfavourable to taxpayers." 11 50 This is because Parliament 
may have fulfilled its obligation to scrutinize and authorize particular tax measures, 
and have little time to scrutinize those other measures. This would affect the quality 
of tax legislation. 
Split of the Finance Bill into two 
It is argued that if the annual Finance Bill were split into two (namely a short 
Finance Bill and a technical bill), this would solve the time constraints. 1151 A short 
Finance Bill would contain "provisions relating to the setting of tax rates and 
1146 'b 'd 9 I I .p. 
1147 The history ofPCT A 1968 can be found in Appendix ill. 
1148 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1112), p.8 
1149 'b 'd 2 I I .p. 
1150 'b'd 9 I I .p. 
1151 Maas, op.cit.(note1 089), p.l1 
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allowances" 1152, or "measures that, for administrative or practical reasons, need to be 
enacted within a shot1 time of their Budget announcement." 11 53 Meanwhile, a 
technical bill would contain " the detailed anti-avoidance provisions, the changes to 
the existing rules to make them work effectively and other technical provisions that 
II -4 do not require Budget secrecy." :> 
There is a proposal that a short Finance Bill would be presented to Parliament 
as usual, whilst " it might not be necessary to have a teclmical bill every year [,] 
perhaps every 18 months or every two years would suffice." 1155 The introduction of a 
teclmical bill to Parliament at a different timetable from a short Finance Bill would 
reduce the speed of introduction of much new legislation and give Parliament much 
time for scrutinizing anti-avoidance provisions and other changes to the existing 
rules as proposed in a technical bill. 
Nevertheless, Governments have resisted the above proposal on the grounds 
that "there is no easy way to separate tax measures into two Bills and that 
Parliamentary time may not be forthcoming for [a technical bill] which is not subject 
to any special time constraints."1156 Additionally, 
"Even if one assumes that Parliamentary time would be forthcoming for [a 
technical bill] , it is unlikely that any of the Treasury, Revenue Departments 
or taxpayers would wish to extend unduly the time allowed to enact tax 
legislation. The Treasury and Revenue Departments will wish to move on to 
the next Pre-Budget and Budget cycle without the distraction of legislation in 
Parliament, and taxpayers are likely to prefer the greater certainty that the 
fmal enactment of the legislation brings. The Finance Bill also cannot 
realistically be included amongst legislative measures that can carry over to 
another Parliamentary session. " 1157 
Due to the above objections, the proposal for splitting the annual Finance Bill 
into two could not really happen in the UK. 
1152 Simon McKie, "For Heaven' s Sake, Just Leave Us Alone", The Tax Journal, Issue 586, Monday, 
5 March 2001 , 12. 
1153 TLRC, op.cit.(note lll2), p.8 
1154 Maas, op.cit.(note 1 089), p. ll 
1155 ibid.p.ll 
1156 TLRC, op.cit.(note1112), p.9 
1157 "b"d 9 I I .p. 
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Powers of the House of Lords 
It has been found that "the House of Commons has neither the time nor the 
expertise nor, apparently, the inclination to under1ake any systematic or effective 
examination of whatever tax rules the government of the day places before it for its 
approval." 11 58 As we saw, the House of Lords has no power to interfere in and amend 
tax provisions. However, this House must certainly have members who have the tax 
exper1ise, which would help the House of Commons improve the parliamentary 
process for proper scrutiny of tax legislation. This can be deduced from the Budd 
Committee Report. 11 59 
It is also noted that "the role of the House of Commons in authorising tax 
legislation is unique in terms of its relationship with government." 1160 This is implicit 
that the House of Lords has a less close relationship with the government than the 
House of Commons. Therefore, this House is likely to take the effective examination 
of the government> s tax proposals before enacting them as tax law. 
From the above, if the House of Lords were conferred powers to initiate or 
amend tax provisions, this would solve the problem of lack of proper parliamentary 
scrutiny of tax legislation. Broke seems to supports this proposal. As he says, 
"The House of Lords has been a very valuable forum for revision of business 
legislation - for example company law has often be~n shaped there as much 
as in the House of Commons. But nobody imagines that the present reform 
of the House of Lords will give it a revising power over fiscal legislation, 
however sensible that might seem to non-politicians." 1161 
However, the implementation of above proposal is not easy. This is not only 
because it is a political issue but also because there must be change in constitutional 
restriction. 
Pre-legislative scrutiny 
The Modernisation Committee as referred to in the Budd Committee Report 
proposes that there should be pre-legislative scrutiny. 11 62 This will help the 
1158 ibid.p.S 
1159 The Report, paragraphs 6.2 and 6.4 (ibid.p.l I) 
1160 "b"d 4 I I .p. 
1161 Broke, op.cit.(note1114), p.24 
1162 The Report, paragraph 5.4 (TLRC, op.cit.(note 1112), p.l 0) 
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Commons to scrutinise tax Bills "while they are still in draft. " 1163 However, 
" legislation is not published in draft for every tax proposal."1164 Therefore, it has 
been proposed that every tax proposal should be expressed "either as draft legislation 
or as a detailed statement [of policy] sufficient to initiate the process of Parliament 
scrutiny." 1165 
Although " the Revenue Department release in draft large amounts of tax 
legislation on particular proposals for [public] consultation"1166, the Report has found 
that Parliament does not take part in public consultation on tax proposals. 1167 
Therefore, in my view, if members of Parliament had a chance to take pre-legjslative 
scrutiny in draft or in a detailed statement of policy, this would improve the 
parliamentary process for proper scrutiny of tax legislation. However, if members of 
Parliament had no or little time to take pre-legislative scrutiny, the establ ishment of a 
Parliamentary Committee would be the mechanism for taking parliamentary pre-
legislative scrutiny. 
Establishment of a Parliamentary Committee 
The Budd Committee Report recommends that "the most effective way to 
increase Parliament's scrutiny of the government's taxation proposals would be by 
creating a Parliamentary Select Committee on Taxation."1168 The Select Committee 
would "most appropxiately be a Joint Committee of the two Houses."1169 This would 
allow "members of the House of Lords with experience of and specialist knowledge 
of tax matters, and with the time, to contribute to Parliament's consideration of these 
matters." 1 170 
The Select Committee would have the duty to scrutinize the government's tax 
proposals prior to the incorporation/introduction of tax proposals into a Finance Bill 
(or the pre-legislative function). 1171 This function might bring about fairness of 
1163 ibid.p.IO 
1164 ibid.p.l 0 
1165 ibid.p.l 0 
1166 ibid.p.IO 




11 71 The Report, paragraphs 6.3, and 6.7 (ibid.p.ll and p.l2) 
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taxation, and prevent unnecessary and poor tax policy from becoming tax law. This 
would improve tax law and make it simpler. 
As the Select Committee would deal with "current tax proposals rather than 
with legislation that was before parliament for enactment"' 172, a creation of the 
Select Committee would not violate "the current prerogati ves of the House of 
Commons in tax legislation." 11 73 That is, tax measures would continue to be debated 
according to the current Finance Bill process and " in par1icular be subject to the 
scnttiny of a Finance Bill Standing Committee." 11 74 
Never1heless, the Budd Committee Report notes that "Members of Parliament 
are not naturally equipped to conduct an effecti ve scrutiny of tax legislation at the 
legislative stages and the process of debate across the floor of the House is also 
poorly suited to the task."1175 It then proposes that "[the] task would be better 
performed by [the Select Committee], with the ability to take evidence and to arrive 
at a balanced understanding of the issues in an atmosphere that lends itself to 
question and answer as a means of resolving points in issue." 11 76 And, " [in] enacting 
the government' s tax proposals, the House will be informed by the work of the Select 
Committee on Taxation."1177 Therefore, this proposal for the Select Committee's 
function during the legislative stages ofthe Finance Bill would also help improve the 
parliamentary process for proper scrutiny of tax legislation. 
Consultative process 
In addition to the methods of improving the parliamentary process (as 
discussed above), public consultation before a taxing bill is presented to Parliament 
would improve the quality of tax legislation. This is because it can: 
• allow "the airing of views and the deliberation of issues"1178; 
• "help build upon a sound idea, turning it into good legislation" 1179; and 
1172 ibid.p. l l 
1173 ibid.p. ll 
1174 ibid. p. l2 
I I7S ibid.p. l2 
1176 ibid.p. 12 
1177 ibid.p.12 
1178 Frank Haskew and Francesca Lagerberg, "Why the taxpayer is not getting a fair chance to be 
heard", The Tax Journal, Issue 536, Monday, 21 February 2000, p.13 
11 79 ibid.p.13 
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• "be the brake on poorly conceived ideas, thus preventing them from 
becoming tax Jaw." 1180 
The UK govemment recognizes the importance of consultation. 11 R1 The 
evidence is that the Cabinet Office published its final Code of Practice on Written 
Consultation on 27 November 2000. 11 82 The Treasury and Revenue Departments 
adopt this Code when they consult publicly.1183 
According to the Cabinet Office Code, "consultation should always be as 
wide as the circumstances permit [;] [other J things being equal, public consultations 
are preferable to closed ones." 11 84 In a matter of taxation, the consultative process 
should take place from the stage of"the formulation of tax policy to the design of tax 
proposals and the detail of implementation to tax policy."1185 
The revenue authorities have certain excuses for not consulting, e.g. "market 
sensitivity, forestalling, anti-avoidance etc."1186 It is however argued that "there 
should be an obligation to consult on all other matters" unless "the measure is stated 
to be an anti-avoidance measure."1187 Additionally, the revenue authorities should 
not avoid public consultation on the grounds that consultation will lead to substantial 
revenue loss "if legislation is not brought in swiftly."1188 This is because this 
situation is rare. 1189 It is recommended that the revenue authorities can avoid 
consultation when they have serious and substantive reasons, and in such cases 
"these reasons should be made publicly available"1190 and "these reasons should be 
subject to review by a 'independent' body, for example a parliamentary 
committee."1191 
I ISO ibid.p.13 
1181 Frank Haskew, "Effective consultation: has the Government taken the pledge?'', The Tax Journal, 
Issue 586, Monday, 5 March 2001, p.16 
1182 ibid.p.16 
1183 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1112), p.6 
1184 Haskew, op.cit.(note1181), p.17 
1185 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1112), p.6 
1186 Haskew, op.cit.(note 1181 ), p.p.18 
1187 ibid.p.18 
1188 Lager berg, op.cit.(note 1081 ), p. 77 
1189 ibid.p.77 
1190 "b"d 77 I I .p. 
1191 Haskew and Lagerberg, op.cit.(note 1178), p.14 
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According to the Cabinet Office Code, "sufficient time should be allowed for 
considered responses from all groups with an interest." 1192 The standard time allowed 
for consultation is twelve weeks according to the Code. 1193 It is however argued that 
where a consultation period is less than twelve weeks, it should not be less than eight 
weeks "unless there are extenuating and publicly documented reasons why this is not 
possibl e."11 9o~ According to the Code, circumstances which unavoidably require a 
consultation period of less than twelve weeks include "those tied to the Budget or 
other annual financial cycles."1195 
Feedback from the revenue authorities should be provided during and after 
consultation. Feedback is important partly because it explains the reasoned 
exposition behind decisions of the revenue authorities. 11 96 According to the Cabinet 
Office Code, "the results [from the departments] should be made widely available, 
with an account of the views expressed and the reasons for the decisions finally 
taken" 11 97 ; and "departments should monitor and evaluate consultations, designating 
a consultation co-ordinator who will ensure the lessons are disseminated." 11 98 
From the above, public consultation is vital for developing the government's 
tax policy and producing its tax proposals to implement that policy. 1199 The good-
quality proposals would guarantee the good quality of tax legislation. Nevertheless, 
the Budd Committee Report notes that "consultation is not and should not become a 
substitute for Parliamentary scrutiny[;] (tax] proposals should move seamlessly from 
development via consultation to effective Parliamentary pre-legislative review."1200 
3.2.2.2 Improvement for clearer and simpler legislation 
In 3.1.2, I found that the present UK tax legislation is complex, lacking in clarity, 
and almost inaccessible and incomprehensible by anybody. These characteristics of 
tax legislation do not satisfy the criteria of simplicity and certainty. They result from 






1196 Haskew and Lagerberg, op.cit.(note1178), p.14 
1197 Haskew, op.cit.(note 1 181 ), p.18 
1198 ibid.p.1 8 
1199 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1112), p.7 
1200 ibid.p.7 
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many factors including language, frequent change, volume, long provisions, drafting 
style, lack of structure, anti-avoidance provisions. Thus, such factors must be 
improved to bring about clearer, simpler, more accessible and comprehensible 
legislation. 1201 
Language 
To make the language clearer and more accessible, the TLRC recommends 
that tax legislation should be written in plain English1202 and not contain jargon. 1203 
The Renton Committee as referred to in the TLRC' s report suggests using simple 
vocabulary and syntax. 1204 The following technique as referred in Wallworth is also 
recommended: 
"[To] throw out all those so-called legal words which are actually 
meaningless: any word beginning with here ... (herein, hereinafter etc.), there 
. . . (therein, thereto, thereof etc.) or ending in ... soever (whatsoever, 
wheresoever), and that little word without which any traditional legal 
document would be incomplete, 'the same' meaning ' it'."1205 
Wallworth also proposes to use one word in place of several words, e.g. ' In 
the event that' can be replaced by ' iP .1206 
Frequency, Quantity, Length 
The Tax Faculty of the Institute of Chartered Accountants challenges the 
assumption that " it is necessary to make changes to tax policy every year and 
undertake only to alter tax legislation when such change is clearly necessary."1207 
Likewise, Broke recommends that income tax should no longer be an annual tax; and 
he encourages "Governments to free up legislative time by having biennial or even 
triennial Finance Acts." 1208 Both recommendations may reduce the frequency of 
changes in tax legislation and the volume of tax legislation. 
In my view, biennial or triennial Finance Acts may mean a delay in dealing 
with new commercial developments. Consequently, horizontal inequity may emerge 
1201 Anti-avoidance provisions will be discussed in section 6. 
1202 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.1 
1203 TLRC, op.cit.(note1128), p.vii 
1204 ibid.p.33 
1205 Wallworth, op.cit.(note 1120), p.413 
1206 ibid.p.413 
1207 McKie, op.cit.(note 11 52), p.ll 
1208 Broke, op.cit.(note1114), p.26 
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because some taxpayers could have opportunities to avoid tax and take tax benefits 
for a long period through new businesses; whilst, others are unable to do so. An 
annual Finance Act can reduce a delay in closing off such opportuniti es. Another 
merit is that tax allowances and bands can be adjusted fo r price inflation every year, 
which would reduce tax inequity (as di scussed in Chapters 2 and 3). Therefore, 
annual Finance Acts are still needed although they do not solve the problem of 
frequency. 
However, I agree that changes to existing tax statutes should be made when 
such changes are clearly inevitable and necessary. This would reduce the quantity of 
legislation. The question then arises when changes are clearly inevitable and 
necessary. In my view, the government's tax proposals to be enacted as the tax 
provisions of annual Finance Acts should be produced only to: 
• strengthen the tax base to respond to new commercial developments, 
• prevent tax avoidance, 
• avoid injustice/inequity, 
• promote fairness, the equity of income redistribution, efficiency of 
taxation, 
• promote legal certainty, and 
• respond to changes in the general legal framework. 1209 
· The above criteria to limit tax proposals mean the limitation of using tax 
policy to achieve social and economic purposes. A limited tax policy or a less 
complex policy would make tax legislation simpler. The TLRC supports the view 
that "simpler policy would allow simpler legislation."1210 However, as quoted earlier, 
"the simpler the rules are, the less fair they are."1211 As discussed in section 2, if we 
used a less complex policy under the idea of optimal tax structures (as proposed in 
Chapters Two, Three, and Four), this could make tax legislation less complex and 
still bring about fairness at the same time. 1212 
When changes to existing tax statutes by annual Finance Acts are still needed 
under limited circumstances above, the length of tax provisions is the next problem 
1209 The examples of these can be found in Appendix IV to Chapter Five. 
1210 TLRC, op.cit.(notell 28), p.l 
1211 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(notel5), p.8 
1212 The examples in Appendix IV to Chapter Five will elucidate this point. 
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to be solved. Detailed provisions are written in response to the complexity of the 
modern world , and are needed for legal certainty and precision 1213 and for 
fairness.1214 However, they should not make tax legislation too complex, inaccessible 
and incomprehensible. The use of shorter sentences1215 supplemented by a splitting 
technique (i.e. a detailed provision is split " into several sentences, or into 
subparagraphs or bullet points")1216 will make tax Jaw easier to read and 
understand. 1217 
Detailed proviSions are needed under the above techniques to make 
legislation clear and precise. However, the TLRC says that it cannot expect the 
application of tax legislation "to be clear beyond doubt in all circumstances." 1218 This 
is because " tax legislation must deal with highly detailed and, frequently, inherently 
difficult subjects."1219 It also says, "primary legislation cannot set out all the 
information relevant to its interpretation [;] [but] this information needs to be made 
available somehow."1220 It then proposes that an explanatory memorandum for each 
and every clause of the annual Finance Bill should be produced 122 1 and presented 
contemporaneously with the Bill to Parliament. 1222 Explanatory memoranda that 
contain explanations of the purpose of each clause of the Finance Bill, the way it 
would operate, worked examples and other useful details1223 would therefore assist 
users understand and interpret the provisions of the law. 1224 
Style 
The TLRC proposes that tax legislation should be written in "a plain English 
style"1225, which involves the use of a clearer structure1226and avoiding the use of 
1213 Howe, op.cit.(note1108), p.89 
1214 Baron, op.cit.(note1124), p.7 
1215 TLRC, Final Report on Tax Legislation (London: IFS, 1996), p.vii 
1216 Wallworth, op.cit.(note1 120), p.413 
1217 ibid.p.413 
1218 TLRC, op.cit.(note1128), p.viii 
1219 ibid.p.viii 
1220 .b.d ... 
I I .p.Vlll 
1221 The TLRC also proposes that the amount of material to be incorporated in each explanatory 
memorandum should be determined in the light of the nature of the legislation and the probable needs 
of its users. (TLRC, op.cit.(note 1215), p.38) Additionally, explanatory memoranda should not be too 
wide that they put an enormous burden on practitioners. (ibid.38) Explanatory memoranda should be 
written by the Revenue ' s officials and approved by Parliamentary Counsel and Ministers. (ibid.39) 
1222 ibid.pp.vii-viii 
1223 ibid.p.38 
1224 ibid.p.vii (More discussion on explanatory memoranda will be made in subsections 4.2 and 5.7). 
1225 ibid.p. vii 
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cross references. 1227 This style of drafting supplemented by a technique proposed in 
Wallworth (to be quoted below) is likely to make tax legis lation clearer, simpler, 
more accessible and comprehensible. 
"Where possible, sentences should be writlen in the active voice (a person 
must pay tax) rather than the passive (tax must be paid by a person). Avoid 
multiple negatives - for an example, see section 78(3), Taxes Act 1988. 
Sentences should be written in a logical order so that the reader finds out 
what it is about at the beginning. Too many statutory provisions list all the 
exceptions before getting to the point. " 1228 
Purposive drafting is another style put forward to make tax law simpler. 1229 It 
is also known as "general principles drafting"1230, which can be categorized into two: 
"general principles without more" and "general principles with supplementary." 1231 
The former relates to "the writing of legislation by reference to general concepts 
without any further elaboration [;] [the] detailed application of the legislation in 
particular cases would be left to the courts."1232 The latter sets out "the general 
concepts but relies on other materials to fill in the detai l." 1233 
On the above bases, general principles drafting would make pnmary 
legislation shorter and more comprebensible. 1234 This would make legislation 
simpler, clearer1235, and easier for judge (and others) to construe tax statutes.1236 The 
TLRC notes that there are attractions in drafting primary legislation by ·expressing 
general principles and filling in the detai l through regulations. 1237 This is partly 
because "it would help avoid the problem of the detail obscuring the broader 
picture" 1238 
1226 ibid.p. vii 
1227 TLRC, op.cit.(note1128}, p.vii 
1228 Wallworth, op.cit.(note 1120), p.413 
1229 Simon McKie, "Correspondance: Feedback: Purposive legislation: a road to ruin?", Taxation, 3 
October 1996, p.6 
1230 TLRC, op.cit.(note1215), p.7 
1231 TLRC, op.cit.(note1128), p.27 
1232 ibid.p.27 
1233 ibid.p.27 
1234 The TLRC's Interim Report, paragraph 4.7 (ibid.p.28) 
1235 ibid.p.28 
1236 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.51 
1237 The TLRC's Interim Report, paragraph 4.11 (TLRC, op.cit.(note 1128), p.29); and The TLRC's 
Final Report, paragraph 3.6 (TLRC, op.cit.(notel215), pp.7-8) 
1238 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1128), p.29 
305 
However, there are at least four objections to general principles drafting, 
namely (a) the sacrifice of certainty, (b) insufficiently parliamentary scrutiny, (c) the 
complexity of regulations, and (d) the arbi tTariness of tax authorities. 
As regards (a), it is argued that "tax simplification [through purpostve 
drafting] would lead to greatly increased uncertainty."1239 This argument may be 
correct. This is because legal certainty requires detailed provisions (as noted above), 
but general principles drafting gets away from the detail. On thjs bas is, Prebble 
supports the view that tax legislation should be written from a precise and detailed 
point of view rather than a principles and purpose point of view. 1240 
As regards (b), the TLRC expresses the view that detailed drafting may not 
offer certainty if it cannot be understood. 1241 Alternatively, general principles 
drafting would create certainty if: 
(i) " the general principles expressed in the primary legislation could be 
elaborated by regulations; 
(ii) the Revenue departments could tssue guidance or authoritative 
notices; and 
(iii) the task could be devolved to the courts." 1242 
MaK.ie argues against (i) and (ii) that "[purposive drafting] would simply 
move tax rules from statute, where they are subject to some sort of parliamentary 
control, to delegated legislation and Revenue memoranda where they would not 
be." 1243 Whilst, the TLRC proposes that a new procedure for parliamentary scrutiny 
of secondary legislation (regulations) would be required. 1244 
Nevertheless, in a democratic society, tax legislation should be enacted by 
statute, neither by secondary legislation nor by tertiary legislation (the Revenue 
departments' rules).1245 Given this, regulations should not be used to elaborate the 
general principles expressed in tax statutes, and they should be restricted to "the 
1239 McKie, op.cit.(notel229), p.7 
1240 Jolm Prebble, "Should Tax Legislation be Written from a Principles and Purpose Point of View or 
a Precise and Detailed Point of View?", British Tax Review 1998 (London: Sweet&Maxwell, 1998), 
113. 
1241 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1128), p.29 
1242 ibid.p.29 
1243 McKie, op.cit.(note1229), p.7 
1244 TLRC, op.cit.(note1215), p.37 
1245 Lagerberg, op.cit.(notel081), p.76 
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mechanics of administration." 1246 Additionally, the tssue of the Revenue 
departments' guidance or authoritative notices means the transfer of power from the 
legislature to the executive, which is dangerous if it is not properly drafted or 
scrutinized. 1247 
Finally, if we produced detailed provisions by the use of shorter sentences 
supplemented by a splitting technique, they would be easily read and understood. 
Therefore, if primary legislation is written in a clear or certain form in the first place, 
it is not necessary to leave the task of filling in the details for obtaining the certainty 
to the courts. 
As regards (c), many regulations to elaborate the general principles probably 
make tax law complex. Prebble notes that "[the US] generally adopts a briefer, more 
conceptual drafting style than other common law countries.''1248 Regulations are 
therefore required to elaborate US primary legislation. However, they are detailed 
and intractable. 1249 
As regards (d), it is argued that purposive drafting would lead to "tyrannical 
Revenue power.'' 1250 This argument may be correct if it leaves the detail to be filled 
in by administrative rulings. In this situation, "if the principle or application is 
unclear, 'purposive legislation' becomes 'what the Revenue tells you it means' ."1251 
According to the TLRC, purposive legislation may include the use of 
purposive statements involving "prefacing each part, chapter or section of the Act 
with a summary of what the detailed legislation which follows is designed to 
achieve.''1252 Statements of purpose make tax legislation clearer since they are used 
to supplement detailed provisions by explaining "as much why a section or chapter 
has been enacted as how it operates."1253 As they can identify the legislative purpose, 
they will help the courts to apply a purposive interpretation of tax statutes.1254 
1246 ibid.p.76 
1247 Anthony Davis, "Purposive Drafting: Not A Panacea", The Tax Journal, Issue 465, Monday, 17 
August 1998, p.12 
1248 Prebble, op.cit.(notel240), p.l13 
1249 ibid.p.113 
1250 McKie, op.cit.(note1229), p.7 
1251 Malcolm Gammie, "Why is tax law complex", Taxation, 9 November 1995, p.l36 
1252 TLRC, op.cit.(notel128), p.27 
1253 TLRC, op.cit.(notel215), p.10 
1254 This point will be discussed in subsections 5.6 and 5.7. 
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Furthermore, " in the case of anti-avoidance legis lation, purpose statements 
could help greatly because they should enshrine the intention behind it, and hopefully 
its scope, in clear and legall y effecti ve form." 1255 However, " introducing a 'purpose' 
test on top of whatever specific conditions the legis lation envisages would create 
more uncertainty over the treatment of a transaction."1256 lt is therefore proposed 
that "statements of purpose will need to be drafted very carefu lly so as not to leave 
either conflicts with the detailed provisions or ambiguity as to their scope."1257 
Tax Law Rewrite Project 
Section 160, the Finance Act 1995 requi red the Revenue to report to 
Parliament on tax simplification. 1258 The Revenue presented to Parliament a report-
The Path to Tax Simplification - together with a background paper in December 
1995.1259 The report has led to a project to rewrite some 6,000 pages of UK primary 
direct tax legislation over a period of five years. 1260 The Project aims to rewrite such 
legislation to make it clearer and easier to use without changing its legal effect. 1261 
The CA 2001 was the first rewritten legislation produced by the Project. The ITEP A 
2003, PA YE Regulations 2003, and the ITTOIA 2005 are the subsequent works by 
the Project so far. 1262 
Here, I will examine whether the Project has rewritten and improved existing 
legislation clearer and easier to use in terms of (i) the language, (ii) the length of 
sentence, and (iii) drafting style. · 
Regarding (i) and (ii), the Project uses (a) colloquial English where possible, 
(b) shorter sentences, and (c) modem words or words that have a well-understood 
meaning in place of archaic words by not changing the law. 1263 These techniques are 
consistent with those which I discussed previously. 
12ss Davis, op.cit.(note 1247), p.12 
12
S
6 ibid.p. l2 
12s7 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1215), p.IO 
12s8 Wallworth, op.cit.(note 1120), p.411 
12s9 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.50; and HMRC, Tax Law Rewrite Part 2: Main features of the Tax Law 
Rewrite project, http://www.hmrc.gov.ukire\\>Tite/plans0304/0304 _pt2.htm, as of 24/04/2006, I. 
1260 Howe, op.cit.(notell08), p.97 
The "five years" has long expired. 
1261 HMRC, Inland Revenue Tax Law Rewrite, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk.irewrite/background.htm, as of24/04/2006, I. 
1262 More details of background, operation, works and problems of the Project and the enactment of 
the Project' s works (Rewrite Bills) can be found in Appendix V to Chapter Five. 
1263 HMRC, Appendix B - Rewrite Techniques, 
308 
For example, the ITEP A 2003 replaces "the rather antiquated term 
'emoluments' with 'earnings', a word which has more immediate relevance to 
employees and employers."1264 The ITEPA 2003 also replaces "the equally 
antiquated phrase 'perquisites and profits whatsoever' with 'any gratuity or other 
profit or incidental benefi t of any kind obtained by the employee' ."1265 
The above is likely to weaken Southem's argument against plain English 
techniques. As he says, " it is impossible to change the language of law without also 
changing its substance."1266 Southem also says that "legislative language has to 
convey exact shades of meaning, and this may not be possible if the draftsman has to 
confine himself to 'the most plain and simple tem1s' ."1267 Therefore, I agree with the 
TLRC when it proposes that "wherever possible, words and phrases which have been 
judicially interpreted should be retained." 1268 
In terms of drafting style, the Project also uses similar techniques to those 
which I discussed previously. The Project adopts "sentences in the active, rather than 
passive, voice."1269 The Project "[harmonises] definitions across the Acts where 
possible, and then [makes] it easier for the reader to find defined terms."1270 The 
Project avoids the use of cross references by grouping "similar rules together in one 
place."l271 
Additionally, the Project rewrites existing legislation with a more logical and 
clearer structure. 1272 For example, "[the ITEPA 2003] reorganises and redrafts the · 
material relating to share schemes and share option schemes which was developed in 
consultation with share scheme practitioners, who confirm that the provisions are 
indeed clearer and easier to understand."1273 And "[the ITEPA 2003] draws together 
all the provisions charging benefits to tax into a coherent code."1274 
http:i/www.hmrc.gov .uk!rewrite!plans0304/appendix _ b.htm, as of 24/04/2006, I. 
1264 HMRC, Tax Law Rewrite - Part 3: What we achieved in 2002/2003, 
http:i/www.lumc.gov.uk/rewrite!plans0304/0304_pt3.htm, as of24/04/2006, I. 
1265 ibid.p.l 
1266 David Southern, 'Big-Endians' v 'Little-Endians', Taxation, 16 October 1997, p.56 
1267 ibid.p.57 
1268 TLRC, op.cit.(notel215), p.31 
1269 HMRC, op.cit.(notel263), p.l 
1270 ibid.p.l 
1271 ibid.p.l 
1272 HMRC, op.cit.(note1259), p.l 
1273 HMRC, op.cit.(note 1264), p.l 
1274 ibid.p.l 
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Also, the CA 2001 is easier to follow because it has a logical structure. As 
Parry-Wingfield says, "it will be in one piece rather than strung all over the place, 
and this is a matter not just of consolidating the provisions from the various Acts but 
of restructuring the topic from first principles." 1275 Morse and Williams also say, "the 
exacting work [has been] undertaken [by the Project] to ensure that a logical 
structure emerges where possible[;] [for] example, many provisions are li sted in the 
d f . I . ,1276 or er o practtca unp01tance. 
Furthem1ore, the Project has used "a new f01mat and layout to make it easier 
to read" 1277, made "greater use of signposts to guide the reader to other relevant 
provisions"1278, made minor changes to improve the rewritten legislation 1279, and 
removed obsolete provisions.1280 Moreover, the Project has produced explanatory 
notes to help users to understand and interpret the rewritten legislation. 1281 
It is probable that the rewritten legislation (after the completion of the 
Project's work) will contain more than 6,000 pages. 1282 Despite this, the Project has 
made the legislation clearer and easier to read and understand. The Budd Committee 
Report supports the view that: 
' 'The benefit of this Project m terms of clearer and more user-friendly 
legislation is apparent from [the CA 2001] and (the ITEPA 2003]. The 
benefits of its work can also be seen in its influence on the drafting style of 
many Finance Bill measures."1283 
Nevertheless, some scholars do not think that the rewritten legislation can 
remove the real cause of legal complexity. 1284 This is because the Project does not 
1275 Maurice Parry-Wingfield, "A Milestone For The Rewrite'', The Tax Journal, Issue 558, Monday, 
24 July 2000, p.20 
1276 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note15), p.52 
1277 HMRC, op.cit.(note 1259), p.l 
1278 HMRC, op.cit.(note 1263), p.l 
1279 HMRC, op.cit.(note 1259), p.1 
1280 ibid.p. l 
1281 HMRC, op.cit.(note1264), p.2 
1282 This is partly because extra statutory concessions have been legislated; and more modem words 
and expressions as well as the splitting technique have been used. 
1283 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1112), p.2 Others also comment that the Project improves tax legislation, 
which can be found in Appendix VI to C hapter 5. The table of comparison between certain 
provisions of the current legislation and those of the rewritten legislation in Appendix Vll to 
C hapter 5 will also prove this point. 
1284 John Avery Jones, "Tax Law: Rules or Principles?", Fiscal Studies (1996) Vol.!?, No.3, p.66; 
David Martin, "Guest Editorial", The Tax Journal, Issue 451, 11 May 1998, p.2; and Chris Reece, 
"The Best of all Possible Worlds", The Tax Journal, Issue 530, Monday I 0 January 2000, p.3 
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change the underlying tax policy. 1285 Tax policy adds to legal complexity.1286 
However, as noted earlier, simpler policy leads to simpler legislation. 1287 Given this, 
if the Project rewrote existing legislation from the simpler policy, the Project would 
solve legal complex.ity. The TLRC supports the view that "complexity does not only 
derive from the way the legislation is expressed and that without policy changes the 
benefits from rewriting existing legislation are not maximised."1288 
However, the TLRC notes that "[the Project] would achieve nothing if it tried 
to change both language and policy." 1289 This is because "it could lead to an 
undesirable blurring of [the Project's) purpose and sidetrack it from its primary 
purpose of producing clearer legislation." 1290 Meanwhile, the Project recognizes a 
change in tax policy, but this is outside the Project' s responsibility. 1291 Tax policy is 
a political problem. 1292 Reece recommends that tax law will be simple if politicians 
have been forced to limit the use of tax policy. 1293 
As a result of the policy constraints, the Project cannot remove legal 
complexity stemming from complex tax policy. It is therefore recommended that 
another project should be established to help the Rewrite Project to review and 
propose changes in the underlying tax policy for tax simplification. 1294 As the Budd 
Committee Report says, 
"There should be established a Tax Structure Review Project (TSRP) as a 
parallel Project complementing the Tax Law Rewrite Project (TLRP). The 
TSRP would have a remit to review current tax legislation free of the policy 
constraints imposed on the TLRP and in particular from the perspective of 
seeing what can be done to simplify the tax system. As such, it should act as 
a constant reminder within government of the need for tax simplification."1295 
1285 Parry-Wingfield, op.cit.(notel275), p.17 
1286 TLRC, op.cit.(note1128), p.22 
1287 ibid.p.1 
1288 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1215), p.40 
1289 ibid.p.40 
1290 TLRC, op.cit.(notell12), p.13 
129 1 HMRC, Tax Law Rewrite - Main features of the Tax Law Rewrite project, 
http://wvAv.hmrc.gov.uk/rewrite/plans0001/000l_pt2.htm, as of 14/02/2006, 4 . 
1292 McKie, op.cit.(note1229), p.7 
1293 Reece, op.cit.(noe 1284), p.3 
1294 The Budd Committee Report, paragraphs 7.4, 7.6, 7.7 and 8.4 (TLRC, op.cit.(note1225), pp.l3-
15) 
1295 .b.d 2 1 I .p. 
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Lord Howe also says, 
"[The TSRP] must be able, ' to put fo rward proposals for tax law refom1 and 
simphfication'. But it must be able to do more than just propose. It must 
have, in Adam Broke's most recent prescription, some guaranteed 'ability to 
get Ministers to promote the change it recommends ' ." 1296 
In doing so and in reviewing and making recommendations as to rewriting 
existing legislation, the TSRP should take into account the idea of optimal tax 
structures and the criteria of making changes to tax statutes where inevitable and 
necessary (as proposed earlier). Tllis would help simplify tax legislation. 
3.2.2.3 Solutions to the problems arising from consolidation 
As noted in 3.1.2, UK tax law is lacking in structure. The system of consolidation has 
been adopted to solve this difficulty. However, consolidation Acts lead to (a) 
inconsistency of language and structure, (b) problems of interpretation, and (c) 
inconvenience to learn new section numbers and a new structure. 
As regards (a) and (b), these can be solved by rewriting existing legislation 
with a more logical and clearer structure, and with modem and well-understood 
words under the Rewrite Project. 1297 This will save the time for users of tax law not 
only to find all the law dealing with a particular tax but also to understand its 
meaning. This can solve the problems raised by the TLRC: "So the reality is not that 
users of tax legislation want that legislation to be as short as possible but that they 
need to be able to comprehend it in the shortest time possible."1298 
As regards (c), this can also be solved by the rewritten legislation under the 
Rewrite Project. As Wyatt notes, 
"The proposed tax rewrite provides the opportunity for designing the new 
legislation in such way that the need for a future consolidating Act is deferred 
for a much longer time than would be available under the present system."1299 
Wyatt also recommends that "every time an entirely new tax is introduced, it 
should be set out in its own separate Act [;] ..... [this) separate Act would itself be 
1296 ibid.p.13 
1297 Gammie supports the view that "drawing existing legislation into a re-written Code could provide 
a clearer, more coherent structure to what we have at present." (Gammie, op.cit.(note 1251 ), p.137) 
1298 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1128), p.4 
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designed for longevity, with the aim of not needing to be consolidated for at least 50 
years. " 1 300 
As we saw, there are now three separate Acts under the Project, i.e. the CA 
200 1, the ITEPA 2003 , and the ITTOIA 2005. There will be Bill 4 to complete the 
Project's work on income tax and Bill 5 (Corporation Tax Bill ). 1301 If separate Acts 
under the Project could defer future consolidation for a longer time, this would solve 
inconvenience to learn new section numbers and a new structure stemming from the 
frequent consolidation legislation. 
A separate Act is "a single of body of law for future amendment." 1302 
Therefore, if there were amendments to and new sections inserted into a separate Act 
by annual Finance Acts, all the changes might be fit into a separate Act immediately 
after changes, instead of waiting for consolidation. This way seems to adopt the 
system of codification into the system of UK tax law. As discussed earlier, 
codification satisfies simplicity and certainty, reducing confusion and difficu lty in 
the application of tax Jaw. In Australia and the United States which adopt 
codification, individual Finance Acts need not be consulted once they have amended 
a single taxing statute. 1303 
However, the disadvantage of codification is that "practitioners in Australia 
can find that they have to refer to section 159GZZZZA(2)(b )(iii)(B), Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936." 1304 This might not .. be a serious problem for separate Acts 
under the Rewrite Project or for other future Acts of Parliament if: 
(a) each Act were designed for longevity, 
(b) a set of tax provisions and a numbering system in each Act were well-
organized, and 
(c) changes to existing legislation were made where clearly inevitable and 
necessary. 
1299 Wyatt, op.cit.(note l l37), p.302 
1300 ibid.p.302 
1301 HMRC, Consultation Papers, Exposure Drafts and Response Documents, 
hrlp://vvww.hmrc.gov.uk/rewrite!exposure/menu.htm, as of 25/05/2006, 1-2. 
1302 Gammie, op.cit.(note l25 l )., p.l 37 
1303 Wallworth,op.cit.(note 11 20), p.413 
1304 ibid.p.413 
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4. Delegated legislation 
4.1 Features, advantages and disadvantages 
Another main source of Thai and UK tax laws is delegated legislation. Theoretically, 
any taxing Act may lack the detailed and technical rules necessary for its operation. 
To resolve this problem, an Act may empower administrative bodies to make orders 
or regulations relating to the detailed and technical rules wi thout the enactment of 
another Act. 
Orders or regulations made by administrative bodies are known as 
'delegated' or 'secondary' legislation; meanwhile an enabling Act is known as the 
'Parent Act.' 1305 Delegated legislation is subject to the doctrine of ultra vires, i.e. its 
content cannot go beyond the conferring provision in the Parent Act (if it goes 
beyond " it is invalid and further legislation is required.")1306 
According to the Thai Constitution, administrative bodies will make 
delegated legislation only when there are provisions in the Parent Act conferring 
powers upon them. Additionally, delegated legislation must be of general application 
and not intended to apply to any specific case or person.1307 Thai taxing Acts 
empower administrative bodies to make delegated legislation, which includes Royal 
Decree, and Ministerial Regulations. 
Meanwhile, UK taxing Acts also empower administrative bodies to make 
delegated legislation by means of statutory instrument. 1308 Delegated legislation is 
used in direct tax, and more extensively used in indirect tax.1309 The objective ofUK 
delegated legislation is " to amend or extend [primary legislation] as [government 
departments think] necessary."131° For instance, "delegated legislation is used in the 
direct tax field to give practical administrative effect to particular proposals, for 
example the PA YE system."1311 
1305 Elizabeth A. Martin, ed., Oxford Dictionary of Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997) p. 134 
1306 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder 2, op.cit.(note79), p.11 10 
1307 Paragraphs one, two and three, Section 29, the Constitution 
1308 CCH Tax Handbook, op.cit.(note12), p.508 
1309 TLRC, op.cit.( note 1112), p.4 
1310 Lymer et al. , op.cit.(note 120), p.1/l6 
1311 TLRC, op.cit.(note 1112), p.5 
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There are four advantages of delegated legislation. 
First, it can be made without taking up as much parliamentary time as 
primary legislation. 1312 
Secondly, it speeds up the operation of the Parent Act without pass111g 
another Act. 
Thirdly, it solves the problem of the Parent Act that lacks details and 
technical rules for its operation. 
Fourthly, since it can make changes to the Parent Act, it will help conect 
errors or fill gaps discovered in the Parent Act. 
Nevertheless, the above advantages may be undermined by three 
disadvantages. 
(1) Abundance of delegated legislation 
Many pieces of delegated legislation complicate the tax legislation. In 
Thailand, most taxing Acts empower administrative bodies to make delegated 
legislation. One possible reason for this is that "Parliament is indirectly dominated by 
the executive branch."1313 In 1987, there were more than 50,000 pieces of delegated 
legislation (incJuding delegated legislation on tax matters). 1314 There are still many 
pieces of delegated legislation at present. 1315 There are over a thousand of pages of 
UK statutory instruments as well. 1316 
(2) Confusion and non-transparency in tax legislation 
Many pieces of Thai delegated legislation dealing with a particular tax cause 
confusion to taxpayers. As Hummel and Sethsathira note, "there are also hundreds of 
[delegated legislation]. .. [;] [it] is little wonder then that foreign investors find 
themselves totally confused with the tax laws, because even their local counterparts 
are also confused."1317 
1312 Martin, op.cit.(notel305), p.l34 
1313 Borwomsak Uwanno and Surakiart Sathirathai, "Introduction to the Thai Legal System", Legal 
Systems in the ASEAN Region (Bangkok: Amarin Printing Group, 1987), 82. 
1314 ibid.p.82 
131s Thongprakam, op.cit.(note l78), p.50 
13 16 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.51 
13 17 Anita Louise Hununel and Pises Sethsathira, Starting and Operating a Business in Thailand 
(Singapore: McGraw-Hill Book Co-Singapore, 1991), 155. 
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Additionally, the steadily increasing provisions of delegated legislation make 
the tax system less transparent1318 and complex. Such confusion, non-transparency 
and complexity go against the criteria of certainty and simplicity. 
One notes that " [finance] legislation in recent times increasingly contains 
provisiOns which empower administrative bodies to make 'secondary' 
legislation." 1319The increasing quantity of UK statutory instrument probably causes 
legal complexity and confusion to British taxpayers. 
(3) Lack of scrutiny 
UK statutory instruments on tax matters have not been examined by 
parliamentary procedures like an Act. One notes, "most statutory instruments which 
deal with taxation must be laid before the House of Commons only and are 
considered by the Commons Select Committee on Statutory Instruments."1320 
Nevertheless, "the [finance] legislation provides for control of statutory instruments 
by Parliament by either requiring approval of the draft by the House of Commons 
before they are made or by making them subject to annulment by resolution of the 
House of Commons (or either House)."1321 
Unlike in the UK, the RCT and the Thai Constitution do not require delegated 
legislation to be laid before the House of Representatives or the Senate, and have no 
provision for control of delegated legislation by Parliament. Therefore, there is no 
parliamentary scrutiny of Thai delegated legislation. Some Thai delegated legislation 
deals with technical rules for supplementing the operation of taxing Acts which, I 
think, need not be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Meanwhile, others deal with 
important tax matters which, I think, must be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. 
The RCT empowers administrative bodies to make delegated legislation to 
deal with the main structures of the PIT, such as granting reduction oftax rates or tax 
exemption1322, determining the deduction of expenses for PIT purposes1323, and 
1318 Dhiratayakinant, op.cit.(note605), pp.l.l-24 
1319 CCH Tax Handbook, op.cit.(notel2), p.508 
1320 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Biuder 2, op.cit.(note79), p. I 110 
1321 CCH Tax Handbook , op.cit.(note!2), p .508 
1322 Section 3, RCT 
1323 Sections 43, 44, 45 , and 46, RCT 
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determining the exclusion of income from the PIT. 1324 From my standpoint, these 
important tax matters should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. 
4.2 Improvements in delegated legis lation in both countries 
Taxation is a function of the public sector interfering with people's rights and 
freedom in using their property. Therefore, the consent of all people of a country 
through the legislative process by Parliament where consists of people's 
representatives must first be obtained before taxes are imposed on people. 1325 In 
other words, all major tax rules/matters should be subject to political debate and 
proper parliamentary scrutiny. 
As noted above, Thai delegated legislation does not receive parliamentary 
scrutiny, and some of which have been made to deal with the main structures of the 
PIT. Tax rate reduction, tax exemption, deductible expenses and income exclusion 
are related to restrictions on people's rights and liberties in the use of their resources 
and on the removal of certain people from tax. These major tax matters should 
therefore be scrutinized under parliamentary procedures, as this represents the 
consent of all citizens. 
Therefore, the scope of delegated legislation should not extend to the major 
tax matters which include changes in tax rates, tax bands, tax reliefs, tax credits, tax 
exemptions, tax abolition, deductible expenses, income exclusion, and the imposition • 
of new taxes. Its function should be limited only to stipulate technical rules (to 
supplement the operation of taxing Acts, such as methods, conditions, guidelines or 
directions for tax administration and tax collection). 
The Budd Committee Report notes that "regulation has been resorted to in 
recent years to deal with a number of highly complex and detailed direct tax 
provisions and power is taken more often than has previously been the case to amend 
particular aspects of certain direct tax regimes."1326 However, statutory instruments 
are not subject to the same parliamentary as Acts of Parliament. Therefore, the scope 
1324 Sections 4 and 42 ( 17), RCT 
1325 Thjs argument is widely supported. For example, Maas says, " taxation is a necessary evil [;] [but] 
it should not be imposed on the citizenry from outside; it need to be sanctioned by their elected 
reRresentatives." (Maas, op.cit.(note I 089), p.l 0) 
13 6 TLRC, op.cit.(notel1 12), p.5 
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of UK statutory instruments should not extend to the important tax matters which 
should be dealt with by taxing Acts, and be limited only to technical rules. 
From the above, the limitation of scope of Thai and UK delegated legislation 
would reduce the amount and steady increase in provisions of delegated legislation. 
This would reduce legal complexity and confusion, and increase transparency in the 
Thai and UK tax system. 
If the expressions in delegated legislation/statutory instruments were plain, 
unambiguous, straightforward, and consistent, this would also help make delegated 
legislation/statutory instruments less complex, cJearer, more accessible and 
comprehensible. To do so, the provisions in delegated legislation/statutory 
instruments should be written from a detailed viewpoint, and not be written in a 
convoluted style and too tight, nor contain jargon and archaic words and very long 
sentences. 
Finally, the TLRC proposes that "explanatory memoranda should be provided 
for secondary legislation on the same basic as for primary legislation."1327 
Explanatory memoranda would contain explanations of the purpose of each clause of 
delegated legislation, the way it would operate, worked examples and other useful 
details. 1328 Therefore, if Thai and UK governments adopted this proposal, 
explanatory memoranda would assist users of delegated legislation/statutory 
instruments understand and interpret the legislation, especially ambiguous 
expressions/words. This would reduce confusion and difficulty m applying the 
legislation. 
5. Judicial interpretation and judicial anti-avoidance rules 
5.1 Function of the courts 
Brooks points out that judges have three tasks in deciding tax cases, i.e. 
(a) to give meaning to the words in the statute, 
(b) to characterize the taxpayer's transaction for purposes of applying the tax 
statute; and 
1327 TLRC, op.cit.(notel215), p.39 
1328 ibid.p.38 
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(c) to discourage tax avoidance. 1329 
One supports (a) that it is necessary for the courts to interpret the words in the 
statute " to ascertain their applicability of the facts in question." 1330 Regarding (b), 
Brooks suggests that 
"lt would be impossible to administer a tax system fairly if the courts were 
bound by the legal form of the parties' transaction. If there is evidence that 
taxpayers do not intend to enforce the legal rights and obligations they have 
created, their economic position has not changed and neither should their tax 
liability." 1331 
In my view, when a dispute between a tax-gatherer and a taxpayer arises, the 
courts need to consider facts and transactions, and then to interpret the words used in 
the relevant tax provisions. Thereafter, they will apply what they interpret to seek 
whether the words are accurately applied by the taxpayer and the tax-gatherer in 
accordance with the intention of an enactment; and to seek whether tax is properly 
paid or collected. 
Regarding (c), Brooks notes that "an additional responsibility of judges is to 
prevent income tax avoidance, when it is administratively feasible." 1332 This task of 
the courts (which may be considered a debatable objective) will be further discussed 
in 5.6. The next sections consider fundamental principles underlying judicial 
interpretation. 
5.2 Impact of Human Rights Act 1998 ('HRA') on statutory interpretation 
HRA came into effect in October 2000. 1333 HRA incorporates the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights ('the Convention') into UK law. 1334 Such 
provisions, which are now set out in Schedule 1 to HRA, are those contained in the 
1329 Neil Brooks, "Chapter 3: The Responsibility of Judges in Interpreting Tax Legislation", Tax 
Avoidance and The Rule of Law, Graeme S. Cooper, ed., (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications BY, 1997), 
94. 
133° CCH Tax Handbook , op.cit.(notel2), p.511 
133 1 Brooks, op.cit.(notel329), p.96 
1332 ibid.p.96 . 
1333 Christopher Wallworth, "Do Taxpayers Have Human Rights?", Taxation, 15 June 2000, p.284 
1334 Thuronyi, op.cit.(note 1 O),p. ll 0 
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Convention itself and in the first and the sixth protocols. 1335 UK courts must give 
effect to such provisions; or must protect human rights as contained in the 
Convention and its protocols (' the Convention rights'). 
In the matter of interpretation, HRA requires UK com1s and tribunals to 
interpret all UK primary and subordinate legislation in a way which is, so far as is 
possible, compatible with the Convention rights. 1336 One notes that "the onus is on 
the courts to provide a judicial interpretation that is in accordance with the 
Convention rights, even if this requires a 'strained ' construction of the legislation. 1337 
This means that "words can be read into statutes or omitted or given an artificial 
meaning." 1338 
If interpretation in accordance with the Convention rights is impossible, then 
the High Court and above may make a declaration of incompatibility. 1339 It is noted 
that "the courts have no power to declare the legislation invalid" 1340, and "the law has 
to be applied strictly as written."1341 Therefore, "if in a particular case, the UK 
legislation cannot be read in a way that is compatible with the Convention rights, 
then the UK legislation will prevail over the Convention."1342 It is also noted that: 
"The court may issue a declaration of incompatibility, but it is up to the 
Government to choose whether or not to amend the offending legislation; and 
the Government is under no obligation to do so. In the event that the 
Government does not introduce curative legislation, then the aggrieved party 
may still apply to [the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR)] for 
relief." 1343 
HRA also requires that in interpreting UK legislation in accordance with 
Convention rights, courts and tribunals must take account of relevant judgments, 
decisions, declarations and opinions of the ECtHR and the European Commission on 
1335 The provisions that are likely to be most relating to tax matters can be found in Appendix Vffi to 
Chapter Five. 
1336 Section 3(1), HRA 1988 
1337 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder2, op.cit.(note79), p.1605 
1338 ibid.p.l605 
1339 Section 4, HRA 1988 
1340 Wallworth, op.cit.(note1333), p.284 
1341 ibid.p.284 
1342 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder2, op.cit.(note79), pp.1605-1606 
1343 ibid.p.1606 
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Human Rights (the EComHR), so far as, they are relevant to the 1ssues m the 
d o 1344 procee mgs. 
The above rules apply to the interpretation of UK tax legislation. When the 
UK courts app ly such rules, they may or may not make a declaration of 
incompatibility. 
Example of no declaration of incompatibility1345 
In R (on the application of Professional Contractors Group Ltd) v IRC1346, 
the Administrative Court did not declare that IR.35 legislation1347 (the provisions in 
the Finance Act 2000) was incompatible with the right under Article 1 of the First 
Protocol. This right is directly relevant to tax legislation, i.e. the right of a natural or 
legal person to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. However, under paragraph 
2 of this article, this right will not impair the right of the state to secure the payment 
of taxes. 
Wallworth refers to the EComHR that "taxation is not compatible with the 
First Protocol if it amounts to confiscation of the taxpayer's possessions." 1348 When 
the Court considered that IR.35 legislation "was not even arguably so severe as to 
amount to a de facto confiscation of property, to fundamental interference with a 
person's financial position or to an abuse of the [UK's] right to levy tax" 1349, it did 
not declare that IR35 legislation breached a Convention right. 
Example of declaration of incompatibility 
In R (on the application of Wilkinson) v IRC1350, W contended that section 
262 (1 ), TA 1988, which granted widow's bereavement allowance to widows but 
refused to provide an equivalent income tax reduction to widowers in identical 
circumstances on grounds of gender, breached Article 14 of the Convention read 
with Article 1 of the First Protocol. Article 14 provided that the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention were to be secured without 
1344 Section 2, HRA 1988 
1345 More examples can be found in Appendix IX to C hapter Five. 
1346 [200 I ]STC629 
1347 Under IR35, individuals who provided services to clients through 'service companies' were taxed. 
1348 Wall worth, op.cit.(note 1333), p.284 
1349 (200 I ]STC629at630 
1350 (2002)STC347 
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discrimination on the grounds such as, inter alia, sex or other status. W was given a 
declaration of incompatibility. 1351 As the Administrative Court declared that: 
"The refusal to grant a tax reduction to men in a similar situation to women 
was a breach of art 14 read with art I of the First Protocol in the absence of 
any objective justification advanced for such discrimination."1352 
However, according to the decision of the Court of Appeal 1353, "there was no 
obligation on the Revenue to grant an extra statutory concession to correct 
discrimination under the tax 1egislation."1354 The provision in question 1s now 
repealed. 1355 
F inally, it should be noted that "the question as to which bits oftax legislation 
are vu lnerable to being declared incompatible with the [Convention] is still an open 
one."1356 
5.3 Judicial interpretation and simplicity and certainty 
It is argued that case Jaw helps make the tax system complex.1357 However, I do not 
entirely agree with this argument. In case where tax provisions are unclear, judicial 
interpretation provides the principles and concepts to make such provisions clear. 
This further makes the tax system less complex. Whitehouse et a/. give an example 
to support this point as follows: 
"Many concepts are not defined by [UK] statute (what is a trade? what is an 
income receipt/expense?), many provisions are obscure, and it is the role of 
the judiciary to resolve such difficulties and of case law to fi ll the gaps."1358 
Additionally, a strict interpretation wi ll ensure certainty in the operation of 
tax legislation. In contrast, if the courts fail to interpret tax legislation and provide 
principles/concepts in the case of ambiguity and to apply a strict interpretation, the 
problems of complexity and obscurity will still exist in the system of tax law. 
1351 However, W was not given compensation. He would have had to apply to the ECtHR for 
compensation. (Collision and Tiley, op.cit.(notellll), p.33) 
1352 [2002)STC347at348 
1353 [2003)STC1113 
1354 Collision and Tiley, op.cit.(notell ll),p.33 
I3SS ibid.p.33 
1356 ibid.p.30 
1357 Lymer, et al., op.cit.(note l20), p.l/16 
1358 Whitehouse, et al., op.cit.(note549), p.36 
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5.4 Strict interpretation 
This approach will ensure legal certainty. A strict interpretation means that the 
meaning of expressions/words is given according to the language of the statute 
regardless of any intendment. Under this approach, the tax statute must be clearly 
worded. Therefore, people can foresee whether they are or are not liable to tax. 
In most cases, the Thai courts have stuck to a strict interpretation. For 
example, in the Revenue Department v. Mrs. Valai or Jitapa Kaithamjittaku/1359, the 
Supreme Court held that: 
"The Revenue Code is the public law that stipulates the people's obligations 
to the State. This law affects the rights, liberties, and properties of the people. 
Hence, the Revenue Code must be strictly interpreted in such a way that the 
taxpayers' obligations are not increased or their rights are not too greatly 
affected .... " 
It has been found that "for a long time, judicial thinking [in the UK] was that 
tax laws should be interpreted strict1y." 136° For example, Lord Cairns LC said in 
Peyce v. Monmouthshire Canal and Railway Company1361 that "Taxing Acts are to 
be construed with strictness." Rowlatt J. laid down the rule in Cape Brandy 
Syndicate v. /RC1362 that: 
" ... .in taxation you have to look simply at what is dearly said. There is no 
room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no 
presumption as to a tax. You read nothing in, you imply nothing, but you look 
fairly at what is said and what is said clearly and that is the tax." 
In Tennant v. Smith1363 Lord Halsbury L.C quoted the statements of Lord 
Wensleydale in In re Micklethwait1364 that: 
"It is a well-established rule, that the subject is not to be taxed without clear 
words for that purpose; and also, that every Act of Parliament must be read 
according to the natural construction of its words." 
1359 The Supreme Court's decision No.l908/2538 





1364 II Ex. at 456 
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The Thai and the Bri6sh courts have interpreted tax provisions in favour of 
taxpayers in the case of ambiguity. For example, in S-Jun advertising j uristic 
partnership v Bangkok Metropolis 1365, the Supreme Collli held that "where the 
legislation is obscure, it must be strictly interpreted in a way that is not against the 
taxpayer.'' Lord Simon said in Customs and Excise v. Thorn Electrical Industries 
Ltd1366 that "You cannot tax on an ambiguity." Lord Wiberforce confim1ed in Inland 
Revenue Comrs v. Joiner1367 that " ... clear words are required to impose a tax, so 
that the taxpayer has the benefit of doubts or ambiguities [whether a tax has been 
imposed on them.]" However, a taxpayer is not favoured in the case of ambiguity in 
the exception from taxation given by the statute because the exception must be 
interpreted with strictness. 1368 
5.5 Material used in the case of ambiguity 
Lord Halsbury said in IRC v Priestley 1369 "the Act must be read as a whole[;] where 
there is an ambiguity the scheme of the Act may resolve it." Additionally, the British 
courts can look at parliamentary material in limited situations, for example, the clear 
statements by a Minister during proceedings or debates in Parliament, in seeking 
Parliament's intention where legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or lead to an 
absurdity. This derives from the rule in Pepper v. Hart. 1370 
The use of parliamentary material in interpreting ambiguous words helps 
make such provisions clear. However, this aid is unlikely to be sufficient to 
encourage legal certainty. This is because words in tax provisions have both a 
technical meaning and an ordinary meaning. There should be other aids than 
parliamentary material in helping construe ambiguous words. This point will be 
further discussed in 5. 7. 
There is no authority to allow the Thai courts to use parliamentary material as 
guidance on the interpretation of tax statutes. 
1365 The Supreme Court's decision No.2317/2519 
1366 [1975]STC617at 620 
1367 (1975]STC65.7at 662 




5.6 Purposive interpretation 
This approach is the interpretation of the legislation by reference to Parliament's 
intention. 1371 The UK courts are increasingly adopting thi s approach because strict 
interpretation leads to tax avoidance. However, whi lst a strict interpretation ensures 
legal certainty, a purposive interpretation cannot ensure certainty. 
A strict interpretation provokes tax avoidance under the following conditions: 
(a) the taxpayer arranges his/her transaction wi thin the wording of the 
relevant statute; 
(b) the courts only consider the legal form of the transaction, regardless of its 
economic substance; 
(c) the courts have regard only to what is c learly said in the statute, without 
reference to legislative intention; and 
(d) therefore, if the transaction which is artificial falls outside the extend of a 
charging provision or within the scope of a statutory provision governing 
favorable tax treatment, the taxpayer will obtain a tax advantage. 
Under the above conditions, the taxpayer can structure a transaction in such a 
way that he/she will pay less tax or pay no tax. Similarly, tax avoidance is approved 
under the combination of literalism and formalism. 1372 The arrangement of the 
taxpayer's transaction to reduce his/her tax liability under the above conditions is 
recognized by the UK courts since the Duke of Westminster 's case (1936) until the 
mid-1980s. 1373 In the Westminster case1374, Lord Tomlin said, "every man is entitled 
if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is 
less than it otherwise would be."1375 
In this case, the court applied a strict interpretation. As Lord Russell said, 
"the subject is not taxable by inference or analogy, but only by the plain words of a 
statute applicable to the facts and circumstances of his case."1376 Additionally, this 
case showed that the court did not look beyond the legal form of the transaction to its 
economic substance. Parsons as referred to in Cooper calls this style of interpretation 
1371 TLRC, op.cit.{note 12 15), p.1 0 
1372 TLRC, op.cit.{note7), p.l 0 
1373 Thuronyi, op.cit.{note 1 0}, p.J52 
1374 
[ 1936] 19TC490 
137s [1936) 19TCat p.520 
1376 
[ 1936] 19TCat p.524 
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"form and blinkers" - "judges confin ing themselves to examining only the fonn in 
which a transaction is cast, examining only the legally enforceable elements of that 
form, and treating that form as detem1inative." 1377 
The combination of strict interpretation and the doctrine of fonn leads to tax 
avoidance, resulting .in injustice/i nequity (because some people could avoid paying 
tax whereas others could not), erodes public revenues, and adversely affects income 
redistribution (because rich people receive the most benefit). To strike down tax-
avo idance schemes, certain judges are prepared " look beyond the words to the 
underlying purpose and beyond the form of the transaction to its substance."1378 
Likewise, the courts have tried to depart from the strict approach, and to adopt the 
purposJVe approach. This new approach is sometimes known as "a judge-made 
rule."'379 
The landmark case as to the new approach is Ramsay Ltd v. IRC. 1380 In this 
case, the House of Lords combated a tax-avoidance scheme on the basis that "it was 
entitled to look at the overall result of several transactions and need not give tax 
effect to every single transaction."1381 Lord Wilberforce stated, 
"It is the task of the court to ascertain the legal nature of any transaction to 
which it is sought to attach a tax, or a tax consequence, and if that emerges 
from a series, or combination of transactions, intended to operate as such, it is 
that series or combination which may be regarded."1382 
The approach or the court's task, according to Lord Wilberforce, has been 
criticised in that "it appears to prefer judge-made law over the expressed intentions 
of Parliament.''1383 It is also argued that the courts "are denying the literal 
interpretation and corresponding application of statutes to transactions which, as a 
matter of fact, have been found to exist."1384 
1377Graeme Cooper, op.cit.(note95), p.24 
1378 Chamberlain, et al.,op.cit.(note78), p.9 
1379 Thuronyi, op.cit.(notel 0), p.151 
1380 [l982)AC300 
1381 Frans Vanistendael, "Chapter 4: Judicial Interpretation and the Role of Anti-Abuse Provisions in 
Tax Law", Tax Avoidance and The Rule of Law, Graeme S. Cooper, ed., (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications BV, 1997), 139. 
1382 
[ 1982)AC300at 323-24 
1383 Tookey, op.cit.(note l), p.368 
1384 ibid.p.368 
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The Ramsay principle was developed by Furniss v. Dawson. 1385 In this case, 
Lord Fraser interpreted the Ramsay principle as being that "the fiscal consequences 
of a preordained series of transactions, intended to operate as such, are generally to 
be ascertained by considering the result of the series as a whole, and not by 
dissecting the scheme and considering each individual transaction separately."1386 In 
addition, Lord Brightman described the criteria for the application of the Ramsay 
principle as follows: 
• there must be a pre-ordained series of transactions (or single composite 
transaction), 
• there must be any aitificial steps inserted in the series of transactions with 
no commercial (business) purpose other than a tax advantage, 
• if the above ingredients exist, the court must disregard the inserted steps 
and look at the end result of the transactions (to determine its true legal 
effect), and tax the end result by relating it to the relevant taxing 
provisions. 1387 
Lord Brightman's formulation is sometimes known as the "step transaction" 
doctrine and the "commercial purpose" doctrine. 1388 Orow notes that "this 
formulation has been adopted and applied by a number of subsequent decisions."1389 
Chamberlain, et al. note that: 
"Apart from illustrating that in certain circumstances it is the substance· of 
the transaction which determines whether or not tax is chargeable, the 
[Dawson] case also showed an acceptance by the House of Lords that the 
courts can and should bolster taxing statutes with judge-made law."1390 
Nevertheless, the scope of the step transaction doctrine is limited by the 




1388 Vanjstendael, op.cit.(notel381), p.l40 
1389 Nabil Orow, "Structured Finance and the Operation of General Anti-Avoidance Rules", British 
Tax Review 2004 (London: Sweet&Maxwell, 2004),418. 
1390 Chamberlain, et al. , op.cit.(note78), p.9 
139 1 [1 988]STC476 
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this case "rejects any possible wide scope of the New Approach in favour of a 
narrowly defined step transaction doctrine."1392 In this case, Lord Oliver said, 
"Every case has to be detem1ined on its own facts and every series of 
transactions has to be examined and analysed to determined whether in truth, 
it constitutes a single composite and integrated whole entitling the court, in 
construing the statute, to ignore the legal effect of individual steps because 
they are not and never were contemplated as other than part of a single 
whole."1393 
Lord Oliver also described that in interpreting tax legislation, the courts have 
to ascertain that "what is the relevant transaction or combination", before they 
construe and apply "the statutory formula" to it. 1394 He disagreed with the rule of 
judge-made law because "judges are not legislators." 1395 Lord Jauncey supported 
that "it does not entitle the court to legislate at large against specific acts of tax 
avoidance where Parliament has not done so." 1396 
Tiley notes that "the first modem tax case where a majority of the House of 
Lords came out in favour of the purposive approach was McGuckian v IRC 1397 in 
1997."1398 In this case, Lord Steyn said, "where there is no obvious meaning of a 
statutory provision the modem emphasis is on a contextual approach designed to 
identify the purpose of a statute and to give effect to it. " 1399 He also stated that the 
following statement made by Lord Wilberforce in the Ramsay case had marked "the 
rejection by the House of pure literalism in the interpretation of tax statutes"1400 : 
"A subject is only to be taxed upon clear words, not on 'intendment' or on the 
'equity' of an Act. Any taxing Act of Parliament is to be construed in 
accordance with this principle. What are 'clear words' is to be ascertained on 
normal principles; these do not confine the courts to literal interpretation. 














There may, indeed should be, considered the context and scheme of the 
relevant Act as a whole, and its purpose may, indeed should be regarded." 1401 
Lord Steyn continued to explain that " the [Ramsay] principle was developed 
as a matter of statutory construction ... [.;) [it) was not based on a linguistic analysis 
of the meaning of particular words in a statute [;) [it) was founded on a broad 
purposive interpretation, giving effect to the intention ofParliament."1402 Lord Cooke 
supported a purposive interpretation that " ... .in determining the natural meaning of 
particular expressions [in the context of taxing Acts], weight is given to the purpose 
and spirit of the legislation." 1403 
In Macniven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd1404 , the House of Lords limited 
the scope of the Ramsay principle. 1405 Lord Nicholls said, 
"The need to consider a document or transaction in its proper context, and the 
need to adopt a purposive approach when construing taxation legislation, are 
principles of general application. Where this leads depends upon the 
particular set of facts and the particular statute." 1406 
In this case, Lord Hoffmann said that one principle of construction is "to 
ascertain what Parliament meant by using the language of the statute." 1407 He also 
described Lord Brightman's formulation in Dawson1408as "a careful and accurate 
summary of the effect which the Ramsay construction of a statutory concept had 
upon the way the courts will decide whether a transaction falls within that 
concept."1409 He continued, 
"If the statutory language is construed as referring to a commercial concept, 
then it follows that steps which have no commercial purpose but which have 
been artificially inserted for tax purposes into a composite transaction will not 













Lord Hoffmann emphasised that "Lord Brightman's formulation in the 
Furniss case is not a principle of construction [;] it is a statement ofthe consequences 
f . . . I . fi I " 14 11 H I .d o g1vmg a commercia construction to a 1sca concept. e a so sa1 , 
"Before one can apply Lord Brightman's words, it is first necessary to 
construe the statutory language and decide that it refers to a concept which 
Parliament intended to be given a commercial meaning capable of 
transcending the juristic individuality of its component parts. But there are 
many terms in tax legislation which cannot be constmed in this way. They 
referred to purely legal concepts which have no broader commercial meaning. 
In such cases, the Ramsay principle can have no application. It is necessary to 
make this point because, in the first flush of victory after the Ramsay [and 
subsequent cases], there was a tendency on the part of the Inland Revenue to 
treat Lord Brightman 's words as if they are a broad spectrum antibiotic which 
killed off all tax avoidance schemes, whatever the tax and whatever the 
relevant statutory provisions."1412 
Thuronyi notes that "it is clear from Westmoreland, as weiJ as earlier 
cases, 1413 that the Law Lords will not use the Ramsay doctrine as a rubber stamp on 
any assessment by the revenue when there is a whiff of tax avoidance in the air." 1414 
In Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson 1415, the House of Lords held 
that " it did not justify the assumption that an answer could be obtained by classifying 
aU concepts a priori as either 'commercial' or 'legal' as that would be the very 
negation of purposive construction."1416 Additionally, this case illustrated "the need 
for a close analysis of what, on a purposive construction, the statute actually 
required." 1417 As the Court held that: 
" .... the proposition that if a statute laid down requirements by reference to 
some commercial concept it would usually follow that elements inserted into 
a composite transaction without any commercial purpose could be 
14 11 73TCat70(para.49) 
1412 73TCat70(para.49) 
14 13 E.g., Craven v. White, [1989]AC398 
1414 Thuronyi, op.cit.(notel 0), p.l83 
1415 [2005]STC1 
1416 (2005JSTCiat3 
1417 (2005)1Ail ER at98 
330 
disregarded, whereas if the requirements of the statute were purely by 
reference to its legal nature then an act having that legal effect would suffice, 
whatever its commercial purpose might have been was not an unreasonable 
generali sation. Nevertheless that proposition did not provide a substitute for a 
close analysis of what a statute meant. 1418 
The Court also held that: 
"The essence of the new approach to the construction of revenue statutes first 
applied in the Ramsay case was to give the statu~ory provision a purposive 
construction in order to detetmine the nature of the transaction to which it 
was intended to apply and then to decide whether the actual transaction 
(which might involve considering the overall effect of a number of elements 
intended to operate together) answered to the statutory description. However, 
the proposition that, in the application of any taxing statute, transactions or 
elements of transactions which had no commercial purpose were to be 
disregarded elided those two steps and therefore that proposition went too 
far."t 4t9 
Lord Hoffmann expresses the view in British Tax Review that "this case has 
killed off the Ramsay doctrine as a special theory of revenue law and subsumed it 
within the general theory of the interpretation of statutes, perhaps the interpretation 
of utterances of any kind."14~0 Similarly, " the courts should be trusted to give effect 
to the intention ofParliarnent as expressed by statute."1421 
However, in IRC v Scottish Provident Jnstitution1422, the House of Lords still 
accepted the Ramsay principle. According to the Appellate Committee, "since the 
decision of this House in [Ramsay] it has been accepted that the language of a taxing 
statute will often have to be given a wide practical meaning of this sort which allows 
(and indeed requires) the court to have regard to the whole of a series of transactions 
which were intended to have a commercial unity." 1423 The Committee continued: 
1418 [2005)STClat2-3 
1419 [2005)STClat2 
1420 Leonard Hoffmann, "Tax Avoidance", British Tax Review 2005, Number 2, (London: 
Sweet&Maxwell, 2005), 203. 




" it would destroy the value of the Ramsay principle of constming 
provisions such as s 150A(1) of the 1994 Act as referring to the effect of 
composite transactions if their composite effect had to be disregarded simply 
because the parties had deliberately included a commercially irrelevant 
contingency, creating an acceptable risk that the scheme might not work as 
planned. We would be back in the world of artificial tax schemes, now 
equipped with anti-Ramsay devices. The composite effect of such a scheme 
should be considered as it was intended to operate and without regard to the 
possibility that, contrary to the intention and expectations of the parties, it 
might not work as planned." 1424 
This case illustrated that the Ramsay principle remains alive in terms of a 
principle of construction: the court should look at the context in which the scheme is 
devised as a whole. 
A purposive interpretation helps the court to counteract tax-avoidance 
schemes. This brings about 'justice'/'fairness'/'equity' but devalues 'certainty'. 
Legal uncertainty stems from two causes, i.e. 
(a) how the purpose of the enactment can be discovered to give meaning to 
the words in the relevant taxing provisions, and 
(b) to what extent the courts will examine the purpose behind the taxpayer's 
transaction to ascertain the legal nature of the transaction for applying the 
relevant taxing provisions. 
Orow supports uncertainty under (a) that "the search for legislative intention 
itself can produce uncertainty."1425 According to Avery Jones, "[for] the question 
'how do the courts know what the purpose is?'[;] [the] answer presumably is that 
they have regard both to principles expressed in the legislation and to external 
materials, such as parliamentary reports."1426 One also notes that: 
"A purposive construction is one that gives effect to the legislative purpose 
either by following the l iteral meaning of the enactment where that meaning 
is in accordance with the legislative purpose, or by applying a strained 
1424 [2005]STC15at26 
1425 Orow, op.cit.(note1389), p.412 
1426 Avery Jones, op.cit.(notel284), p.79 
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meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative 
purpose."' 427 
However, the courts cannot resort to the literal meaning of the enactment to 
seek the legislative purpose in all cases. This is because if an interpretation based on 
the literal meaning leads to injustice (because the taxpayer could avoid paying tax), 
the courts should strive to avoid adopting it. A purposive interpretation based on a 
strained meaning by having regard to extemal materials (such as parliamentary 
material) would be a better approach to seek the legislative purpose. This will reduce 
uncertainty under (a). 
As regards (b), a judicial rule in Ramsay or the rule allowing the courts to 
devise the approach to determine the true legal effect of the transaction to which it is 
sought to attach a tax has been either extended or limited by subsequent cases. Such 
extension or limitation makes a judicial anti-avoidance mle uncertain. The TLRC 
supports the view that a judicial mle "offers no clear framework within which it shall 
operate or not." 1428 
To make this mle certain is not easy because it depends upon facts and 
transactions in each case and upon different judicial attitudes. 1429 The TLRC 
recommends that "the judges must develop a judicial anti-avoidance doctrine within 
the constraints imposed by their role as interpreters of the law rather than as 
1awmakers."1430 This recommendation may reduce uncertainty from a judicial mle. · 
5.7 Improvements 
5.7.1 Improvements in judicial interpretation in the UK1431 
In the case of ambiguity, the UK courts use parliamentary material as an aid in 
interpreting ambiguous words. However, parliamentary material is insufficient to 
encourage legal certainty. A purposive interpretation may also bring about 
uncertainty. 
1427 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder2, op.cit.(note79), p.1315 
1428 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.xii 
1429 ibid.p.31 
1430 ibid.p.31 
143 1 The improvement in judicial interpretation in the UK will be helpful to discuss that in Thailand 
thereafter. 
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As discussed in 3.2.2.2, the TLRC proposes that there should be explanatory 
memoranda to support primary tax legislation to assist understanding and 
interpretation. 1n terms of helping the courts, explanatory memoranda would help the 
courts (a) to resolve ambiguities in the legislation and (b) to apply a purposive 
interpretation. 
As regards (a), explanatory memoranda would contain explanations of how 
each clause of the tax statute would operate, worked examples, answers to difficult 
points or any other relevant matter. 1432 The TLRC proposes that explanatory 
memoranda should have the same status as parliamentary material (Hansard) in the 
courts1433; and the courts should have to strike the balance between explanatory 
memoranda and Handsard. 1434 Nevertheless, the TLRC expects that the courts should 
no longer consuJt Handsard for interpreting tax legislation where explanatory 
memoranda are available. 1435 
As regards {b), a purposive interpretation requires "consideration of the 
legislative history of the enactment, including the pre-enacting, the enacting, and the 
post-enacting history." 1436 As explanatory memoranda would contain background 
material and explanations of the purpose of each clause of the tax statute, they would 
help the UK courts to identify Parliament's intention. 1437 
Thus, if the courts could consult explanatory memoranda m addition to 
parliamentary material to ·identify Parliament's intention, this would ensure legal 
certainty. However, the TLRC expresses the view that "in some cases statements of 
purpose may be a better way to identify Parliament's intention [than explanatory 
memoranda] since they have full legislative force." 1438 
1432 TLRC, op.cit.(notell28), p.viii 
1433 TLRC, op.cit.(notel215), p.39 
1434 TLRC, op.cit.(notell28), p.43 
1435 "b"d 43 1 I .p. 
1436 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder2, op.cit.(note79), pp.l308-l309 
1437 TLRC, op.cit.(notell28), p.64 
1438 TLRC, op.cit.(notel215), p.lO 
334 
5.7.2 Improvements in judicia l in terpretation in Thailand 
The Thai courts are not allowed to use parliamentary material as guidance to 
interpret ambiguous words. It would be further helpful to reinforce legal certainty if 
they could consult parliamentary material to interpret such words. 
Additionally, the Thai government should adopt the TLRC's proposal of 
explanatory memoranda and statements of purpose for supporting new legislation. 
And the Thai courts should consult both explanatory memoranda and statements of 
purpose to help interpret the ambiguous words of the future tax legislation. 
The Thai com1s have not applied a purposive interpretation. The question 
arises whether they should adopt this approach. From my standpoint, where there are 
clear words in taxing Acts, they should be construed strictly to ensure legal certainty. 
The Thai courts should nevertheless adopt the purposive approach for two purposes, 
i.e. 
(a) to interpret ambiguous words, and 
(b) to counteract tax-avoidance schemes. 
As regards (a), looking at the context and scheme of the relevant Act to 
identify Parliament's intention would help the courts to interpret ambiguous words. 
Consulting parliamentary material, explanatory memoranda and statements of 
purpose would be helpful to perform this task. 
As regards (b), a purposive interpretation should be applied where: 
(i) the taxpayer's transaction is abusive or relies upon artificiality; and 
(ii) a strict interpretation (if applied) would not combat artificial/abusive 
tax-avoidance schemes, and a purposive interpretation could operate 
oppositely. 
To reduce legal uncertainty, the Thai courts should consult parliamentary 
material, explanatory memoranda and statements of purpose (if any), and confine 
their role as interpreters of the law. 
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6. Statutory anti-avoidance rules 
6.1 Objections to a judicial rule 
As we saw, a judicial anti-avoidance rule results in legal uncertainty. Additionally, 
there are two objections to the rule: 
(a) the role ofthe courts vis-a-vis the legislator, and 
(b) retroactive effect. 
As regards (a), there are arguments for and against the role of the courts in 
filling gaps and loopholes in the legislation to prevent tax avoidance. Brooks argues 
that "where there is a gap in the statute, ....... there is really no option but for the 
. h . fl kin ,1439 courts to engage m t e creattve process o aw rna g. 
Whilst, V anistendael argues that "most people however see a more limited 
role for the courts [;] [when] there is clearly no legal basis for taxation in the text of 
the law, there is no reason for the court to legislate judicially."1440 This argument is 
based on the doctrine of the separation of powers which holds that "it is not for the 
judiciary to legislate."1441 And it is the task of Parliament to enact anti-avoidance 
legislation. 1442 
Regarding (b), the TLRC says that the reason why a judicial rule is 
unsatisfactory is that it operates retrospectively. 1443 Meanwhile, Lymer et al. say that 
a statutory rule operates· prospectively; therefore, the Revenue "can stop a scheme 
from being used again but legislation changes alone cannot be used to foil a scheme 
which has already been executed."1444 Likewise, "to render loopholes ineffective, 
they must be closed with retroactive effect."1445 However, the retroactive effect of a 
judicial rule may undermine legal certainty which demands that "an individual can 
arrange his affairs in the expectation that he will or will not have to pay tax."1446 
Despite objections, the judges should not be denied absolutely from 
participation in developing the anti-avoidance approach. This is because a judicial 
1439 Brooks, op.cit.(note1329), p.IOl 
1440 Vanistendael, op.cit.(note1381), p.l53 
1441 ibid.p.l33 
1442 Tburonyi, op.cit.(notel 0), p.138 
1443 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.xii 
1444 Lymer, et al., op.cit.(note120), p.l /20 
1445 Thuronyi, op.cit.(notelO), p.l52 
1446 Tiely, op.cit.(note6), p.l 02 
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rule brings about faimess, protects public revenues, prevents an adverse effect on 
redistribution, and has a retroactive effect on the closure of tax-avoidance loopholes. 
Fur1hermore, "[a judicial rule) can develop gradually and cannot be undennined by 
microscopic examination in the search for loopholes." 1447 Moreover, "the more 
modern notion is that legislative power generally is founded on the generalised 
consent of the citizen given in Parliament, but that has not been taken to prevent the 
development of the common law as a whole."1448 
Therefore, if we want to rely solely upon statutory anti-avoidance mles 
(specific and general provisions), such rules should: 
(i) protect tax revenues; 
(ii) generate justice/fairness/equity; 
(iii) create legal simplicity; 
(iv) bring about legal certainty; 
(v) not impede ordinary commercial dealings; and 
(vi) not give excessively discretionary powers to the tax gatherer. 
6.2 Specific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs) 
The UK has adopted SAARs to deal with particular tax avoidance 
schemes/transactions. 1449 SAARs "identify with precision the type of transaction to 
be dealt with and prescribe with precision the tax consequences of such a 
transaction."1450 Parliament can legislate SAARs promptly when unacceptable tax 
schemes are discovered.1451 SAARs are therefore a better approach than a judicial 
rule to prevent loss of tax revenues through tax avoidance. 
Tiley notes that "tax equity demands that artificial tax avoidance schemes 
should be of no effect." 1452 However, SAARs cannot absolutely satisfy this 
criterion. That is, although SAARs can prevent specific abuses, ''they will never be 
1447 Brian J. Arnold, "Chapter 7: The Canadian General Anti-Avoidance Rule", Tax Avoidance and 
The Rule of Law, Graeme S. Cooper, ed., (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications BY, 1997), 226. 
1448 Edwin Simpson, 'The Ramsay Principle: A Curious Incident of Judicial Reticence?", British Tax 
Review 2004 (London: Sweet&Maxwell, 2004), 365. 
1449 Cooper, op.cit.(note1377), p.40 
145° Collision and Tiley, op.cit.(notellll), p.180 
1451 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.8 
1452 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.l 00 
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completely effective in stopping abuse. " 1453 This is because the taxpayer may find 
transactions that SAARs do not cover. 1454 
Likewise, the introduction of SAARs creates new avoidance opportunities 
14--
because SAARs act "as a 'road map ' for tax planners." '' Consequently, "a spiral 
develops in which the blocking of one loophole is followed by the identification of 
another, and so on."1456 This contributes to legal complexity, increasing 
administrative and compliance costs. Thus, SAARs dissatisfy the criterion of 
simplicity, and prevent efficiency of taxation. The UK has a number of SAARs.1457 
Most of them can be found in TA1988, Part XVII. 1458 Additionally, Finance Acts 
contain a long list of SAARs. 1459 
SAARs under the UK Jaw are detailed provisions. 1460 As noted earlier, 
detailed provisions are needed for legal certainty. Additionally, "a targeted approach 
is consistent with the traditional UK legal view that legislation should state clearly 
the circumstances in which a liability to tax arises." 1461 Moreover, SAARs can run 
from a certain date. 1462 This seems that SAARs satisfy the criterion of certainty. 
However, detailed SAARs also mean extensive and complex provisions. As a 
result, "taxpayers and their advisers routinely urge governments to use narrowly and 
precisely drafted, targeted provisions to give them the certainty they require."1463 The 
TLRC notes that "the clearer the boundaries drawn by the legislation, the easier it 
may be for taxpayers to arrange their affairs to fall on one side of the boundary or 
another."1464 Consequently, "there are incentives to draft anti-avoidance measures 
ever more widely, even at the risk of catching innocent transactions." 1465 One has 
1453 Thuronyi, op.cit.(note 1 0), p.152 
1454 ibid.p.l97 
1455 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.4 
1456 ibid.pp.4-5 
1457 Thuronyi, op.cit.(notel 0), p.198 
1458 Tookey, op.cit.(notel), p.364 
1459 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.6 
1460 Thuronyi, op.cit.(note 1 0), p.152 
1461 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.8 
1462 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.l 00 




found that SAARs in TA 1988, Part XVII (ss 703-787) "impose heavy liabilities in 
respect of many kinds of ordinary and innocent transactions." 1466 
Thus, SAARs unduly affect ordinary commercial dealings. Troup 's 
recommendations below are likely to solve this problem. 
" Where a loophole is discovered, the intention to legislate can be announced 
(provided that that intention is clearly stated) but there should then be 
adequate consultation and a real determination to target any provisions with 
certainty and with cJarity." 1467 
Thuronyi notes, "common law countries ... typically include [SAARs] that 
apply only where the tax administration can prove that the taxpayer acted with a tax 
avoidance purpose."1468 This seems that SAARs do not give excessively 
discretionary powers to the tax gatherer. Nevertheless, many examples of 
discretionary powers exercisable by the Revenue are found in T A 1988, Part XVII 
(ss 703-787). 1469 Troup's recommendation below is likely to help protect innocent 
people from unacceptable discretion. 
"Where necessary, a discretion can be given to the Revenue as to the 
application of the provisions but the discretion must be properly hedged about 
with an adequate appeal procedure." 1470 
6.3 General anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) 
GAARs have been adopted in many continental countries1471 (e.g. France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Spain). 1472 Meanwhile, the UK tax system has no GAARs.1473 
Legislators cannot anticipate all possible forms of tax avoidance 
schemes/transactions. Therefore, SAARs that deal with specified 
schemes/transactions will inevitably leave tax loopholes. 1474 GAARs aim to cover "a 
1466 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder 2, op.cit.(note 79), pp.1336-1337 
1467 Edward Troup, "Unacceptable Discretion: Countering Tax Avoidance and Preserving the Rights 
of the Individual", Fiscal Studies (1992) Vol. 13, No.4, p.l38 
1468 Tburonyi, op.cit.(note I 0), p.20 I 
1469 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder 2, op.cit.(note79), p.1337 
1470 Troup, op.cit.(note 1467), p.138 
1471 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.l 01 
1472 Van.istendael, op.cit.(note 1381 ), p. l44 
1473 ibid.p.l44 
1474 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.6 
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range of unspecified schemes where the dominant purpose is to avoid tax."1475 
Therefore, GAARs bring about equity because they make unspecified schemes no 
effect. Likewise, GAARs prevent people from avoiding tax under unspecified 
schemes which SAARs cannot deal with. And if people who cannot obtain a tax 
advantage from such schemes are the rich, this wi ll promote income redistribution. 
GAARs also prevent loss of tax revenues via tax avoidance that SAARs cannot do. 
Unlike SAARs, GAARs satisfy the criterion of simplicity and efficiency of 
taxation because they do not contribute to legal complexity on two grounds. First, 
GAARs do not require detailed provision. This is because GAARs set out broad 
criteria to be applied to any tax avoidance scheme/transaction "without being tied to 
specific cases."1476 Secondly, GAARs possibly break .. the development of the 
legislative spirals." 1477 As we saw, SAARs lead to the legislative spirals in which " the 
blocking of one possible loophole is followed by the identification of another, and so 
on."J478 
GAARs operate prospectively; however, the broad scope and application of 
GAARs contribute to legal uncertainty. The broad scope and application of GAARs 
mean that provisions "do not say with precision in what circumstance tax will be 
imposed."1479 Additionally, their broad scope and effectiveness "depend ultimately 
upon the interpretation of the provision by the courts." 1480 
To provide legal certainty, GAARs must distinguish between acceptable and 
unacceptable transactions. Arnold says, "this distinction is central to [GAARs]."1481 
Acceptable transactions to which GAARs will not apply include legitimate tax 
planning or mitigation. 1482 Meanwhile, unacceptable transactions to which GAARs 
will apply are those which have no legitimate business purpose and/or are primarily 
intended to avoid tax. 1483 
1475 Michael Brooks and John Head, "Chapter 2: Tax Avoidance: In Economics, Law and Public 
Choice", Tax Avoidance and The Rule of Law, Graeme S. Cooper, ed., {Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications BY, 1997), 72. 





1481 Arnold, op.cit.(notel447), p.228 
1482 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.xv 
1483 Brooks and Head, op.cit.(note 14 7 5), p. 72 
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Salter notes that "tax avoidance and tax evasion are quite distinct." 1484 On 
this basis, "evasion of tax by presenting false records, will ful non-disclosure and so 
on, is also not within the purview of a GAAR."1485 The following definitions of the 
terms ' tax minimization ', ' tax avoidance', and ' tax evasion' are likely to make the 
distinction among these terms not become blurTed. 
Thuronyi notes that " tax minimization (tax mitigation, tax planning) is 
behavior that is legally effective in reducing tax liability." 1486 Tiley notes that " tax 
planning is what all sensible people do in order to reduce their tax liabilities."1487 He 
also notes that "tax mitigation arises where the taxpayer takes advantage of a fiscally 
attractive option afforded by the tax legislation, and genuinely suffers the economic 
consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking advantage of 
the option." 14HH 
The TLRC has regarded tax avoidance as "action taken to reduce or defer tax 
liabilities in ways that Parliament plainly did not intend or could not possibly have 
intended had the matter been put to it."1489 This is similar to the formulation by Lord 
Nolan in IRC v Willoughby. 1490 He said that tax avoidance is "a course of action 
designed to conflict with or defeat the evident intention ofParliament."1491 
Kessler notes that tax evasion is "conduct which constitutes a criminal 
offence (fraud on the Revenue or similar offences) [;] tllis normally involves 
dishonest submission of an incorrect tax return." 1492 However, Freedman notes that 
"not all evasion is criminal." 1493 It js found that "dishonesty is essential to the 
offence."1494 This necessity can be found in section 144 of the Finance Act 2000 
which introduced the offence of fraudulent evasion of income tax. It is provided, 
1484 David Salter, "Some Thoughts on Fraudulent Evasion of Income Tax", British Tax Review 2002 
(London: Sweet&Maxwell, 2002), 501. 
1485 Cooper, op.cit.(notel377), p.27 
1486 Thuronyi, op.cit.(note lO), p.l56 
1487 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.94 
1488 ibid.p.94 
1489 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.3 
1490 70TC57atl16 
1491 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.3 
1492 James Kessler, "Tax Avoidance Purpose and Section 741 of the Taxes Act 198.8", British Tax 
Review 2004 (London: Sweet&Maxwell, 2004), 376. 
1493 Judith Freedman, "Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-A voidance 
Principle", British Tax Review 2004 (London: Sweet&Maxwell, 2004), 347. 
1494 Kessler, op.cit.(notel492), p.376 
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inter alia, that: "A person commits an offence if he is knowingly concerned in the 
fraudulent evasion of income tax by him or any other person." 
Salter notes that "the phrase 'knowingly concerned' requires knowledge of 
(rather than mere suspicion) and involvement in the evasion of income tax."1495 Ele 
fUJ1her e laborates that " in re lation to section 144, it can be argued that it should be 
sufficient that the defendant was aware that an evas ion of income tax occurTed and 
that he knowingly pa11icipated in it, and thus a charge may be framed accordingly." 
1496 
Regarding ' fraudulent evasion', Salter notes that "[it] necessitates the proof 
of a dishonest intent."1497 He further notes that" ... no action would be taken in such 
cases under section 144 unless there was dishonesty.'' 1498 He also opines that "the 
probable attribution of dishonesty to the word 'fraudulent' will mean that proof of an 
integral part of the new offence will be dependant in each case upon what stance a 
jury or magistrates take(s) to the question of whether or not dishonesty is present, 
which may be difficult to predict."1499 Freedman notes that "whether innocent or 
dishonest, evasion will lead to re-assessment for tax purposes but only dishonesty 
should result in criminal prosecution.''1500 
Vanistendael notes that tax avoidance is an action that does not constitute a 
criminal offense. 1501 A question arises whether a taxpayer and his tax advisers 
commit an offense under section 144 if an avoidance scheme is not successful. Salter 
refers to a particular view of some members of the House of Commons Standing 
Committee H that "those involved in fiscally ineffective tax avoidance schemes 
should not be regarded as being within the ambit of section 144.''1502 He supports this 
view on two grounds (a) "tax avoidance and tax evasion are quite distinct", and (b) 
"the often highly artificial and complex nature of such avoidance schemes should not 
necessari ly be perceived as evidence of dishonesty on the part of those who devised 
1495 Salter, op.cit.(note1484), p.492 
1496 ibid.pp.497-498 
1497 ibid.p.492 
1498 ibid.pp.50 1-502 
1499 ibid.p.505 
1500 Freedman, op.cit.(note1493), p.348 
1501 Vanistendael, op.cit.(note 1381 ), p.132 
1502 Salter, op.cit.(note 1484 ), p.50 1 
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and implemented them." 1503 Tiley also supports the v1ew that "at present, tax 
avoidance is lawful whether or not it is successful, [which] means that if an 
avoidance scheme is attempted, but fails , the taxpayer must simply pay the tax with 
any interest or surcharges." 1504 
It is clear from the above that ' tax minimjzation ' (' tax mitigation ', ' tax 
planning'), ' tax avoidance', and ' tax evasion ' are distinct. If GAARs could draw a 
distinction among these terms and specify that only a scheme/transaction wruch has 
'tax avoidance' as a primary purpose was within its scope, this would help provide 
legal certainty. The TLRC supports the view that "[GAARs] can describe the nature 
of the arrangements that fall within its scope of operation and - equally important - it 
can explicitly specify the arrangements that remain outside its scope." 1505 Tills is the 
advantage ofthe GAAR over a judicial rule. 1506 
In 1997, the TLRC proposed the adoption of GAARs in the UK. In October 
1998, the Inland Revenue published its Consultative Document dealing with GAARs 
for direct taxes. The TLRC Report and the Consultative Document both envisage that 
"the trigger for the GAAR would be a transaction that has as its sole or main purpose 
the avoidance of tax." 1507 Similarly, the GAAR would apply to the transaction that is 
designed to avoid tax in a way contrary to Parliament's intention.1508 
However, " it is not always easy to discern Parliament's taxing intentions, 
especially in the case of novel and complex transaction."1509 The TLRC Report and 
the Consultative Document both envisage that "a list of factors would be used to 
determine the [tax avoidance] purpose"1510, which includes a tax benefit in mjnd1511 
and the obtaining by a taxpayer of a tax benefit. 1512 This would help provide legal 
certainty. 
1503 ibid.p.50 1 
1504 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.97 
1505 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.xiv 
1506 ibid.p.xiv 
1507 TLRC, A General Anti-Avoidance Rule For Direct Taxes: A Response to the Inland Revenue' s 
Consultative Document (London: IFS, 1999), 11. 
1508 In the case of a composite transaction, the GAAR "would apply [where that transaction (taken as a 




15 11 ibid.p.l4 
15 12 Cooper, op.cit.(note 1377), p.33 
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Based on the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable transactions, 
GAARs would not apply to 'a protected transaction ' or 'acceptable tax planning. ' 
This would also be helpful in providing legal certainty. According to the TLRC 
Report, a transaction would be a protected transaction if it: 
(a) "can reasonably be regarded as encouraged by legislation" 1513, 
(b) "falls within an exception to, or an exclusion from, other anti-avoidance 
provisions"1514, or 
(c) "otherwise does not conflict with or defeat the purpose of the 
legislation. " 1515 
In the case of a multiple step transaction, GAARs would not apply "where 
that transaction (taken as a whole) is entirely or mainly a protected transaction."1516 
According to the Consultative Document, the following fact would indicate 
acceptable tax planning: 
(a) that "the purpose of a transaction is to take advantage of a relief or 
allowance provided by the tax legislation"15n, or 
(b) that "a transaction is specifically excepted from an anti-avoidance 
provision." 1518 
It is argued that "if the scope of [GAARs] is too widely drawn, this would 
create a serious impediment to commercial and personal transactions."1519 Similarly, 
GAARs "bas created a significant scope for uncertainty in commercial dealings."1520 
In addition to providing legal certainty, the Rule that provides exceptions for certain 
transactions (e.g. a protected transaction or acceptable tax planning) is a safeguard 
for ordinary commercial dealings. Furthermore, GAARs that incorporate a clearance 
procedure will provide greater certainty and protect the interests of taxpayers. This is 
another advantage of GAARs over a judicial rule. 
The TLRC expresses the view that "the more broadly [the GAAR] is cast, the 
greater is the need for taxpayers and their advisers to seek advance clearances [from 
1513 TLRC, op.cit.(notel507), p.1 3 
1514 ibid.p.l3 
1515 ibid.p.13 
1516 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.38 
1517 TLRC, op.cit.(note1507), p.14 
1518 ibid.p.14 
1519 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.xvi 
1520 Orow, op.cit.(notel389), p.410 
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the Revenue] to secure the certainty that they require [or to ascertain whether 
proposed transactions would be regarded by the Inland Revenue as falling within the 
scope of the GAAR]."1521 The clearance procedure could be implemented if the 
Revenue had sufficient resources and experienced and trained officials to deal with 
clearance applications within a short time to avoid inhibit1ng ordinary commercial 
dealings. 1522 Additionally, if the clearance application is refused, the taxpayer should 
be able to appeal to an independent tribuna1. 1523 
The Consultative Document agrees that GAARs must incorporate a clearance 
procedure1524, and proposed that a clearance application should include a teclmical 
analysis (for the Revenue to fully understand the facts) 1525 and be published (in 
anonymised form). 1526 It also proposes that some charge will be made for clearance 
applications. 1:,:.i·r However, the TLRC criticizes that "a taxpayer should not have to 
pay to confirm that his transaction is entirely acceptable for tax purposes."1528 For 
charging and administrative cost reasons, the UK Government rejected the 
Revenue's proposal for the introduction of GAARs in March 1999.1529 
The final point to discuss is whether GAARs would give excessively 
discretionary powers to the Revenue if they were adopted. GAARs inevitably require 
the Revenue to opine at the outset whether the taxpayer's transactions fall within the 
Parliamentary intent.1530 This probably extends the scope of the Revenue's power, 
which may interfere ordinary commercial dealings. There should therefore be a 
limitation on the scope of the Revenue's power in applying GAARs. The TLRC 
proposes that only the Head Office of the Revenue concerned should invoke the 
Rule. 1531 When invoking the Rule, the Revenue must show "why transaction is of a 
1521 TLRC, op.cit.(notel507), p.8 
1522 ibid.p.8 
1523 TLRC, op.cit.(note7), p.xvi 





1529 Tiley notes that "the government was not willing to pay the financial costs of (a pre-clearance or 
rulings system], nor was it willing to pay the political cost of trying to force such a system onto 
taxpayers." (Tiley, op.cit.(note6) p.l 02) 
1530 TLRC, op.cit.{note7), p.35 
153 1 ibid.pp.xv-xvi 
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nature that [GAARs] ought to apply." 1532 It must also state "the altemative 
transaction that it considers should be substituted for the actual transaction as the 
basis for assessing tax."1533 
6.4 Disclostu·e rules 
In addition to SAARs, the disclosure rules have been introduced to counter tax 
avoidance in the UK, as from 1 August 2004. 1534 Part 7 of the Finance Act 2004 
(FA2004) provides the framework for the rules1535, which have been elaborated by 
regulations.1536 
The rules require promoters and, in some cases, users of tax avoidance 
schemes to notify the Revenue of such schemes as summarized below. 
(a) A promoter1537 must, within 5 days1538, notify the Revenue of: 
1532 ibid.p.xiv 
1533 ibid.p.xvi 
(1) information on any notifiable proposal1539 after he makes the proposal 
available for implementation by any person, or if earlier, after he first 
becomes aware of any transaction forming part of notifiable 
arrangements implementing the proposal, and 
(2) information on notifiable arrangements1540 after he first becomes 
aware of any transaction forming part of those arrangements (unless 
1534 Section319, FA2004 
1535 The Act applies to all the direct taxes, but regulations restricted disclosure in the initial phase to 
remuneration schemes and financial products. Stamp duty land tax schemes were added in 2005. As 
from 1 July 2006, the rules are extended to include the whole of income tax, corporation tax and 
capital gains tax. (HMRC, BN 63 - Modification and extension of the disclosure regime, 
http://www.lunrc.gov.uklbudget2006tbn63 .htm as of 28/07/2006, 1.) 
1536 Revenue Press Release 22 June 2004 
1537 A person is a promoter if, in the course of providing tax services, he makes available for 
implementation or design proposals and arrangements prescribed by regulations. (Section 307, FA 
2004) More details of definition and dutY. of promoter can be found in Appendix X to Chapter Five. 
1538 Reg 4, SI 2004/1864 
1539 It is a proposal for arrangement which, if entered into, would be notifiable arrangements. (Section 
306, FA 2004) 
1540 They are any arrangements of a description prescribed by regulations which enable or expect to 
enable any person to obtain a tax advantage, and that rax advantage is the main benefit, or one of the 
main benefits of the arrangements. (Section 306, FA 2004) 
SI 2004/1863 described the proposals and arrangements which a promoter must notify to the 
Revenue. As from I July 2006, SI 2004/1863 are revoked and new regulations contain hallmarks 
(descriptions of arrangements in line with the system used for VAT). If a tax scheme falls within any 
one hallmark then it will be noti fiable. (HMRC, op.cit.(note1535) ,p.2) 
SI 2004/1864 prescribe the information that need to be notified, including a summary of the tax 
scheme and the statutory provisions relied upon. 
346 
the arrangements implem~nt a proposal in respect of which has been 
notified under (1)). 1541 
(b) Where there is a non-UK resident promoter (and no UK resident 
promoter), persons entering into notifiable anangements must notify the 
Revenue of information on those arrangements within 5 days after doing 
so.l 542 
(c) Where there is no promoter, persons entering into notifiable anangements 
must notify the Revenue of information on those arrangements by the 
date they would normalJy have had to notify the Revenue of the scheme 
reference number (had one been allocated). 1543 
The Revenue may, within 30 days of being notified, allocate a reference 
number to the notifiable arrangements or proposals, and inform the number to the 
person who notify information. 1544 The promoter must pass on to the client the 
reference number within 30 days after he first becomes aware of any transaction 
fo1ming part of the arrangements or, if later, after the reference number is informed 
to him. 1545 
A party to any notifiable arrangements must notify the Revenue of the 
reference number informed to him by the Revenue or by the promoter, and the time 
when the tax advantage is expected to arise. (This information must be included 
when filing the relevant tax return). 15'i6 
A person failing to comply with any of the disclosure obligations above shall 
be liable to Penalty of up to 5,000 pounds. 1547 
The mles do not require the disclosure of information subject to legal 
professional privilege (LPP). 1548 The client must notify the Revenue of information, 
1541 Section 308, FA 2004 
154 2 Section 309, FA 2004; Reg 4, SI 200411864 
1543 Section 310, FA 2004; Reg 4, SI 2004/1864 
Businesses may have their own in-house tax departments which may devise tax avoidance 
schemes. b1 tills case, the business itself must notify the arrangement. (Simon's Direct Tax Service 
Finance Act Handbook, The Finance Act 2004, (London: LexisNexisUK, 2004), 288.) As from l July 
2006, the time limit for notification of in-house schemes is reduced to 30 days from the date that 
scheme is implemented; and neither individuals nor businesses that are SMEs will have to notify in-
house schemes. (HMRC, op.cit.(note 1535), pp.l-2) 
1544 Section 311, FA 2004 
1545 Section 312, FA 2004 
1546 Section 313, FA 2004; Reg 8, SI 2004/1864 
1547 Also, there are other penalties provided by section 315, FA 2004. 
347 
within 5 days of entering into the first transaction fomung pa11 of the arrangements, 
in place of a promoter where the promoter believes the relevant information is 
covered by LPP. 1549 However, the client may waive privi lege, thereby allowing the 
promoter to notify the relevant jnformation on his behalf. 1550 
The rules give extra powers to the Revenue, namely they enable "the Revenue: 
(a) "to see which retums Ltnder a self-assessment should be examined more 
closely"155 1, which will enable the Revenue " to check whether the right 
amount of tax, including any payments on account, have been paid"1552; 
and 
(b) " to obtain much earlier notice of new arrangements so that, where 
appropriate, schemes can be blocked by targeted anti-avoidance 
provisions." 1553 
As regards (b), this may however lead to discretionary powers because the 
Revenue can "give quite some thought to the question whether the arrangements 
succeed or not." 1554 Discretionary powers may unduly affect legitimate/acceptable 
tax planning. Therefore, in construing and applying both disclosure rules and SAARs 
to information/arrangements disclosed, the Revenue should not go beyond the strict 
letter of the law. This will: 
(i) protect legitimate/acceptable tax planning1555, 
(ii) provide legal certainty, and 
(iii) strike down unacceptable tax schemes/arrangements which come 
within SAARs. 
As regards (iii), arti:ficiaVabusive tax avoidance schemes will therefore be of 
no effect. (The rules aim to deter "the use of tax schemes that are abusive or rely 
1548 Section 314, FA 2004 
1549 Reg 3, SI 2004/2613 
1550 Revenue Press Release 6 October 2004 
1551 Tiley, op.cit.(note6!, p.99 
1552 ibid.p.99 
1553 Simon's Direct Tax Service, op.cit.(notel543), p.284 
1554 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.99 
1555 The Rt. Hon Dawn Primarolo says, " . . .. it is not the intention of the disclosure rules to stop 
accountants advising their clients on the tax breaks and the concessions that Parliament has 
introduced. That is entirely acceptable tax planning." (HMRC, Disclosure of Direct (IT,CGT. and CT) 
Tax Avoidance Schemes (The Main Guidance), July 2005, p.4 , available from HMRC's website at 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/aiu/index.htrn.) 
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upon artificiality"). 1556 This will bring about tax equity, promote mcome 
redistribution from the rich to the poor (if the rich cannot obtain a tax advantage or 
avoid paying tax from artificial/abusive tax avoidance schemes), and prevent loss of 
tax revenues. Hartnett, director general, HMRC says that the rules help HMRC 
"en01mously to counter tax avoidance faster than [HMRC] would ever have done 
without this legislation." 1557 Meanwhile, most accounting :fim1s "believed that the 
avoidance industry had been substantially disrupted."1558 
Nevertheless, the rules undennine efficiency of taxation, which reqUJres 
taxpayers to comply with tax law at low cost to themselves. The rules that provide 
the disclosure obligation impose costs on tax advisers, taxpayers and businesses -
deadweight. 1559 For example, "most of the accounting firms had established a new 
centralised process for handling or co-ordinating [the disclosure rules]."1560 
Furthermore, although regulations that have elaborated the rules in FA 2004 
provide certainty for tax advisors, taxpayers and businesses1561, the frequency of 
changes and the quantity of regulations probably contribute to complexity and 
increased compliance costs. 1562 
Finally, the rules may increase administrative costs because the 
implementation of the rules to achieve the above-mentioned aim requires disclosure 
departments (i.e. HMRC's Anti-Avoidance Group) staffed with "persons of 
sufficient technical calibre'' to identify acceptable/unacceptable tax .. 
scbemes/arrangements. 1563 And, if the rules are too widely drawn, it is less easy to 
identify the real abusive schemes. 1564 
1556 ibid.p.4 
1557 David Earle, "Taken the money? Open the box!", Taxation, 6 October 2005, p.l4 
1558 ibid.p.l8 
1559 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.99 
1560 Earle, op.cit.(note 1557), p.15 
1561 It is however noted that "both the primary legislation and the regulations leave much room for 
doubt about certain definitions." (Chamberlain, et a!., op.cit.(note78), p.1 004) In my view, to ensure 
certainty, regulations must not be too widely drawn because they are not subject to the same 
farliamentary scmtiny as Acts of Parliament. 
562 There are regulations including SI 2004/1863 (which are revoked and replaced), SI 2004/1864, SI 
2004/1865, SI 2004/2429, SI 2004/2613, and SI 2005/1869. One notes that "the disclosure regime has 
been extended several times." (Author not identified, Accountancy, January 2006, Vol.l37, p.102) 
1563 Simon's Direct Tax Service:Binder2, op.cit.(note79), p.4904 
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6.5 Proposal for adoption of GAARs and disclosure rules in Thailand 
Thailand has no GAARs. When tax loopholes are discovered, specific anti-avoidance 
provisions will be enacted to fi ll such loopholes.1565 However, specific provisions 
create legal complexity (which deters efficiency of taxation), whereas GAARs 
operate oppositely. 
Nevertheless, open-ended GAARs produce tmcertainty, impede ordinary 
commercial transactions, and give the tax authorities' discretionary powers. 
Therefore, if GAARs were adopted in Thailand to support specific provisions to 
solve deficiencies that such provisions make, GAARs would have to: 
(a) draw a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable transactions; 
(b) apply to schemes/transactions which are designed to avoid tax in a 
manner contrary to legislative intention; 
(c) allow an exception for legitimate/acceptable tax planning; 
(d) incorporate a quick clearance procedure/a short-time pre-transaction 
rulings system under which there is no charge for applications1566, and the 
taxpayer has the right to appeal against a refusal for his/her application; 
(e) specify that only the Head Office of the Revenue Department (the RD) 
can invoke the Rule. 
Additionally, the Thai gevernment should have adequate resources and well-
trained officials to deal with clearance applications. 
Finally, as we saw, the disclosure rules probably counteract abusive tax 
schemes, but offer discretionary powers, increase administrative and compliance 
costs, and impose penalties for non-compliance. Therefore, if such rules were 
adopted in Thailand, the rules would not: 
(a) be too widely drawn (to avoid much room for uncertainty about certain 
definitions, e.g. who must notify the relevant information, and whether a 
scheme is notifiable); 
(b) be frequently amended (to avoid legal complexity and confusion); and 
(c) give a too little period for preparation and notification of the information. 
1564 Chamberlain, et al., op.cit.(note78), p.l 004 
1565 For example, Section 40 (4), RCT 
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Additionally, the RD must have experienced and well-trained officials who 
can identify the real abusive schemes and strictly apply the proposed disclosure rules 
and specific anti-avoidance provisions to the information disclosed. 
7. Administrative practice 
7.1 Features, advantages and disadvantages 
Thai and UK tax authorities may make statements to help administer tax legislation. 
Such statements help reduce confusion and difficulty in applying the law, which 
support legal certainty and simplicity. 
In Thailand, the RD has made statements including departmental 
notifications, departmental clarifications, and departmental instructions. 
Departmental notifications explain or enlarge on the meaning of certain 
provisions of the RCT and delegated legislation1567, which help taxpayers to 
understand and to comply with such provisions. 
Departmental clarifications clarify certain provisions of the RCT and 
delegated legislation, which reduce confusion and difficulty for taxpayers in applying 
the law. 
Departmental instructions provide the officers of the RD with guidelines on 
tax administration and collection.1568 Departmental instructions result from there 
being insufficient details in certain provisions of the RCT and delegated legislation, 
causing difficulties in administrative operation. Departmental instructions are 
therefore intended to enlarge on or add details to tax provisions, which enable tax-
gatherers to carry out their duties. 
Since the above statements have no legal force, the taxpayer who disagrees 
with and is adversely affected by them can argue against them in court. 
Tax rulings are another statements issued by the RD to taxpayers who are 
uncertain about the tax treatment of particular transactions. A ruling is an official 
view only. The taxpayer who requests the ruling may or may not comply with it. 
1566 Efficiency of taxation requires low compliance costs. 
1567 Suthep Pongpitak, "Question-Answer", RD Tax Journal, Year 46, Issue 10, October, 1999, 77. 
15
68 " ------------------ -------------------- ---------------------------------------" Issue II , November, 1999, 61. 
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In the UK, the Revenue (which is part of HM Revenue & Customs) has 
issued statements including extra-statutory concessions (ESCs), Statements of 
Practice (SPs), News Releases, Tax Bulletin, guidance manuals, guidance leaflets, 
indirect guidance, post-transaction rulings, statutory clearances, and statutory 
approvals. 
ESCs are "relaxations that give a reduction in tax liability that [the taxpayers] 
would not be entitled to under the strict Jetter of the law." 1569 (There will be more 
discussion on ESCs below). 
SPs are issued to "explain [the Revenue's] interpretation of legislation and 
the way [the Revenue) apply the Jaw in practice."157(} They "deal with doubtful 
points, and questions which the law does not answer." 1571 As a result, they "operate 
as a shield for the taxpayer rather than a sword for the Revenue."1572 They have no 
legal force. The taxpayer who disagrees with them can argue for a different 
interpretation before the courts. 1573 
News Releases are issued "to announce a proposed change in the law, a 
change in [the Revenue's] practice or some other change or initiative of interest to 
the public." 1574 Tax Bulletin is published "to inform tax practitioners of matters of 
technical interest, including [the Revenue's] interpretation of aspects of tax 1aw."1575 
Guidance manuals are "the internal guidance manuals [that the Revenue's staff] 
use1576; however, "certain passages are held back for operational reasons." 1577 
Guidance manuals cover "the interpretation of tax law and the operation of the tax 
system."1578 Guidance leaflets "have been published for many years, but they have 
gained considerably in appearance and readability since the Revenue started taking 
the Plain English Campaign seriously, and they now regularly win praise for 
1569 HMRC, COPlO: IR Code of Practice 10, http: //www.hrnrc.gov.ukJpdfs/coplOhtm as of 
24/07/2006, 2. 
1570 ibid.p.2 
1571 David W. Williams, "Extra Statutory concessions", British Tax Review 1979 (London: Sweet& 
Maxwell, 1979), 143. 
1572 A. Foreman, The Allied Dunbar: Tax Handbook 1998-99 (London: Allied Dunbar Assurance plc, 
1998), 10. 
1573 Chamberlain, et al., op.cit.(note78), p.11 
1574 HMRC, op.cit.(note 1569), p.2 
1575 "b"d 2 I I .p. 
1576 "b"d 2 I I .p. 
1577 Tiley, op.cit.(note6), p.59 
1578 HMRC, op.cit.(note 1569), p.2 
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clarity." 1579 Indirect guidance is the Revenue 's letter sent to taxpayer 
representatives and professional associations about the operation of the taxes in its 
charge. 1580 
The above statements keep taxpayers informed of the movement of tax laws 
and the tax authorities' interpretation and application of tax law .in practice, which 
reduce confusion and difficulty in applying tax law. However, Revenue 
interpretations have no legal force, "cannot, in the Revenue's view, require 
appropriate action by the taxpayer"1581 , and "the Revenue will not necessarily regard 
itself as bound by them."1582 
A post-transaction ruling is "a ruling by [the Revenue] on the application of 
tax law to a specific transaction after that transaction has taken place."1583 Tax 
rulings are of importance for the self-assessment system since they can assist 
taxpayers to ascertain tax law and practice, particularly concerning the tax treatment 
of their transactions. The taxpayers can apply for a post-transaction ruling when the 
tax treatment of the particular transaction is in doubt. 1584 In receiving rulings, the 
taxpayers can see their tax obligations and complete their tax retums.1585 
Post-transaction rulings are merely official views. The taxpayer who 
disagrees with a post-transaction ruling cannot appeal against it. 1586 However, he/she 
is entitled not to comply with such ruling in his/her return. If the difference of 
opinion between the taxpayer· and the Revenue cannot be resolved (after the return · 
being completed and sent to the Revenue), the taxpayer can "appeal against the 
Revenue's assessment or amendment of [his/her] Self Assessment in the usual 
way."'587 
1579 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note 15), p.40 
1580 ibid.p.41 
1581 Collision and Tiley, op.cit.(note 1111 ), p.43 
1582 Tiley, op.cit.(note6),p.59 
1583 HMRC, op.cit.(note1569), p.3 
1584 .b.d 3 I I .p. 
1585 ibid.p.3 
1586 .b .d 4 1 1 .p. 
1587 .b .d 4 I I .p. 
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The Revenue is bound by a post-transaction ruling. However, the Revenue 
would not be bound by a post-transaction ruling if the information that the taxpayer 
gave were incotTect and incomplete. 1588 
Apart from post-transaction rulings, the taxpayers can app ly to the Revenue 
fo r advice on the application of the Jaw to a speci fie proposed transaction. 1589 Jn 
addition, the taxpayers can understand their rights and obligations by applying to the 
Revenue for statutory clearances or approvals for cer1ain transactions. Statutory 
clearances are "advance rulings about the tax effect of certain tTansactions." 1590 
Meanwhile, statutory approvals are "statutory approval to contractual or other 
arrangements. " 1 591 
Tax statutes entitle taxpayers to apply for statutory clearances or approvals, 
and the Revenue is obliged to give them. For example, taxpayers can apply for 
statutory clearances in respect of transactions in securities under section 707 of 
TA19881592 ; and taxpayers can apply for statutory approvals in respect of pensions 
under sections 590 and 591 of the TA1988. 1593 Statutory clearances or approvals 
have the advantage of "helping people to understand their rights and obligations so 
they can get their tax affairs right and pay tax on time."1594 
Statutory clearances or approvals are legally binding on the Revenue.1595 
However, the clearance given by the inspector can be withdrawn by the Revenue. 
This is not unfair and will not amount to an abuse of power by the Revenue if the 
taxpayer has not fully disclosed relevant facts and materials to the inspector. This is 
confirmed in Matrix-Securities Ltd v. /RC. 1596 Per Lord Templeman, the Revenue 
was entitled to revoke the clearance given by the Inspector. In this case, the material 





1592 ibid.p.l 0 
1593 ibid.p.ll 
159 4 Revenue Press Release 2 April 1998 
1595 Shipwright and Keeling, op.cit.(note I 075), p.27 
1596 [1994]STC272 
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The advantages of statements made by Thai and UK tax authorities may 
be undermined by three disadvantages. 
(1) Instability of interpretation 
Interpretation of tax law by the tax authorities that is unstable may create 
confusion for both tax-gatherers and taxpayers in applying the law. For example, 
according to the RD's ruling no. 080217536, dated 14111 May 1996, a deduction of 
actual expenses is allowed for prizes won in lucky drawings under section 8 bis of 
Royal Decree (NO.ll) B.E. 2502, provided that the person having such income 
produces evidence proving actual expenses. If he/she fails to produce evidence 
required, a standard deduction of75 percent will be allowed as expenses. 
However, according to the RD's mling no. 0811113116, dated 8111 September 
1998, a standard deduction is not allowed as expenses on prizes won in lucky 
drawings under section 8 of Royal Decree (NO.ll) B.E. 2502. Instead, actual 
expenses will be deducted from such income under Section 8 bis of Royal Decree 
(N0.1 I) B.E. 2502. 
(2) Lack of legal authority to give formal pre- and post-transaction 
rulings 
Neither Thai law nor UK law has any provision calling for formal pre- and 
post-transaction rulings. When there is no law to force the tax authorities to give 
such fo~al rulings, the tax authorities may not speed up the issue of rulings or may 
give rulings at its discretion or under strict conditions. 
There is no specified period of time required for applying and giving rulings. 
under the Thai rulings system, and the issue of the Thai rulings is at the discretion of 
the RD. By contrast, the Revenue will normally give a post-transaction ruling within 
28 days of the date of receiving the taxpayer's request1597, and the Revenue will give 
them in accordance with procedures as set out in theIR Code ofPractice 10. 
(3) Broad scope of explanation, interpretation and application of tax law 
by the tax authorities via various statements 
This may increase taxpayers' obligations and greatly affect their rights 
beyond the stated intention of enactment. The taxpayer who disagrees with the tax 
authorities' broad explanation, interpretation and application can appeal against them 
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to the court, and he/she will probably win the case because they are against not only 
the principle of certainty but also the law. The Thai Supreme Court's decision m 
Callbacks (Thailand) v. the Revenue Department 1598 supports this point. 
In this case, the RD issued Departmental Instruction No.Paw.2/2526 giving 
guidelines on the method of computation of tax withholding. This method of 
computation is different from that legislated in section 50 (1) of the RCT. 
Furthermore, the withholding tax calculated under this Departmental Instruction is 
not the same as that calculated under Section 50 (1). The Supreme Court held that tax 
assessment using the method of computation under this Departmental Instruction by 
the assessment officer is not legally enforceable. 
As quoted earlier, the Revenue makes ESCs to reduce tax liability that "(the 
taxpayer] would not be entitled to under the strict letter of the law."1599 ESCs are not 
passed by Parliament but are issued by persons "who have no legal power to do 
it."1600 ESCs are therefore not law, and "the courts cannot enforce them or interpret 
them because they have never been enacted."1601 Given this, the issue ofESCs is the 
application of tax law by the UK tax authorities beyond the stated intention of 
enactment. 1602 
ESCs will be m the interests of some taxpayers, but do not bring about 
benefits and fairness for taxpayers and society in general. Furthermore, ESCs do not 
comply with the criterion of certainty that requires tax rules to be reliable and non-
arbitrary. This is because ESCs are made in favour of some groups of people at the 
Revenue's discretion (based on a list of concessions)1603, and will not be given where 
the Revenue considers that an attempt is made to use them for tax avoidance. 1604 
1597 HMRC, op.cit.(note1569), p.5 
1598 The Supreme Court's decision No.4083/2532 
1599 HMRC, op.cit.(note1569), p.2 
1600 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(note15), p.37 
1601 ibid.p.37 
1602 In Vestey v. IRC [No2] (1979] 2All ER225 at 233, Walton J conunented that the issue of ESCs 
should be a matter for Parliament, and not the Inland Revenue Conunissioners. In Preston v. IRC 
[1985] STC282 at 293, Lord Templeman said, " .... the commissioners themselves must bear in mind 
that their primary duty is to collect, not to forgive, taxes." 
1603 List of the Revenue's concessions and full texts are printed in a booklet issued by the Revenue. 
1604 This term is printed on the inside cover of a booklet issued by the Revenue. 
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7.2 Improvements in administrative practice in both countries 
In my view, in explaining, interpreting and applying the law via various statements, 
the Thai and UK tax authorities should not go beyond the strict letter of the law. This 
kind of administrative practice wi 11: 
• reduce confusion ari sing from the instability of interpretation of tax law; 
• not increase taxpayers' obligations, nor greatly affect thei r rights beyond 
the stated intention of enactment; and 
• make tax law more certain. 
In the case of ambiguity, the Thai and UK tax authorities should consult 
parliamentary materials and explanatory memoranda (if any) to help interpret 
ambiguous legislation in the same way as the courts, as discussed in 5.7 and 5.8. 
Additionally, detailed legislation should be preferred to purposive legislation. 
This is because the former would help prevent the tax authorities from explaining, 
interpreting and applying the law beyond the strict letter of the law, whereas the 
latter would allow the tax authmities to explain, interpret and apply the law beyond 
the strict letter of the law. 1605 Collision and Tiley support the view that 
"The Revenue position often prefers a broad legislative rule which can then 
be interpreted 'liberally' or not. The disadvantages of this are that such a rule 
may be interpreted unevenly and there is the possibility, however unlikely, of 
abuse."1606 
Chamberlain, et al. , note, "[SPs] should be treated with caution since they 
may not accurately state the law." 1607 This possibly results. from the Revenue' s 
liberal and uneven interpretation. 
As discussed above, ESCs are made at the Revenue's discretion, dissatisfying 
the criterion of certainty. In my view, one way to make tax rules reliable and non-
arbitrary is that the tax authorities have to perform their duties according to the strict 
letter of tax statutes. Thus, the Revenue should no longer issue ESCs, as explained 
more below. 
160s Also, GAARs would probably allow the tax authorities to use discretionary powers or apply the 
law beyond the strict letter of the law. Therefore, to prevent this, GAARs (if adopted) should restrict 
such powers and bring about certainty by incorporating rules as proposed in 6.5. 
1606 Collision and T iley, op.cit.(note 1111 ), pp.41-42 
1607 Chamberlain, et al., op.cit.(note78), p. l2 
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Each tax statute has its own particular purpose under the strict provisions; for 
example, one of the primary purposes of the income-tax statute is to raise revenue. 
Therefore, if the income-tax statute wanted to allow relaxation to some taxpayers, 
such relaxation would have to be enacted by Parli.ament as provisions of such statute 
wi th which the Revenue would have to comply. 
The concess ions would therefore have to be made Lmder the income-tax 
statute by Parliament rather than by the Revenue. It seems also unreasonable to say 
that concessions are made by the Revenue to deal with anomalies under the 
legislation and to meet cases of hardship which are difficult to remedy by statute. 1608 
This is because these ought to be a matter for Parliament to deal with as Parliament 
has directly derived the power to do so from the Bill of Rights. 
It would be justifiable for the Revenue to receive legal power from an Act of 
Parliament to make ESCs. An enabling Act should also lay down the ambit of 
concessions to avoid arbitrary power and to comply with the principle of certainty. 
As discussed above, the tax authorities may not speed up the issue of rulings 
or may give them at their discretion because there is no law to force either Thai or 
UK tax authorities to give them. Thus, there should be provisions in both the Thai 
and UK tax Acts to stipulate the conditions for applying and giving formal post-
transaction and pre-transaction rulings. The following conditions should be the 
essence of such rulings. t· 
First, the tax authorities should be obliged to give formal pre- and post-
transaction rulings on all requests (save for the purpose of tax avoidance or evasion) 
within a specified period of time. The rulings should cover all existing enforceable 
taxes. 
Secondly, taxpayers should apply for tax rulings when they find that there is 
an ambiguity in a particular legislative provision to be applied to proposed 
transactions. 
Thirdly, the procedure for applying rulings should not be complex. This will 
save the taxpayer's resources when preparing the application for a ruling; and the tax 
will be paid on time if the taxpayer agrees with the ruling. An uncomplicated 
procedure will also save the government's resources. 
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Fourthly, the infom1ation to be supplied with the application for a mling 
must not be too difficult for the taxpayer. However, such information should 
indicate uncertainty on how tax law applies to a pa1ticular transaction. The law 
should however give relaxation with regard to the taxpayer's opinion and provide 
reasons for the tax consequences ofthe transaction as well as technical analysis. 
Under the IR Code of Practice 10, in applying for infonnal rulings, taxpayers 
must supply information that is sometimes difficult for those who have no profound 
knowledge of tax law. For example, according to Appendix 1 of the Code, the 
taxpayer must give "a technical analysis that is sufficiently detailed for [the 
Revenue] to fully understand the facts and problem that [the taxpayer] wishes [the 
Revenue] to consider." 1609 
Fifthly, the tax authorities should be bound by given rulings, provided that 
the infonnation supplied by the taxpayer is correct and complete. 
Sixthly, a ruling given by the tax authorities is an official v1ew only. 
Taxpayers may or may not comply with tax rulings. 
Seventhly, in giving tax rulings, the tax authorities should not go beyond the 
strict letter of the law. This will also make tax law more certain and reduce 
confusion. 
F inally, given rulings should be published regularly in the RD's Journal and 
the Revenue's Tax Bulletin. Such publication will assist the persons concerned to see 
the guidelines on the tax authority's application of tax laws to the particular 
transactions, make tax law easier to use, and lead to more foreign investment. 
8. Tax collection: an overview 
Although both Thailand and the UK adopt methods of withholding at source and 
self-assessment, the revenue share from the UK income tax is higher than that from 
the Thai PIT. Furthermore, although the cost of Thai tax collection is proportionately 
lower than that of UK tax collection, the methods of tax collection in question do not 
work well in Thailand. 
1608 Revenue press release 17 May 1985 
1609 HMRC, op.cit.(note 1569}, p.6 
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Revenue collection 
PIT revenue in Thailand since the fiscal year 2003 1610 has been shown in 
Table 5.1 below. 









PIT revenue was not the largest source of revenue for the Thai government 
during these periods. The three largest sources were excise taxes, VAT and corporate 
income tax. 
Meanwhile, the UK income tax was the largest single source of revenue for 
the UK government during the periods of 2003/04-2005/06. Income tax revenue in 






Costs of tax collection 




In 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001, the RD collected taxes with costs of 0.61, 
0.68, 0.76, and 0.74 Baht per 100 Baht collected. 1615 Meanwhile, the costs of 
collecting taxes by the Inland Revenue in 200 l/02, 2002/03, 2003/04 and 2004/05 
were 1.38, 1.41, 1.36, and 1.34 pence per£ collected. 1616 
1610 Year ending September 30 
1611 Source: Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance, 
http://dw.mof.go.tb!foc/gfs/database/Cl Budgetary.html,as of27/07/2006, 1. 
1612Source: Stuart Adam and Jonathan Shaw, A Survey of The UK Tax System (updated November 
2003), http://www.ifs.ora.uk/taxsystem/taxsurvey.pdf, 3. 
1613 Source: Adam, op.cit.(note215), p.4. 
1614 Source: Adam and Browne, op.cit.(note75), p.4 
16 15 These latest data are provided by an officer of the RD. 
1616 HMRC, Annual Report 2004-05 (Norwich: TSO, 2005.), 104. 
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The low costs of tax collection are partly due to the fact that the private sector 
acts as an unpaid tax collector for the public sector under the system of withholding 
at source. Additional ly, taxpayers may incur costs under the self-assessment system. 
Nevertheless, a low cost of tax collection is not the only factor indicating 
whether tax administration is efficient. We also need to look at whether the methods 
of tax collection entai l voluntary tax compliance and cheap compliance costs as well 
as absence of abuse of power and bribery in determining administrative efficiency. 
9. Withholding at source ('withholding' ) 
9.1 Features, advantages and disadvantages 
Under Thai law, the payer of income ('the payer') from certain types of income 
must withhold tax at each time of payment1617, and remit the tax withheld to the 
government within a prescribed period. 
Despite 'withholding', Thai law still requires all individuals and married 
couples whose assessable incomes exceed a specified amount to complete and file 
end-of-year tax returns. To calculate the total amount of assessable income of a 
taxpayer for completing an end-of-year tax return, the tax withheld and remitted will 
be deemed the assessable income of the taxpayer and offset/credited against the final 
tax liability of the taxpayer. 1618 The taxpayer whose tax withheld at source exceeds 
his/her fmal tax liability can claim a tax refund 1619; whereas the taxpayer whose final 
tax liability exceeds the tax withheld has to pay the excess. 
Presently, many types of income, which cover eight categories of assessable 
income under the RCT, are taxed through 'withholding' at various rates. In the case 
where the recipient of the income ('the recipient') is liable to the PIT, 'the payer' 
must withhold tax at source at a rate varying according to the type of income, e.g. 3% 
(for income from liberal professions), 5% (for income from prizes in contests), I 0% 
(for dividend income), 15% (for income from royalties), or 0-37% (for income from 
employment). 1620 
16 17 Section 50 RCT 
1618 Section 60, RCT 
1619 Section 63: RCT 
1620 More details can be found in Appendix XI to Chapter Five. 
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In the UK, 'withl1olding' includes withholding from (a) certain interest 
payments, (b) employees' eamings, and (c) income other than (a) and (b). 
As regards (a), the payer of interest income (e.g. banks and buil.ding 
societies) is required to withhold income tax at source from the following interest 
payments at the rate of 20%, and remit the tax withheld to the Revenue: 
• bank deposit interest "unless a claim has been made by a non-taxpayer to 
. 1 . , 1621 rece1ve t 1e mcome gross , 
• building society interest "unless a claim has been made by a non-taxpayer 
to receive the income gross"1622, 
• debenture interest1623and other loan interest paid by UK companies1624, 
and 
• interest on UK government securities1625; however, "as from 6 April 
1998, anyone receiving such interest may choose whether to receive the 
interest gross or net."1626 
Unlike interest payments, company dividend payments have not been subject 
to withholding since the tax year 1999/00. 1627 The recipients of UK dividends now 
receive a tax credit of one-ninth of the amount of dividend.1628 Such tax credits are 
charged to tax and deducted from the taxpayer's income tax liability on 
dividends.1629 The result is that "there is no outstanding income tax liability except 
for higher rate taxpayers." 1630 
As regards (b), 'withholding' from employees' earnings is known as the 
Pay-As-You-Earn system ('PAYE').1631 Under 'PAYE', employers are required to 
withhold income tax and National Insurance contributions from employees' earnings 
1621 Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.73 
1622 ibid.p.73 
1623 ibid.p.73 
1624 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.21 
1625 Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.73 
1626 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.21 
1627 Walter Sinclair, Tax Guide 2003-2004 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 9. 
1628 "b"d 9 1 I .p. 
1629 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.26 
Melville also notes, "it is not possible to claim payment of any tax credits which exceed [the 
taxpayer's liability] [;] [nor] is it possible to deduct tax credits from the tax due on other 
forms of income." 
1630 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l57 
163 1 Section 203, TA 1988 
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at the time of payment1632, and remit the tax withheld to the Revenue.1633 
'Withholding' from wages and salaties is done on a cumulative basis, wh ich covers 
"starting, basic and higher rate income tax ." 1634 
James and Nobes explain a cumulative basis as fo llows: 
"Cumulation simply means that a taxpayer's pay and allowances are 
accumulated throughout the tax year so that the amount withheld in any one 
period is dependent on the income received tlu·oughout the tax year up to and 
including the current period." 1635 
'PA YE' applies to all earnings from employment (e.g. wages, salaries, bonus, 
commission, fees, pension, pay during sickness or other absence from work, and 
holiday pay). 1636 'PA YE' also applies to transactions as follows: 
(i) trade debts, 
(ii) some payments to sub-contractors in the construction industry, 
(iii) payments to outworkers, and 
(iv) payments in the form of 'readily convertible assets.' 1637 
As regards (c), 'the payer' is required to withhold tax at source from the 
following income at the basic rate of 22%, and remit the tax withheld to the 
Revenue: 
• income received under a deed of covenant, 
• patent royalties, and 
• income portion of a purchased life annuity. 1638 
Advantages of 'withholding' 
There are at least four advantages of 'withholding', namely (a) stability of tax 
revenue, (b) prevention of avoidance and evasion, (c) reduction in the abuse of power 
and bribery, (d) convenience and low costs for tax-gatherers and individual taxpayers 
1632 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.l 04 
1633 Sinclair notes, 
"[The] employer has to pay over to the Collector of Taxes the total PA YE income tax 
deductions (less refunds) and National Insurance contributions in respect of the previous 
month. The time limit is by the nineteenth day of the following month." 
(Sinclair, op.cit.(note1627), p.l25) 
1634 ibid.p. l25 
1635 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p. l70 
1636 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p. l 04 
1637 More details can be found in Appendix Xll to Chapter Five. 
1638 Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.72 
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As regards (a), 'withholding' improves "the speed and reliability of the 
gove1nment's income tax revenue"1639 because 'withholding' reduces loss of tax 
revenue due to tax evasion and brings money into the government' s treasury 
regularly. 
As regards (b), 'withholding' reduces the opportunity and incentive for tax 
evasion 1640 because ' the payer' is responsible for the tax due, not the taxpayer who is 
the recipient. 1641 'Withholding' under current Thai and UK laws covers increasing 
types of income and payment, which makes it more difficult for individuals to evade 
paying tax, i.e. by failing to report or underreporting income from legal activities. 
For example, under Thai law, 'withholding' is extended to income from liberal 
professions. 1642 The extended scope of 'withholding' also helps prevent tax 
avoidance. For example, P AYE that extends to payments in the form of 'readily 
convertible assets' prevents employers from avoiding PA YE by paying employees in 
assets. 1643Consequently, 'withholding' helps reduce administrative costs to prevent 
and detect tax avoidance and evasion. 
As regards (c), 'withholding' reduces corruption because under this system, 
tax-gatherers are not directly responsible for tax collection. 
As regards (d), according to Adam Smith, having a great number of tax-
gatherers and frequent visits of tax-gatherers produces high administrative costs1644, 
and "frequent visitations from tax-gatherers" also increase compliance costs.1645 As 
we saw, under 'withholding', 'the payer' must remit the tax withheld to the 
government. 'Withholding', therefore, reduces the number of tax-gatherers, the 
number of tax-gatherers ' visits to individual taxpayers to assess and collect tax, 
which reduces administrative and compliance costs. 
Additionally, compliance costs are reduced because under 'withholding', 
"the tax payment coincides with the receipt ofincome."1646 This convenience enables 
most taxpayers to avoid completing end-of-year tax returns (as described below). 
1639 Black, op.cit.(note140}, p.344 
1640 Whitehouse and Vaines, op.cit.(note695), p.I06 
1641 Lymer, eta!., op.cit.(note120), p.4/ 12 
1642 More examples can be found in Appendix XIII to Chapter Five. 
1643" " -·-·---------------·-----·-------·----·---·-------·--·---·--------·------.... __________ _ 
1644 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.20 
1645 "b'd 21 I I .p. 
1646 Trotman-Dickenson, op.cit.(notel38), p.82 
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This convenience also prevents tax evasion, because if ' the payer' did not withhold 
· tax from income weekl y or monthly, taxpayers would pay a large amount of tax at 
the end of the tax year. This might create a di sincentive to pay tax. Furthermore, this 
convenience prevents bad debts because tax payers might not have enough money to 
pay tax at the end of the tax year due to overspending during the year. 
In the UK, most people whose income tax is withheld by 'PA YE' do not have 
to complete end-of-year tax retums.1647 Given this, "the UK P AYE system takes the 
process of assessment and collection largely out of the hands of most taxpayers"1648, 
reducing the compliance costs of those who have no burden of completing and filing 
end-of-year tax returns. 
The reason why most UK wage and salary earners do not have to complete 
end-of-year tax returns is that the tax withheld equals final tax liability. This results 
from a cumulative PA YE system.1649 Under the cumulative system, income tax on 
the earnings of those with simple affairs (e.g. starting-rate and basic-rate taxpayers) 
is withheld accurately at source throughout the tax year. 
However, for those with high income and complex financial affairs (e.g. the 
self-employed, people with multiple sources of income, and company directors), 
there are difficulties in withholding tax accurately throughout the tax year, thereby 
requiring adjustment to the amount of tax already withheld at the end of the tax year 
on completion of tax returns. 
As noted above, Thai law still requires individuals whose assessable incomes 
exceed a specified amount to complete and file end-of-year tax returns despite 
'withholding' . For those whose tax withheld equals final tax liability (i.e. low- and 
middle-income wage and salary earners whose income taxes are withheld at source 
on a cumulative basis), the requirement for filing and completing end-of-year tax 
returns costs them time (and sometimes money). Dealing with tax returns oflow-rate 
taxpayers by tax-gatherers also increases administrative costs disproportionately to 
the tax revenue received from them. 
1647 HMRC, Income Tax Statistics and Distributions, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.ukistats/income_tax/income_tax_ int:ro.pdf, as of 27/07/06, 2. 
1648 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.l56 
1649 ibid.p.l73 
365 
Disadvantages of 'withholding' 
The advantages of 'withholding' may be undermined by five disadvantages. 
(1) Many ru les 
Presently, in Thailand there are at least ll pieces of legislation dealing with 
'withholding': the RCT, two Royal Decrees, four Ministe1ial Regulations, and four 
Departmental Regulations. There are more than 50 main rules (and many sub-
clauses) on 'withholding' in these laws. Rules on UK 'withholding' are found in the 
TA 1988, the ITEPA 2003, Finance Acts and PAYE Regulations 2003. 1650 · 
Numerous rules create complexity, confusion, difficulty, and high costs in 
making 'withholding' as well as in checking the correct amount of tax withheld. 
(2) Many rates 
There are more withholding tax rates under Thai law than under UK law. 
Many tax rates make the withholding system complex. Consequently, the system is 
difficult and confusing to comply with, imposing considerable costs on 'the payers '. 
Additionally, the complexity increases the costs of tax-gatherers in checking the 
correct amount of tax withheld. 
(3) Inequity of taxation 
'Withholding' can cause tax inequity. First, some incomes are taxed at 
source, whereas others are not. Secondly, there are differences between withholding 
tax rates. 
Despite the extension of scope of 'withholding' in both Thailand and the UK, 
current 'withholding' in both countries cannot cover all types of payment. For 
example, under Thai law, 'withholding' does not cover all payments for sale of 
goods, whereas certain payments for sale of goods (e.g. payment for sale of goods 
made by government agency) are subject to 'withholding' . 
Withholding tax rates under Thai law differ according to the type of income, 
'the recipient' (Thai or non-Thai resident), and 'the payer' (a person, a juristic 
person, a non-juristic body of persons, or governmental agencies). Comparing two 
persons with equal income, a salary earner whose income is taxed at source at rates 
of 0-37% has disposable income during the tax year less than a contractor whose 
1650 There will be Bill 4 to complete the Rewrite Project' work on income tax. The Draft Bill also 
include rewritten legislation for withholding at source. (HMRC, op.cit.(notel301), p.2) 
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income is subject to a 3% withholding tax. Therefore, horizontal inequity emerges 
since individuals with equal income are taxed at source at different tax rates.1651 
Additionally, difference in withJ1olding tax rates may encourage individuals to re-
arnnge their financial affairs to benefi t from lower withholding tax rates. 
(4) Tax loopholes and revenue loss 
Thai law sti ll requires all individuals to complete and file an end-of-year tax 
retum despite 'withholding'. Additionally, an individual may elect to pay tax on 
certain types of income through 'withholding' and not include such income as 
assessable income in an end-of-year tax return. 
At the taxpayer's election, interest income need not be included in an end-of-
year tax retum, provided that such income is already taxed at source at the 15% 
rate. 1652 This is a tax loophole. This is because if the taxpayer elects to include 
interest income in an end-of-year tax return for computing his/her final tax, this 
income and other assessable incomes (if any) in the tax return will be charged with 
tax at the rates in the tax-rate schedule (0-37%). Additionally, the taxpayer may elect 
not to include other income (such as dividends, income from saJe of immovable 
property, etc.) in an end-of-year tax return, provided that such income is already 
taxed at source. 1653 
The taxpayer's election to have certain mcomes taxed at source without 
including them in an end-of-year tax return generates tax loopholes, inequity m 
taxation, and revenue loss. 
(5) Payers' burden in tax collection 
'Withholding' imposes additional costs on 'the payers'. According to Collard 
and Godwin, compliance costs for employers of 'P AYE' and National Insurance 
were about £1.3 billion in 1995-96. 1654 They have also found that the costs are high 
for the small new employer; but for the largest employers, "these costs may be offset 
by the cash-flow benefits of acting as tax collectors."1655 Given this, a small business 
1651 Thai wage and salary earners receive unfair treatment from the withholding system because 
withholding tax rates on wages and salaries are much higher than those on other incomes. 
1652 Section 48 (3), RCT 
1653 More details can be found in Appendix XIV to Chapter five. 
1654 David Collard and Michael Godwin, "Compliance Costs for Employers: UK PA YE and National 
Insurance 1995-96", Fiscal Studies (1999), vol.22, no.4, p.423 
1655 ibid.p.423 
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owner may resent the high costs that he/she incurs in acting as "an unpaid tax 
collector." 1656 This resentment may lead to "an anti-tax mentality and an antipathy to 
the tax system." 1657 Consequently, a small business owner may not only fail to 
comply with the requirements that 'PAYE' imposes on him/her but also avoid or 
evade paying income tax as a personal income taxpayer. 1658 
Under Thai and UK laws, ' the payers' will be given penalties if they fail to 
withhold tax at source and to remit the tax withheld to the governments .1659 The 
imposition of penalties is not only a measure to prevent 'the payers' from non-
compliance with the 'withholding' rules but also an incentive to ensure that they will 
comply with the rules promptly and accurately. 
9.2 Improvement in 'withholding' in both countries 
9.2.1 Improvements in the interests of tax-gatherers and taxpayers 
'Withholding' wiU benefit to tax-gatherers and taxpayers more if (a) more items of 
income are taxed at source, (b) withholding tax rates are the same for all types of 
income, and (c) withholding tax rates are equal to those in the tax-rate schedule. 
As regards (a), if 'withholding' in both countries covered as many types of 
payment as possible, this would: 
• · minimize tax evasion (by fai ling to report or underreporting income), 
• provide less opportunity for tax avoidance and for corruption, 
• bring about tax equity, 
• reduce administrative costs m collecting tax and m preventing and 
detecting tax avoidance and evasion, and 
• improve revenue collection. 
As regards (b), as we saw, many different withholding tax rates make 
'withholding' complex, which increase administrative costs, lead to horizontal 
inequity, and provide an opportunity for resource reallocation to benefit from lower 
1656 Sandford, op.cit.(note58), pp.155-156 
1657 ibid.p.155 
1658 ibid.p. l56 
1659 More details can be found in Appendix XV to Chapter Five. 
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withholding tax rates. Therefore, if 'withholding' covered payments extremely 
extensively with the same tax rates, this would: 
• lower administrative costs, 
• reduce horizontal inequity, 
• di scourage resource reallocation or close tax loopholes, 
• minimize revenue loss resulting from the Thai taxpayer's election not to 
include income taxed at source in an end-of-year retum, and 
• improve revenue collection. 1660 
As regards (c), to remove djfference in withholding tax rates, withholding 
tax rates for all types of payment should be equivalent to rates in the tax-rate 
schedules. In Chapter Two, a system of two tax -rate schedules is proposed. The 
proposed schedule for low-income groups contains two rates (0% and 8%), whilst the 
proposed schedule for high-income groups also contains two rates (8% and 35%). On 
this basis, all payments for low-income groups should be taxed at source at the rate 
of 8%. Meanwhile, all payments for high-income groups should also be taxed at 
source at the rate of 8%. This proposed way of withholding at source is likely to help 
resolve the problem of difference in withholding tax rates. 
However, to make the amount of tax withheld be equivalent to final tax 
liability, 'withholding' at source from wages and salaries should be done on a 
cumulative basis and taxed at two rates (0% and 8%) in the proposed schedule for 
low-income groups or at two rates (8% and 35%) in the proposed schedule for high-
income groups. On this basis, people whose employment income is taxed at source 
should not be required to complete and file end-of-year tax returns. The lack of any 
requirement for completing and filing tax returns will not only be convenient but also 
reduce compliance costs for taxpayers. It will also reduce administrative costs for 
checking tax returns. 
However, wage and salary earners who have income from other sources, the 
self-employed, those with complex financial affairs, those with fluctuating income 
and those with multiple sources of income should still be required to complete and 
file end-of-year tax returns. This is because income of these groups may sometimes 
be taxed at source at the proposed rate of 8% and not taxed on a cumulative basis. 
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9.2.2 Improvements for reduction in burdens on 'the payers' 
To lessen additional costs on ' the payers' , (a) withholding tax rates should be the 
same for all types of income; and (b) there should be measures to reduce the degree 
of complexity in ' withholding'. 
As regards (a), no difference m withholding tax rates would reduce the 
payers' costs in making 'withholding' . Low compliance costs would further reduce 
the payers' resentment and resistance to complying with the rules concerned. 
As regards (b), reducing the complexity in 'withholding' would reduce 
compliance costs for 'the payers', and prevent the payers' failing to meet their 
obligations. Presently, there are at least two measures to help achieve these goals, i.e. 
• the provision of 'tax codes' and 'tax tables', and 
• the filing of withholding tax return via the Internet and computer 
software. 
In the UK, the Revenue provides employers with a 'tax code' for each 
employee. A 'tax code' represents the amounts of allowances and reliefs that the 
employee is entitled to. 1661 Employers have to use 'tax codes' along with a set of 'tax 
tables' provided by the Revenue in calculating the amount of tax to be withheld.1662 
Regarding 'tax tables', one notes, 
"The tables operate on a cumulative basis. For each week or month they 
show, by reference to each code, the cumulative amount of tax due from the 
beginning of the tax year in respect of the cumulative emoluments from the 
beginning of the tax year. Thus the tax to be deducted in a particular week or 
month is the difference between the amount shown in the tables for that week 
or month and the cumulative amount of tax deducted in previous weeks or 
months. " 1663 
The use of 'tax codes' and 'tax tables' helps employers to deduct the correct 
amount of tax from employees.' earnings at source. 1664 The RD should adopt the 
system of 'tax codes' and 'tax tables' into the Thai withholding system. The adoption 
would reduce compliance costs and prevent employers making incorrect deductions. 
1660 In 2000, 90% of PIT revenue in Thailand was derived from 'withholding'. (Source: The RD) 
1661 Simon Direct Tax Service, op.cit.(notel49), p.5106 
1662 ibid.p.5106 
1663 ibid.p.Sl 06 
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Regarding filing of withholding tax retums via the Internet and computer 
software, the Thai payers are allowed to fi le withholding tax retums together with 
attachments (or the detai.ls of tax deducted at source) on computer diskette or CD-
ROM. Jn the UK, small employers are now required to file their end-of-year PAYE 
retums via the Internet. 1665 Larger employers (i.e. those with 250 or more 
employees)1666 are required to file their end-of-year PAYE retums via the Internet as 
from 2004/05. 1667 This electronic means wi ll be available to everyone by at the latest 
2010.1668 
To encourage the use of electronic means, small employers who fi led their 
end-of-year PA YE returns via the Internet in 2000/01 and paid any tax due 
electronically were given a discount of £50.1669 Thailand should adopt this way of 
subsidising internet filing. 
As indicated earlier, Thai and UK mles on 'withholding' can be found in 
many tax statutes and delegated legislation. One tax Act would ease administration 
and make it convenient for ' the payers' to comply with the mles. Any changes (e.g. 
the amendment of withholding tax rates) should fit into this proposed Act. However, 
administrative bodies should be empowered by tills Act to make delegated 
legislation, such as technical rules regarding conditions or directions for tax 
administration. 
Furthermore; the law should not require an individual to deduct tax if it is 
inconvenient for the payment to be taxed at source (e.g. payments for sale of goods). 
Moreover, the law should allow the private sector (such as a company or any juristic 
person who is subject to corporation tax) to be entitled to subtract the costs incurred 
in 'withholding' from its profit for the purposes of corporation tax. Such costs may 
be fixed as a percentage of the amount of tax withheld by the private sector in a tax 
year ( e.g.l %). This would obtain better voluntary compliance of 'the payers'. 
1664 ibid.p.5106 
1665 Arnold Homer and Rita Burrows, Tolley's Tax Guide 2003-04 (London: LexisNexis UK, 2003h 
3. 
1666 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.l 07 
1667 Homer and Burrows, op.cit.(note 1665), p.3 
1668 ibid.p.3 
1669 Homer and Burrows, op.cit.(note 111 3), p.xli 
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Finally, if govenunental agenc1es are ' the payers ', they should be required to 
withhold tax from all types of payment. 
10. Self-assessment 
10.1 Features, advantages and disadvantages 
In T hailand, a person whose assessable income exceeds a specified amount (e.g. a 
single person deriving exclusively income from employment exceeds 50,000 
baht)1670 bas to file an end-of-year tax retum and pay his/her income tax (if any) to 
the tax authorities not later than 31 March following the end of the tax year.1671 
Thai people whose assessable income is lower than a specified amount are 
not required to file end-of-year tax returns. This can move the poorest group from the 
income-tax system. Additionally, govemrnent resources are not used to deal with the 
large number of tax retums that would otherwise be filed by the poorest people and 
which would lead to complexity and increased cost of tax administration without 
producing a large amount of tax revenue. 
When the assessment officer is of the opinion that a person has reported false 
or inadequate information in a tax return or has failed to file a tax return, he has the 
power to issue a summons requiring the presence of such a person or a witness for 
examination, and to order either of them to produce books of account, documents or 
other relevant records for inspection.1612 After taking such actions, the assessment 
officer has the authority to make tax assessment and give notice of any additional 
amount of tax or the amount of tax payable.1673 Within 30 days from the date of 
receiving notice from the assessment officer, a taxpayer must either pay tax 
according to the tax assessment (together with any penalty and surcharge) or file an 
appeal against the assessment. 1674 
1670 More details can be found in Appendix XVI to Chapter Five. 
167 1 The Thai tax year begins on I st January and ends on 31st December. 
1672 Sections 19 and 23, RCT 
1673 Sections 20 and 24, RCT 
1674 Sections 18 ter, 20 and 24, RCT 
In the case of an appeal, this must be filed with the Tax Appeal Committee. If disagreeing with the 
ruling of the Tax Appeal Committee, the taxpayer may bring the case to the Central Tax Court and 
then the Supreme Court. 
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In the UK, only those with high income and complex financial affairs are 
required to complete and file tax returns.1675 Under the UK self-assessment system, 
the Revenue sends Self-assessment tax returns to the people mentioned above1676 
after the end of the tax year (after 5 April).1677 People who receive Self-assessment 
tax retums have two ways to deal with such returns. 
First, if they want the Revenue to calculate income tax for them, they must 
fill the information on their taxable income from all sources and their claims for 
allowable expenses, reliefs and allowances on tax returns (without tax computation) 
and send them back to the Revenue before 30 September following the end of the tax 
year. t678 
Secondly, if taxpayers are willing to calculate their own tax liability1679, they 
must complete and send back their tax returns to the Revenue before 31 January 
following the end of the tax year. 1680 
In both cases, the deadline for payment of the tax is 31 January following the 
end of the tax year. 
The Revenue has the right to correct minor errors based on the information 
provided in the tax return within 9 months of the taxpayer' s sending in the tax 
return. 1681 In this case, the taxpayer can object to such amendment. 1682 
Additionally, the Revenue can make an inquiry into the tax return within one 
year from the 31 January filing date. 1683 Based on such an inquiry, the Revenue can 
make an assessment to recover the loss of tax if the Revenue has found that the 
taxpayer has underpaid tax because he/she has given inadequate information in the 
tax return or is fraudulent or negligent, e.g. under-reporting income or over-claiming 
reliefs. 1684 In certain circumstances, taxpayers can appeal against such 
1675 More details can be found in Appendix XVI to Chapter F ive. 
1676 People who have taxable income but do not receive Self-assessment tax returns must notify the 
Revenue within 6 months from the end of the tax year, so that the Revenue can send them tax returns. 
1677 The UK tax year begins on 6 April and ends on 5 April of the following year. 
1678 Section 9 (2), TMA 
1679 Details of how to work out the tax liability and examples of tax calculation can be found in 
Appendix XVD to C hapter Five and Appendix VI to C hapter Two. 
1680 Section 8 (I), (IA) and (5), TMA 
168 1 Melville, op.cit.(note541), p. 13 
1682 Sinclair, op.cit.(notei 627), p.248 
1683 Section 9A, TMA 
1684 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p. I 4 
373 
assessment. 1685 In cases where the taxpayer has not submitted the tax retum within 
the specified period, the Revenue has the right to make an estimated assessment. 1686 
The UK's Self-assessment is applied more efficiently than Thailand 's Self-
assessment. Evidence for this is the number of people filing end-of-year tax returns 
in comparison to the number of population and working people. The table of 
comparison below will illustrate this point. 
Table 5.3: Thailand's data1687 
Years Number of Population Number of Working People Number of People Filing Tax Returns 
(million) (million) (million) 
1995 59.45 32.57 4.7 
1998 60 30 Less than 5 
2002 62.19 33 4.3 
At the near time, there were 58.8 million people living in the UK in 2001 
(36.1 million people in working age). 1688 As noted earlier, most people whose 
income tax is withheld by PA YE do not have to complete and file end-of-year tax 
returns. Nevertheless, there were more than 9.15 million people1689filing end-of-year 
tax returns in 2001-02. 1690 This datum is not much different from that in 1996-97(the 
first year of the introduction of Self-assessment). In that year, 9 million people filed 
end-of-year tax returns. 1691 
Advantages of 'Self-assessment' 
'Self-assessment' benefits both tax-gatherers and taxpayers as discussed 
below. 
1685 Melville notes that "appeals are heard initially by the General Commissioners or the Special 
Commissioners but may progress to the Courts." (ibid.p.14) 
1686 Sinclair, op.cit.(note1627), pp.248-249 
1687 Source: 
For year 1995: Prapai Arayarangsarid, 'The use of Information Technology in the Tax System", 
RD Tax Journal, Year 44, Issue 9, September, 1997, 115. 
For year 1998: The World Bank, op.cit.(note262), p.27 
For year 2002: The Bank of Thailand, op.cit.(note2.S8), p.1; and Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of 
Finance, as referred to in Daily News, on 29m January, 2002, p.9 
1688 The Office for National Statistics, op.cit.(note751 ), p.2 
1689 Around 8.5, 9.3 and 9.3 million people were required to file end-of-year tax returns in 2002-03, 
2003-04, and 2004-05 respectively. Source: 
(I )The Office for National Statistics, UK2003-The Official Year book (London: TSO, 2002}, 353. 
(2) " ........ . .... . ....................... ", UK2004-" ......... ... . ... ............................ ", 2003), 358. 
(3) " ............. . ....................... ", UK2005-" ....... ..... ......... ......... .............. ", 2004), 372. 
1690 Lymer, et al., op.cit.(notel20), p.l2 
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Benefits to tax-gatherers 
The income tax of people with a high income and multiple sources ofincome 
or of those with complex fmanciaJ affairs cannot accurately be dealt with by 
'withholding' . These people are therefore required to make adjustment to the amount 
of their tax already withheld by completing and fi ling end-of-year tax returns. The 
taxpayer's declaration of income from all sources and tax computation at the end of 
tax year ensures. payment of the correct amount of tax. 1692 
James and Nobes point out that "without self-assessment a great deal of work 
would remain with the Inland Revenue."1693 From the UK experience, the Revenue 
were entirely responsible for the assessment of an individual's tax liability prior to 
the tax year 1996/97. The shift of responsibility for tax assessment from the 
Revenue to the taxpayer under ' Self-assessment' saves administrative costs.1694 
Additionally, 'Self-assessment' probably makes ~ax administration more efficient 
because the Revenue have more time to check whether or not taxpayers are 
complying with the tax law.1695 'Self-assessment' also improves the government's 
cash flow because tax payments are made promptly by taxpayers on the fil ing 
date.I 696 
Benefits to taxpayers 
'Self-assessment' makes the income-tax system fairer for taxpayers. As 
Morse and Williams note: 
"The aim of self-assessment is to transfer to the taxpayer any decision about 
the extent to which something should be taxed. Decisions about the relevance 
of any tax provision to a set of facts, or of interpretation and application of 
the law to those facts, is for the taxpayer."1697 
It is also argued that Self-assessment reduces comptiance costs for British 
taxpayers. From the UK experience, prior to the introduction of Self-assessment, 
"many taxpayers had to contend with several different tax districts making 
1691 L.Chennells, A.Dilnot and N.Roback, A Survey of The UK Tax System (updated August 
2000)http://www.ifs.org.uk/taxsystem/taxsurve)!'.pdf, p.6 
1692 Melville, op.cit.(note541 ), p.2 1 
1693 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p. 202 
1694 Nightingale, op.cit.(note65), p.l6 
1695 Shipwright and Keeling, op.cit.(notel82), p.35 
1696 Whitehouse, et al., op.cit (note549), p.16 
1697 Morse and Williams, op.cit.(notel5), pp.38-39 
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assessments on particular types of income, sometimes from opposite ends of the 
country."1698 Under 'Self-assessment', the taxpayer deals with one tax 
office1699because he/she reports all his/her income fi·om different sources and then 
calculates his/her own tax liability in one tax return which will be submitted to one 
tax office. On this basis, the compliance cost incuned by the taxpayer is now less 
than it was in the past. 1700 
Disadvantages of 'Self-assessment' 
The above advantages may be undermined by the following disadvantages. 
(1) Taxpayer's burden 
'Self-assessment' imposes compliance costs, which includes time and money 
spent in completing tax returns and traveling to tax offices. Completing the tax return 
is not «a simple exercise."1701 This is because taxpayers must have basic knowledge 
of tax laws and of arithmetic. It is possible that compliance costs are costly for those 
who have neither knowledge of tax Jaws nor competence in arithmetic and for those 
who have complex tax affairs because these groups may have to employ tax advisers 
to help complete their tax returns. 
The UK tax return is more complicated, confusing, difficult and costly to 
complete than the Thai tax return. This is because the UK tax legislation is more 
complex than the Thai tax law. The complicated tax return makes it more difficult to 
complete and to check, which increases compliance and administrative costs. 
In Thailand, an end-of-year tax return for employment income has one page, 
and there is a one-page tax calculation guide. An end-of-year tax return for incomes 
other than employment income has four pages, and there is a four-page tax 
calculation guide. Meanwhile, the UK end-of-year tax return has a number of pages. 
For example, the British taxpayers received "a very hefty package from the Post 
Office [for the tax year 2000-2001], with the tax calcuJation guide being expanded 
from last year's eleven pages to twenty nine."1702 
1698 Foreman and Mowles, op.cit.(note574), p.41 
1699 ibid.p.41 
1700 Sue Green, "Self-assessment: A New Era for United Kingdom Taxpayers, But What About the 
Costs", British Tax Review 1996 (London: Sweet&Maxwell, 1996), p.1 09 
1701 ibid.p.l45 
1702 Homer and Rita Burrows, op.cit.(note 1113), pp.l-2 
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Under Thai and UK laws, a taxpayer will be given penalties if he/she fa il s to 
comply with the ' Self-assessment' rules, e .g. filing an incorrect end-of-year tax 
retum, or failing to fi le an end-of-year tax return and to pay tax .1703 
Under ' Self-assessment', taxpayers must also keep accounts and records that 
he lp them to complete or correct their tax returns. Information contained in such 
accounts and records will also be useful for the taxpayer to answer the tax-gatherer' s 
enquiries and to contend/appeal against the tax assessment when the assessment 
officer believes that there is false or inadequate information in the tax return. 
However, keeping proper accounts and records increases compliance costs. Under 
Thai law, there is no provision to impose a penalty in the case of failure to keep 
accounts and records. Under UK law, taxpayers must preserve adequate records fo r a 
specified period. If taxpayers fai l to keep proper records, they will be penalised.1704 
(2) T ax evasion and revenue loss 
It is argued that 'Self-assessment' provides "a plethora of opportunities to 
evade." 1705 This argum ent may be correct for three reasons. 
First, 'Self-assessment' gives taxpayers opportunities to control their tax 
affairs. Therefore, dishonest taxpayers use such opportunities to overstate deductions 
or not to report income from all sources in tax returns. 
Secondly, tax-gatherers do not send tax returns to taxpayers, particularly in 
Thailand. Therefore, 
(a) people who have an income but do not know that they have duties to 
make 'Self-assessment' innocently fail to file tax returns and to pay tax; 
and 
(b) people who have an income but do not appear on the records of tax-
gatherers may dishonestly ignore their duties to file tax returns and to pay 
tax. 
Thirdly, tax evasion by not filing the tax return may happen in Thailand 
because: 
• there is less record-keeping, 
1703 More details can be found in Appendix XV to Chapter Five. 
1704 " " 
1705 Ann Mumford, "Self-assessment for Income Tax: The Relevance of Historical and Constitutional 
Difference", British Tax Review 1996 (London: Sweet&Maxwell, 1996), 13 1. 
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• there are many people having no knowledge of tax laws; and 
• there are few checks or Jack of competent tax officials to check on the 
number of people who dishonestly ignore their duti es to file tax retums. 
10.2 Improvement in 'Self-assessment' in both countries 
1 0.2.1 Reduction in compliance costs 
Presently. there are at least three ways of resolving the difficulty of completing tax 
returns and helping taxpayers with no knowledge of tax laws, namely: 
(a) the tax gatherers• assistance with tax calculation, 
(b) the provision of tax manuals, and 
(c) electronic filing of tax returns and payment. 
As regards (a), if British taxpayers want the Revenue to calculate tax for 
them, they have to fill in the information on tax returns and send them back to the 
Revenue. Therefore, the RD should adopt this method, which would reduce the 
difficulty of completing the tax return and lessen compliance costs on Thai 
taxpayers. 
As regards (b), the tax calculation guide, the tax return guide and helpsheets 
provided by both Thai and UK tax authorities educate taxpayers. A better 
understanding of tax laws would help taxpayers comply with their obligations 
voluntarily and complete tax returns accurately and promptly. 
As regards (c), Thai taxpayers have been allowed to file end-of-year tax 
returns and pay the tax electronically, via the Internet, since 2002. British taxpayers 
can also file Self-assessment tax returns electronically. 
To encourage the use of electronic means, "a one-off discount of £10 [was] 
g1ven to individuals who file their 1999/2000 self-assessment returns over the 
internet and pay the tax electronically."1706 Thailand should adopt this method of 
subsidising internet filing. 
However, the existing methods above are unlikely to be enough to reduce the 
difficulty of completing the tax return and lessen compliance costs. The evidence for 
this is found in difficulties with the technology. In Thailand, " there was little cross-
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checking, even of computer-processed returns, and collection and compliance 
'fi . d' ,1 707 ven 1Cat10ns were ru tmentary. 
In the UK, "the Revenue's self-assessment computer programme does not 
always work correctly, particularly where tax has been overpaid." 1708 Whitehouse et 
al. remark that ''difficu lties with the technology have meant that filing electronically 
has not yet become a popular option." 1709 (About 1.1 million people filed their tax 
returns electronically in 2003-04). 1710 It is found that "a shorter self-assessment tax 
return is being introduced for those with simple tax affairs." 1711 
The following measures are likely to help reduce the difficulty of completing 
the tax return and lessen compliance costs. 
First, legal complexity should be reduced. The two tax-rate schedule system 
and the abolition of certain tax expenditures as proposed in Chapters Two and Three 
aim to simplify tax rates and the tax base. The simpler tax legislation will lead to a 
simpler tax return. The World Bank supports the view that "simplified tax laws 
facilitate self-assessment, which in turn allows administrators to enforce Jaws more 
effectively. " 1712 
Secondly, the tax authorities of both countries should continue to improve the 
system of e-filing. 
Thirdly, although keeping accounts and records imposes a burden on the 
taxpayer, it is useful for the taxpayer to complete or correct his/her tax return. 
Therefore, the Thai law should impose a penalty in the case of failure to keep 
accounts and records. 
1 0.2.2 Improvement in taxpayers' voluntary compliance 
The following measures would improve taxpayers' voluntary compliance and 
prevent tax evasion under ' Self-assessment'. 
1706 Homer and Burrows, op.cit.(note ll13), p.2 
1707 The World Bank, "Thailand 's Troubled Tax Computerization Project", 
ht:tp: /iwwwl. worldban.k:.org/pubJjcsector/egov/Thai taxcs.htm, as of 15/03/02 
1708 Homer and Burrows, op.cit.(note 1113), p.169 
1709 Whitehouse et al., op.cit.(note549), p.17 
1710 The Office for National Statistics: UK 2005, op.cit.(note 1689), p.372 
171 1 ibid.p.372 
1712 The World Bank, op.cit.(note112), p.61 
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First, educating people about 'Self-assessment' would help prevent people 
who have no knowledge of tax laws fi·om ignoring their obligations to file tax returns 
and pay tax. 
Secondly, simplifying tax laws and procedures would also tmprove 
taxpayers ' compliance and administrative efficiency. 1713 
Thirdly, continuous improvements of the computing system (particularly, an 
automatic calculation of tax liability and a taxpayer identification numbering system) 
and the trainjng of tax officials should be made to be capable of checking people who 
fail to file tax returns. 
Four thly, the existence of penalties for non-compliance with the ' Self-
assessment' rules would prevent tax evasion. The imposition of penalties is not only 
a measure to prevent the taxpayer from non-compliance with the rules but also an 
incentive to ensure that he/she will comply with the rules promptly and accurately. 
F ifthly, imposing penalties upon those who fail to keep proper accounts and 
records would also prevent tax evasion. In Thailand, most street vendors fail to file 
tax returns and to pay income tax. 1714 The World Bank proposes that "more stringent 
rules for record keeping should be introduced, and tax inspectors should be able to 
impose fines on vendors if they do not keep proper records."1715 
Sixthly, in Thailand, traders and professionals (such as lawyers, physicians, 
accountants, and architects) should be required to produce with governmental 
agencies copies of tax returns and receipts of tax payment at the time of renewing 
their business or professional licenses. Tlus would prevent these groups from failing 
to file tax returns or underreporting profits or professional income in tax returns. 
Seventhly, Self-assessment tax returns should be sent to people. In the UK, 
the Revenue send Self-assessment tax returns to people who are required to file the 
returns. Additionally, British taxpayers who have taxable income but have not been 
sent tax returns are required to notify the Revenue within six months of the end of 
the tax year; and "failure to do this will result in penalties and fines on the overdue 
tax when later discovered." 1716 These help prevent people from omitting their duties 
1713 ibid.p.7 
1714 Daily News, on 29th January, 2002, p.9 
1715 The World Bank, op.cit.(note262), p.31 
1716 Lymer, et al., op.cit.(note l20), p.l/13 
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to file tax returns and to pay tax. Nevertheless, James and Nobes argue that as the 
Revenue do not sent tax returns to every taxpayer each year at present, "there must 
be a much greater temptation not to disclose casual and other receipts in the United 
Kingdom than in other countri es." 1717 
Accordingly, Self-assessment tax returns should be sent to Thai people who 
have taxpayer identification numbers appearing on the records of the RD and whose 
taxes are not withheld at source on a cumulative basis. 1718 Additionally, Thai people 
who have not been sent tax returns are required to notify the RD within a specified 
period. Penalties should also be imposed for non-compliance. 
11. Conclusion 
To achieve efficient tax legislation (simple and certain), primary and secondary 
legislation should be written from a detailed viewpoint with a limited tax policy, and 
by the Rewrite Project's drafting techniques. The proper parliamentary scrutiny and 
the public consultation will help improve the quality of primary legislation. The 
system of codification and the limitation of the scope of secondary legislation will 
help reduce legal complexity and confusion. 
The courts should interpret clear words with strictness to ensure legal 
certainty. However, a purposive interpretation should be applied where it can prevent 
tax avoidance. Parlian1entary material, explanatory memoranda and purposive 
statements (if any) would help the courts to interpret ambiguous words and to apply a 
purposive interpretation. 
GAARs (if adopted) must distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable 
transactions, incorporate a clearance procedure, and restrict discretionary powers. 
The disclosure rules should not be too widely drawn and frequently amended. In 
explaining, interpreting and applying the law, the tax authorities should not go 
beyond the strict letter of the law. 
'Withholding'should cover the types of payment extensively with few tax 
rates. Additionally, reducing the complexity of 'withholding' would reduce 
compliance costs for 'the payers'. To resolve the difficulty in completing tax returns 
1717 James and Nobes, op.cit.(note5), p.203 
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and to improve voluntary compliance under 'Self-assessment' , methods, such as e-
fi ling, a less complicated tax return, and simplification of tax laws and procedures, 
should be introduced and improved. 
1718 However, Self-assessment tax returns need not be sent to employees whose tax is withheld at 
source on a cumulative basis equals fmal tax liability, such as low- and middle-income employees. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
It has been found that the components of substantive PIT law in Thailand and 
the UK cause conflict between equity and efficiency. This research has proposed and 
validated theories that (i) optimal tax structures and (ii) efficiency in tax legislation 
and administration could reduce the conflict. 
I. Optimal Tax Structures 
The current Thai and UK tax-rate schedules are not highly progressive, i.e. 
there are few low MTRs and wide tax bands on high incomes, which promote 
vertical equity/redistribution to some extent, but generate simplicity, reduction in 
incentives to avoid and evade tax, and reduction in a disincentive effect. 
The two tax-rate schedule system is proposed to replace the current Thai and 
UK tax-rate schedules. This is a structural proposal of optimal statutory marginal tax 
rates ("OSMTRs"). This system consists of a schedule for low-income groups (which 
contains two MTRs of 0% and 8%) and a schedule for high-income groups (which 
contains two MTRs of 8% and 35%). MTRs in both schedules are supposed to be 
OSMTRs, which would promote efficiency and vertical equity/redistribution to 
greater extent. 
Vertical equity/redistribution would be promoted because the proposed 
increase in personal allowances and the proposed zero-rate bracket in the proposed 
schedule for low-income groups would raise the level of income subject to the low or 
starting rate, which would lower tax burdens on low-income earners. Additionally, 
tax burdens on (lower) middle-income earners would be reduced because (a) they 
would receive tax benefits from the proposed increase in personal allowances and the 
proposed zero-rate bracket, and (b) the tax rate for them would be low (only 8%). 
Furthermore, the proposed schedule for high-income groups would: 
(a) increase the number of highest- or higher-rate taxpayers, and 
(b) impose greater tax burdens or ATRs on high-income groups by 
(i) preventing high-income groups from receiving the benefit of the low 
rate in the proposed schedule for low-income groups, especially the 
0% rate, and 
(ii) reducing incentives for high-income groups to avoid or evade tax. 
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Simultaneously, the two tax-rate schedule system would promote efficiency. 
This is because low and few MTRs together with wide and few tax bands in both 
schedules would reduce incentives to avoid and evade tax, and be unlikely to create 
disincentive effects. Furthermore, few MTRs and tax bands in the two tax-rate 
schedule system would reduce administrative and compliance costs because they 
generate simplicity. Simplicity in the taxing process will also occur when low-
income earners are moved out of the PIT system as a result of the proposed zero-rate 
bracket along with the proposed increase in personal allowances. A reduction in rate 
differentials between earned and unearned income by the use of the two tax- rate 
schedules would also generate simplicity. 
Structural reliefs and non-structural reliefs (or tax expenditures) under Thai 
and UK laws narrow the income-tax base, and reduce the taxable income and tax 
burden on the poor. However, tax reliefs cause (a) horizontal inequity, (b) vertical 
inequity, (c) the negation oftax progressivity, and (d) inefficiency oftaxation. This is 
because (a) they are only available to particular types of individuals (except for the 
basic allowance); (b) they reduce the taxable income and tax burden on the rich; (c) 
they give the rich a greater proportionate reduction in the tax burden than the poor; 
and (d) they lead to revenue loss, complicate tax legislation, provide tax loopholes, 
and distort resource allocation. 
The income-tax base should be broadened in line with the CIT idea which 
requires all forms of economic accretion to be included in the income-tax base. 
Broadening the tax base can be implemented by (a) defining income subject to tax 
broadly and (b) limiting the use of tax reliefs. The two measures will generate an 
optimal tax base, which would generate both equity and efficiency. 
The broad definition of income can achieve equity because it prevents 
vertical and horizontal inequity, closes loopholes for tax avoidance, and brings more 
high-income taxpayers. Simultaneously, it can achieve efficiency because it 
generates a great amount of tax revenue. 
Tax reliefs should erode the tax base for low-income earners rather than 
doing so for high-income earners. This would promote equity and efficiency 
simultaneously because it would (a) reduce horizontal and vertical inequity, (b) 
reduce the tax burden on the poor, (c) increase the tax burden on the rich, and (d) 
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generate more tax revenue, simplify tax legislation, and reduce tax loopholes and 
distortion in resource allocation. 
The above proposal can be implemented by maintaining and increasing 
personal allowances to cover private consumption expenditures per capita (under 
both laws) and to be in line with price inflation (under Thai law), phasing out 
personal allowances for the rich (under both laws), abolishing a standard deduction 
of exp~nses (under Thai law), applying a deduction of actual expenses for all sources 
of income (except for savings and dividends incomes) (under both laws), improving 
. and enforcing account and record keeping (under Thai law), abolishing certain tax 
expenditures (under both laws), maintaining certain tax expenditures (under both 
laws), and discontinuing new tax expenditures that cannot be justified on the grounds 
of equity and expediency (under both laws). 
The Thai joint-taxation system can succeed in satisfying equity more easily 
than it leads to efficiency. To strike a balance between equity and efficiency, joint 
taxation should increase efficiency while sustaining equity. Four methods can 
achieve this goal. 
151 method 
The discretion of the assessment officer under the rules of separate 
assessment should be reduced to promote more efficiency. Additionally, the mles of 
wife's election for separate taxation should be abolished because they impede equity 
and cannot completely fulfil the efficiency requirement. 
2"d method 
The tax-rate schedule which contains low and few MTRs, and wide and few 
tax bands should be used with joint taxation because it would reduce disincentives 
for married couples to engage in economic activities. The proposed two tax-rate 
schedules are consistent with this proposal. Additionally, MTRs and tax bands in the 
proposed schedule for low-income groups would lower tax burdens on low-income 
and (lower) middle-income married couples. 
3rd method 
An allowance for the taxpayer's spouse should be provided only to a married 
person whose spouse stays at home because of old age, poor health, or the necessity 
of staying at home to care for relatives, because this will help reduce inequity in joint 
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taxation. This allowance should not be given to a married person whose spouse 
chooses to stay at home to enjoy leisure or to do housework because if this allowance 
were provided to such a married person, this might discourage a non-earning spouse 
from participating in the labor force. 
4th method 
Thai anti-avoidance rules are not extensive enough to close loopholes to 
avoid tax by shifting investment income from parents to children. The rules on 
settlements and outright gifts under UK law should be adapted to Thai law. 
Meanwhile, the UK individual-taxation system can lead to efficiency rather 
than bring about equity. To achieve a balance between equity and efficiency, 
individual taxation should reduce inequity while maintaining efficiency. There are 
three methods of achieving this goal. 
1st method 
The proposed two tax-rate schedules should be used with the individual-
taxation system. This is because low and few MTRs, and wide and few tax bands in 
the proposed two tax-rate schedules could: 
• reduce the different treatment of two low-income married couples where 
the distribution of income between both couples is different, 
• reduce the different treatment of two high-income married couples where 
the distribution of income between both couples is different, and 
• create incentives to work and discourage tax avoidance and evasion. 
2"d method 
An additional personal allowance should be available to a childless married 
person whose spouse stays at home but is unable to do housework because of old 
age, poor health, or the need to stay at home to care for a relative. It should not be 
available to a childless married person whose healthy spouse chooses not to earn but 
to stay at home. 
3rd method 
Rules on settlements and outright gifts help prevent tax avoidance by the 
transfer of property between spouses and between civil partners and by the transfer 
of property to an unmarried child under 18, a married child under 18 or a child over 
18. 
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II. Enhancement of efficiency in tax legislation and administration 
Simple and certain tax legislation, and simple, certain and convenient 
methods of tax collection are efficient tax legislation and administration, which 
encourage efficiency of taxation and further promote equity. 
To achieve simple and certain tax legislation, Thai and UK primary and 
secondary tax legislation should be written from a detailed viewpoint with a limited 
tax policy, and by drafting techniques including: 
• not be written in a convoluted style and too tight, nor contain jargon and 
archaic words and very long sentences, 
• be written in pain and unambiguous language (e.g. using one word in 
place of several words, simple and well-understood vocabulary and 
syntax), with a clear and consistent structure, and in short sentences 
supplemented by a splitting technique. 
Furthermore, changes to primary legislation should be made where clearly 
inevitable and necessary. Moreover, secondary legislation should not extend to the 
important tax matters, and its scope should be limited only to technical rules for 
supplementing the operation of primary legislation. 
There should be an annual compulsory Act relating to taxation passed by the 
Thai Parliament. This would make Thai tax legislation more flexible to respond to 
social and commercial changes and more equitable because allowances and bands for 
inflation would be adjusted every year. 
The problem of lack of proper parliamentary scrutiny of UK Finance Acts 
could be solved by allowing the House of Commons to have more time to debate the 
Pre-Budget Report, conferring powers on the House of Lords to initiate or amend tax 
provisions, establishing a Parliamentary Committee to take parliamentary pre-
legislative scrutiny (if members of Parliament had no or little time to take pre-
legislative scrutiny). 
The system of codification is more likely to satisfy simplicity and certainty 
than the system of consolidation. This is because codification resolves the problem 
of lack of structure and the problem of the multiplicity of statute laws dealing with a 
particular tax. 
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A strict interpretation ensures legal certainty; therefore, the Thai and UK 
courts should interpret clear words with strictness. A purposive interpretation can 
help the UK courts to prevent tax avoidance, but it results in legal uncertainty. The 
Thai courts should adopt this approach where a strict interpretation would lead to 
injustice (because of not preventing tax avoidance). Parliamentary material, 
explanatory memoranda and purposive statements (if any) will help the courts to 
interpret ambiguous words and to apply a purposive interpretation because they can 
help identify the legislative intention. 
To reduce uncertainty and discretionary powers, GAARs (if adopted in 
Thailand or the UK) must distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable 
transactions, incorporate a clearance procedure, and restrict discretionary powers. To 
avoid uncertainty and complexity, the UK disclosure rules should not be too widely 
drawn and frequently amended. 
To ensure legal certainty, in making statements for explaining, interpreting 
and applying the law, neither the Thai nor the UK tax authorities should go beyond 
the strict letter of the law. Furthermore, the tax authorities should consult 
parliamentary material and explanatory memoranda (if any) to help interpret tax 
legislation in the case of ambiguity. Moreover, the UK Revenue should derive legal 
power from an Act of Parliament in making extra-statutory concessions. There 
should also be provisions in the Thai and UK tax Acts to stipulate conditions on 
applying and giving formal post-transaction rulings and pre-transaction rulings. 
'Withholding' in Thailand and the UK should cover the types of payment 
extremely extensively with few tax rates. This would make tax laws fairer, minimize 
tax evasion, provide less opportunity for tax avoidance and for abuse of the tax 
authorities' power, reduce administrative costs in collecting tax and in preventing 
and detecting tax ' avoidance and evasion, and improve revenue collection. 
'Withholding' from wages and salaries should be done on a cumulative basis and at 
the rates in the proposed two tax-rate schedules. This would help the amount of tax 
withheld equal final tax liability. 
Reducing the difference m withholding tax rates and the complexity of 
'withholding' would reduce compliance costs for the payers and prevent them from 
failing to meet their obligations. Methods that should be implemented include 
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subsidizing internet filing, the rules on 'withholding' being put into one tax statute, 
and a company being allowed to subtract the costs incurred in 'withholding'from its 
profit for the purposes of the corporation tax. 
The Thai and UK self-assessment system increases costs in the private sector. 
Methods that could help taxpayers to complete tax returns include subsidizing and 
improving internet filing, simplifying legislation, and enforcing taxpayers to keep 
accounts and records. 
Self-assessment may lead to tax evasion and revenue loss. Methods that could 
encourage voluntary compliance include educating Self-assessment, simplifying tax 
laws and procedures, and improving the computing system. 
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